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Abstract  
 
Virtues, as described by Aristotle and Aquinas, are understood as dispositions of 
character to behave in habitual, specific, positive ways; virtue is a critical 
requirement for human flourishing. From the perspective of Aristotelian-Thomistic 
anthropology which offers an integrated vision of the material and the rational in 
the human person, I seek to identify the neural bases for the development and 
exercise of moral virtue. First I review current neuroscientific knowledge of the 
capacity of the brain to structure according to experience, to facilitate behaviours, 
to regulate emotional responses and support goal election.  Then, having 
identified characteristics of moral virtue in the light of the distinctions between 
cardinal virtues, I propose neural substrates by mapping neuroscientific 
knowledge to these characteristics. I then investigate the relationship between 
virtue, including its neurobiological features, and human flourishing. This process 
allows a contemporary and evidence-based corroboration for a model of moral 
development based on growth in virtue as understood by Aristotle and Aquinas, 
and a demonstration of a biological aptitude and predisposition for the 
development of virtue.  Conclusions are drawn with respect to science, ethics, and 
parenting.  
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Abbreviations 
 
5-HT   5-hydroxytryptamine (serotonin) 
ACC   anterior cingulated cortex  
ACh   acetylcholine  
ADHD  Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder  
AMPA  α-amino-3-hydroxyl-5-methyl-4-isoxazole-propionate 
AMPAR  AMPA receptor  
A-O  action-outcome  
aPFC  anterior PFC 
aTL   anterior temporal lobes  
ATP   adenosine triphosphate  
BDNF   brain derived neurotrophic factor  
BG   basal ganglia  
BLA   basolateral complex of the amygdala  
BOLD   blood oxygen level dependent  
cAMP   cyclic AMP (AMP is agonist for AMPA channels) 
CAT  computerised axial tomography 
CEA   central nucleus of the amygdala  
CNS   central nervous system  
CREB   cAMP response-element binding protein  
CRF   corticotrophin releasing factor  
DA   dopamine  
DLPFC   dorsolateral prefrontal cortex  
DLS  deep limbic system, also, dorsolateral striatum in rodents 
DMPFC   dorsalmedial PFC  
DMS   dorsomedial striatum in rodents 
DSCAM  Downs Syndrome cell adhesion molecule  
DT-MRI  Diffusion tensor magnetic resonance imaging 
EC  endocannabinoid 
EEG  electroencephalography 
elF2x   a particular translation initiation factor  
Epi   epinephrine  
EPSP  excitatory postsynaptic potential 
ERP  event related potentials  
FAPs   fixed action patterns  
FGF   fibroblast growth factor  
FGF-2  fibroblast growth factor 2  
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fMRI   functional magnetic resonance imaging 
GABA   -Aminobutyric Acid  
GP   globus pallidus  
GPi   internal segment  
GPe  external segment  
GPCR  G-protein-coupled-receptor 
HFS  high frequency afferent stimulation  
HSV1  herpes simplex virus type 1  
IGF   insulin-like growth factor  
ILN   intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus  
IMM   medial mesopalium 
IT   inferotemporal cortex  
ITM   intermediate term memory  
LA   lateral amygdala  
LC   locus ceruleus  
LGG   low grade glioma  
LIP   lateral intraparietal cortex  
LOFC   lateral OFC  
LTD   long term depression  
LTM   long term memory  
LTP   long term potentiation  
M1   primary motor cortex  
 MA   motor adaptation 
MEG  magnetoelectroencephalography 
MRI   magnetic resonance imaging  
MRS  magnetic resonance spectroscopy 
MSL   motor sequence learning  
MSN  medium spiny neuron 
MTL   medial temporal lobe  
mPFC   medial PFC (in some literature, the rodent equivalent to human DLPFC)  
NAc   nucleus accumbens  
nAChR   nicotinic receptor 
NE   norepinephrine  
NMDA   N-methyl-D-aspartate 
NMJ   neuromuscular junction  
NMP  neuromotor prosthesis  
NMR-MOUSE  nuclear magnetic resonance mobile universal surface explorer 
NOIR  near optical infra red 
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NTF   nerve growth factor  
OCD   obsessive compulsive disorder  
OFC   orbitofrontal cortex  
PAS   paired associative stimulation  
PCD   programmed cell death  
PET   positron emission tomography 
PKA and PKC  particular protein kinases 
PNS   peripheral nervous system  
PPC   posterior parietal cortex  
preNMDARs  presynaptic NMDARs  
PSP   post synaptic potential  
pSTS   post central gyrus 
rTMS   repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation 
SACD   social and character development programs 
SMA   supplementary motor area  
S-O   stimulus-outcome  
SN   substantia nigra  
SNpc   substantia nigra pars compacta  
SNr   substantia nigra pars reticulata  
STDP   spike timing dependent plasticities  
S-R   stimulus response  
S-S   stimulus-stimulus 
STN   subthalamic nuclei  
STS   posterior superior temporal sulcus  
TAN  tonically active neuron 
tDCS   transcranial direct current stimulation 
tLTD   spike timing-dependent LTD  
TMS   transcranial magnetic stimulation  
VBM   voxel based morphometry 
VGCC  voltage gated calcium channel 
VL   ventrolateral nucleus of the thalamus  
VLPFC   ventrolateral PFC  
VMPFC   ventromedial PFC  
VP   ventral palladium  
VTA   ventral tegmental area  
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Chapter 1 
Aristotle and the neuroscientists sit down to talk. 
 
“There is something at work in my soul, which I do not understand.” 
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus 
Mary Shelley 
 
1.1 The structure of this study.  
 
This study argues that the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of human flourishing, the 
acquisition and development of virtues that are understood as stable and 
intentional dispositions of character to behave in habitual, specific, positive ways, 
is supported by neuroscientific knowledge.  
 
Chapter 1 commences with a preamble in which prima facie evidence is presented 
to support the view that there are both material and non-material factors 
involved in the analysis of human rationality.  I situate this task on the spectrum of 
contemporary approaches to philosophy of mind, discussing advantages of the 
hylomorphic philosophy of the person and critiquing various other philosophies of 
mind. I place the study within eudaimonist virtue ethics in the tradition of 
Aristotle and Aquinas. Further possible outcomes of this study are then projected: 
a scientific validation of virtue ethics, benefits to be derived by virtue ethics itself 
from the cross disciplinary insights of neurobiology, and brief reflections on the 
potential contribution of moral education and parenting.   
 
This multidisciplinary study will focus both on current neuroscience and on 
Aristotelian-Thomistic notions of virtue. Chapter 2 proposes six lines of neural 
investigation that appear to be of most relevance to this study. In Chapter 3 I 
examine the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of virtue illustrated by real life case 
studies. In Chapter 4 I investigate the distinctive contributions of prudence, 
justice, temperance and fortitude, the virtues which Aristotle and Aquinas 
regarded as core dispositions of mature character. I seek to draw conclusions 
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about what is known as the “unity of the virtues”, the view that these four 
cardinal virtues play an integral part in every human act.   
 
The central methodology of the study will be to propose the neural structures and 
processes that appear to underpin the identified characteristics of virtue. Chapter 
5 proposes this alignment of neuroscientific data. Finally, in the light of what has 
proceeded, in Chapter 6 I investigate the notion of flourishing. I reflect on the 
biological aptitude of the human being for the acquisition and development of 
virtue, and draw out implications of this study for science, ethics and moral 
education. 
 
In summary, the central areas of investigation in this thesis are:  
 To develop a methodology by which I can identify the core characteristics 
of the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of moral virtue. 
 To identify, on the basis of current neuroscientific knowledge, the neural 
substrates that may reasonably be demonstrated to play a substantial role 
in the acquisition and exercise of virtue.  
 In the light of neurobiological evidence, to draw conclusions about the role 
of virtue in human flourishing.  
 To consider wider implications of these findings, with particular respect to 
philosophy of mind, ethics and parenting. 
 
1.2 Preamble. The prima facie case.  
 
The monster that Victor Frankenstein fashions from the sinew and cartilege of 
dead men is endowed with intelligence, a yearning for happiness and love, but 
also a fearsome capacity for burning hatred and vengeance. Frankenstein had 
proclaimed that his experiments would “unfold to the world the deepest 
mysteries of creation”,1 and he does not disappoint us. There is a depth of being 
in the creature for which dead flesh can offer no account.  I do not intend a 
                                                          
1
 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, (New York:  Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1993), 40. 
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deeper analysis of this fable, yet, as an introduction to the task of this study, it 
confronts us with questions about human existence, about that by which we are 
constituted, and about that to which we look for fulfilment.  We too are bone and 
sinew, yet we too yearn for happiness.     
 
In this preamble I overview prima facie evidence that our biological processes are 
implicated in our rational function. First of all in 1.2.1 I examine phenomena that 
suggest there is a physical substrate to human rationality. Second I consider 
phenomena suggesting that any wholly material conception of human rationality 
may have explanatory deficiencies. Third I look briefly at intimations of a profound 
integration of the rational and the material.  
 
In 1.2.2, I consider the prima facie evidence for neuronal implication in the 
acquisition and exercise of moral virtue, understood as good habits.   
 
1.2.1 Material and non-material constituents to human rationality. 
 
Phenomena at the genetic, biochemical, and neuroscientific level suggest that the 
material is implicated in what is commonly understood as the rational. Philosophy 
also offers arguments that implicate the physical in mental activities.   
 
At first sight many of the points below (in 1.2.1.1) would seem to invite material 
explanations for rationality that would overcome the apparent problems.  Yet (as 
will be seen in 1.2.1.2) material explanations for rationality struggle to account for 
human freedom.  
 
1.2.1.1 We are not disembodied spirits. Evidence of the involvement of the 
physical in rationality. 
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Aristotle pointed out that the health and age of the body affects intellectual 
function. Just as the elderly would see more clearly had they eyes of youth; so too 
we think with greater clarity when our bodies are in their prime.2  
 
What we do with our body, and what happens to our body, influences our mental 
state.3 It is clear that all cognitive activity is unconditionally dependent on certain 
bodily parameters, for example, loss of oxygen leads to loss of consciousness and 
cognitive function. Experiments show time and again that a negative environment 
can contribute to a negative mood, and vice versa.  In a similar way we see that 
learning is dependent on directed attention, and knowledge on accurate 
information gathering by the bodily senses. 
  
There is considerable prima facie evidence for a strong biochemical component to 
human behaviours. For example behaviours can be triggered by sensory inputs 
(the need to care for a sick child elicits extraordinary generosity from a mother); 
drug therapies can profoundly affect our mood, our behaviours, and the way we 
perceive the world; the dissemination of hormones in the body can also affect 
behaviour.  
 
Conversely, thought seems to lead to bodily changes,4 thoughts seem to trigger 
chemicals! For example, just thinking of a scene can increase our blood pressure. 
The mere apprehension of a stimulus can initiate behaviours, or unleash passion, 
triggering a biochemical cascade propelling action. This would appear to suggest 
that there is natural affinity between thought and biochemical processes or at 
least a biochemical component to the human experience of thinking. Without 
such connaturality, no interaction would be possible. Furthermore we see that our 
past behaviours influence even unintentional future behaviours, as is the case 
                                                          
2
 Aristotle, De Anima, 408b. (Hereafter DA.) Aristotle. The complete works of Aristotle. ed Jonathan 
Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Volumes 1 and 2. 
3 
Typified in the science of biological psychology. See for example, S. Marc Breedlove, Neil V. 
Watson and Mark R. Rosenweig, Biological Psychology. An introduction to Behavioural, Cognitive 
and Clinical Neuroscience, 6th ed. (Sunderland: Sinauer Associates Inc, 2010). 
4
 See discussion, for example in J. M. Schwartz and S. Begley, The Mind and the Brain (New York: 
Harper, 2002), 319.  
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most dramatically in addiction. That this can happen even in the case of 
unintended future patterns of behaviour, seeming to suggest that our actions can 
create some material blue print for future action. Our actions seem to change us 
as people.  
 
Furthermore, our genetic makeup, including temperament, exerts forces on us to 
act in particular ways:  often a decisive influence on behaviours specific to the 
species, and a major influence on our temperamental behaviours over which we 
maintain some capacity for modification. Genetically attributable behaviour may 
be traced to the programmed release of specific amino acids into our developing 
metabolism. In other words, chemicals are ultimately a significant influence on the 
type of person we allow ourselves to become. 
 
Neural studies show that illness, and impairment in specific brain areas, have 
cognitive consequences. It has been shown that certain cognitive processes (such 
as the capacity to plan and to have due regard for consequences) are impaired if 
there is damage to the prefrontal cortex (PFC).5 It is also well documented that 
these neural pathways of the PFC can be interfered with by powerful emotional 
experience.  Also, vivid memories and extreme sense input can override activity in 
the PFC, cutting out of the loop circuitry apparently essential for cognitive 
processes.6  
 
Memories, initiated by electrical messaging from the senses, can have rich 
emotional associations and be integrated with our cognitive life. Images arising in 
our memories are capable of evoking not only impulsive behaviours but of 
initiating considered behaviours; for example sight of an animal suffering beside a 
road may, on the basis of certain past experiences, provoke us to stop a car, pick 
up the animal, and pay veterinary fees. All this suggests that concrete material 
                                                          
5
 To be discussed at length in Chapters 2 and 5. 
6
 For example Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) deficits can be effectively treated by 
cognitive-behavioural therapies (CBT). See discussion: JoAnn Difede and Judith Cukor “Evidence-
based long-term treatment of mental health consequences of disasters among adults” in Y. Neria 
et al. Mental health and disasters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 336-339. 
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input to the mind is decisive in higher function.  Furthermore, it is clear that there 
is emotional interaction with cognition. Encouragement and emotional 
affirmation are shown to help children learn; the provision of information may 
well be inadequate to help a child acquire knowledge, behaviours or habits, or the 
motivation to do so. 7   
 
It is common experience that specific memories can be very concretely associated 
with other specific memories created at the same time.8 Hence, a memory can 
trigger very specific previous associations in the mind: for example sliced potatoes 
might always bring to mind Friday nights in front of TV as a child; potato scallops 
always bring to mind a specific fish shop; the sight of a vodka bottle evokes a 
particular moment in time thirty years before, etc. This is consistent with the 
accepted principle of neuronal development, “neurons that fire together wire 
together” (see 2.2.1), that more direct connections form between associated 
memories and associated actions.  Too often experience shows that people out of 
sight fall out of mind. Skills, memories, and even human relationships, can 
deteriorate over time. Such degradation is consistent with biochemical 
explanations at the synapse.  
 
1.2.1.2 Nor are we mere bodies. Intimations of the non-material.  
 
Learning takes time, but insight and choice, can be instantaneous. In a flash of 
illumination, a person may conceive a new profound and complex insight, or 
totally change an opinion. This suggests a fundamental difference between these 
manifestations of rationality. That certain intellectual processes take place in what 
appears to be an instantaneous way suggests that material processes are less 
significant in certain operations of knowing or choosing. This is consistent with the 
insights of Aquinas.9 The bodily process of acquiring sense data, and presenting a 
                                                          
7
 Teresa M McDevitt and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Child Development and Education (New Jersey: 
Merrill, 2010), 425-427. Also see Motivation. 480-515. 
8
 This associative principle is central to the development of neural connectivity.  
9
 Aquinas, Summa Theologia,  ed. various (Cambridge: Blackfriars/McGraw Hill, 19650, Q.75, Art.2. 
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coherent image to the mind may take time, but the person grasps knowledge 
instantaneously.10 For this reason, Aquinas argues it is “impossible for (the mind) 
to understand by means of a bodily organ.” 11 
 
Man can transcend the material and the concrete. He may, for example, choose to 
respond with habitual detachment to the material world; in the midst of constant 
contact with consumerism and access to all comforts and pleasures, he may keep 
himself detached. As an extension of this insight, it is universal experience that 
man has the capability of acting contrary to emotional and bodily impulses. For 
example, one can resist action consequent to a specific emotion such as anger or 
hatred. Not only can one resist emotion, one can still carry out an action out of 
conviction or will power when there is indifference or apathy at the level of 
feelings.12  
 
Although man’s senses may access only sense knowledge, we see that man can 
develop and hold to beliefs and convictions that are not sense derived however 
much sense experience may be necessary to convey them.  
 
The not infrequent occurence of altruism, of aid to others through one’s time, 
energy or money without tangible reward, indicates that non-material factors play 
a significant role in human motivation.13 Non tangible realities can move us 
physically and even change us as persons.14  
                                                                                                                                                                 
(Hereafter ST.) Aquinas suggests that while “The body is necessary for the action of the intellect”, 
it is so, “not as its organ of action, but on the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect 
what colour is to sight.” 
10
 Furthermore, human beings are capable of conceptual discussion, again indicating a capacity to 
transcend the immediate and material.  
11
 ST, Ia, Q.75, Art.2.  
12
 Mischel’s experiments in 1972 into infant capacity for delayed gratification demonstrate the 
human capacity to transcend concrete incentives. Behaviours can be opposed to considered 
choices at times: one can find oneself following behaviours contrary to what one wishes were the 
case, for example in the case of addictions or a weakness of will. We are conscious of alternatives 
to the material and immediate. Walter Mischel, et al., "Cognitive and attentional mechanisms in 
delay of gratification," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21,2 (1972): 204–218. 
13
 That rationality has the capacity to respond to the non material is also demonstrated in the 
observation that faith-based convictions or ideals that motivate behaviour. Take for example the 
teaching of Therese of Lisieux that we should attend to the smallest detail out of love of God: 
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In contrast it appears that an animal can only be motivated by sense-affecting 
incentive. The apparent contrast between human and animal behaviours suggests 
that man is capable of operating at a level transcending the immediate. There is 
no conclusive evidence that any animals, even primates, have the capacity to 
manage their own actions outside of an immediate context, nor do they appear to 
have any equivalent to man’s capacity to direct his own actions on the basis of 
prior mental reflection.  
 
1.2.1.3 A prima facie case exists for a profound integration of the physical and 
rational in the human person. 
 
This study, in line with the Aristotelian-Thomistic view, understands human beings 
as “ensouled bodies”, “animated flesh”.  Human rationality and biology are fully 
integrated. Possessing a non-material dimension, human beings enjoy, within 
limits, the capacity to make free choices.  
 
By this view it appears incorrect to attribute agency to the body or to the mind. 
Rather it is the position of this study that it is the person who acts. Our somatic 
and rational faculties are integrated in human operations. It is the sensing, 
emotion-responding person who acts. The person imagines, remembers, desires, 
conceptualises, and thinks logically and rationally. 
 
A strong prima facie case exists for a profound integration of the physical and 
rational in the human person: 
i. It may be argued that the capacity we have to modify our habits and 
behaviours, and ultimately personality, derives from the material 
dimension to our personality. Matter by its very nature is changeable. A 
                                                                                                                                                                 
“Miss no single opportunity of making some small sacrifice, here by a smiling look, there by a 
kindly word; always doing the smallest right and doing it all for love.” 
14
 Loving relationships attest to the reality of the non material. The reciprocal gift of persons in a 
loving relationship, a non-material form of gift that does not diminish the giver, is only conceivable 
in a world of non material realities.  
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corollary of this profound integration of body and mind is that man 
achieves his end in his body or not at all.  
ii. Passion and reason are able to be integrated. Emotion and passion may 
lead to impulsive, imperfectly rational responses, yet universal experience 
is also that an emotion-proposed course of action can be tested against 
principles of reason and either pursued or rejected.  
iii. We are able to inform these principles of reason by general laws to which 
we bind ourselves in conscience. We are capable of testing intended 
actions against conscience. Conscience then may be reasonably proposed 
to consist in a judgement based on universal principles, transcending 
specific memory and hypothetical action. In each judgement of conscience 
there are complex interplays of concrete and the universal evident.15  
iv. The interplay of the immediate and the universal suggests a profound 
integration of body and rationality. Aquinas and Aristotle proposed a 
psychological model in which universal knowledge is derived from 
immediate sense knowledge.16 They suggested that intellectual knowledge 
is derived from the senses. Universals are necessarily linked to experience 
of the particulars. Aquinas argues that the material phantasm or image 
facilitates the grasp of universals. Whenever we reason, we reason with 
reference to the particular. Even in a simple syllogism, universal terms 
evoke accompanying specific images and specific characteristics:  
Frankenstein’s creature seeks vengeance on humankind.   
Dr Frankenstein is human.  
The creature seeks vengeance on Frankenstein. 
v. Rationality appears to begin in sense knowledge but utilises rules of logic, 
analogy, and inductive processes to move from the specific to the general 
rule or conclusion. The concrete and material plays a necessary role in 
rationality, but rationality transcends the concrete. Reason would not be 
able to know universals and manipulate sense data by means of inductive 
and deductive reasoning were the intellect not integrated with the senses.  
                                                          
15
 Refer for example to the model of the human act proposed by Aquinas. See 3.1.3. 
16
 See discussion below in 1.4.2. 
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vi. It can be argued that distinctively human activity always requires 
involvement of the intellect.  It would appear that the body can operate 
without the mind (although such “vegetative function” may not be 
described as truly human activity), but application of the rational powers 
appears to require bodily-dependent capacities such as imagination, sense 
knowledge or memory of the specific events or of concrete objects, and 
desires. For example, human acts can be triggered at times by simple 
sensory input, such as the smell of food, the picture of a loved one. 
Concrete symbols, such as a blood soaked flag, or a cross, can carry 
associations of meaning that can stir us to considered action.17  The 
Thomistic view is that the point of death is that point at which bodily 
functions are no longer able to sustain rationality. 
vii. A rational act may be conducted through the instrumental activity of the 
body. Action in and through the body involves complex neural instruction 
to muscles as well as monitoring of feedback from our senses and muscles. 
There is a profound integration of the biomechanical with higher functions 
of goal setting and executive direction of activity.  
viii. Persons are able to express their very selves and communicate by medium 
of material things. For example, we express our love of benevolence 
towards others by means of material gifts. We use words, complex 
patterns of compression waves through the atmosphere, to convey 
notions of truth, beauty, and goodness.  
ix. Rationality is not an end in itself. It may be argued that rationality 
empowers human beings to love, to unite their own will to that of another. 
In this view, rationality is fulfilled by generosity and gift of self.18 In this 
context, reason enables us to transcend the material, in order to know and 
love others.  
                                                          
17
 See discussion pertaining to scenarios in 3.1.2. 
18
 An advocate of this rationally founded view has been John Paul II who insisted that man is 
fulfilled by loving and experiencing the love of others. John Paul II, Familiaris Consortio, 11. “Love is 
the fundamental and innate vocation of every human being.” See also discussion of fulfilment in 
my Appendix 1. A Response to the Claims of Emergent Rationality by Non-reductive Materialism. 
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x. A profound unity of hearts and minds is seen to exist in certain 
relationships between persons. Such profound union appears to be 
nourished by positive emotional engagement, attention, touch and 
communication. The material facilitates the transcendent. It is generally 
agreed that the bodily phenomenon of emotions plays a significant role in 
helping us empathise and connect as persons. Furthermore, love between 
human beings appears better able to flourish where there is contact and 
communication. The more present, the more personal; the more concrete 
our experience of the other, the more love is facilitated.  
xi. Similarly, it may be argued that the capacity to choose to unite oneself to 
the will of another is necessarily evidence of freedom and hence of a non-
material dimension to personality.19 It may be argued that the highest 
expression of human existence is to be found in reciprocal relationships 
where fulfilment of the will of the other is the goal.  
 
1.2.2 Prima facie evidence for a neuronal underpinning of virtue  
 
I suggest that the neuroscience of virtue, understood in the Aristotelian/Thomistic 
sense, offers a pleasing consonance with the natural world. The development of 
virtue, in contrast with other ethical paradigms, is proposed as necessarily 
experiential: this is consistent with the explanation that developing neural 
structures of the human brain require experience and environment for maturity.20   
 
                                                          
19
 The capacity to be able to choose to unite one’s own will to the will of others (a capacity we see 
in obedient children and teenagers, diligent workers, spouses in close relationships, soldiers in 
battle) counters arguments asserting that human actions are predetermined by biology. Even if, in 
refutation of such a free will argument, one attempts to argue that the very choice to do what 
someone else suggests may be biologically dependent, nonetheless  to commit oneself to always 
follow the will of another, for example in a committed relationship of love, effectively cuts one’s 
actions loose from one’s biology. It is absurd to argue that while some people have a biological 
predisposition to act in individual and specific ways (ie heeding sensible appetency), others have a 
biological predisposition to commit themselves to the choices of another (ie heedless of sense 
appetency). This would be to have a bet both ways. Hence, this is an effective refutation of 
biological determinacy. 
20
 It is evident that there are no “child prodigies” when it comes to virtue. It is necessary to work at 
one’s character.  
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Furthermore, informed by the explosion of neuroscientific knowledge in recent 
decades, it is reasonable to propose that several major neurobiological strands are 
implicated in any neurobiological component to virtue. 
 Neural plasticity which permits alterations to established, or establishing, 
neural connections. Closely associated to plasticity are the mechanisms of 
synaptic strengthening. 
 Mechanisms for learning, memory, habit formation, imitation, emotional 
management, goal election, and executive control. 
 An understanding of the various discrete constituent structures of the 
brain, together with a mapping of neural interconnections. 
 The contribution that integrated systems and complex neural mechanisms 
play in support of human rationality.   
 
On the basis of advances in neuroscientific knowledge and on the Aristotelian 
notion of moral virtue as a habit directed towards human flourishing (see 1.6.3 
and Chapter 3), it is reasonable to propose for investigation the following prima 
facie evidence for a neuronal underpinning of virtue: 
 
i. Insights into neuronal development and its relationship with behaviour 
appear to be consistent with the notion of virtue as a preferred model for 
moral development. This is because virtue development is experience 
based rather than theory based. It is derived from analysis of the facts of 
human experience, development and flourishing, rather than from 
intuitive, internally consistent, principles. Hence, a study of the 
neuroscience of virtue is not an arbitrary choice to study one ethical 
system among many, but a choice well grounded in the compatibility of 
virtue development with neuroscientific knowledge.  
ii. The brain is plastic. Every experience brings about functional response of 
some type in the brain. Structural change can accompany and underpin 
functional responses, in a wide array of neural processes collectively 
known as structural plasticity. Developmental plasticity is essentially 
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irreversible; this plasticity with respect to processing of sensory inputs and 
control of motor function is now well established. It is also well established 
that plastic neuronal change is at work in learning and in that particular 
form of learning classified as habit formation. I argue that plasticity is also 
a central neuronal process in those specific types of habit that we call 
virtue. (See extensive discussion of plasticity in 2.2.) 
iii. Virtue is a form of learning. Various features of learning, for example habit 
formation, suggest a neurobiological basis, that learning has a material 
substrate in the brain. (See discussion of habit learning in 2.4)  
iv. Certain pathways of habit formation are now quite well described.  All 
behaviours are essentially reinforcing: the more we do something the 
more we reinforce that behaviour. (See discussion of habit formation in 
2.4.)  
v. Memory too plays a significant part in learning, and appears to operate via 
neurobiological mechanisms. (See discussion of memory in 2.3.) 
vi. Imitation is a form of learning from direct experience. A neural component 
facilitating imitation, the mirror neuron, has recently been identified. 
Imitation is known to play a role laying down new neural pathways. (See 
discussion in 2.3.6.) 
vii. There is considerable work now written on the interplay between emotion 
and rationality. This study focuses on the interplay of emotion, rationality 
and habit formation. (See discussion regarding regulation of emotion in 
2.5.) 
viii. The cognitive processes at the heart of executive control are understood 
to be supported by areas and processes in the cortex, particularly the PFC 
This area of the brain maintains rich inhibitory linkages with the emotional 
centres of the brain.  (See discussion regarding cognition and executive 
function in 2.7.) 
ix.  “Happiness is the reward of virtue” wrote Aristotle.21  Virtue is the facility 
to act in ways that complement our nature bringing us increased self-
                                                          
21
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1099b16. (Hereafter NE.). Aristotle. The complete works of 
Aristotle. ed Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Volumes 1 and 2. 
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mastery and fulfilment. This study will argue that human flourishing, 
including moral flourishing, has a biological basis, showing that there is a 
neuroscience of virtue development in which the brain has neural 
mechanisms that, if perfected, provide for ease of action in the moral 
sphere. I argue that virtue development is therefore the path of 
development for the human being most in accord with human nature, 
denoting maturity at the levels of personality and biological development.  
 
1.3 Situating this study within contemporary approaches to the philosophy of 
mind.  
 
This current study falls into the field of philosophy best described as philosophy of 
mind. Therefore at this introductory point it is most appropriate to situate and 
justify this study in the field of contemporary approaches to the philosophy of 
mind. This will be a three step process. First I offer a broad overview of the various 
currents of contemporary philosophy of mind. Second (1.4) I review the basic 
tenets of hylomorphic theory as proposed by Aristotle and Aquinas. Third, 
especially in Table 1.1 and in Appendix 1, I summarise the spectrum of 
contemporary positions in philosophy of mind and offer a brief hylomorphic 
critique of each. 
 
In the history of twentieth century philosophy of mind there have been a number 
of more significant figures and lines of development. Among these we find Ryle 
and his articulation of logical behaviourism, Identity Theory developed by Lewis 
and Armstrong, Functionalism proposed by Putnam and Fodor, Davidson’s 
articulation of non reductive materialisms, Dennett and Churchland with respect 
to instrumentalism and eliminative materialism, and Block and Chalmers, among 
others, in the search for philosophical understandings of consciousness and 
qualia.   
 
This panorama has been characterised, for the most part, by materialistic and 
physicalist explanations for mental phenomena in which language also has played 
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a significant role. Recent years have been dominated by non-reductive physicalist 
acknowledgement of the reality of consciousness in an emergent paradigm. To 
some extent these currents are reactions to substance dualism, with its inability to 
explain causation in any rationally satisfying manner, and to behaviourism, with its 
reluctance to discuss matter at all. 
 
Despite the quantity of writing and energy of debate, there is a certain same-
againness evident. None of the major lines of development of philosophy of mind 
in the twentieth century have accorded ontological legitimacy to the non-
material. The non-material has been dealt with: 
i. In pragmatic fashion with no interest in metaphysical possibilities and 
explanations (logical behaviourism). 
ii. As causally disconnected (epiphenomenalism). 
iii. As immediately dependent on the material (Identity Theory, and type 
functionalisms). 
iv. As ultimately dependent on the material (emergentism, forms of 
functionalism, non-reductive materialisms such as Davidson’s Anomalous 
Monism, and mentalist emergent views). 
v. Or as a fictional construct (eliminative materialists and projectivists, 
neurobiological physicalist explanations).   
 
The inevitable outcome of mechanistic and materialistic approaches, and of 
epiphenomenal inabilities, is that contemporary philosophy of mind is generally 
dismissive of non-instrumental rationality and human freedom. None of the 
current approaches to philosophy of mind offer a way forward able to 
accommodate human freedom in a manner that is rationally acceptable.22 This is 
the elephant standing in the philosopher of mind’s lounge room because freedom 
cannot be easily dismissed. It is apparent that man possesses a certain freedom; 
                                                          
22
 This is not to say that many philosophers don’t accept and advocate an emergent free will. They 
do; but they are unable to offer any articulation of how the limitations of animal life can have 
given rise to man’s demonstrable capacity for universal truths and freedom. In contrast stands the 
Thomistic model, based on an enriched notion of causality embracing formal causality, that man 
enjoys participation in rationality as a principle of unity and function.  
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indeed, freedom must be a prerequisite for such widespread belief in the need for 
ethics. Either the great architects of ethics, from the times of Socrates and 
Confucius, have been deluded, the historical and political figures who sought to 
improve the lot of man were acting on false presumptions, and the teachings of 
Christ and Muhammad deceive over half the human race into thinking we have 
any control over our actions – or our moral philosophies require an adequate 
account of human freedom. It is time to revisit the suppositions of contemporary 
philosophy of mind.  
 
This denial of human freedom in philosophy of mind is found in much of 
contemporary neuroscience.23 Larry Squire writes in standard reference text, 
“Neuroscience is a large field founded on the premise that all of behaviour and all 
of mental life have their origin in the structure and function of the nervous 
system.”24 Another prominent neuroscientist, Nobel prizewinner Eric Kandel, is 
equally adamant. He writes,  
Most neuroscientists and philosophers now take for granted 
that all biological phenomena are properties of matter. This 
physicalist stance breaks with the tradition of dualism 
stemming from ancient Greek philosophy. The break with the 
tradition that mind and consciousness arise from a mysterious 
interaction of spirit with body actually focused the problem of 
consciousness for the 20th century neuroscientist. 
Philosophically disposed against dualism, we are obliged to find 
a solution to the problem in terms of nerve cells and neural 
circuits.25  
The common view in neuroscience is simply that the materialist and the dualist 
are the fundamental categories defining attitudes to the mind-body problem: the 
                                                          
23
 Neuroscientist Christof Koch substitutes “compatibilism” for freewill, the view that  man has the 
capacity to follow his desires as determined by his chemical programming. See Christof Koch, 
“Finding Free Will,” Scientific American Mind, May/June, 2012, 22.  
24
 Larry  Squire et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3
rd
 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008). 
25
 Eric R Kandel et al. Principles of Neural Science, 4
th
 ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 1317.  
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materialist says that the mind is the body; the dualist says that the mind and body 
are two different things.  
 
Kandel appears not to have considered the implications of a “different substances 
view” nor any non Cartesian understanding of mind and body interaction, namely 
the integrated view of Aristotle and Thomas.  
  
1.4 The hylomorphic underpinnings of this study. 
 
An Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of the human person underpins this 
project. This multidisciplinary investigation into the neural substrates for virtue 
emphasises the rational person, the ensouled body, as the subject of action. In the 
sections that follow I explore this concept. The sections below (1.4.1 - 1.4.3) set 
out the hylomorphic, psychological, and personalistic frameworks underpinning 
the philosophical reflections in this current study. In 1.4.4 I discuss the relative 
merits of the hylomorphic approach.  
 
In the quotation above Kandel reveals that he does not conceive of a third 
possible understanding of matter, one that is neither materialistic nor dualistic: 
this third way will now be presented as the hylomorphic view, that matter and 
mind are both expressions of the same reality. The clues are of course implicit in 
matter itself –when a human being dies, the body itself ceases to be a body, 
decomposing to a mess of chemicals that no longer have a principle of unity: it is 
evident there was a principle of unity that held the constituent substances in 
order. We need a wholly different view of this type of matter, matter that is 
ensouled. Only while it is ensouled is there a human body; the soul, or form, 
makes it to be what it is. The clues are in what we see; acceptance of 
hylomorphism does not depend on an interpretation of qualia or an appreciation 
of subjective experience, nor even on the debate about the degree of freedom 
man enjoys. Hylomorphism provides an account of matter that not only 
38 
 
accommodates universals and the possibility of freedom, but also what is 
manifested to our senses about matter itself.26  
 
I look first at the key features of hylomorphic theory, the Aristotelian theory of 
substances, then specifically at living intelligent material substances in a review of 
the rational psychology developed by Aristotle and refined by Aquinas. Finally I 
review the evolution of the concept of personhood, in the Boethian sense as 
individual rational substance, through the fragmentation that followed Descartes 
and at recent efforts to restore the hylomorphic understanding of person. In the 
process I review the significance of an adequate understanding of person.  
 
With these understandings, we then return in more detail to the principal currents 
of contemporary philosophy of mind (1.5) in order to offer the summary of 
current positions. In so doing I argue for the suitability of an hylomorphic solution 
to the mind-body problem and so prepare the way for the proposition that brain 
function is part-constitutive of human moral development.  
 
1.4.1 An overview of hylomorphic theory27.  
 
Aristotle’s studies of the what, how, and why of existence were further developed 
by Aquinas. Their metaphysics and rational psychology seek to explain what 
makes things, including creatures and people, to be, to be what they are, and why 
they act the way they do.  It is a satisfying, rich, coherent and systematized 
account that integrates science, psychology, ethics and social philosophy. Some 
understanding of the principles of their teaching is required in order to appreciate 
the potential it has to accommodate human behaviour and learning, the core area 
of this study.    
                                                          
26
 See 1.5 and 6.4.2. 
27
 According to Royce, William James is on record as accepting hylomorphism as “probably the best 
ultimate explanation of man”, although he himself did not adopt it in his writing. James also 
reached acceptance of the notion of soul “in which scholastic psychology and common-sense have 
always believed.” William James, The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular 
Philosophy (1897), reprinted in Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine, 
(New York: Dover, 1956), Vol. 1, 181. 
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a) Substance 
 
An appreciation of causality underpins the hylomorphic notions of substantial 
form and prime matter. 
Aristotle proposed a theory of hylomorphism that non-material properties adhere 
together with material properties in a single substance.28 Hylomorphism means 
“matter and form” (meaning “lumber”, later “matter”;  meaning 
“form”); the underpinning constituents of substance. Hylomorphism underpins 
the Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of virtue, the core matter for this study, and best 
describes the approach to philosophy of mind. 
 
To understand what something is, Aristotle argued that it is necessary to employ a 
notion of causality, what causes it to be what it is. Defending the unity of 
substance, he argued that any material being is a composite of two co-principles 
of substance: substantial form and prime matter, reflecting notions, respectively, 
of act and potency. Substantial form makes something what it is; prime matter 
makes it potentially other things.29  
 
He proposed that form perfects matter, making something the fundamental sort 
of thing it is. 30 Prime matter and substantial form bestow essence and compose 
actual material substance, which itself will be expressed through its 
characteristics, or “accidents”. Individual substances exist in themselves; a 
substance is that which can be “by itself”.  
 
Aristotle’s notion of causality extends beyond activation of matter, to psychology, 
to learning and to acting, with significant implications throughout this study. 31  
                                                          
28 
The Shorter Oxford defines “hylomorphism” as “the doctrine that primordial matter is the first 
cause of the universe.” 
29
 James E Royce, Man and his nature (NY: McGraw Hill, 1961), 287. 
30
 Leslie Stevenson and David L Haberman, Ten Theories of Human Nature, 4
th
 ed, (NY: OUP, 2009), 
94. 
31
 Alan Donagan, “Thomas Aquinas on human action”, in Cambridge History of Later Medieval 
Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 653. Donagan writes, “To many 
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The act of esse. 
To the preoccupation with “what things are” in Aristotle’s matter and form, 
substance and accidents, and act and potency, Aquinas adds an overriding 
existential concern about “why things are”, with the distinction of essence (what a 
thing is) and existence (the fact of its being).32  “Because of (this)… stress on the 
act of existence, rather than upon substantial form, Thomistic metaphysics is said 
to rise above Aristotelian metaphysics.”33 
 
Aquinas wished to address squarely the challenge of explaining how things may 
come into existence and may cease to be. He emphasized what he called the unity 
of being. He observed that finite beings may come to be and cease to be: they do 
not possess being. He taught that finite things are compositions of potentiality 
and act in two senses, first matter and form, but also, importantly with respect to 
essence (what they are) and esse.34 A possible being has essence, but only a really 
existing being has esse. Hence essence is “in potency to” esse.  
 
Aquinas emphasized that matter and spirit differ in degree of perfection of being, 
not in kind. This is a particularly significant insight providing a key to the refutation 
of a substance dualism that overlooks any principle of actual existence, the act of 
esse, and considers only the essence of material and non-material reality.35 
 
Aquinas taught that unity of being comes from esse, and that every being that is 
created must participate in the Divine act of existing. Aristotle too had argued for 
                                                                                                                                                                 
twentieth century philosophers, the feature of Aquinas’ theory that is most objectionable is his 
retention of Aristotle’s conception of causation as the exercise of a power or capacity, which 
allows him to think of human beings themselves, and not only of events occurring within them, as 
genuine causes of their actions –‘agent causes’”. 
32
 Joseph Torchia OP Exploring Personhood. (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 128. 
33 
Herman Reith, The Metaphysics of  St Thomas Aquinas (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 111. 
34
 “This being is distinct from that being inasmuch as it is the being of this or that nature”. 
 
Aquinas, 
On the Power of God, trans. English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, Maryland: Newman, 1952), 
Q.7.2. ad 9. 
35
 Aquinas also differentiates between the human soul and the possibility of spiritual beings, 
subsistent and complete in themselves, such as angels or even God himself. 
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such an ultimate principle of existence. 36 “Since everything that moves and 
undergoes change requires an act responsible for initiating these processes, 
Aristotle reasons that the entire universe requires some ultimate principle of 
actuality.” To avoid the impossible situation of infinite regress, an unmoved mover 
is posited, the ultimate end, “the final cause producing motion as being loved.” 37   
 
The concept of participation. 
Aquinas taught that substances possess being only by participation, that being is 
predicated of finite creatures by participation. 38 He wrote: “From that one being 
all other beings that are not their own being, but have being by participation, 
must needs proceed.”39  
 
In summary, each actual finite being will be actualized in three ways: by a 
substantial form making it to be that which it is; by a participatory act of being, 
that by which a thing is, eg its colour, shape and smell; and, by further perfection 
by its accidents which are non essential characteristics of a substance.  
 
Nature: the principle of operation. 
Our behaviour follows upon the type of creature we are: “operatio sequitur esse”. 
Do follows be: “agere sequitur esse.” Observations of the operation of a being 
allow us to draw conclusions about its nature: “The nature of a being as such is 
not directly observable. We must observe its operations and then draw 
conclusions about its nature.” 40   
 
b) Soul 
                                                          
36
 In seeing existent reality as a dynamic act, Aquinas transcends the essentialist approaches that 
preceded him. He argued that the distinctive nature of human beings, with their capacity to grasp 
the non material, derives from their rationality which imparts a unique mode of existence. The 
intentionality of God is the first efficient cause, bringing things into being so his goodness might be 
communicated to creatures in a manifold and variegated manner. Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 
131-2.  See also ST, I, 47 1. 
37
 Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 77. 
38
 Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 129. 
39
 Aquinas, On the Power of God Q.3. ad5. Aquinas, On the Power of God, trans. English Dominican 
Fathers (Westminster, Maryland: Newman, 1952), Q.3.5. 
40
 Royce, Man and his nature, 25. 
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Soul as life principle and principle of unity. 
Aristotle taught that all life forms a hierarchy and that the life principle of 
something is its soul. Aristotle defines soul as “the actuality of a body that has life 
potentially”.41 In other words, the soul activates the body. 
 
Hence it is not accurate to think of the soul as a free standing substance. It is not a 
thing, but the very principle of unity of the body itself. The soul can admit no 
division for there is no further principle of unity. Whereas substances without 
souls expand through “addition”; a living thing is nourished when it “receives in its 
very self something that serves to maintain it”.42 “Only ensouled things truly 
grow.”43  
 
 It is the soul that bestows on a substance its nature. “While it cannot be a body, it 
is in a body and a body of a definite kind.”44 In contrast with Plato, Aristotle 
affirms the explicit contribution of the body to humanness.  The body is 
potentiality with respect to the soul, “The soul is suited to be the form of a body; 
the body in turn has a receptivity to ensoulment.”45 
 
It is better to talk of “ensouled”, having distinctive ways of functioning, rather 
than “having a soul” as if it were a substance.46  Body and soul make one thing 
(unum) according to Aquinas. 47The unity of the soul and body is illustrated by the 
integrity of wax and the imprint it bears.48  
 
                                                          
41
 DA, 2.1, 412a 
42
 DA, 2.9, 135-36. 
43
 DA, 2.9, 152-3. 
44
 DA, 2.1, 414a. 
45
 Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 85. 
46
 Matter of course is vital to the whole understanding; forms exist only in individuated matter. 
Matter is the principle of individuation. 
47
 Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on human nature: a philosophical study of “Summa Theologiae” 
1a75-89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 73. 
48
 DA 2.1, 412b. 
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Aristotle proposes that there are three kinds of soul: the rational, sensitive, and 
vegetative. Adopting a teleological perspective from Plato49 Aristotle argues that 
the potency of matter is limited by its form, or soul. Fullness of potentiality, for 
example, “human flourishing”, is inherently associated with final causality, the 
purpose of human existence. Thus final and formal causes are related. As its form, 
the soul directs each living body to its true telos.50  
 
Aquinas emphasises that the parts cannot survive without the whole. 51 The soul 
“perfects not only the whole but each part” of the organism, it is present as a 
whole in every part of the matter that it actualizes.52 Nor, he writes in anticipation 
of Descartes’ error, is the soul to be found in a determined location in the body, 
“as a sailor in a ship.” 53 54The body itself does not remain after death;55 as has 
been noted, the substance that is the being of the animal decomposes to its 
constituent substances.  
 
“For living things, living is existing”56; “living is the mode in which living things 
have existence”. “The soul does not merely make the body to be of a certain kind, 
the living kind; the soul also gives a body its very existence.”57 Hence, the 
decomposition of death, entails division and loss of this specific form; the prime 
matter is activated by other forms. “The soul itself forms that body that fits it; it 
does not take up one already prepared.”58 The body has no existence outside of 
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 Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 6. 
50
 Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 77. 
51
 43, Thomas Aquinas on human nature: a philosophical study of “Summa Theologiae” 1a75-89, 
93. This is not to say that the whole cannot survive without some of its parts at times. 
52
 “The whole soul is in the whole body and in each of its parts, nor is is joined bodily as bodies are 
joined to each other… The soul performs all its operations through its powers.” Aquinas, Summa 
Contra Gentiles, trans. James F. Anderson (NY: Hanover House, 1955-7), II.72; cf ST, Ia, Q.76, Art.8. 
53
 Aquinas wrote of ridiculous assumptions of those who consider the soul’s being in body as in a 
place, like a sailor in a ship, or as if it is a point at an indivisible location. cf In 1 Sent 8.5.3c.  
54
 ST, Ia Q.76, Art.1. Nor is rationality united to the body as a “motor”. 
55
  Aquinas writes, on death, “No part of the body has its proper function, whereas anything that 
retains its species retains the operation belonging to that species” ST, Ia, Q.76, Art.8. See also 
Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on human nature: a philosophical study of “Summa Theologiae” 1a75-89, 
88. 
56
 Aquinas quotes Aristotle DA, II 4, 415b13. 
57
 Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on human nature: a philosophical study of “Summa Theologia” 1a75-
89, 96. 
58
 In DA I. 8.358-59. 
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the substance, and exists as a human body or not at all, corrupting into secondary 
substances59. 
 
The human soul is the substantial form of man.60 
Aristotle argues that man, as other material substances, is composed of the two 
constitutive principles of matter and form: 61 “People are constituted in two 
substantial elements, the soul with its reasoning power (understanding and will), 
the flesh with its senses.”62   Man’s soul is the “ultimate integral formal principle 
by which we live”. 63 The soul is not within man causing him to act in certain ways; 
rather “it refers to the fact that man is capable of causing these activities, and that 
man is not just matter since matter of itself does not live.”64 65  
 
The soul, in actualising matter, forms the body. It has no specific locus within the 
body. “It is really just as correct to say that matter is in the soul as to say that soul 
is in matter.”66 The soul is wholly there, wherever man is.67 The soul has a virtual 
presence, by virtue of power exerted.  
 
Integrity of the human person.68 
Aristotle insisted that it is the person who acts, not the soul, not a part of the 
person: “It is surely better not to say that the soul pities, learns, or thinks, but that 
the man does these with the soul.”69 As the immaterial soul admits of no real 
division, rationality is predicated essentially: “Humans are sentient as well as 
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 Richard Taylor, “Mind and Body” in Exploring Philosophy: an introductory anthology, ed. Steven 
M. Cahn (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 102. 
60
 See discussion in Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 135. 
61
 Royce, Man and his nature, 282. 
62
 ST, Ia, Q.75, Art.6 ad3; and ST, Ia, Q.77, Art.8. 
63
 Royce, Man and his nature, 293 
64
 Royce, Man and his nature, 293 
65
 Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 149. “The soul is the primary metaphysical principle of the 
essence of human nature... being or esse provides the constitutive principle and a way of being 
appropriate to nature.” 
66
 Royce, Man and his nature, 316. 
67
 ST, Ia, Q.75, Art.8. 
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 This section draws from excellent discussion in Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 130-150. 
69
 DA, 408b15. 
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intelligent beings. By extension, then, the body which allows for sensation, is part 
of a being that is essentially rational.”70  
 
He divides the powers of the human being into reason and that which can obey 
reason.71 He writes of theoretical and practical reason,72 and of the rational and 
non rational aspects of the soul.73  
 
Aquinas also maintained the complementarity of soul and body. He adopted the 
Aristotelian hylomorphic understanding of humans “as composites of the formal 
principle of the soul and the material substrate of the body”, that the human 
subject is an “inextricable union comprising one substantial reality”.74  
 
In virtual anticipation of contemporary philosophy of mind dilemmas, he strongly 
rebutted the naturalism that did not distinguish between body and soul, and the 
ancients who asserted “that only bodies were real things; and that what is not 
corporal is nothing; hence they maintained that the soul is something 
corporeal.”75 
 
Adopting a Boethian line of thinking, he wrote, “In a more special and perfect way, 
the particular and the individual are found in rational substances, which have 
dominion over their own actions… actions belong to singulars. Therefore 
individuals of a rational nature even have a special name among other substances; 
and this name is person.”76 Person derives from persona, the Latin word for 
“mask”; it suggests the voice sounding through the mask of the individual actor, 
per-sonare, possibly conveying the dignity of the great person portrayed.77 
Thomas suggests that the dignity of the person derives from its spiritual, therefore 
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 Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 135. 
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 NE, 1098a5. 
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 NE, 1139a5. 
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 NE, 1192a28ff. 
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 Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 131-2. 
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 ST, Ia, Q.75, Art.1. 
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 ST, Ia, Q.29, Art.1. 
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 Reith, The Metaphysics of  St Thomas Aquinas, 118. 
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indestructible, act of subsistence.78 He wrote, “Person signifies what is most 
perfect in all nature – that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature”79 
 
Ensouled bodies; animated flesh. 
Classical philosophical texts typically describe human beings as “composite 
realities of soul and body” but this can be more confusing than helpful. It is much 
truer to the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas to think of soul as the “animating 
principle of matter”. I suggest the term “animated flesh” even more than 
“ensouled body” for it better avoids any erroneous suggestion that the soul is 
somehow an entity in itself.   
 
Both Aristotle and Aquinas argued that when the soul is in a state united to the 
body the soul and the body may only act in concert. This understanding is of great 
importance in this study. Aristotle emphasised that the highest part of the rational 
soul, the intellect, is inseparable from the body: “No one can learn or understand 
anything in the absence of sense, and when the mind is actively aware of 
anything, it is necessarily aware of it along with an image.”80Thomas too avoids 
both “excessive spiritualism and naive materialism regarding human nature”. 
Torchia sums up this feature: “Soul and body require each other: the soul depends 
on the body as its instrumentality in the world, and the body depends on the soul 
as its principle of life and activity.”81 
 
The reality of ensoulment allows our thoughts to impact on our physical 
constitution, and conversely the body to influence our mental life. It is clear that 
thought is in constant and reciprocal interchange with bodily state: anxiety causes 
tummy ache, stress induces cancer, life meaning impacts on bodily health, hope 
prolongs the life of a terminally ill person… and neural pathways are instruments 
for higher thinking. 
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 Reith, The Metaphysics of  St Thomas Aquinas, 119. 
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 ST, Ia, Q.29, Art.3. 
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 DA III 8 431b. 
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Immortality of the soul. 
Aristotle wrote of the human capacity for “thought and intellect”82 and does 
suggest that the faculty of contemplation can exist separately from the body “as 
the everlasting can from the perishable”.83 Yet ultimately, both Aristotle and Plato 
deemed the only basis for human individuality to be the perishable body. 84 85  86 
Aquinas held the view that the disembodied soul enjoys another mode of 
existence.87 88 He argued that the human soul must be a substantial reality,89 but 
that alone the soul does not constitute a human being. 90 
 
1.4.2 Rational psychology 
 
Overview. 
Rational psychology is the discipline whereby we seek to understand human 
nature by “diligent and subtle investigation”91, as a preliminary to understanding 
what fulfils human nature and how human beings should act. A correct grasp of 
the Aristotelian understanding of soul is crucial if one is to arrive at an adequate 
metaphysical understanding of the role of matter in the human constitution, of 
great relevance to this current study. Aristotle writes of the nature of man in De 
Anima. Aquinas sets out his anthropology in the Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89. It is 
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 Aristotle argued that the disembodied soul has no memory, “It is in its separated state that the 
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 ST, Ia, Q.75, Art.2. In a state of independence from the body he argues that the soul is able to 
engage in operations per se, as an incorporeal knowing substance. He writes of the soul as 
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immediately apparent that Aristotle and Aquinas firmly ground their discussion in 
material reality. Aquinas writes, for example, “It belongs to the notion of this 
particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, of these bones.”92 93  
 
In this section we look briefly at the psychology that follows from an hylomorphic 
notion of substance, and in particular an hylomorphic understanding of the 
relationship between the rational soul and the body. This is of essential 
significance to this study which looks in detail at the interconnection between 
rationality, and bodily emotion and passion. It is within rational psychology that 
Aristotle and Aquinas developed their understanding of virtue and its role in 
human action and fulfilment.  
 
I start with the notion that human biology must be attuned to the operations of 
the soul.  
 
Man is endowed with a body suited to the operations of the soul.  
Man is endowed with a “distinctive cluster of faculties including reasoning, that 
are fundamental to the human way of living and functioning.”94 The soul is the 
principle of these operations. The most complex relationship exists between the 
soul and human body. “It was necessary that the intellectual soul be united to a 
body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense”.95 In other words, the body 
possesses a suitable potency.96 Man as a type of animal uniquely capable of 
rational thought has a body with biology attuned to human operations: cognition, 
perception, belief; appetite and desire; locomotion, growth, flourishing, and 
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decay. These correspond to the three powers of the human soul: the rational, 
sensitive, and vegetative.97   
 
It is inaccurate to suggest that the soul as the life principle of the body operates 
through the body, as if the body were a mere instrument. Torchia writes, “If 
powers are related to the soul, it is because the soul is their cause or principle, not 
necessarily their subject.”98 When the soul animates the body there can be only 
one subject operating, the person, the ensouled body. There is no other 
possibility. Aquinas insists that we understand not because we are moved by our 
intellects, but that we are moved by our intellect because we understand, because 
we are rational.99 Hence, intellect is not just another cause among physical 
causes.100 
 
Rationality embraces the whole person but it will be argued there is a dependence 
of rationality upon the body as upon a material cause.101 This carries enormous 
significance in this current study. All human operations, including rationality, are 
conducted with cooperation of the body. While the soul is always the “principle of 
action”, in its united state, it is the person, animated body, who acts.  
 
The process of knowing. 
Aristotle and Aquinas insisted that the pursuit of knowledge is fundamental to the 
human psyche, “All humans desire to know by nature”102 and that this pursuit of 
wisdom is characterised by knowledge of first causes.103 For this task man 
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possesses non-material powers of rationality: the intellect (our power to 
understand).104 105  106 
 
Knowledge starts with sense impressions.  According to Aquinas, man uses his 
senses to grasp realities external to himself. Raw sense information informs 
memory, imagination and appetites, impulses and drives, emotions and passions. 
And at the rational level, this information may inform simple apprehension, 
judgements (including conscience), reasoning, rational desires, and choices. This 
accords with the scholastic adage: “There is nothing in the intellect that was not 
previously in some way in the senses.” 107  
 
Motivation and action. 
The intellect has being as its object; the will, which is the power of the soul to 
choose and to love, has that which is good for one’s nature as its object. 108 Just as 
we can be moved by sense appetites, the will is our intellectual appetite. Aquinas 
defines will as a rational appetite in keeping with the rationality we find in the 
human soul. We seek what our bodies or our intellects perceive as good.  
 
Our appetites sideline rational decision-making when we act impulsively to satisfy 
that appetition, be it hunger or the craving of a kleptomanic; alternatively our 
sensory appetites inform our rational choices when behaviour is consequent to 
the judgements we make in our will. 109 We will see this has great relevance in the 
action of the moral virtues.  
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Will is this power of rational appetition.110 In a well balanced personality, our 
choices are based on an appreciation of the facts. Normally our intellect, assisted 
by our emotions, and with sound convictions and reasoning processes, guides the 
judgements and choices of our will.  
 
Emotions and passions. 
Embodied souls have emotions “passiones animae”, essentially physical 
phenomena, involving “some physiological modification”.111 People are agents 
with desires, purposes and goals, and their actions are performed by virtue of 
intellect and will. People chose in accord with what they know.  
 
Emotions and passions are closely linked to our senses, but, as we have seen, 
require the guidance of reason. We are a package deal; our happiness is linked 
with use of our reason to manage our choices, our passions and our emotions. 
Ultimately our actions all may be traced back to considered or impulsive choices, 
to well or poorly managed passions and emotions.  
 
Human acts. 
Aquinas distinguishes acts of a human being (actus hominis) from human acts 
(actiones humanae), genuinely moral acts. The acts of a human may not 
necessarily involve reason, whereas human acts are rational and voluntary - acts 
motivated by reason. Aquinas argues that “That over which we hold mastery can 
be said to be voluntary.”112 He accepts that animals can undertake limited forms 
of voluntary action.113  
 
Virtues and vices. 
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Habitual dispositions for positive human acts are known as virtues. 114 Human life 
is not limited simply to isolated acts, episodic and detached from the bigger 
perspective; this can overlook the importance of action on the basis of 
“habitus”115, dispositions. “For Aquinas, habitus ... puts one’s activity more under 
one’s control than it might otherwise be.”116 The concepts of habitus (“an 
acquired quality that we change only with difficulty” according to Thomas) and 
connaturalisation are essential to the notion of virtue.117 
 
Cardinal virtues. 
The four cardinal virtues are the umbrella habits that accord us effective 
management of our thinking, and of our passions and feelings. In a well rounded 
personality, through these four habits we maintain a level of management over 
our passions, acknowledging their aptitude for the good, but not surrendering to 
them.  
 
Of the four cardinal virtues, sound judgement refers to effective management of 
our thinking. But the other three help us manage our passions, feelings and 
relationships so that passions and feelings do not manage us, and so that we truly 
respect others.  For example, without self control, our passions of desire or anger 
could dominate our decision-making. Without fortitude, our fears would stop us 
thinking clearly, and without responsibility to keep our self love in check, our 
decisions could neglect our duties to others.  
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Human fulfilment. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle addressed human fulfilment. He argued that 
human flourishing is to be found most perfectly in the life of the mind. Aristotle 
wrote in the Nicomachean Ethics of “The life of the intellect (as) the best and most 
pleasant life for man”.118 Both Aristotle and Aquinas held that, nevertheless, a less 
perfect beatitude is to be found in the practice of moral virtue as it is disposes us 
to rational operations, and hence to contemplation. 
 
Further Aristotle and Aquinas regarded man as a social animal.119 Rationality may 
be seen as the capacity for loving personal relationships. In this sense, intelligence 
and virtue are at the service of freedom and love. 120 121   
 
Flashing insights into the truth of things nor the instants of choice characterize us 
as rational. Our rationality is a state of being. It is an abiding participation in the 
capacity for rational thought and choice that empowers us to know ourselves, to 
understand the real world in which we operate as agents, but at the same time to 
stand above that world, capable of altering it and of discovering in it the pleasures 
of loving relationships.  
 
Aquinas argued that only God can fulfill a composite of a body and a soul with a 
capacity for infinite good. 122 Love of God in the will is better, in this sense, than 
                                                          
118
 NE X 7,9; cf NE X 8,7 where Aristotle writes, “Among human activities that which is most akin to 
the divine activity of contemplation will be the greatest source of happiness.” 
119
 NE 1097b11. 
120
 Davies, “Being Human,” 220. Davies writes, “Intellect is that by which one recognises what is 
true. Will... is a matter of being drawn to things insofar as one knows them and is attracted to 
them”. 
121
 In Aquinas’ worldview, the concept of personal loving relationship extended to the Divine 
Being. The relationship of man with the First Cause fascinated Aquinas. Torchia writes, “Any 
attempt to penetrate the richness of Aquinas’s anthropology must address how humans stand in 
relation to their creator and how they exist within the larger scheme of creation.” (Torchia, 
Exploring Personhood, 128.) Aquinas taught that man has what he calls “obediential potency” for 
elevation to the supernatural life. He linked activation of this potency with man’s ultimate 
fulfilment.  
122
 In ST, Ia-IIae, Q.10, Art.2 Aquinas argued that an object perceived as “universally and from every 
point of view” good moves the will necessarily. “The will cannot but will it.” He called “beatitude” 
this adherence to the greatest of goods.  
54 
 
knowledge of God in the intellect.123 Thomas says the human will is in a state of 
potency to its summum bonum, the ultimate Act of Being.124 The will cannot be 
moved necessarily by any created finite good; it is only “our rational apprehension 
of an unqualified good (that)... frees us from ... attachment to any finite good”. 
Man may only be fulfilled, ultimately, in love of God. He argued that this capacity 
to love is a consequence of rationality, which in turn, is disposed to perfect 
operation by virtue. 125  
 
He argued that it is the potency for a loving relationship with God as first cause 
and final end of the person, that bestows on each human person an intrinsic 
dignity. Man’s fulfilment is in the activation of this potency. “...all things exist to 
the extent that they share in God’s self-subsistent esse, all things desire to be like 
God as their final end. Accordingly to become like God is the ultimate goal and 
completion of all things.”126  
 
This lies beyond the strict scope of this study. 
 
1.4.3 Restoring the hylomorphic notion of person. 
 
The concept of person (1.4.1) within an hylomorphic understanding of reality 
provides a powerful alternative to the current fragmentation of approaches that 
characterize contemporary explorations into philosophy of mind. In this section 
following a brief overview of how different schools of philosophical thought have 
approached the concept of person, and I outline certain advantages that the 
notion of person offers for reaching valid conclusions about human agency 
including virtue development.  
 
Overview of changing understanding of person. 
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Aristotelian-Thomistic anthropology presents an integrated vision of the material 
and the rational in the human person. Torchia articulates the view that 
perceptions of personhood have moved through relatively distinct phases. Plato 
and Aristotle reached an understanding of humans in generic terms, as anthropos 
or homo. The Christian era, viewing persons as individual, unique and relational, 
reached a high point in the work of Aquinas. Following the Cartesian revolution 
and reactions to it, Torchia identifies a “steady undermining of a metaphysical 
understanding of a unified abiding self during the modern and contemporary 
periods”.127 
 
Essential to the Platonic and Aristotelian vision was the notion of an underlying 
subject. Plato identified that subject with the soul. Plato argued that the human 
soul has a non corporeal nature. 128 He was criticized by Aquinas for regarding the 
soul in the body “as a sailor in a ship”129 from which the inescapable conclusion 
had to be that soul and body were distinct things unable to make one composite 
unity. 
 
Addressing this dilemma, Aristotle argued that the subject possessed both 
physical and psychic properties. Aristotle in De Anima regarded people as 
composite individuals, “complex unities both mental and physical”. 130 Crucially, as 
we have seen, he proposed that people are ensouled bodies: 131 “We can wholly 
dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the body and soul are one: it is as 
meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are 
one.”132 Aristotle argued that semantics must reflect reality.133  
 
The neo-Platonic early Christian era built on these understandings. In City of God 
Augustine emphasised the composite model: “Man is not a body alone or a soul 
                                                          
127
 Torchia, Exploring Personhood, xiv. 
128
 Davies “Being Human,” 212. 
129
 SG 2,57. 
130
 Davies “Being Human,” 209. 
131
 Davies “Being Human,” 209. 
132
 DA, 412b6. 
133
 Torchia suggests that Aristotle resolves this error at a semantic level, but it would appear that 
the fundamental principle he defends is metaphysical. Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 80. 
56 
 
alone. He is composed of both body and soul.”134 He insisted on an “harmonious 
union” of the inner spiritual and outer bodily man, and acknowledged the 
subjective ego: “You stood me face to face with myself...”135. In line with Plato and 
Aristotle, he proposed that will underpins personal moral responsibility.136 The 
later Augustine referred explicitly to individual person of composite body and 
soul.  
 
Building on Augustine’s concept of “harmonious union”, Aquinas argued not only 
for the dual properties of the one subject, “a compound whose substance is both 
spiritual and corporeal”137, and that the mental and physical are notions that are 
not reducible to each other, but that the soul is the very principle of life. Anima, 
for Aquinas is “that which animates”, “that which gives life”; it is “the root 
principle of life in living things within our experience.”138 There is no “medium 
connecting the two together”. As we have seen above he argued that the soul is 
the form of the body. “The soul is the substantial form of the body, giving to the 
whole body and to each of its parts their act of existing and species. Furthermore, 
the whole constituted of these parts is a substantial unity.”139 
 
Importantly too, Aquinas took Boethius’s landmark definition of person: 
“rationalis naturae individual substantia” 140 (individual substance of a rational 
nature) adapting it to “a person is a subsistent individual in a rational nature”.141 
He argued that substance is the basis of individuality clarifying the equivocal usage 
in Aristotle who used substance to mean both the individual and the genus.142 
Aquinas thus more clearly reflects the autonomy of the individual. 
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In texts such as Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes interpreted 
personhood in terms of consciousness. In a dualist paradigm, he identified the 
person with his mind or soul.  He held that mental stuff (mind) and physical stuff 
(body) are distinct but connected, and able to influence each other. He argued 
that persons are identical with their minds but not with bodies. “I have a body 
that is closely joined to me”.143 
 
The immediate successors of Descartes, Geulincx (1625-69) and Malebranche 
(1638-1715), rejected interaction of soul and body, and in its place advocated 
occasionalism, a psychophysical parallelism dependent on God’s intervention, 
with a denial of causality.144 This denial of common sense helped to provoke the 
intellectual reaction that sought no further explanation for human behaviour in an 
incorruptible and immaterial mind. 
 
In the centuries following the Cartesian revolution, the concept of person was 
effectively lost under pressure from empiricism.  
 
Once we discard any metaphysical understanding of personhood and dismiss any 
non-material dimension we are left only with the perceptions themselves.  
 
John Locke (1632 – 1704) argued that personal identity derives from 
consciousness.  
To find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider 
what person stands for, which, I think is a thinking intelligent 
being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as 
itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places, 
which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable 
from thinking.145 
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The empiricism of Locke was followed by Hume’s arguments against 
consciousness and person. Finding his antecedents in Francis Bacon (1561-1626) 
and Newtonian physics, Hume (1711-1776) employed a mitigated scepticism that 
questioned the dogmas of metaphysics. The impact of the new science was felt 
everywhere, mathematics focused on efficient causality, and a demand that 
conclusions should be evidence based.146 He argued that “We have no perfect 
idea of anything but of a perception. A substance is entirely different from a 
perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance.”147 Ultimately, he argued 
that human beings are no more than “bundles” of perceptions.   
 
These reactions have led to the physicalist, the functionalist and the non reductive 
materialist views of the last seventy years.  The physicalist understanding of the 
person, widely encountered in contemporary neuroscientific literature and 
contemporary philosophy of mind, regards people as only made of matter, for 
example: 
According to the Identity Theory, persons are identical with a set of physical 
states or events just as lightning is identical with electrical discharge, or just as 
the Morning Star is identical with the Evening Star.148 
 
Somewhat ironically numerous commentators have pointed out that the 
physicalism appears as much a reaction to the inadequacies of dualism as a 
conviction in materialism. Of course both dualism and physicalism contrast with 
Aquinas’s view of what people are.149 
 
More recent approaches have blended physicalist and functionalist approaches. 
Daniel Dennett, dismissing a qualitative distinction between matter and spirit, 
ascribes personhood according to function and behaviour, the fulfilment of 
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experimentally verifiable descriptors. He proposes six conditions for personality: 
rationality, intentionality, an attitude or stance towards intentionality, reciprocity, 
verbal communication, and consciousness in some special way (eg self 
consciousness).150 151  
 
Reductionist (or, more properly, eliminative materialist or epiphenomenalist) 
understandings have replaced teleological understandings of the person. For 
some, selfhood is essentially denoted by conscious experience.152Dennett also 
targets Cartesian dualism, insisting that there is “no Cartesian Theatre”153, in other 
words references to the mind derive from Cartesian misconceptions.154 His work 
represents a current endpoint of reductionism. See “Fictionalism” in Table 1.1. 
 
Francis Crick has harnessed the neuroscience in a further strain of contemporary 
reductionism. He writes, “The Astonishing Hypothesis is that ‘You,’ our joys and 
your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity 
and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve 
cells and their associated molecules.”155 See “Competition for Executive Control 
Accounts” in Table 1.1. 
 
Searle is a proponent of non reductive approaches. He emphasises the subjectivity 
inherent in consciousness which he compares in some ways to “a surface feature 
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of physical systems”.156 Consciousness is simply bracketed off, too hard to explain, 
but material by definition. See “Biological Naturalism” in Table 1.1. 
 
Chalmers also resists reductionism but his epiphenomenal approach fails to bridge 
the mind body divide. Nevertheless his work has highlighted the transcendent 
nature of consciousness.  
Even such “revolutionary” developments as the invocation of 
connectionist networks, non linear dynamics, artificial life, and 
quantum mechanics will provide only more powerful functional 
explanations... but the mystery of consciousness will not be 
removed.157  
See “Epiphenomenalism” in Table 1.1. 
 
Simultaneously, there are various other currents which have defended the 
“person”. Bernard Williams, pursuing a non Aristotelian, relativistic, anti-utilitarian 
approach, argued that if there is no body there can be no person, and that human 
identity is necessarily bodily, although body is seen as a separate substance, not 
integrated to the mind.  
 
Henry P. Stapp, Evan Harris Walkers and others, including Roger Penrose, have 
proposed a quantum theory explanation of consciousness. Some, among them 
Jeffrey Schwartz158, have seen this as a way of preserving a spiritual dimension to 
the human person, but it appears essentially to be another form of non reductive 
materialism, in this case proposing that sub particle physics can have something to 
tells us about the soul.159 Essentially it is another physicalist explanation for the 
mind body connection. See “Quantum Indeterminism” in Table 1.1. 
 
An enriched understanding of “person”. 
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It was not until the early 20th century that there was a rediscovery of “person” 
through the philosophy of Jacques Maritain and others. Much of this work is 
inherently attuned to hylomorphic theory.  
 
In recent decades through Karol Woytyla’s (the future Pope John Paul II’s) 
articulation of “personalism”, the notion of the person as “an objective entity, 
which as a definite subject has the closest contacts with the whole (external) 
world, and is most intimately involved with it precisely because of its 
inwardness”160  has gained traction.  Woytyla’s notion of person is founded 
broadly and synthetically on hylomorphic principles. He writes of the distinctive 
character of the person, having an “inner life”, “of whose nature reason is a 
property”161, and with the power of free will, of self determination. 162  He 
proceeds to argue that love is “always a mutual relationship between persons”163, 
in fact, “the unification of persons”164 and it is the “authentic commitment of the 
free will of one person (the subject), resulting from the truth about the other 
person.”165 He says, “Freedom exists for the sake of love.”166 Woytyla proposes a 
vision of human fulfilment in which our materiality and sexuality are truly 
integrated with rationality. He provides a philosophical defence of human 
rationality and freedom, and a vision of human flourishing dependent upon the 
integration of the spiritual and material properties of man. It is significant that 
Woytyla ties his discussion explicitly to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.167  
 
Furthermore, without a vision of the integration of the rational and the material, it 
is not possible to attribute to man non-material goals.168 Charles Taylor writes:  
A self or person ... is not like an object in the usually 
understood sense. … We don’t have selves in the way we have 
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hearts and livers.... We are only selves insofar as we… seek and 
find an orientation to the good.169 
 
Note these analyses also would not be possible without the hylomorphic 
foundation. 170   
 
Torchia has noted the postmodern tendency to separate human nature from 
moral personhood, an approach at contradiction with Aquinas’s definition of 
person as an individual subsistent reality. Torchia writes, “A qualitative sense of 
personhood must rest on a fundamental metaphysical one, as the core of our 
humanity and individuality.”171He notes the scepticism or even hostility of many 
contemporary thinkers to the claim that there is a set of universal human traits 
grounded in a stable abiding “nature” which all humans share (simply by virtue of 
their humanity.)172 This is found, for example, in the work of Peter Singer. 
 
In another line of investigation relevant to the task of this study, Haldane and 
Torchia both question the possibility of consciousness studies offering a way 
forward in philosophy of mind. Haldane comments, “Contemporary philosophers 
of mind confirm the persistence of Cartesianism in their preoccupation with the 
status of qualia. I remain agnostic about the possibility of a naturalistic account of 
qualia.”173 
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In like vein Torchia writes that personal identity is not based only on continuity of 
self awareness but “rooted in enduring human nature that persists in the midst of 
accidental changes flowing from the substantial union of soul and body. This is 
why humans require a metaphysical explanation that is more encompassing and 
penetrating than any scientific account of any biological or biochemical 
processes.”174  
 
The discussion in 1.4.1 - 3 highlights the significance of Haldane’s analysis above: 
that the current impasse in philosophy of mind can only be broken by a 
metaphysical breakthrough about the nature of man. Torchia concludes, “Once 
we define ourselves as embodied spirits, the insolubility of the modern mind-body 
problem is effectively neutralised.”175 The physicalist backlash to dualism has 
ultimately failed to explain human nature and human behaviour. A richer 
understanding is needed.      
 
1.4.4 Advantages offered by an hylomorphic notion of person.  
 
Serious deficiencies arise in discussion of the human being or human agency when 
the hylomorphic notion of person is lost:  
 
i. The concept of an underlying subject is easily compromised. Man becomes 
equated either to his mind, or to his physiology. To equate man to his mind 
implies a loss of dignity of the body. To equate him to his physiology 
implies a loss of dignity and a denial of any necessary distinction between 
human nature and animal nature.  
ii. A loss of the concept of form, a loss of the notion of an animating principle 
for matter, opens the way to a dual substance view in which matter and 
man’s actions can be too easily diminished in comparison to subjective 
perceptions and intentions, and in which it becomes impossible to explain 
satisfactorily psychic causality of the physical (or better to say “non-
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material causality”). Ultimately this line of thinking leads, as in the work of 
Hume, to a denial of the very principle of causality.  
iii.  A loss of this integrity of mind and matter also makes it very difficult to 
account for the interaction between thought and emotion, or to account 
for choice and election of action. Ultimately too, it diminishes the dignity 
of human sexual relationships, expressed bodily.    
iv. A lack of understanding of the potential of the hylomorphic explanation for 
the human person has led, in neuroscientific circles, to the assumption 
that all theories of a non physical component to the human person have a 
substance dualism at their core.  
v. We have seen that explanations for the interaction of the material and the 
rational resort either to some form of non reductive physicalism or 
epiphenomenalism. These non reductive approaches assume there to be 
no metaphysical difficulty in accounting for rationality within such 
frameworks. They are unable however to provide a satisfactory physicalist 
or epiphenomenalist explanation for  the hylomorphic conclusion that 
rationality must be considered as a spiritual power because it permits the 
possession of truths which are universal, not just particular. (See Appendix 
1.) 
vi. The lack of a satisfying rational psychology opens the door to empiricist, 
behaviourist, and functionalist approaches, in which a richer metaphysical 
explanation can be dismissed as inaccessible, irrelevant, or simply too 
hard.   
And this, I suggest, is precisely what has happened. 
 
An Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of person provides:  
i. An effective response to physicalist understandings that deny the 
possibility of human freedom. (See 1.3 and Table 1.1).  
ii. A scientifically coherent alternative to dualist understandings for the 
interaction of body and mind. (In the process I will draw attention to the 
simplistic understanding of non-materialism, considering all proponents as 
dualists, by many in contemporary neuroscience.) 
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iii. A satisfying epistemology that accounts for the interaction of human being 
with the material world. 
iv. A metaphysical basis for human dignity. Human dignity is founded not in 
our rationality, as such, but in the fact that we have a rational soul. 176 As 
persons we are unique, having our own personal dignity, and we are at the 
same time, relational.  This is the core of Aquinas’ doctrine of the 
person.177  
 
1.5 An hylomorphic critique of 20th century currents in philosophy of mind. 
 
In this section I argue for the legitimacy of an hylomorphic approach to philosophy 
of mind. In the light of the preceding understanding of the human person, it is 
possible now to offer a critique of 20th century currents in philosophy of mind and 
to argue that a philosophy of mind founded upon an hylomorphic notion of the 
human person offers distinct advantages.  
 
By offering an understanding of how the material and non-material can coexist 
and interact as properties of a single substance, hylomorphism provides a robust 
foundation for a philosophy of mind and a framework for criticism of other 
approaches to brain and mind, and of freedom and virtue.178  The integration of 
material and non-material properties offered by hylomorphism stands in constrast 
to one-or-the-other understandings of the material and mental offered by what 
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can be seen as the three basic approaches to philosophy of mind: dualism, 
reductionism, and eliminativism.179   
 
John Haldane’s writings on the advantages of an hylomorphic approach to 
philosophy of mind emphasize the necessity for a metaphysics that permits 
material and non-material properties to be integrated. He argues that beneath 
thought and action we must discern the acting person: “A correct account of the 
nature of persons will include, as essential aspects, accounts of the nature of 
thought and of action, since these are the primary modes of activity of those 
beings whose nature is that of persons.”180 His work in this field offers an 
approach and credibility for the hylomorphic underpinnings of this study.  
 
Hylomorphism offers a number of advantages over competing ontologies utilised 
in philosophy of mind debate.  
i. Progress on the knotty mind-body question is possible once we accept the 
hylomorphic premise that “do follows be”, that actions follow upon the 
nature of the entity. Hylomorphism offers an understanding of the nature 
of persons, and of the metaphysical priority of person over thought and 
action.181  
ii. The perennial difficulty for philosophers of mind to explain how mental 
phenomena could possibly cause physical events appears overcome using 
an hylomorphic framework.182   
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iii. A further nagging problem for philosophers of mind has been to offer an 
explanation for mental responses to the environment. Hylomorphic 
philosophers argue that it is that we possess the object itself in our 
intellect, a conformity of mind to thing; we do not “perceive visual 
experiences, we have them” as Putnam says in the Dewey lectures.183  
Haldane too recognises the fertile ground here for hylomorphism to offer a 
clear understanding of the intersection of mental and physical.184  
iv. Causality, since Descartes, has been a central issue in the mind-body 
problem. Again hylomorphism offers a way forward with its rich 
understanding of causality and the distinction it offers between efficient 
and formal causation.185  
v. Haldane argues that an hylomorphic understanding of substance permits 
an effective critique of both dualism and materialism as flawed 
philosophical notions.186 (See also 6.4.2) 
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vi. An hylomorphic analysis urges a radical departure from philosophy of 
mind’s dead-end preoccupation in recent years with consciousness and the 
notion of qualia. It is not the way we feel about reality that gives us a non 
physical dimension, it is a reflection of our nature itself. An hylomorphic 
analysis permits a return to being away from both epistemological and 
metaphysical idealism.187  
vii. The hylomorphic ontology is very much in keeping with, and provides an 
explanation for, our intuitions of being, our observations of human 
freedom, of human action and causation, and of teleological motivation.188  
The hylomorphic approach is in keeping with the widespread acceptance 
of human freedom.  Without an understanding of substance that 
integrates the material and non-material as properties, neural 
explanations for consciousness, intentionality and qualia must remain as 
mechanistic and deterministic. It is time for a radical return to the 
ontological basis of subjective experience. 
 
Table 1.1  An hylomorphic critique of 20th century currents in philosophy of 
mind (in endpapers) classes the principal currents of philosophy of mind according 
to categories of irrealism, conceptual reductionism, conceptual anti-reductionism, 
and ontological antireductionism. These categories, adapted from Ludwig, provide 
a convenient framework for analysis on a spectrum of physicalism:189 from radical 
physicalist, through reductive and non reductive materialism, to ontological 
solutions. Hylomorphism, described by Haldane as “non physicalist, non dualist, 
dual aspect” theory is situated in the last of the four categories. 190The 
subcategorisations are substantially my own. In the right hand column I offer a 
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brief hylomorphic critique for the various lines of thought. For the purposes of 
refutation, the various subcategories tend to group into recurring themes, broadly 
though not exclusively: eliminativist, behaviourist and functionalist, reductive and 
non-reductive emergent, and dualist. If hylomorphism is correct, then we have a 
solution to the major objection to my thesis: that it cannot relate propositions 
about the brain to propositions about choice and virtue.  
 
Also by this approach I wish to suggest the incisive potential for an hylomorphic 
contribution to philosophy of mind and to further justify the position adopted by 
this current study. It is beyond my scope to offer more a more detailed critique 
but I do wish to demonstrate that hylomorphism exposes significant weaknesses 
of irrealism, conceptual reductionism, and conceptual anti-reductionism, and of 
dualistic forms of ontological antireductionism.  
 
Also in the endpapers is found Appendix 1. A Response to the Claims of Emergent 
Rationality by Non-reductive Materialism. The paradigm of emergent rationality 
requires a more detailed philosophical response. I argue that acceptance of this 
position, popularised by both neuroscientists and philosophers, reveals an 
incorrectly framed inquiry from the start, and that acceptance must lead to a 
denial of the eudaimonic dimension of virtue.  
 
1.6 Situating this study in current approaches to ethics.  
 
The Aristotelian-Thomistic view of human moral development proposes that 
human personality, if it is to flourish, requires the development of intrinsic 
qualities of self management. This study proposes that these qualities, in ways 
essentially described by Aristotle and Thomas, have a neural substrate.  
 
As the field of the morality of acts, moral behaviour and moral character is broadly 
described as moral philosophy or ethics, it is appropriate that I briefly situate this 
study in the spectrum of current approaches to ethics.  
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During the early period of the second half of the 20th century, the prevailing view 
was that ethics classified conveniently into two broad groups: 191  
i. Consequentialist ethical theories developed from the utilitarian doctrines 
of Bentham and Mill. These are essentially teleological approaches in 
which the ethical nature of an action is derived from the contribution of 
the action to the well being of human beings. 192  
ii. Deontological (duty based) theories, including ethical systems where moral 
obligation is primarily derived from a religious or from a purely rational 
framework.  Many of these theories take Kant as their philosophical 
founder. Kant argued, captured in his “Categorical Imperative”, that ethics 
derives from “a universal and impartial law of rationality”. 
 
Many commentators now add virtue ethics as a third fundamental category; it is 
increasingly regarded as a “serious rival” for traditional moral theories of 
utilitarianism and deontology. 193   
 
This study, seeking out the neuroscientific aspects of the development and 
practice of virtue, is situated in the field of virtue ethics.  
 
1.6.1 Some reasons for the growing stature of virtue ethics. 
 
The legitimisation of virtue ethics as an alternative ethical approach is the result of 
a number of factors. A 1958 paper by Elizabeth Anscombe’s is regarded as the 
forerunner of this philosophical revival. 194 Her call for a return to the notion of 
human flourishing founded on the development of virtue was a turning point. She 
argued forcefully that without a clear psychological understanding, ethics must be 
unproductive, that we must “stop doing moral philosophy until we get our 
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psychology straight”. 195   Anscombe also took specific issue with modern moral 
ethicists in the utilitarian tradition for allowing worthy ends to justify means that 
are unjust.196  
 
In the decades since Anscombe’s paper, virtue ethicists have argued that virtue 
ethics offers distinct and inherent advantages over deontological and 
consequentialist approaches.  
 
i. It has been argued that virtue ethics holds “explanatory primacy”, that 
deontological or teleological ethical systems focusing on moral analysis of 
actions beg investigation into the qualities of character that give rise to 
such actions. One virtue ethicist, Gary Watson, sums up this view, “Action 
appraisal is derivative from appraisal of character... .Basic moral facts are 
about quality of character.” 197 198 
ii. Virtue based approaches have gained ground for their positivity and 
flexibility, and for their ability to offer solutions in the myriad of ethical 
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dilemmas that can occur in real life. According to Macintyre, Aristotle sees 
virtues as effective and explanatory of outcomes in the real world. 199  
Swanton praises virtue ethics for “taking seriously the richness of the 
moral domain, its sensitivity to context and situation, its scepticism about 
the codifiability of ethics”.200 201   
iii. It is argued that virtue ethics is more compatible with the dignity of the 
human person. The inability of both duty based and consequentialist 
systems to offer approaches that accommodate the dignity of human 
autonomy has also been pointed out, in that there is an manifest gulf, a 
schizophrenia, between justification and motivation.  It is argued that we 
are diminished as human beings if we take external principles as our 
motivation.  
iv. Reflecting human dignity, virtue ethics is oriented towards personal 
relationships. It is argued that in deontological and consequentialist 
approaches the person disappears under the tyranny of principles; genuine 
relationships become impossible.202 
v. Christine Swanton argues that virtue ethics provides an enriched account 
of automony, an automony that even allows an agent to act apparently 
sub-optimally, yet, satisficing rationality, in such a way that such behaviour 
can be a legitimate expression of one’s character. (Swanton picks up the 
economics term originally coined by Herbert Simon denoting a rational 
approach that stops looking for alternatives once one that is “good 
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enough” is found.203) Results and consequences are avoided as the 
ultimate measure for the rightness or goodness of an action.204 
vi. Beyond simple effectiveness in understanding human behaviours, it is 
argued that virtues are constitutive elements of human wellbeing.205  Slote 
argues that in duty based ethics, the agent’s actions are directed to the 
well being of others but not of self. He argues that this reduces agents to 
the status of tools to help others, and that this ultimately devalues the 
moral agent and undermines the Kantian principle that every individual is 
of intrinsic and equal value. 206 
vii. Virtue ethics provides a view of ethical activity that is perfectly integrated 
with a naturalistic view of man. 207  
viii. It is argued that virtue based approaches are superior to rule or end based 
approaches in the way they can accommodate an ethic of care. Carol 
Gilligan, Nell Noddings, and Annette Baier have developed a “relational 
ethics” that sits well with virtue ethics.208  
ix. An ethic of virtue is also most compatible with a rich human psychology 
that recognizes the contribution of positive human emotion in human 
decision making and action. Aristotle viewed virtue as “a disposition in 
which both reason and emotion are well ordered”. 209 Anscombe had 
drawn attention to the “lack of an adequate philosophy of psychology” in 
Kant and Hume.210 Cottingham argues:  
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“one of the key insights of virtue theory is that the good life consists 
in a structured pattern of living... whose fundamentals have to be 
rooted in a civic culture, a culture in which the right pathways of 
emotion and action have been laid down in infancy and fostered by 
long habits of training and upbringing.”211  
The bottom line is that virtue ethics appears more compatible with 
reflections on aspects of character such as emotion, subjectivity and 
human relations. 212  Furthermore, as will be seen, in this study I am 
arguing that virtue ethics is not only compatible with the psychology of 
emotion, but shares common ground with the neuroscience of effective 
self management and emotional control. 
x. Virtue ethics seems to offer a better understanding of principles of 
education founded on human psychology. For example, the core of moral 
motivation is not rules, nor do rules play a key role in moral education. 
“According to virtue ethics, education through moral exemplars is more 
effective than education focussed on principles and obligations, because it 
is far more concrete.”213 (See 6.5.) 
 
However, when all is said and done virtue ethics resists direct comparison with 
alternative approaches to ethics. Gary Watson argues:  
To think that an ethic of virtue ... is opposed to duty is a 
category mistake. Duties and obligations are simply factors to 
which certain values, for example, fidelity and justice, are 
responsive. They do not compete with virtue for moral 
attention... . One’s virtues may enable one to endorse, 
apprehend, correctly apply, or disregard some principle of 
action. 214  
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The ten reasons above will be further validated by a successful description of the 
biological bases of virtue. In this study I am arguing not only that neural 
development harmonises with the development of virtue, but also that virtue 
ethics constitutes an ethical account that is more attuned to human nature than 
are the more theoretical accounts of Western ethics.   
 
1.6.2 Within virtue ethics there exists a spectrum of significantly contrasting 
approaches. 
 
We have looked briefly at advantages offered by virtue ethics as an ethical system. 
Now we look at the range of approaches within virtue ethics, a field in which there 
are numerous approaches but one nevertheless in which “... the similarities 
between species of virtue ethics are more important than their differences.” 215  
 
Various historical approaches to the notion of virtue. 
Contrasting understandings of the notion of virtue are not a new phenomenon. 
Macintyre writes of three contrasting historical attitudes towards virtue. He 
suggests that: Homer understood virtues as means to empower a person to fulfil a 
social role; Aristotle and Aquinas focused on virtue as “a quality the exercise of 
which leads to the achievement of the human telos”; and, Franklin offered a 
utilitarian account of the virtues as keys to earthly and heavenly success.216 
 
According to an alternative view:217 Socrates, Cicero and Kant share a stoic 
emphasis on the dignity of virtue, with emphases on piety and courage; Aristotle 
and Aquinas offer a rich and realistic understanding of virtues as psychological 
habits; and, Hume transforms virtue into a useful tool to achieve social-political 
ends.  
 
Divisions according to judgements about character. 
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As we have seen above, virtue ethicists will all agree that aretaic judgements 
(judgements about character) are prior to judgements about rightness or 
wrongness of actions. Again there is a spectrum of approaches. 
 
The moderate view is some actions are always abhorrent, and hence that 
character need not be prior to action. Slote argues “the ethical status of acts is not 
entirely derivative from that of traits, motives or individuals....”218  Alderman and 
Soloman present a more unitary view, either reducing deontic concepts to aretaic 
concepts, or with Anscombe and Williams, arguing that deontic concepts should 
be ignored completely.  There is also the moral worth view proposed by Audi, 
whereby virtue “is the sole ground of moral goodness, even though it is not the 
ground of moral rightness or of obligatory conduct.”219 Similarly, Hursthouse 
argues that an action is right if it is carried out by a virtuous character. 220   
 
Divisions according to universality. 
Universality provides another lens for assessment of the various contemporary 
approaches to virtue ethics. Aristotle conceives virtues as human excellences 
contributing towards a form of flourishing that is perfective of human nature. 
Aristotle’s vision of the rational life is embraced by some contemporary virtue 
ethicists, such as Foot, Hursthouse, Taylor and Nussbaum; others seek to shrug off 
Aristotelian metaphysics.221 Originally MacIntyre claimed virtues are culture 
specific, but later adopted the Aristotelian position.222   
 
Divisions of virtue ethics according to deontological and consequentialist 
considerations. 
The relationship of the various contemporary approaches of virtue ethics to 
deontology and to consequentialism is complex.  
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Virtue ethicists adopt either a teleological view, that virtues permit human 
flourishing, or a non teleological account, that virtues are worthy in themselves. 
Rawls understands virtues to be “strong and normally effective desires to act on 
the basic principles of right”,223 yet virtue ethics stands against this conventional 
wisdom that would align virtue ethics with deontology.  Velazco y Trianosky 
argues that, in fact, an ethics of virtue and an ethics of duty are radically different 
approaches to ethical questions, yet each may be either in a teleological or non 
teleological (deontological) form.224 Furthermore, these teleological accounts may 
also be considered from the perspective of consequentialist principles. Trianosky 
argues that as many virtue ethicists maintain a form of utilitarianism when they 
argue for the usefulness of the virtues, they are thus teleological in orientation.225  
 
Typical of this approach is that adopted by Von Wright: “Virtues... are needed in 
the service of the good of man. This usefulness of theirs is their meaning and 
(natural) purpose”. 226 Julia Driver also adopts a consequentialist view, viewing a 
moral virtue as “a character trait (a disposition or cluster of dispositions) which, 
generally speaking, produces good consequences for others.”227 Other virtue 
ethicists while teleological may give more importance to intention rather than 
causality.  
 
Watson suggests that we should consider an ethics of virtue as at once 
teleological and nonconsequentialist.228 He points out that Aristotle is regarded by 
Rawls as teleological, yet he may just as readily be seen as deontological, opposed 
to consequentialism. He suggests that following Socrates who regarded virtue as 
the primary constituent of human flourishing, Aristotle saw virtue, human 
                                                          
223
 Rawls, A theory of Justice, 436. 
224
 He argues that in a teleological approach, “the rightness of actions or the virtuousness of traits 
depends on their causal relation to the good”.
 
Gregory Velazco y Trianosky, “What is virtue ethics 
all about?” 47. 
225
 Statman, “Introduction to Virtue Ethics,” 10-11. 
226
 G. H. von Wright The varieties of goodness, (London: Humanities Press, 1963), 140. 
227
 Julia Driver “The virtues and human nature”, 122. 
228
 Watson, “On the primacy of character”, 57. 
78 
 
excellence, as constitutive of, not instrumental to, human flourishing.229  This is an 
important distinction.  
 
It is in this sense that Anscombe, too, is non teleological, while seeking to retain a 
close connection between virtue and human good. 230  Swanton defends the non 
utilitarian character of virtue ethics comparing it, for this purpose, with 
deontological ethics. 231  She too maintains a strong connection between virtue 
and human flourishing. Others, like Slote, are of a radical non-teleological 
orientation and prefer not to link virtues to wellbeing. Slote consciously adopts an 
agent based ethics that regards virtues as admirable traits not tied to the 
promotion of further good, 232 arguing that it is the intrinsic features of virtue that 
make it attractive, and even that the “contribution” of virtues to an agent’s 
wellbeing should be disregarded.233   
 
Alasdair Macintyre, although adopting a teleological position, offers a meeting 
point for teleological and non teleological approaches. He insists that virtue is not 
a means to enjoyment, rather fulfilment and enjoyment are integral to the very 
exercise of virtue. 234    
 
Virtue empowers from within and cannot be understood as a means to be utilized 
in the pursuit of happiness. Macintyre’s understanding is that virtue empowers us 
to do things which will bring in themselves fulfilment.  
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and 
exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods 
which are internal (the outcome of which is a good for the 
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whole community) to practices and the lack of which effectively 
prevents us from achieving any such goods.235  
 
1.6.3 This study is situated under the umbrella of eudaimonist virtue ethics. 
 
The current study subscribes to a moderate Aristotelian eudaimonist approach in 
which virtues, acquired and exercised for their own sake, are constitutive 
elements of human flourishing and wellbeing, denoted sometimes by the 
Aristotelian term eudaimonia.   
 
While, as we have seen, virtue ethicists adopt either a teleological view, that 
virtues enable human flourishing, or a non teleological account, that virtues are 
worthy in themselves, Aristotle adopts the teleological position. According to 
Aristotle, it is the promotion of human flourishing, eudaimonism, that makes a 
trait a virtue. In line with Aristotle, Statman asks, “If the virtues are not derived 
from the notion of flourishing, where are they derived from?”236 He argues that 
Aristotle takes for granted the virtues really are virtues and that the goods they 
promote are really worth having. Rejecting the extremes that a non teleological 
approach imposes, Statman argues that Aristotle held “to quite a moderate 
version of virtue ethics (if at all)”.237 
 
Within the range of positions adopted by teleological virtue ethicists with respect 
to end, Rosalind Hursthouse and Christine Swanton offer finely nuanced accounts 
illustrating the richness of current scholarship.  Of the two, the approach of 
Hursthouse is the more Aristotelian. She combines eudaimonism with 
“naturalism, the view that what makes a trait of character a virtue is its being 
partially constitutive of non-defectiveness in human beings”. She sees virtue as a 
trait “that makes a human good qua human”, serving also the flourishing of the 
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species. Hursthouse sums up, “A virtue is a character trait that a human being 
needs for eudaimonia, to flourish and live well.”238  
 
Swanton argues that Aristotle fails to make a satisfactory link between the 
demands of the world and the flourishing of the virtuous person. She suggests 
that he insufficiently develops an account of flourishing. “We do not, in Aristotle, 
understand virtues via an account of flourishing - we understand flourishing via an 
account of the virtues.”239 
 
Each however provides an effective answer to The Thesis of Non Aretaic Value, 
the assertion that the base level goods of flourishing are prior to virtue and that 
therefore virtue is derivative. Swanton does so explicitly, herself drawing on 
Aristotle, arguing that the base level goods of flourishing must be considered 
more broadly than goods as such. She argues that Aristotle regarded the field of 
virtues as pertaining to pleasures, friends and small details, not necessarily good 
or evil in themselves, etc, in other words “being”, itself.  
 
Ultimately Swanton argues that virtue is a responsiveness to being, that the 
appropriate responsiveness of a human being is virtuous, and that it is human 
nature that imparts to the goods of flourishing their value; hence their value is 
intrinsically related, but not prior, to virtue itself. 240 Ultimately, she says, the 
complexity of virtue is derived from the complexity of human nature itself. 241   
 
These views sit most comfortably with the notion that virtues are a flourishing at 
both the organic and personal levels, the approach that this study has taken. 
These explorations into a biophysical basis for eudaimonia will be taken up again 
in 6.2. 
 
1.7 An overview of the potential benefits of this study.  
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The object of this study is the accord between the acquisition of moral virtues, 
understood as good habits enabling human flourishing, and neuroscientific 
knowledge of how the human being develops. This study argues that virtue 
development is fitting and proper to the development of mature human beings. 
As such it brings together ethics and neuroscience with a view to drawing 
practical, albeit brief, conclusions in the field of moral education.  
 
It is hoped that outcomes from this study will include the following. 
 
Contributions to medical science.  
i. This review of mechanisms of plasticity and learning, of goal election, habit 
formation, cognitive processing, moral activity and emotional regulation, 
cross referenced to physically identifiable characteristics of virtue, will 
draw conclusions at the macro level about the systems, mechanisms, 
processes and brain structures underpinning virtue.  
ii. Among various conclusions, new insights will be offered into the role of 
deep cortical structures, such as the basal ganglia (BG), in the operation of 
the virtues. The view will be offered that the operation of virtue should be 
considered as a “macro” system within the brain. 
Contributions to ethics. 
i. This endorsement of a virtue based approach to living has the potential to 
contribute to the debate evaluating the contrasting approaches to ethics. 
ii. In particular, this understanding at the biological level of the operation 
and development of virtues promises to emphasise the necessity for 
virtue, and therefore virtue ethics, for effective moral education and 
human flourishing.  
Contributions to philosophy of mind. 
i. Insights into neuroscience in the light of an hylomorphic approach to 
philosophy of mind offer the possibility of effective critiques of other 
current writing on the topic.  
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ii. In particular it is hoped that this study contributes to effective responses 
to non-reductive and reductive physicalist approaches, and to dualistic 
understandings of one form or another. 
Contributions to Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. 
i. The attempt to reconcile  Aristotelian-Thomistic understandings with 
current neuroscientific knowledge has the potential not only to enrich 
neuroscience by offering it a coherent template for human nature and 
activity, but also to enrich and contemporize this philosophical tradition. 
ii. Among other conclusions, it is hoped that discussion about the nature of 
various cardinal virtues yields insights into the unity of the virtues, ie the 
integration of the four cardinal virtues in each human action. 
iii. Furthermore it is hoped that this investigation into the nature of virtue, in 
the light both of neuroscience and the Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition, 
assists in clarifying the relationship between rationality and virtue, and 
therefore in delineating what could be termed “the biological dimension” 
of virtue.    
Contributions to education. 
i. The discussion of neuroscientific development will lead to numerous 
conclusions about optimum pedagogical methods. 
ii. Brief and practical conclusions will be drawn with respect to parenting. 
 
1.8  Conclusion 
 
This study investigates the neural bases for moral virtue in the Aristotelian-
Thomistic understanding, and whether or not this neural basis is integral to the 
notion of fulfilment or eudaimonia.  
 
My starting point in this chapter has been to establish a prima facie case for the 
profound integration of the physical and the rational in the human person. I have 
noted the effectiveness of an hylomorphic psychology in reconciling these realms 
and the contribution that hylomorphism has the potential to make to philosophy 
of mind. Having situated this study in the spectrum of contemporary approaches 
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to philosophy of mind, I then apply an hylomorphic critique to contemporary 
philosophy of mind in order to demonstrate the explanatory power of such an 
approach. I respond to the notion of “emergent rationality” that is prevalent in 
contemporary philosophy of mind.  
 
I then consider the place of this study within current approaches to ethics. The 
comparative advantages offered by virtue ethics are noted and I situate this study 
within the spectrum of approaches to virtue ethics itself, placing it under the 
broad heading of eudaimonist virtue ethics. Finally I offer an overview of expected 
outcomes to arise from this study. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Neural Mechanisms and Systems. 
 
I saw the hideous phantasm of a man stretched out, and then, on the working of some powerful 
engine, show signs of life, and stir with an uneasy, half vital motion. Frightful must it be; 
for SUPREMELY frightful would be the effect of any human endeavour to mock the stupendous 
mechanism of the Creator of the world. 
Preface to the 1831 Edition 
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus 
Mary Shelley 
 
2.1 Overview. 
 
In this chapter I focus on particular areas of current neuroscientific research 
which, I suggest, are most relevant to the biological structures underpinning 
virtue.  
 
I focus first on the umbrella category of mechanisms underpinning brain plasticity, 
the anatomical restructuring of the brain in the process of learning, through the 
impact of environment or as a result of passive or freely elected experience. 
Plasticity is of central interest in this study because virtue is a manifestation of 
conscious experiential learning. I review the numerous cellular, molecular and 
genetic systems and mechanisms of neuronal structural plasticity, and suggest 
that mechanisms of structural plasticity underpin the formation of virtue, 
understood as good habits. “Neuroplasticity is the key bridging process” for 
learning. 242 Plastic anatomical changes are at the neuronal basis of a range of 
phenomena, including habitual actions,243 and the attention, motivation and goal 
election required in conscious learning.  
 
I then present current research into learning and memory. It is argued that, as 
virtue development is a form of memory and learning, mechanisms of plasticity 
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such as long term potentiation (LTP) and other processes for synaptic 
strengthening, as well as other mechanisms such as myelination that serve to 
consolidate pathways, will be involved. Recently identified mechanisms for 
imitation associated with what are known as mirror neurons, discovered by Italian 
researchers in the early 1990s, are outlined as field that promises significant 
insights into forms of imitative learning that occur in the early stages of virtue 
development.  
 
Then I review studies representative of major themes of current neuroscientific 
research in a number of areas. My focus is on the brain’s capacity to develop 
establish or consolidate pathways for behaviours and for the cognitive-emotional 
regulation of those behaviours. Mechanisms of plasticity accord a degree of 
permanence to the neurobiological changes in each of these areas and hence to 
the behaviours supported by those neural bases.  
 
 Currents of contemporary research into the role of the BG are reviewed. 
The BG have been understood for decades as having a role in the 
formation of motor habits, but now also their contribution to decision 
making and motivation is recognised.  
 I then consider the neural bases for emotional control. Emotional control is 
central to a life of virtue. Virtue, as will be seen below, was understood by 
Aristotle and Aquinas to empower us to manage our emotional lives. 
 Then the focus moves to current research into goal directed behaviours 
and reward activation. Virtue consists not just any habitual action, but in 
consciously elected good habits. Reward pathways provide a key 
mechanism for positive goal election which is a necessary aspect of the 
process of the development of virtue.  
 The final section in this chapter will review strands of current research in 
the vast field of cognition and executive function. I will consider neural 
bases for cognition and executive function including consideration of 
consequences, planning, goal election and executive direction. Virtue, as 
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understood by Aristotle and Aquinas, is a characteristic of rational life, and 
therefore it is essential that any proposal for the neural bases of virtue 
encompass conscious executive direction, decision making, planning, 
assessment of consequences, all in the light of the underpinning 
Aristotelian anthropology discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
This selection of areas of focus has been progressively refined at the draft stage of 
writing in the light of the analysis I develop in Chapter 5.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Gross anatomy of the human brain. 
Source: Moore, K.L.et al. Clinically oriented anatomy. Philadelphia: Wolters Kluwer, 2010. 879. 
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Specific neuroscientific content essential to the argument of the thesis is included 
within this study proper. Familiarity with the fundamentals of contemporary 
neuroscience is treated as assumed knowledge so I recommend that readers with 
a non scientific background refer to Appendix 2. A Brief Introduction to 
Neuroscientific Concepts and Terminology.244 
 
2.1.1 Rationale for the structure adopted. 
 
In this section my selection of the above areas of investigation is discussed and 
justified.  
 
My argument is summarised as follows. New imaging techniques and a 
consequent increasing weight of studies argue that it is possible to identify 
specific areas, pathways, systems and mechanisms in the brain that, at the neural 
level, support behaviour. Moreover the Templeton grants provide a rule-of-thumb 
confirmation that areas of investigation in this study are consistent with the 
contemporary attempts of others.  Furthermore a simple analysis of the human 
act identifies a number of key systems that one would expect to find implicated in 
habitual behaviours. Finally, several arguments are proposed with a view to 
justifying the inclusion of the BG as an important area of investigation in this 
study. 
 
2.1.1.1 Imaging the brain. 
 
Although there is no literature detailing the neural substrates for virtue, rigorously 
defined, it is a fortuitous time to be attempting such a task. A wealth of data and 
enriched understanding of brain structure and function have come to light in the 
past two decades directly as a result of new imaging techniques. Neuroscientist 
Antonio Damasio wrote in 2005, “More may have been learned about the brain 
and the mind in the 1990s, than during the entire previous history of psychology 
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and neuroscience.”245 These imaging techniques not only permit high resolution 
studies of brain activation in real time, but they offer insights into previously  
unrecognised contributions of deep brain regions, and the data may be applied to 
an understanding of virtue as good habit, simplistically speaking.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2    Examples of high resolution magnetic resonance images.  These are T2 weighted 
images in which white matter (myelination) appears darker than grey matter.  
Source: Nolte, John. The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy.  6th ed. Philadelphia: 
Mosby, 2009. 116. Obtained by courtesy of Dr Joachim F. Seeger, University of Arizona College of Medicine.  
 
 
 
The implications for a greater understanding of human behaviour are far reaching. 
Pontifical Academy of the Sciences gathering of experts in Human Neuroplasticity 
and Education in October 2010 concluded:  
The methods of brain and cognitive sciences have reached a 
stage such that we can now objectively monitor the 
developmental trajectory of the child’s brain and document 
how this trajectory is being shaped by parenting, education, 
and other environmental influences.246 
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These imaging advances have allowed more precise temporal and spatial 
identification of brain areas implicated in specific function and processes than has 
ever been possible before, and have led to a surge in understanding of plasticity in 
the brain, of localised functionalities, of connectivities, and of the scale of cortical  
networking. 
  
See 2.1.3.e. for caveats regarding neuroimaging. Principal neuroimaging 
technologies in use are summarised in Appendix 3 Neuroimaging Technologies.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 
 
 
An example of the use of combined PET and MRI imagery to detect areas of 
increased cortical activity in specified tasks. Imaging demonstrates changes in 
blood flow on the lateral surface of the occipital lobe as subjects attend to 
moving visual (as opposed to stationary) stimuli. The four images in each row 
are of the same subject. PET scanning after intravenous injection of H2
15
O 
mapped blood flow, and T1-weighted MRI scans permitted reconstruction of the 
surface of each brain. Data was then coregistered.  Source: Watson, J.D.G. et al. 
Cerebral Cortex 3:79 (1993). Cited in Nolte, John. The human brain. An introduction to its functional 
anatomy.  6th ed. Philadelphia: Mosby, 2009. 136.  
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2.1.1.2 Prima facie confirmation for the broad direction of this investigation: 
Projects recognised in the 2009 Templeton Positive Neuroscience 
Awards. 
 
In 2009 the Templeton Foundation fund offered substantial grants, the Positive 
Neuroscience Awards, for research into the neural bases for virtue. 247  Impelled 
by this support there has been an explosion of research focussing explicitly on the 
neural bases of virtue. Topics of the projects chosen by the recipients of the first 
round of grants are broad and disparate:  
 The effect of specific genes on the neurotransmitter dopamine (DA) which 
is understood to be a factor in resilience. 
 The neural processing of attention in schizophrenics and meditators.  
 The relationship between social support and genetic action.  
 The effects of meditation on the structure and function of the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), hippocampus, and amygdala, 
brain regions part of the neural circuit critical for deactivating conditioned 
fears.  
 Neural connectivity in musicians.  
 Whether heroically altruistic people show greatest sensitivity to fearful 
expressions, more amygdala activation, and enhanced amygdala-
prefrontal connectivity.  
 The neural bases of trained resilience following intense stress. 
 Activity in the reward areas of the brain when subjects share the positive 
emotions of others.  
 The relationship between the activity of nerve fibres transmitting gentle 
touch, empathy and bonding.  
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 Brain regions for empathy and altruism.  
 A study of the impact of genotype, and hormonal, and neural differences 
in nurturing behaviour of fathers.  
 The relation of reward systems of the brain to intrinsic reward.  
 A study of the possibilities of altering the response of one’s amygdala.  
 A study of the neural processes supporting positive thought and affiliation 
to others.  
 A study of the cooperation of various neural regions in the processing of 
emotion.  
 
The areas of interest in these projects are broadly in accord with those selected in 
this chapter. However it is noticeable that Templeton projects appear to lack a 
rich understanding of virtue that could assist in directing their search. The work of 
Chapters 3 and 4 will directly focus on provision of a coherent underlying 
definition of virtue to assist in identification of neural bases.  
 
Several observations are relevant:  
 The Templeton list provides insights into current thinking about the neural 
bases of virtue. There is agreement that the neural bases of virtue are 
identifiable and that they are multifaceted. 
 All subheading themes which are the focus of Chapter 2 are represented in 
this current list, except, tellingly that of 2.4 focussing on the role of the BG. 
It is possible this is so because the classic definition of virtue as good habit 
has been overlooked. It is proposed that an Aristotelian-Thomistic 
anthropology and definition of virtue can greatly assist the search for the 
neural bases of virtue. 
 Furthermore without an Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of the 
intrinsic relationship of virtue to human flourishing, the neural features of 
virtue may well remain elusive for they will have lost a connection with 
biological development. This current study proposes that the neural bases 
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of virtue, in the light of Aristotelian thought, denote not only the holistic 
but also the biological flourishing of the organism. 
 
It is hoped that his current study seeking neural bases consistent both with 
rational psychology and the neuroscience will add substantially to the endeavour 
of identifying the neural bases of virtue. 
 
2.1.1.3 The human act provides insight into the function of virtue. 
 
A further key to this task is the enriched understanding of the human act offered 
by Aristotle and Aquinas. In a simplified model of any human act, there are four 
steps leading to rational action: desire, emotion, reason, and choice/action. Such a 
division provides a starting point for productive analysis with the purpose of 
identifying neural correlates. Virtue must essentially be understood as the stable 
disposition to act well, ie to carry out these four steps well. (See 3.1.3 for 
elaboration of these points.)   
 Desire corresponds to the motivation underpinning acts. Aristotle argues 
that, when a creature acts virtuously, it is motivated by the desire of acting 
for its own natural good. Aquinas writes similarly, “a good habit is one 
which disposes to an act suitable to the agent’s nature”.248 Hence the 
motivational pathways, the pathways of reward activation, appear 
implicated in our search for the neural bases of virtue. A further feature at 
this point may be the pleasure that Aristotle argues accompanies the 
exercise of virtue.249  
 A second key to understanding the neuroscience of virtue is to understand 
the neuroscience of emotion. A classical understanding of virtue is that it 
assists us to manage our emotional lives; hence, the neural bases for 
emotion, and for the cortical regulation of emotional pathways, appear 
implicated.  
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 Next we apply the understanding that human acts, and hence virtuous acts 
as a subset of human acts, must be guided by reason. Aquinas wrote, “the 
habits of the moral virtues are caused in the appetitive powers, according 
as they are moved by the reason”.250  The various pathways of the brain 
that contribute to planning, memory, logic and cognition, are relevant 
here.  
 Furthermore all human acts require the exercise of choice. The co-
constituent of man’s rationality is the will, man’s capacity for choice.251 In 
fact, Aristotle proposed that virtue is the “habit of choosing”. The neural 
bases of executive action, goal election and attentional systems appear 
implicated in the neuroscience of virtue. 
 
Add to these constituent steps of the human act, the understanding that virtue is 
a stable and easily repeated behaviour. So, it is necessary to investigate the 
neuroscience of habit formation.  Further, it will be argued in Chapters 3 and 4 
that the four cardinal virtues have distinctive roles each with specific neural basis. 
Hence distinction at the neural level, of the four cardinal virtues, will be also 
require discussion. 
 
2.1.1.4 Insights into the basal ganglia. 
 
The brain regions and pathways associated with the BG, linking habit formation 
and volition, appear to offer a significant key to understanding the neural bases of 
virtue. Research into the BG sheds light on procedural memory and habit learning, 
and recent studies of cortical plasticity and the role of BG-thalamo-cortical loops 
with their widespread cognitive-emotional interaction offer understanding of 
processes of planning, goal selection, self regulation, attention and motivation. 
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a) Pathological insights into dysfunctional basal ganglia: Huntington disease, 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Parkinson disease, and Encephalitis Lethargica. 
 
Pathological studies into Huntington disease, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD), Parkinson disease, and Encephalitis Lethargica (EL), assisted by new 
imaging technologies, argue for an expanded role attributable to the BG. 
Consistent with this view, this study presents the BG as an important player in the 
complex interplay of multiple brain regions active in reward and emotion 
processing, motor instruction, and goal election. Prior to this study there appears 
to be no literature identifying a decisive role of the BG in the formation and 
exercise of virtue. 
 
An important source of knowledge about the brain, and particularly about 
subcortical structures is obtained through autopsy seeking causes for abnormal 
behaviours in the years preceding death. A number of conditions are linked to 
diseases of the BG. Although loss of motor control is the most obvious 
manifestation in each case, behaviour change associated with the illness provides 
insight into the breadth of function of the BG. In many cases dysfunction in the BG 
has been associated with a significant loss of emotional regulation, executive 
capacity, and capacity to read social cues.252 
 
In The Exceptional Brain, Robert Kaplan, a clinical professor of psychiatry, 
documents the trajectory of BG diseases of the BG on Woody Guthrie (Huntington 
Disease), Howard Hughes (OCD), and Adolf Hitler (Parkinson Disease).  His broad 
brush conclusions throw into relief the cognitive contribution of the BG, thereby 
adding weight to the view that the BG play an integral role not only in motor 
function but also in the development of conscious and volitional habits.  
 
The most significant conclusions may be summarized: 
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 Huntington disease is characterised by uncontrolled movements, not 
uncommonly accompanied by symptoms of psychological dysfunction: 
increased moodiness, anger, loss of self control, depression, substance 
abuse, absence of personal hygiene and loss of sexual inhibition. Psychoses 
are evident in up to 12% of cases. 253 Huntington disease is caused by 
neural degeneration in the BG as a result of a gene mutation. Huntington is 
characterised by severe degeneration of the putamen and caudate in the 
BG and of the frontal cerebral cortex, and is associated with an excess of, 
or supersensitivity to, DA in the substantia nigra (SN).254 That Huntington is 
associated with changes in personality and psychological health argues for 
a broader attribution to the BG than that of movement control.  
 OCD is associated with obsessional behaviours. Untreated OCD can 
develop a psychiatric or psychotic dimension, a loss of touch with reality. 
OCD is caused by dysfunction in the caudate nucleus and irregularities in 
the BG (with some frontal cortex contribution) of DA and 5-
hydroxytryptamine (5-HT) more commonly known as serotonin. The 
repetitive nature of activity appears caused by excessive DA release. 
Anxiety manifests as a comorbidity when this compulsivity is associated 
with lack of 5-HT control over DA release. 255 Kaplan describes OCD as “an 
anxiety disorder”. That this disease of the BG may often be successfully 
treated by cognitive therapies,256 possibly suggests that the caudate 
possesses plasticity, and that the caudate has a cognitive role. 257 In any 
case, intractable cases of OCD can be successfully resolved by operating to 
disconnect the pathway between the thalamus and the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC), the striato-thalamocortical pathway. That OCD is associated with 
changes in personality and psychological health argues for a broader 
attribution to the BG than that of the mediation of repetitive behaviours. 
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 Parkinson disease is a common movement disorder resulting from 
degeneration of the BG. Some 50% of sufferers of Parkinson disease also 
show cortical and executive function deficits in addition. Parkinson can also 
be associated with the development of OCD.  Both these comorbidities 
attest to the cognitive contribution of the BG. When the DA inhibitory 
influence in the BG is diminished, the tremors of Parkinson disease 
develop. 258 259 
 
Furthermore, encephalitis lethargica (EL) the mysterious sleepy sickness epidemic 
early in the 20th century, appears to have been a disease of the BG. Amongst the 
alarming effects were a loss of will, and at times an insensitivity to situations 
requiring will power.260 
 
b) A role for the basal ganglia in volitional habits.  
 
The pathways and mechanisms of addition (2.6.6) and insights into the cognitive 
consequences of diseases of the BG provide important insights into the 
development of volitional habits. The fact that addictions develop not only from 
the intake of substances (for example, nicotine and alcohol), but also from 
behaviours (for example morally negative behaviours such as viewing 
pornography, and morally neutral behaviours such as computer gaming and 
distance running). A subject may find himself addicted against his will because of 
ignorance of addictive behaviours (video gaming, for example), but an addiction 
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may also result from the subject knowingly indulging in an activity that he knows 
will become harder and harder to resist.   This raises the distinct likelihood that 
positive behaviours may also be pursued with intention that such behaviours 
become facilitated.   
 
Of course not all activities become addictive; no amount of washing up or making 
our beds will give us an addiction to washing up or making our beds. Yet it is 
universal human experience that activities frequently performed in childhood 
induce not only a capacity to perform that activity in adult life, but also a tendency 
to do so (to make one’s bed on rising, to wash glasses rather than leave them in 
the sink, etc). Such tendencies are not addictions, but are rather what we could 
call volitional habits.  
 
It is possible to propose that these volitional habits may be mediated by plasticity 
in the upper cortex but this explanation in isolation appears less than adequate. It 
fails to take into account the demonstrated role of the BG in mediating repetitive 
behaviours arising from addiction, OCD, Tourette Syndrome, and in its 
demonstrated contribution to consciously directed movement, a role that has 
become dysfunctional in Huntington, Parkinson and EL. There is a very strong case 
to be made that the BG are integrally involved in the development of volitional 
habits (2.4): 
 
 We know that, without dependency on the PFC, the BG are integral to 
non-volitional habits, addiction and compulsions (OCD, Tourette 
Syndrome, etc). It does not logically follow that just because the BG are 
integral to non-volitional habits that they are not also implicated in 
volitional habits. In fact, given recent knowledge of pathways, 
interdependence, and the cognitive contribution of lower cortical 
structures, I suggest the weight of evidence has dramatically shifted 
towards this latter view.  
 The role of the BG is now increasingly understood in both cognitive 
operations, and in reward based activity, and therefore in emotional 
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management and goal setting. The role of the BG in instructing cortical 
areas, in clarifying motor and reward messages to cortical areas, is now 
also better understood.  (See especially 2.4 and 2.6 for references.) 
 We now know that reward representations in the cortex, in the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and PFC (see 2.6.5) are linked to the reward 
representations in the BG. Horvitz, for example, draws attention to the 
sustained activity in cells of the striatum in anticipation of reward as a 
mirror of reward coding in the OFC.261 Such cortical management of 
striatally based behaviour patterns is consistent with the action of virtue. 
 We also know that these volitional, reward based responses are mediated 
in the ventral striatum, and that in time these transform to reward 
independent, overlearned experiences mediated in the dorsal striatum.262 
Sustained volitional behaviour in the face of a lessened significance of 
reward is consistent with the action of virtue. 
 
A mechanism for volitional habits appears present here. This appears to be a 
neural pathway integral to the support of virtues in the brain. It remains to be 
demonstrated whether the BG be implicated in the full range of habitual 
behaviours that arise through virtue, or only in simpler procedural, but volitional 
and virtuous, behaviours, such as habitual routines of work and courtesy, respect, 
and positive self talk.  
 
In conclusion, it may be seen that there is prima facie evidence for the selection of 
the key subheadings of Chapter 2: mechanisms of plasticity, mechanisms of 
learning, memory and imitation, understandings of particular neural structures 
with a particular focus on the BG, neural bases for emotional control, goal 
directed behaviours and reward activation, and cognition and executive function. 
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2.1.2 Search information. 
 
Information about my search for relevant neuroscientific studies is set out in 
Table 2.1 in the endpapers. My focus was to obtain studies representative of 
current knowledge. By preference I sought recent studies and recent, review 
studies.  Of the studies yielded by these literature searches, I deemed many 
inappropriate for selection because they were irrelevant to this project, too 
narrow in scope, anecdotal and pertaining to limited samples, or superseded by 
later studies. I obtained a number of other studies first identified as references in 
studies that I had selected in the search process.  In addition material was 
obtained from numerous recently published texts and monographs. Several 
prominent authors in the fields of plasticity were contacted in an effort to locate 
all relevant studies. In my final stage of writing and editing, I checked for new 
information and included content from some 25-30 new studies. 
 
Consequently material obtained from close study of some 110 papers and 
approximately 30 recently published texts and monographs has been integrated 
into the discussion of this chapter.  
 
2.1.3 This neuroscientific investigation carries some caveats. 
 
Although the goal of associating complex psychological phenomenon with neural 
substrate is still very much a field in its infancy, this study draws on a growing 
tradition of highly credentialed contemporary literature which links function with 
specific processes, mechanisms, pathways and areas of the brain.  
 
Much about neural processes remains currently undescribed so it is necessary to 
be somewhat measured in conclusions. While likely biological mechanisms have 
been identified, the basis of the interface between biological molecular processes 
and conscious learning and memory is still conjectural. For example it is not 
understood how modifications of neuronal connections form a representation of 
reality to the person.  What has become clear is that the brain operates as a highly 
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complex network, with sophisticated, concurrent signalling and reciprocal 
interactions between multiple brain regions and systems, attuned to the 
orchestration of outputs at the service of the acting person.   
 
As is evident in Chapters 2, 3 and 5  this approach aligns with the methodology of 
much contemporary neuroscientific research in seeking to identify brain regions 
and pathways which are actively implicated in specific activities (eg executive, 
cognitive, attentional, limbic, sensory regions and pathways). While it is true that 
rigid localisation theories of the brain have given way to a broader focus on 
pathways, on integrated and flexibly acting brain regions, and on some 
appreciation of the complexity of networking in brain, it is also clear that specific 
areas and pathways demonstrate direct and at times critical involvement in 
particular functions.  
 
There are contrasting schools of thought with reference to the anatomo-
functional model, a form of localisation, that has arisen as a consequence of more 
precise imaging. Desmurget et al. propose that their data calls into question what 
they see as a fashion of functional localisation that has penetrated even our most 
complex human faculties. (See also 2.2.6.) They cite an extensive list of papers 
that they argue have taken the concept of localisation to an unwarranted degree, 
including the work of Anderson et al. in 1999 who placed our moral sense in the 
PFC, Azari et al. who argued that religious experience is built into our nervous 
system within a restricted fronto-parietal network, and Bartel’s and Zeki’s thesis 
that romantic and maternal love engages the medial insula and the anterior 
cingulated cortex. They argue that the brain is not “a rigid mosaic of 
independently encapsulated modules.” 263  
 
Furthermore, philosopher Martha Nussbaum uses the very notion of plasticity to 
argue against precise localisation of function, and to oppose the view that we 
“include a particular physiological process as a necessary element in a definition of 
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a given emotion type”.264 Yet she uses the word plasticity in a slightly unusual 
manner in relation to the vast contemporary literature on physiology of the brain, 
suggesting that plasticity is opposed to a view that specific processes, pathways 
and locations may be identified with any certainty in the brain.  
 
These are however the dissenting voices. Although “functional localisation” is by 
no means a universally accepted position, a judicious acceptance of the notion of 
“localisation” may be found in the vast majority of relevant current studies. 
Certainly the old localisation theories are now discredited but new imaging 
approaches and advances in molecular biology are helping us identify when 
information about processes, pathways and locations is reliable or when greater 
caution should be applied. 
 
a) The brain is constantly in a state of change. 
 
The brain changes physically and constantly in response to input from within and 
outside the body. In addition to this passive process, the individual has the 
capacity to self-manage change. In other words every choice we make, wherever 
we direct our attention, every move we make, every word we speak, in short, 
every input from our environment, works change in our brains on a functional and 
often structural basis.  
 
This study takes the position, aligned with a great majority of current 
neuroscientific studies seeking neural bases for processes, that this state of 
constant change does not preclude the possibility of detecting patterns of neural 
activation.  
 
b) Our appreciation of the complexity of brain networking is at a rudimentary 
level.   
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The complexity of the human brain is a result not only of the vast numbers of 
neurons and glial cells (some 100 billion neurons and perhaps twice that number 
of glial cells), nor simply of the number of synaptic interconnections between 
neurons (estimated at an average of several thousand per neuron), but also of the 
pathways and networking that integrate the various brain regions. For example, 
the significance of certain subcortical areas reciprocally connected to the cortex is 
being increasingly understood. Sub-cortical areas that had been thought, only two 
decades ago, to be mere relay stations for motor commands are now understood 
to play integral roles in cognitive function. The complex contribution of the 
cortico-striatal-thalamocortical pathways, as a further example, have been a rich 
field of research in recent years. 
 
As scanning technologies have improved, localisation theories of the brain have 
given way to an understanding of the flexibility, complexity and integration of 
neural networking. In 5.3 I will be discussing the extension of neural networking 
and collaboration of systems in the brain. Within this context much contemporary 
neuroscientific research seeks identify brain regions which are actively implicated 
in specific function.265 It remains clear that specific areas demonstrate direct and 
at times critical involvement in particular functions. Conclusions in this study will 
be required to respect principles of functional integration and of specific function.  
 
c) The basis of the interface between molecular processes and conscious 
processes, such as learning and memory, is still conjectural.  
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Although various convincing hypotheses (eg LTP) are proposed for the molecular 
mechanisms of memory with the support of a growing body of evidence, and 
while the manner by which networked neurons may mediate memory and 
learning is supported by plausible computer modelling, the actual processes are 
not described. Currently there is no neuroscientific understanding of the 
relationship between neural mechanisms and mental representations.266 The 
position of this study, based on the integrity of rational and the biological in man 
according to Aristotle and Aquinas, is that mental and biological events are 
coincident manifestations of the one phenomenon. (Refer to Chapter 1 
discussion.) 
 
In line with the abundant current research into plasticity, memory and learning, 
we will seek to identify processes, mechanisms and pathways that are implicated 
and, at times critically so, in the functioning of the person.  
 
d) Our experimental knowledge of brain function is derived from animal as well 
as human studies.   
 
It is necessary to be cautious in transferring conclusions in animal studies to the 
human domain. Nevertheless “clinical findings strikingly parallel animal 
experimentation data,” indicating that function and structure can be highly 
phylogenetically conserved.267 
 
e) Our capacity to study neuronal activity in real time and with precision is 
uneven and still developing.  
 
The “voodoo correlations” and “neurotrash” line of criticism popularised by 
Raymond Tallis, in rubbishing practically every attempt to relate localised brain 
function to human behaviour, goes beyond what is broadly acceptable in the 
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neuroscience community.268 Of more weight however are the tightly argued 
criticisms of Edward Vul et al.269  
 
Neuroimaging has definite limitations. Educator and neuroscientist John Geake 
comments: 270  
 We must always bear in mind that brain structure is extremely complex, 
and function, non linear.  
 The vast functional interconnectivity of the brain means that mappings of 
structure to function, the neural bases of specific tasks,271 are not straight 
forward activities.  
 The data is limited by the imaging method chosen.  
 Neuroimaging data is a statistical comparison of indicators of neural 
activation against a baseline that has been set by the researcher, and that, 
as “most of the brain is involved in any cognitive task”, changes in 
statistical parameters will change the apparent results. Imaging data 
defining areas of heightened neural activity in a given task certainly must 
not be interpreted to mean that other areas of the brain may not be 
implicated in that activity.272 
 The mere fact that an area of the brain is implicated in a given activity does 
not provide direct insight into the contribution that area makes.  
 
Johnson et al. reflect this wariness. They argue that imaging depends upon choices 
of the researcher: “thickness of brain slices, level of clarity and detail, techniques 
for filtering signal from noise, and choice of individuals to be sampled”; and they 
caution that there is rarely a 1:1 correspondence between region and function. 
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They cite a celebrated misuse of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
study of swinging voters prior to USA presidential elections to illustrate the 
problem of reverse inference and that because brain regions may be activated by 
many different processes, it may not be possible to draw conclusions about 
specific mental states, motivations and cognitive processes.273    
 
f)  Cross disciplinary studies involving neuroscience are uneven in quality.  
 
New fields such as neuroethics,274 and even neurotheology, have flourished, along 
with some intelligent to absolutely shonky writings and therapies blending brain 
science with educational, business and even entertainment.275 Usma Goswami has 
offered a telling review of “brain based” learning packages, too many of which, 
the author argues, are “scientifically spurious applications”.276 
 
A growing number of commentators in this field focus on fulfilment through 
relationships, finding evidence for this position in the neuroscience itself. For 
example, neuroscientist Daniel Siegel pioneers a field he calls “interpersonal 
neurobiology”, or the “neurobiology of we”.277 Despite the jargon, Siegel’s 
approach broadly accords with cognitive management of emotion, and with the 
view that attention and plasticity are linked. Unfortunately, and this is a common 
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problem faced by intuitive approaches, an impoverished anthropology fails to 
offer sure guidance to the applications of science.    
 
… 
 
My investigation will respect these caveats. My intention is to propose, by means 
of an integrative analysis of current research into brain function, a highly plausible 
model for the biological bases of virtue, the accuracy of which could be laboratory 
tested in the future. By highlighting the expansive trend in plasticity studies, and 
by making cross disciplinary links, I hope to stimulate interest in what I see as an 
important field for further exploration.  
 
2.2 Plasticity. 
 
Neuroplasticity refers to the ability of neurons to change their function, chemical 
profile (amount and types of neurotransmitters produced), or structure in 
response to learning, environment or experience.278  
 
The phenomenon of plasticity is of particular interest in this study because it is 
widely accepted that it provides the underlying mechanisms for learning and 
memory. Processes of learning and memory, in turn are central to the 
development of virtue, particularly habit formation, of ready attention, and of the 
associated goal directed behaviours that underpin purposeful action.   
 
Plasticity may be categorised as functional or structural. It is also described as 
developmental, or activity/environmentally dependent plasticity. Note that these 
categories are not exclusive of each other. Much developmental plasticity is 
driven by timely environmental inputs, and structural change is perhaps always 
accompanied by functional change.  
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Figure 2.4      The astonishing capacity for structural change in the brain, for reengineering 
connectivities and function. Pre- and post-operative T1-weighted MRI show removal 
of total glioma and resection of right paralimbic system. Despite post-surgical 
hemiparesia, within three months the patient had completely recovered.  
Source: Desmurget, M. et al. “Contrasting acute and slow growing lesions: a new door to brain plasticity 
(Review).” Brain, 130 (2007). 903. 
 
2.2.1 Historical considerations. 
 
Plasticity, as a term in neuroscience, was first used by William James in 1890 in 
reference to the potential for humans to modify their behaviour. Remarkably, he 
linked plasticity to habitual behaviours. He wrote: 
Plasticity [. . .] means the possession of a structure weak 
enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield 
all at once. Each relatively stable phase of equilibrium in such a 
structure is marked by what we may call a new set of habits. 
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Organic matter, especially nervous tissue, seems endowed with 
a very extraordinary degree of plasticity of this sort; so that we 
may without hesitation lay down as our first proposition the 
following, that the phenomena of habit in living beings are due 
to the plasticity.279  
 
In 1895 the great Spanish neuroscientist Ramon y Cajal offered the hypothesis 
that learning could be based on the selective strengthening of synapses, now 
recognised as a central mechanism for plasticity. He predicted both experience-
induced, plastic change to neuronal pathways and also genetically-driven, 
developmental plasticity,280 and that association learning might involve 
morphological and functional changes at the synapse. He wrote in 1904 of “the 
formation of new pathways through ramification and progressive growth of the 
dendritic arborization and the nervous terminals.”281 He argued, “The organ of 
thought is, within certain limits, malleable and perfectible by will-directed, mental 
exercise” and that “mental practice” must strengthen neuronal connections and 
create new ones.282  
 
At the heart of plasticity is the distinction, described by Jerzy Konorski in 1948, 
between, on the one hand, the neuronal reaction to an incoming impulse, in other 
words the neuron’s excitability, and, on the other, the permanent functional 
transformations and the corresponding anatomical changes, plastic changes that 
arise in particular systems of neurons as a result of appropriate stimuli.283   
 
The following year Donald Hebb, another giant in the field of neuroscience, 
described what has become known as the Hebbian principle: “Cells that fire 
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together wire together”284 and its corollary “Cells that fire out of sync lose their 
link”.285 Hebb postulated conditions under which synapses change on the basis of 
activation: “When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and 
repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic 
change takes place in one or both cells such that A’s efficiency, as one of the cells 
firing B, is increased.”286   
 
With repeated firing, nerve cells become firmly connected. In this way, neuronal 
pathways are self reinforcing. Furthermore whichever cell is triggered first, 
connected neurons tend to fire in concert, as one unit. Donald Hebb had 
successfully described the principle underpinning activity-dependent plasticity: 
that changes in synaptic strength correspond to changes in neuronal morphology.  
 
Arden and Linford explain, “On the macro level: the more often we do something, 
the more likely we are to do it again.”287 This principle is at the basis of much 
experience dependent plasticity whereby cells that excite other cells cause those 
cells to become linked in their firing characteristics. This study proposes that 
experience dependent plasticity at the neuronal level as the fundamental 
mechanism for reinforcement of behaviours through repetition.  
 
When we speak of activity dependent plasticity, we are referring first of all to 
electrical activity within the neuron. “Structural plasticity in the mature brain is 
guided by neuronal activity.”288 Synaptogenesis, neurite outgrowth and other 
forms of structural change are driven by electro-chemical processes associated 
with neuronal activity.  
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Plasticity was first documented by Timothy Bliss and Terje Lomo in their 1973 
discovery of LTP as a stable modification of synaptic strength. That dendritic 
length and branching complexity could be altered by experience was documented 
in the late 70s by Fiala et al. and by Pysh and Weiss.  Later Eric Kandel was 
awarded the 2004 Nobel Prize for his identification in the 1960s and 70s of the 
Hebbian mechanism as a basis of memory and learning in the sea slug Aplysia.289 
 
It is now accepted that plasticity is present in all parts of the mature brain.290  
Pioneer in plasticity studies, Alvaro Pascual-Leone, writes: “Plasticity is an 
obligatory consequence of all neural activity (even mental practice), and 
environmental pressures, functional significance, and experience are critical 
factors.”291  
 
Lashley had suggested in 1950 that the brain is equipotent, able to compensate 
for any lesion, and yet, while this view is not borne out empirically, in the last two 
decades there has been a growing recognition of the enormous plasticity of the 
brain.292 “Synaptic plasticity may be the rule throughout the brain, rather than the 
exception,” comments one study. 293 294  Norman Doidge, psychiatrist and popular 
science writer, calls plasticity “one of the most extraordinary discoveries of the 
twentieth century”.295   
 
2.2.2 Plasticity is categorised as functional or structural.  
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 Source for this section unless otherwise attributed: Byrne, John H. “Learning and memory: basic 
mechanisms” in Fundamental Neuroscience. 3
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 ed. Larry Squire et al.,Chapter 49. Burlington, MA: 
Elsevier, 2008. 
290
 Butz, “Activity dependent structural plasticity (Review),” 287-305.  
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 Pascual-Leone, Alvaro, “The Plastic Human Brain Cortex,” 395. 
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 For clinical observations of remarkable plasticities in action: Desmurget, “Contrasting acute and 
slow growing lesions: a new door to brain plasticity (Review),” 898-914. See also Doidge, The Brain 
that changes itself.   
293
 J. A. Blundon and S. S. Zakharenko, “Dissecting the components of LTP,” The Neuroscientist 14 
(2008): 6. 
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 Cf Desmurget, “Contrasting acute and slow growing lesions: a new door to brain plasticity 
(Review),” 908. The authors comment: “Massive brain lesions within almost any area of the brain, 
including the supposedly untouchable eloquent areas, can often be effectively counterbalanced by 
adjacent and remote changes in neural organisations ... (revealing) astonishing plasticity.” 
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 There has been an evolving appreciation, in contrast with the most rigid forms of localisation 
theory, that elements of the human CNS have a potency for plastic change, and not infrequently 
repeated plastic change. Doidge, The brain that changes itself. 
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Functional plasticity is essentially any change in the transmission characteristics of 
a neuron without change to the anatomical connection between neurons. Usually 
this term is used in contrast to structural plasticity, even though structural 
changes themselves will normally lead to detectable changes in function.  
Functional plasticity usually takes place through temporary changes to synaptic 
strength. This may be for example, owing to a change in number and availability of 
post synaptic receptors, alteration to presynaptic release of neurotransmitter, and 
alteration of the thickness of synapse. This short term synaptic plasticity is a 
virtually ubiquitous form of plasticity in the brain. Another example would be the 
phenomenon whereby in certain conditions the frequency of firing patterns can 
up-regulate response thresholds in particular cells, habituating the neuronal 
response.  
 
Structural plasticity is the anatomical remodelling of neural pathways. Typically it 
may involve changes to numbers of synapses and neurons, or changes to 
branching and connectivity patterns. As noted above structural changes bring 
about an altered function. 
 
Sometimes, but not always, structural change may also be a consequence of 
functional changes. For example, genetically induced structural changes may 
themselves be triggered by certain firing patterns. Structural changes are always 
mediated by intracellular chemical signalling and often lead on to changes in extra 
cellular signalling at the synapse.    
 
Note however that the distinction between functional and structural changes is 
increasingly blurred. Neuronally associated functional change often implies 
structural changes in some form or other. For example, we can now witness and 
measure in actu the rapid growth or retractions of dendritic spines, and the 
discharge of single neurons. These phenomena bring about not only molecular but 
also morphological changes at the synapse, changes such as synaptogenesis, 
vesicle transport and receptor mobility.   
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Plasticity may also be subtractive, when neurons or synapses are eliminated. It 
may be reactive (after pharmacological intervention or surgery) or spontaneous 
(experience dependent). It is competitive, as demonstrated in countless studies; 
for example, visual topographic representations, rerouted to the auditory cortex, 
will compete for neural “real estate” at that location even when auditory input is 
present.296  
 
The brain’s capacity to lock in new behaviour has been dubbed, “the forgotten 
fourth aspect of plasticity”.297 William James’s linkage of habit with plasticity has 
already been noted. As this study is of the habits of virtue, durable changes 
established in character, I will focus principally on structural plasticities. It is highly 
consistent with an Aristotelian-Thomistic, ensouled-body anthropology that 
changes in our very character should be thus reflected in our biological 
constitution. Recall too that James emphasised the “stability” of the new state, 
the potential for us to be in a new way. This sits most comfortably with 
Aristotelian descriptor of virtue, to be seen in Chapter 3, as “that which makes us 
who we are”.   
 
 
2.2.3 The big picture: synaptic strengthening as the net result of structural 
plasticity. 
 
At their essence, all structural plasticities involve modifications to neural pathways 
either directly (direct modifications of neuronal pathways or adjustments to the 
anatomy of the neuron itself) or indirectly (through changes to the amount and 
types of neurotransmitter or neuromodulator produced).  
 
                                                          
296
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the developing brain,” Brain and Development 31 (2009): 1-10. 
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Neuronal function in almost all its aspects is dependent on intracellular signalling 
initiated at the cell surface. The cell’s response to neurotransmitters, growth 
factors and other signalling molecules depends on receptors and pathways that 
relay messages to intracellular compartments, and to the enzymes, ion channels 
and proteins in the cytoskeleton that mediate the effects of transmitters. The 
variety of ion channels and the flexibility of mechanisms regulating these 
channels, such as G-proteins, 298  second messengers, and cognate protein kinases 
that phosphorylate ion channels,299 greatly enhance the scope for modulating 
neuronal function. Responses are further modified through localisation and 
concentration of signal activity and by history of prior activity. It is believed that 
protein phosphorylation and the regulation of gene expression by intracellular 
signals are the most important mechanisms for neuronal plasticity.300 
 
Ultimately, synaptic strengthening will be the net result of both direct and indirect 
forms of modification of pathways. These permanent anatomic changes are 
mediated through gene expression.301 
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 G-protein linked signals are of particular interest to plasticity studies for they offer rich 
possibilities of modulation of cell function and plasticity. Their slower time frame for operation 
allows modulation of distant cell processes. Diffusion of second messengers extends messaging 
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 Source for intracellular signalling: Howard Schulman, and James L. Roberts, “Intracellular 
signalling” in Larry Squire et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3
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 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008), 
Chapter 10; Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 157-163. 
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 Genes are in a sense third messengers. Extracellular signals (neurotransmitters, hormones, 
drugs, growth factors, etc) are most influential at the point where transcription is being initiated.  
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Figure 2.5   Signal Transmission at the chemical synapse. 1.Nerve impulse arrives at synaptic knob. 
2. Voltage gated Ca
2+
 enters cell. 3. Ca
2+
 triggers exocytosis of synaptic vesicles. 4. 
Neurotransmitter suffuses across synaptic gap. 5. Neurotransmitters bind to ligand 
gated channels allowing Na
+ 
to flow into post synaptic neuron. 6. Postsynaptic 
potential develops.7. Action potential triggered in axon on post synaptic neuron.  
Source: Tortora, Gerard J. and Derrickson, Bryan. Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, 12th ed. New 
Jersey: Wiley, 2009. 442 
 
2.2.4 Developmental plasticity.302  303 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Critical to nuclear transcription is the role of the catalytic subunit of PKA that phosphorylates the 
activator protein CREB on entering the nucleus. Evidence is growing that some forms of long term 
memory require new gene expression. Intracellular signalling also affects nuclear gene expression. 
Schulman and Roberts, “Intracellular signaling.”  
302
 For an introduction: A. Siegal and Hreday N. Sapru, Essential neuroscience, revised ed. 
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, Williams and Wilkins, 2006), Chapter 2. 
303
 Unless otherwise attributed in this section: Eric I. Knudson, “Early experience and sensitive 
periods” in Larry Squire et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3
rd
 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008), 
Chapter 22. Note that some draw a distinction between critical periods when changes are in a tight 
window and are “wholly or partially irreversible” and sensitive periods as “a time period when 
exposure has a stronger effect on development.” Yoav Ben-Shlomo and Diana Kuh, “A life course 
approach to chronic disease epidemiology: conceptual models, empirical challenges and 
interdisciplinary perspectives,” International Journal of Epidemiology 31, (2002): 285-293.  
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Many developing neural circuits demonstrate periods of development, known as 
sensitive or critical periods when their ability to adjust to experience is 
heightened; they are refined by means of changes in synaptic connectivity.304 
Critical periods or sensitive periods are those finite windows of opportunity for 
the development of specific sensorimotor faculties.305 The term is less precisely 
used for broadly indicative times of greater responsiveness in the development of 
neuronal systems, for example the window of opportunity for the development of 
the prefrontal cortical pathways, understood to extend to the early 20s in males.  
 
In critical periods a failure to experience appropriate inputs can lead to 
permanent impairment of perception or behaviour. Studies of the temperament 
of rats, for example, provide useful insights into this form of plasticity: attentive 
mothering is conducive to important behaviour changes that are increasingly 
understood at the cellular level. The interactions that a newborn rat experiences 
with its mother in the first week after birth profoundly influence its response to 
stress as an adult.306  
 
In sensitive periods changes are far more readily induced than in maturity; for 
example, a new language may still be learned as an adult although more 
arduously and only with focused attention. For other changes the opportunity is 
lost; for example the window for imprinting may open and close within space of 
hours. Circuit changes occurring in sensitive periods differ from those in 
adulthood in magnitude, persistence, and behavioural conditions upon which 
changes are dependent.  
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 Veronica A. Alvarez et al. “Distinct Structural and Ionotropic Roles of NMDA Receptors in 
Controlling Spine and Synapse Stability,” Journal of Neuroscience 27 (2007): 7365. 
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 For example, the time outside of which the development of cortico-optic pathways is not 
possible. 
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 The primary mechanism at work is the experience dependent expression level of the GR gene in 
the hippocampus. Attentive mothering causes a demethylation of a GR gene, thereby a stable 
increase in GR gene expression in the hippocampus, and a resulting decrease in basal levels of 
glucocorticoids which at high circulatory levels, lead to anxiety and fearfulness. Also the animal is 
thereby made capable of tighter regulation of hormonal release in response to stressors. This leads 
the animal to be calm, adventurous and able to react without anxiety and fear to stressors. Rats 
that, in these first two weeks, were groomed extensively and where the mother facilitated access 
to milk are less fearful and less reactive to stressors even as adults. Cross fostering shows the 
source of these traits to be experiential.  
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2.2.4.1 Sensitive periods in humans. 
 
Appropriate and adequate environmental inputs are crucial for sound 
development.307 308 This is true for affective and sensory development.309 
Sensitive periods can intersect with the development of moral behaviour. We 
have seen above the importance of attentive mothering. Positive modifications of 
an infant’s behaviour effected by sound parenting practices, arguably lay the 
foundations for later virtuous self-directed behaviours.  
 
Rene Spitz broke new ground with his 1945 studies of deprived children suffering 
from what he called “hospitalism”. He found that these children, often with only 
one carer for eight or more children, were affectively impaired.310 In the 1990s 
various researchers followed the longitudinal progress of Romanian orphans 
raised with little affection and sensory stimulation whilst in orphanages in their 
early infancy. On leaving the orphanages, the children were found to be impaired 
in all domains. Despite making up physical size relatively quickly, infants who had 
been in the orphanages past six months of age were found to have lasting 
cognitive deficits. Those adopted after the age of two suffered profound deficits. 
Further studies link postpartum depression in mothers with affective deficits 
expressed neurobiologically and behaviourally. Infants of depressed mothers tend 
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 Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 701.  
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 Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 15. This text also contains a 
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 For an overview of the dynamics of attachment, and neural development of the affective 
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development, affect regulation and infant mental health” Infant Mental Health Journal 22, Nos 1-2 
(2001):7-66. 
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 Dennis Coon, Essentials of psychology, 7
th
 ed. (Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole , 1997),  115. 
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to show a overactivation of areas of the right frontal lobe, and underactivation of 
the left, in comparison with the norm.311 
 
The apt times for development of the child and adolescent brain may also be 
understood as arguably a “sensitive period”. Human grey matter reaches a 
maximum at 10-12 years of age in parietal lobe, 11-12 in frontal lobe, and 16-17 in 
temporal lobe. White matter maturation continues throughout childhood and 
adolescence and within the association areas of the neo cortex has been noted to 
continue to myelinate through the third and into the fourth decade of life. 
Myelination the subicular and presubicular regions, and volume of the 
hippocampus to which these regions connect, continue to grow even into 
adulthood.312 When habits of self control, respect and reflection are not acquired 
in these formative years it can be a steeper road in adulthood to motivate oneself 
to develop, for example, a habit of study, or a habit of getting up early. If, instead 
of positive behaviours, the maturing person develops negative traits such as 
laziness or a habit of venting anger, the challenge of substituting new behaviours 
can be daunting and all-too-difficult.    
 
For summary, refer to Table 2.2 Systems for sensitive periods of development in 
endpapers.  
 
2.2.4.2 Mechanisms of developmental phases. 
 
The period of early development involves, on a grand scale, plastic change in 
particular systems of neurons during as a result of appropriate stimuli. An 
understanding of the mechanisms at work in these early stages is helpful.    
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Figure 2.6 
 
The developing cortex. The images are generated from a longitudinal MRI study of 
13 children scanned biennially over an 8-10 year period. Predominance of blue 
corresponds to grey matter loss, and increasing myelination, commencing in primary 
sensorimotor areas and spreading to PFC and lastly to temporal cortex. Source: Gogtay, 
N. et al. “Dynamic mapping of human cortical development during childhood through early adulthood.” 
Procedings of the National Academiy of Science, USA, 101 (2004): 8174–8179. Citation in Blakemore, 
Sarah-Jayne. “The social brain in adolescence.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9 (2008): 267-277. 
 
 
a) Experience tuned development. 
 
Developmental plasticity typically involves axonal overdevelopment, activity 
dependent synaptic pruning, and staged synaptic reorganisation. Experience tunes 
both excitatory and inhibitory connections in a largely non reversible manner and 
according to Hebbian principles.313 It seems that the same mechanisms controlling 
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 The opening of critical and sensitive periods depends on pathway maturation. Information 
involved (from lower circuits) must already be sufficiently reliable, circuit connectivity sufficiently 
mature, and mechanisms enabling plasticity must be active: for remodelling of axons and 
dendrites, elaboration of new synapses, adjustment of synapse performance, changes in gene 
expression.  
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synaptogenesis during circuit development also underpin circuit remodelling and 
the establishment of new synapses. For example, neurotrophins such as brain 
derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) can also play an essential role in anatomical 
remodelling. LTP and long term depression (LTD) have a role in developmental 
learning and N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors are integral to the 
mechanisms of plasticity at work. (See 2.2.5.1) When appropriate experience is 
received and brain circuitry commits to specific linkages, the sensitive period 
ends. Importantly, once a specific circuit is formed it is much more difficult for 
altered experience to induce new connections.314 
 
b) The role of axons. 
 
The growth cones of neurons, christened by Ramon y Cajal as “soft battering 
rams”, are the axonal tips that grow towards target synapses.315 316 Since his work 
detailing the growth and connectivity of major classes of nerve cells, much insight 
has been gained into the mechanisms for axonal guidance and for achieving 
specificity in neuronal connections. Growth cones are actively guided.317 Sperry 
from the 1940s showed that there is a highly specific targeting mechanism. In the 
vicinity of the target field axon development is very accurate, with selection of 
target cell very precise. Programming in neurons seems to be for specific targets; 
it has been shown that surgically transferred motorneurons still reached their 
target. Formation of connections with target cells depends on three factors: the 
directed growth of axons to the target fields, the selection of target cells, and 
importantly for the purposes of this study, electrical activity.  
                                                          
314
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 Accurate axonal guidance depends on various mechanisms such as scaffolding on other axons, 
use of other extracellular matrices and guidepost cells. The growth cone of the axon, both a 
sensory and a motor structure, responds to the received guidance cues from outside the cell in the 
form of large soluble molecules such as netrins, semaphorins, laminins, and cadherins. Four types 
of guidance mechanisms seem to operate: contact attraction, chemoattraction, contact repulsion, 
and chemorepulsion. 
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c) Synapse formation and elimination.  
 
Synapse formation and elimination is a core developmental process. 318 The 
development of the nervous system is directed by the expression of particular 
genes at specific times and in specific places but external factors such as nutrients, 
sensory stimuli and social experience also play a major role in development. 
Mechanisms exist for neuronal differentiation, for axonal targeting of destination 
cells, and for regulation of synaptic formation. It is known too that deprivation of 
normal environmental conditions has profound repercussions on maturation of 
the nervous system and on behaviour. Of particular interest in this study is the 
role that physical and social interaction with the environment, and subsequent 
electrical activity, play in modifying or reinforcing the neural structures once they 
are formed.  
 
In the human frontal cortex, maximum synaptic density is reached at one year 
with the numbers coming down to adult levels at approximately 16 years of 
age.319  While programmed cell death, in contrast to the case for other animals, 
plays a lesser role in human brain development, synaptic elimination seems to be 
more prevalent in humans and primates. 320  The gradual decline in synaptic 
density proceeds into late adolescence suggesting substantial changes to 
connectivity up to age 20.  DA is believed to play a key role in cortical information 
processing around puberty.321 The changing neuromodulatory effects of DA 
appear to impact on refinement of excitatory and inhibitory inputs of layer III 
pyramidal neurons during adolescence.  
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One recent study shows that children’s plasticity of brain seems attributable to a 
number of mechanisms: neuronal overproduction and programmed cell death 
(apoptosis) of excessive neurons; overproduction of synapses (approximately 
twice adult levels in the cortex at age 2) and deletion of immature synapses; and 
from activity dependent processes that allow for ongoing stabilisation and 
modification of synapses. By means of these forms of plasticity, children are 
enabled to learn new skills quickly or recover from brain injury. Synaptic 
proliferation and pruning are controlled by intrinsic mechanisms and 
environmental factors.322 Developmental plasticity is evident through 
adolescence.  Neuroimaging evidence suggests that elimination of synapses has a 
causal role for changes in social cognitive processing in the PFC, particularly for 
decreased activity during adolescence in the medial PFC (mPFC) and post central 
gyrus (pSTS), a process in which the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC), the inferior 
frontal gyrus, the amygdala and the anterior insula also play a role.323 
 
Synapse elimination is a normal aspect of development of the organism and may 
be viewed as a fundamental process for plasticity. 324 Synapse elimination is 
essentially a response of the organism to environment. Lichtman and Colman 
have argued that synapse elimination allows the organism to be more adapted to 
its specific environment.325  
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 They proposed that the loss of connections is due to the greatly 
duplicated neurons present in mammalian and vertebrate nervous systems. Noting that vertebrate 
neuromuscular junctions (NMJs) initially contain large numbers of fan-in (multiple innervation of 
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Rather than ridding the nervous system of connectivity “mistakes”, synapse 
elimination appears to sharpen specificity based on the cues that promote 
selective synapse formation. The number of axons converging on postsynaptic 
cells, and number of postsynaptic cells contacted per axon decreases. There is a 
removal of inputs due to branch trimming. Remaining inputs compensate, adding 
in part new synapses. Although innervation from multiple sources is eliminated 
there is an increase in the number of presynaptic terminals linking the surviving 
axon to the target. Trophic substances appear to contribute to this process. 326 
The end result is that new structures more than compensate for the loss. There is 
no net weakening of synaptic input to target cells. Such synapse elimination is 
now understood to be central to the maturing CNS through adolescence and into 
adulthood. Clarification of pathways appears associated with this period of 
increasing self control. 
 
Typically in neonatal vertebrates axons of neurons fan out to many target cells 
and connect weakly. In adulthood, axons disconnect from many target cells, there 
is a lessening of fanning out, and numbers of synapses on each target can 
increase. Some two thirds of axonal branches in the corpus callosum of newborn 
monkeys are eliminated in this way, and a similar process has been shown to take 
place in the human corpus callosum, and in cortico-spinal axons also. This process 
is linked to experience, and hence is a mechanism of plasticity. 327    
 
Synapse elimination may play a role also in memory. Bailey and Chen 
demonstrated that long term habituation of the gill withdrawal reflex also 
features synaptic elimination. Habituated animals exhibited a pruning of synaptic 
terminals associated with long term habituation, with a 35% reduction on average 
from 1300 per neuron to 800 per neuron.328 It has been suggested that “the most 
important form of adult plasticity must certainly be memory.” 329   It is possible 
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that learning may involve selection of synaptic pathways already in existence 
rather than construction of new circuits. Plasticity can be both in elimination of 
some circuits and an alteration of the strengths of existing connections.  
 
Plastic change is not simply about maintaining adaptability, it is also concerned 
with locking in changes. Hence, synaptic elimination seems closely associated with 
critical periods and also with the durability of memory. Tapia and Lichtman argue 
that input elimination provides an answer both for the inability for change after a 
certain point in critical periods, and also for the indelibility of memory. “Input 
elimination is an attractive means of assuring indelibility because by eliminating 
competing (ie asynchronously firing) inputs, a circuit becomes sheltered from 
disruption by different activity patterns.” 330With respect to memory, the authors 
note that “the permanent loss of axonal input is an attractive mechanism for 
information storage.” 331 
 
2.2.5 Other synaptic factors.332 
 
There is a growing understanding of homeostasis of the neuron, the maintenance 
of the overall synaptic weight in the neuron by means of plastic changes and of 
the associated phenomena of homo-and heterosynapic changes.  Butz et al. argue 
that forms of structural plasticity, rather than following Hebbian or anti-Hebbian 
principles, 333 contribute to the homeostasis of the neuronal network.  
Homeostatic neural plasticity refers to the capacity of neurons to compensate for 
                                                          
330
 Tapia and Lichtman. “Synapse Elimination,” 488. 
331
 Tapia and Lichtman. “Synapse Elimination,” 488. 
332
 Material in these paragraphs draws on: M. Chistiakova and M. Volgushev, “Heterosynaptic 
plasticity in the neocortex (Review),” in Experimental Brain Research 199,3-4 (2009):377-90; and 
Butz, “Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 287-305. Chistiakova and Volgushev have focused 
on homosynaptic and heterosynaptic complementarity. They argue that homosynaptic changes are 
synaptic changes of transmission as a result of the specific induction related to learning. Changes 
at other synapses on a given neuron that are non involved in the original induction related to 
learning are called heterosynaptic changes. The authors argue that evidence suggests that these 
changes are complementary processes. Further they suggest that heterosynaptic plasticity may 
assist in synaptic homeostasis, the maintenance of the overall synaptic weight of a neuron, and in 
ensuring that certain memories are given greater permanence. 
333 
Anti Hebbian plasticity “causes synapses to decrease in strength when there is simultaneous 
pre- and postsynaptic activity”. It is believed to predominate in fibres to cerebellum Purkinje cells. 
P. Dayan and L.F. Abbott, Theoretical neuroscience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). 
124 
 
network activity by regulating their own excitability. This is a neuron centric view 
in which synaptic remodelling, involving an interdependent complex of functional 
and structural plastic changes, maintains desired levels of neural activity. Wolff 
and Wagner noted in 1983 that activity dependent plasticity restores neural 
homeostasis.  
 
Chistiakova and Volgushev explain that nonassociative, or heterosynaptic, 
plasticity of specific synapses may result in a neuron as a result of back 
propagation, where other synapses in the same neuron have experienced 
Hebbian-type associative, or homosynaptic plasticity by well understood 
processes of Ca2+ influx (fast large amplitude influx leading to LTP; slower low 
amplitude to LTD) in response to intracellular tetanization. (See 2.2.5.4.) 
 
2.2.5.1 NMDAR and AMPAR mediated plasticities. 
 
a) NMDA plasticities. 
 
NMDA mediated plasticities, associated with LTP and LTD, are a burgeoning area 
of current research. The NMDA receptor is one type of ionotropic glutamate 
receptor.334   It was first described by Moriyoshi in 1990. Significantly, this 
pathway seems linked to development, learning, and memory, and to neuronal 
recovery from injury.335  
 
                                                          
334
 See discussion in M. Neal Waxham, “Neurotransmitter receptors” in Larry Squire et al. 
Fundamental Neuroscience, 3
rd
 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008). Unless otherwise noted, 
Waxham is the source of information in this section.  
335
 Enzymes triggered by this process then sensitize the cell to subsequent stimuli through both 
retrograde signalling and modification of post synaptic proteins, as well as triggering genetic 
manufacture of new synaptic proteins through the second messenger CREB in association with 
BDNF. Some hallucinogenic compounds block the NMDA ion channel, but require it open to work, 
hence are called open channel blockers. NMDA receptors are dependent for opening on both 
appropriate binding of glutamate and on depolarization of the membrane (having a Mg
2+
 
dependent block at resting potential), and they permit Ca
2+
 permeability. Normally these receptors 
prevent calcium entry, but the arrival of an action potential at the synapse leads to glutamate 
binding that allows calcium influx and depolarises the cell. 
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NMDA receptors are implicated in LTP and LTD processes and numerous variations 
this category of plasticity are now identified: “many forms of activity dependent 
regulation of synapses demonstrated both in vitro and in vivo require activation of 
NMDA-type glutamate receptors. These receptors are among the first molecules 
to accumulate at the sites of nascent synapses where NMDARs become stable 
synaptic components.” 336   
 
LTP results, described as “an experience dependent, long lasting increase in 
chemical strength of neurotransmission that is a crucial mechanism in learning 
and memory”.337 The precise timing of neuronal plasticity in response to diverse 
environmental stimuli seems to be a function of the interaction of 
neurotransmitter and growth factor-signalling pathways. In most structural 
synaptic plasticities intracellular calcium and gene expression appear implicated. 
Calcium influx is understood to be a trigger for LTP.338  
 
Corlew et al. (2008) suggests that postsynaptic NMDARs trigger classical forms of 
LTP and LTD, and that presynaptic NMDARs (preNMDARs) mediate spike timing-
dependent LTD (tLTD) at some synapses with some evidence also of LTP. 
“NMDARs were first discovered as postsynaptic receptors at glutamatergic 
synapses, and have since been shown to be involved in many aspects of synaptic 
transmission, dendritic integration, synaptic and neuronal maturation, and 
plasticity throughout the brain.” 339 Corlew et al. place emphasis on preNMDAR 
regulation of probability for presynaptic release and short-term plasticity. 
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 Alvarez, “Distinct Structural and Ionotropic Roles of NMDA Receptors in Controlling Spine and 
Synapse Stability,” 7365. 
337
 LTP: Definition of Ronald W. Oppenheim and Christopher S. Von Bartheld, “Programmed cell 
death and neurotrophic factors,” in Larry Squire et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3
rd
 ed. 
(Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008), 456. 
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 Butz, “Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 289. Hebbian and anti-Hebbian mechanisms 
(filtering out unwanted noise allowing only preferred spiking patterns to emerge) seem to be at 
the core of structural plasticities and synaptic potentiation in the form of LTP and LTD. 
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 R. Corlew, et al. “Presynaptic NMDA Receptors: Newly appreciated roles in cortical synaptic 
function and plasticity,” The Neuroscientist 14 (2008): 6, 609. 
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Another focus for current research in this field is the role of NMDARs in the 
stabilisation of glutamatergic synapses.340 Alvarez et al. note that NMDARs 
perform a regulatory function in the neuron via various pathways and at many 
levels and that NMDAR presence is essential for spine density and regulation of 
the number of active excitatory synapses. The authors find that “through 
ionotropic and structural signalling, NMDARs regulate the rapid dynamics of spine 
morphology.”341   
 
Studies by Markram and Sakmann at the Max Planck Institute have demonstrated 
NMDA related plasticity as a result of pre and post synaptic interaction: precise 
timing of backpropagating post synaptic potential (PSP) following excitatory 
postsynaptic potential (EPSP) leads to a strong depolarisation. This leads to 
glutamate ejection from NMDA receptors, thus allowing Ca2+ influx, a cascade of 
intracellular messaging, and release of growth signalling factors associated with 
structural plasticity and consequent LTP.342  
 
b) Interplay with AMPARs. 
 
Studies are unveiling the role of presynaptic NMDARs and their interplay with α-
amino-3-hydroxyl-5-methyl-4-isoxazole-propionate receptors (AMPARs), 
establishing necessary conditions for plasticity.343 NMDARs have been found at 
“silent synapses”, immature synapses lacking AMPARs but with the potential to 
acquire them by means of NMDAR mediated LTP. 344 Although LTP and LTD are 
                                                          
340
 Alvarez, “Distinct Structural and Ionotropic Roles of NMDA Receptors in Controlling Spine and 
Synapse Stability,” 7365-7376. 
341
 Alvarez, “Distinct Structural and Ionotropic Roles of NMDA Receptors in Controlling Spine and 
Synapse Stability,” 7372. The authors note that in vitro studies of rat hippocampal pyramidal 
neurons demonstrate that the absence or loss of NMDARs seems not to affect synapse formation 
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 H. Markram et al., “Regulation of Synaptic Efficacy by Coincidence of Postsynaptic APs and 
EPSPs,” Science 275, (1997) 213-215. Cited in Waxham, “Neurotransmitter receptors.” 
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 Corlew, “Presynaptic NMDA Receptors: Newly appreciated roles in cortical synaptic function 
and plasticity,” 609-625.  
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 Alvarez, “Distinct Structural and Ionotropic Roles of NMDA Receptors in Controlling Spine and 
Synapse Stability,” 7365. 
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regulated by many mechanisms, AMPA receptor trafficking, the insertion or 
removal of the AMPA receptor (AMPAR) at the synapse, on the basis of evidence 
from animal studies linking AMPAR trafficking in the rodent barrel cortex to 
experience dependent plasticity, and AMPAR trafficking to fear conditioning in 
hippocampus, appears to account for postsynaptic expression involved in LTP and 
LTD.345 Kessels and Malinow argue that AMPA trafficking is the mechanism 
underlying the formation of neuronal pathways, and behaviour modification 
itself.346 
 
Blundon and Zakharenko reviewed the evolution of understanding of LTP and its 
cellular locus. They described this as an unresolved area for understandings of 
plasticity. New imaging demonstrates that LTP has both pre- and post- synaptic 
components although most current studies focus on post-synaptic contributions. 
“LTP is not a unitary phenomenon, even at a single synapse, but rather is a group 
of plasticities.” 347  NMDA-LTP develops rapidly, is expressed postsynaptically, and 
is needed for short term memory retention.  
 
The role of zinc at the cortical synapse, and on NMDARs and AMPARs has also 
become a field of active investigation.348 That zinc seems to play a role in cortical 
plasticity is suggested by animal studies showing that rats on zinc deficient diets 
are more aggressive and have poorer memories at maturity, and monkeys raised 
by mothers on zinc deficient diets manifest poorer memories and learning. Zinc 
deprivation during development appears to have a negative effect on DNA 
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 Kessels, Helmut W. and Malinow, Roberto. “Synaptic AMPA Receptor Plasticity and Behaviour” 
in Neuron 61(2009): 342-3. 
346
 Kessels and  Malinow, “Synaptic AMPA Receptor Plasticity and Behaviour,” 340. 
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 Blundon and Zakharenko, “Dissecting the components of LTP,” 600. In contrast to the work of 
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 Amy S. Nakashima and Richard H. Dyck, “Zinc and cortical plasticity,” Brain Research Reviews 59 
(2009): 347-373. 
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synthesis. Although the exact function of zinc in the cortex is not clear, vesicular 
zinc (about 20% of the zinc present in the CNS) has a wide ranging impact on 
postsynaptic function. A consensus of numerous studies is that zinc can inhibit LTP 
in specific neural locations. At postsynaptic locations zinc has various potential 
effects including inhibition of NMDA, kainite and -Aminobutyric Acid (GABA) 
receptors, potentiation of AMPA receptors, increasing glutamate present in the 
synapse via mechanisms involving glial cells, modulation of internal cell signalling 
thus also affecting protein synthesis and plasticity.  
 
2.2.5.2 DA and the GPCR receptor. 
 
Of particular interest in this study is the mechanism of DA mediated plasticity, the 
neurotransmitter most directly associated with the reward systems in the brain. 
DA, as well as most neuropeptide transmitters, binds only to the G-protein-
coupled-receptor (GPCR) metabolic receptor. Second messenger pathways are 
established which may trigger gene transcription. This is one reason why DA is an 
effective mediator of plasticity. 349 Neuroleptic drugs used in the treatment of 
neuropsychiatric disorders block DA receptors creating imbalances in the 
dopaminergic system.  
 
Evidence links NMDARs and D1 Dopamine receptors as critical in certain 
plasticities.350 Scott and Aperia show that striatal culture exposure to NMDA 
promoted recruitment of D1 receptors to the plasma cell membrane via vesicular 
transport and also by lateral movement in the membrane. An imbalance of D1 and 
D2 receptors leads to glutamatergic imbalance altering behaviour. For example, 
hypofunction of the glutamatergic system appears to lead to schizophrenia. 
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 For an overview of neurotransmitter receptors see: Waxham, “Neurotransmitter receptors” ; 
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Metabotropic receptors are also associated with electrical-signalling-induced 
plasticities. The study of post synaptic potentials (PSPs) reveals a mechanism for 
long term plastic changes in neuronal and synaptic structure. 351 352 Slow PSPs are 
the indirect effect of transmitter binding to metabotropic receptors.353  
 
2.2.5.3 Neurotrophic factors.354 
 
The presence or absence of neurotrophic factors (NTFs) or neurotransmitters can 
promote neural growth. 355  Following groundbreaking work, from the 1930s, by 
Viktor Hamburger and Rita Levi-Montalcini into into programmed cell death (PCD) 
or apoptosis, came the identification of NTFs.356 This led in turn to the 
neurotrophic hypothesis: “Neurons compete for limiting amounts of target 
derived survival promoting (trophic) agents during development.”357   
 
The presence or absence of NTFs can play a decisive role in a number of 
mechanisms in the nervous system including the fate of cells, axons, neurite 
growth and branching, dendrite development, synapse development and 
regulation, stabilization and plasticity, in LTP, and in learning and memory. Poo 
and his team discovered that neurotrophins can have a regulatory function in 
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 Byrne, “Presynaptic Potentials and synaptic integration” Chapter 11. 
352
 For a clear introduction to synaptic transmission: Laurie Lundy Ekman, Neuroscience 
Fundamentals for Rehabilitation, 3
rd
 ed. (St Louis: Elsevier, 2007), Chapter 3. 
353
 A typical pathway involves the K
+
 metabotropic channel which is normally open.  The 
transmitter binds to the receptor activating the G protein to interact with AC adenylyl cyclise. As a 
result the synthesis of cAMP is increased, PKA protein kinase A is activated, the channel protein is 
phosphorylated, and the channel closes. These PSPs are generally slow and persistent because of 
activation of second messenger systems. This pathway provides long term modulation of the 
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 Principal source for this section: Oppenheim and Von Bartheld, “Programmed cell death and 
neurotrophic factors,” 452. 
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 Wolff et al. in 1979 documented that neurotransmitter GABA may also act as neurotrophic 
agent.
 
 See Butz, et al., “Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 288. 
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 Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 707. 
357
 Kristin Scott, “Chemical senses: taste and olfaction,” in Larry Squire, et al. Fundamental 
Neuroscience, 3
rd
 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008), 452. 
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synaptic plasticity through the neurotrophins BDNF and NT-3 that have fast and 
major effects on the strength of synapses.358 In 2003 Chao noted that:  
Neurotrophins and other NTFs also play a role in modulating 
long term changes in functional and anatomical plasticity in the 
developing and mature brain by altering long term 
potentiation, synaptic connectivity, and responses to stress, 
inflammation and trauma.359  
 
There are multiple families of NTFs: 
 CNTF and LIF of the neuropoietic cytokine family possess widespread 
neurotrophic acivity. 
 The GDNF family (GDNF, neurturin, artemin, and persephin) relate to the 
TGF  gene family impacting on enteric, dopaminergic and motor neurons.  
 fibroblast growth factors (FGFs) may have role in injury. 
 And NTFs themselves, which have a role in determination of stem cells, 
neuronal migration and survival, axonal growth and regulation of synaptic 
competition and plasticity, LTP, response to injury, regeneration and adult 
neurogenesis.  
 
NTFs interact with two major classes of receptors:  
 the trk (tyrosine receptor kinase) family of receptors;360  
 the receptor p75NTR.  
 
It is believed that interaction between neurotransmitter and growth factor-
signalling pathways plays an important role in neural plasticity in response to 
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 M. M. Poo, “Neurotrophins as synaptic modulators,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2 (2001): 24-
32. Cited in Oppenheim and Von Bartheld. “Programmed cell death and neurotrophic factors,” 
461. 
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 M. V. Chao, “Neurotrophins and their receptors: a convergence point for many signalling 
pathways,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4 (2003):299-309. Cited in Oppenheim and Von Bartheld, 
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 The Trk receptor kinases and the trk family members, trkA, trkB, and trkC, transduce 
neurotrophic signals setting up pathways that are inhibitory to apoptopic mechanisms. Deprivation 
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diverse environmental stimuli. 361  BDNF is an important mediator of plastic 
change. It is active in synaptogenesis, 362  and appears to play a role in converting 
short term memories to long term memories; blocking of BDNF during exercise 
prevents exercise induced increase in cAMP response-element binding protein 
(CREB) mRNA levels. CREB activation, via cyclic AMP (cAMP) pathways,363 leads to 
expression of cFos and Jun which  in turn effect the expression of genes bringing 
about LTP and long term memory. Some studies suggest that self-perpetuating 
loops are established.364   
 
2.2.5.4 Other chemical signalling systems. 
 
a) Ca2+. 
 
Ca2+ plays a key role in the mechanisms of plasticity.365 Calcium channels are found 
in all neurons. Ca2+ is an important second messenger in neurons influencing 
neurotransmitter release, synaptic plasticity, neurite outgrowth during 
development and gene expression. The variety of ion channels and ionic 
mechanisms make possible complex patterns of action potentials within single 
neurons as well as complex synaptic computations. 366   
                                                          
361
 Oppenheim and Von Bartheld, “Programmed cell death and neurotrophic factors,” 452. 
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strengthen active synapses.” 
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intact and injured central nervous system by using neurotrophins,” Neurorehabilitation and Neural 
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2+
 processes affect short term synaptic plasticity. We speak of dependent plasticity whereby 
the performance of synapses varies according to frequency of stimulation and record of prior 
activity. Usually, repetitive high frequency stimulation (known as a tetanus) is initially dominated 
by a growth in successive PSP amplitudes. This is a process known as synaptic facilitation (or 
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Ca2+ can be associated with memory and learning. Significantly, excess Ca2+ is toxic 
to the neuron, a feature linked to neurodegenerative disorders and to cell death 
in hypoxic brain injury. The glutamate receptor, mGluR1, has been linked to long 
term synaptic plasticity at many sites in brain especially LTP in hippocampus, and 
LTD in cerebellum.  
 
b) ACh. 
 
ACh is the agent of plasticity in the neuromuscular synapse. Initially various motor 
neurons may input a single muscle fibre, but stimulation accelerates the pruning 
of inputs to one source.  AChR elimination precedes loss of the synapse as the first 
step in the process. The presynaptic terminal then disassembles and the axon 
retracts. It has been shown that when bungarotoxin blocks some of the ACh 
receptors the process is triggered. 367  ACh has been described as “a brain 
chemical essential for learning”.368 Nicotinic ACh is the major neurotransmitter 
acting at neuromuscular junctions in the peripheral nervous system (PNS) and is a 
mediator of memory in this pathway. ACh at muscarinic receptors plays a role in 
neuromodulation in the CNS, specifically in selection of objects of attention, and is 
thus an important contributory factor for learning and thus plasticity.369 Aspartate 
and glutamate, the biogenic amines, and neuropeptides also have significant links 
to pathways of plasticity. There are numerous other currents of investigation.370 
                                                                                                                                                                 
synaptic depression where the second stimulus is lessened the closer it is to the first as a result of a 
depletion of available vesicles; autoinhibition, or receptor desensitization). By paired pulse 
facilitation the second pulse can be twice the amplitude of the first as registered across the 
synapse, typically within a second. Augmentation over seconds replaces facilitation. Potentiation is 
a third phase of growth in amplitude, evident over minutes (also concept of post-tetanic 
potentiation). Residual Ca
2+
 seems to lead to facilitation, augmentation and potentiation. It seems 
this is not simply due to residual Ca in active zones but possibly to an overloading of the Ca 
removal processes. For more detail: David A. McCormick, “Membrane potential and action 
potential” in Larry Squire, et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3
rd
 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 
2008), 125. 
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c) Other chemical signalling. 
 
Other chemical signalling is also conducive of plasticity. As we have seen above, 
certain chemical signalling, most commonly in the forms of neurotransmitters, 
neuromodulators such as enkephalins, and growth factors, affect function at the 
synapse and are candidates to mediate plasticity. Endocannabinoid (EC), DA and 
calcium signalling mediate plasticity in the form of LTD and LTP as revealed in the 
corticostriatal pathway. Wickens explains that DA “plays a crucial role in 
determining the magnitude and direction of plasticity.” He notes that EC signalling 
and spike timing dependent plasticities (STDP) are also significant in mediating 
presynaptic LTD.371  
 
d) Desensitization. 
 
Desensitization, a simple mechanism of plasticity, is common in the GPCR 
receptors. There are two known mechanisms for desensitisation. The first is rapid, 
from seconds to minutes, and involves receptor phosphorylation. The second may 
take either minutes or hours, and involves the physical removal of receptors, a 
process that involves endocytosis. As a down-regulating mechanism it may be 
either reversible or irreversible.   
 
2.2.5.5  Astrocytes at the synapse. 
 
In a 2008 review, Stevens looked at the emerging understanding of the complex 
role of astrocytes in mediating synaptogenesis, synaptic elimination, and 
structural plasticity using chemical and physical signals. Advances in imaging 
provide graphic insights into the speed of spine and synapse formation, and the 
morphology of the astrocytes themselves. Astrocyte envelopment of a synaptic 
terminal, a dendritic spine, is shown to take place over some 12 minutes; single 
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astrocytes may associate with multiple neurons and over 100,000 synapses, 
actively signalling and providing stability to each.372 Releasing trophic factors and 
“gliotransmitters”, exhibiting rapid reaction to environmental cues, and 
expressing many of the same surface molecules, receptors and channels as do 
neurons, astrocytes are now seen as critical in developing neural pathways in the 
brain. 
 
2.2.5.6 Structural considerations. 
 
a) Dendritic spines. 373 
 
Dendritic development provides important insights into experience based 
plasticity. Rapid changes in arbor development are possible in response to 
synaptic inputs or growth factors. Slower changes link to gene transcription.  
Dendritic growth and branching is influenced by a variety of extra cellular signals. 
NTFs (eg NGF, BDNF, NT-3, NT-4) act through Trk receptors in regulating 
arborisation, increasing length, branching, and the number of primary 
dendrites.374  
 
Synaptic inputs, by increasing calcium influx rapidly, may enhance rates of branch 
addition and stabilization. Slower phase calcium signals may signal the nucleus for 
gene transcription. Such activity induced genes can then have profound effects on 
dendritic arbor structure and function. This dynamic morphological remodelling 
allows individual neurons to constantly adapt and respond to external stimuli.  
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 Stevens, “Neuron-astrocyte signalling in the development and plasticity of neural circuits,” 278-
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 L. Ciani and P. C. Salinas, “Signalling in neural development: WNTS in the vertebrate nervous 
system: From patterning to neural connectivity,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6 (2005): 351-362. 
Authors note that Notch signalling activates gene transcription and can restrict length of dendrite, 
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Robo receptor are also involved in signalling. Ciani and Salinas documented the role of WNT 
signalling (secreted proteins with a role in neuronal cytoskeleton. Cadherins and  catenin also 
seem to be important mediators of dendritic morphogenesis. 
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Bestman et al. (2008) demonstrated that processes of selective stabilization and 
elaboration of branches toward appropriate target areas, leading to circuit 
refinement, are present in developmental stages and also underlie the 
refinements occurring in the mature nervous system.375  
 
Synaptic strength and dendritic development are interrelated. Synaptic and 
structural plasticity seems to be a result of signals received by the dendrite. Work 
by Luo in 2002 suggests that synaptic strength and dendritic arbor development 
share the same molecular regulatory pathways.376 Synaptic inputs and 
neurotransmitters actively play a significant role in controlling dendritic arbor 
development. NMDA and AMPA receptor function is linked to dendritic branch 
specialisation: hence synaptic strengthening and structural stability seem linked. 
Engert and Bonhoeffer (1999) showed that LTP inducing stimuli increase both 
synaptic strength and spine formation.377 As it does for synaptic strengthening, 
sensory input has striking effects on dendritic development.378 In a calcium 
dependent process, afferent input through AMPA receptors stabilizes synapses 
and increases arborisation. There is evidence that waves of calcium in the 
developmental stages of neurons may underpin normal brain development and 
plasticity.379 Calcium/calmodulin dependent protein kinases (CaMKs) and MAPKs 
appear to be mediators of calcium dependent dendritic growth.380 381 
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 Different types of neurons all have characteristic arborisation. Dendritic trees also vary 
according to spatial extent and type of afferent input. The orderly arrangement of dendrites is 
governed by three factors: self avoidance (no overlapping with dendrites of own neuron) leading 
to maximal dispersion and unambiguous signal processing;  tiling (no overlap of dendrites of 
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b) Dendritic processing facilitates plasticity and cortical control.  
 
The phenomenon of retrograde impulse spread into dendrites, whereby action 
potential actively back propagates into dendrites, can have many functions and 
effects. 382 Importantly for this study, it creates conditions for synaptic plasticity by 
depolarising spines. Permanent changes at the spine in response to stimuli greatly 
enhance the potential for plasticity in the neuron. It is the synaptic regions of 
dendritic areas of the neuron that exhibit the plastic changes involved in learning 
and memory. 383 “Spines add a dimension of local computation to dendritic 
function that is especially relevant to mechanisms for learning and memory.” 384  
 
c) The speed of morphological change.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
neighbouring dendrites. Many of these signals remain to be identified, although Downs Syndrome 
cell adhesion molecule (Dscam), originally identified as an axon guidance receptor, provides 
insights into Drosophila dendrite self avoidance. Drosophila studies give insight into mechanisms of 
dendrite development, revealing for example, the genetic basis for characteristic arborizations. For 
example, Lohmann et al (2005) documented that synaptic inputs, by increasing calcium influx 
rapidly may enhance rates of branch addition and stabilization. Dendro-dendritic interactions 
regulate the shape and organisation of dendritic fields. Dendrite development involves both 
growth and retraction. See C. Lohmann, et al. “Local calcium transients regulate the spontaneous 
motility of dendritic filopodia,” Nature Neuroscience 8 (2005): 305-312. Cited in Cline, et al. 
“Dendritic development.” 
381
 Additional source for this section: Cline, et al. “Dendritic development.”  
382
 For example, dendritic information processing can enhance the signal to noise ratio, enable the 
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result is that in the dendritic tree various modes of information processing are evident: logic 
operations, motion and coincidence detection, oscillatory activity, lateral inhibition, network 
control of sensory processing involving attenuation, filtering, amplification, and segregation, and 
motor control. Standing oscillatory activity along neural pathways has been associated with neural 
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Tiny dendritic spines seem related to cognitive function: studies of mental 
retardation and different hormonal exposures show that spine morphology is 
greatly altered in cortical neurons. The dimensions of the spine stem determine 
quality of the connection to dendritic branch, thereby providing a mechanism for 
learning and memory. 385    
 
The time required for a synapse to develop is remarkably short. 386  It is calculated 
that the presynaptic terminal forms in 10-20 minutes, and that the complete 
process from initial contact to a functional synapse requires only one to two 
hours. Once the target is reached, cell adhesion molecules bring the cells together 
at the synapse in a rapid process. This data is of significance in studies of plastic 
change.  
 
Yasumatsu et al. (2008), with ongoing physical measurement of cultured rat 
hippocampal CA1 pyramidal dendritic spines via two photon imaging over the 
space of several days, demonstrated that generation and elimination of spines 
took place more frequently than had been previously believed, and that this took 
place both with and without synaptic activity. The authors suggested that 
enlargement of a spine, being a virtually instantaneous process unlike the 20 mins 
required for spine generation, can provide a mechanism for short term memory. 
They note that large spines with long necks, found more often in the cortex than 
the hippocampus, are resistant to activity dependent shrinkage and they suggest 
that this supports the current view that the neocortex is responsible for longer 
lasting memories.387    
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Further corroboration is found in the studies by Conde and Caceres highlighted 
the extremely dynamic internal structures of axons and dendrites and speed with 
which change plastic structural change occurs.388 (See 2.2.5.6. e) They showed 
that microtubules grow and disassemble rapidly, especially at times of 
synaptogenesis and that growth cone motility may be regulated by microtubule-
associated-protein 1B (MAP1B). In a 2003 study of mice genetically engineered to 
express differently fluorescing proteins, Walsh and Lichman were able to obtain 
images of retraction of the axon from one motor neuron and replacement by 
another over the space of four days. The dramatic substitution of one axonal tip 
for the other appears to takes place in less than a day.389 
 
d) Plasticity as a consequence of neurogenesis.  
 
Neurons in the human organism are normally established at birth, yet in adult 
humans neural stem cells persist in regions near ventricular layers, including 
hippocampus, regarded as a key region for memory and learning.390 The signals 
triggering development of neural stem cells are not yet clear but environment 
may well play a key role. For example, rats raised in enriched environments show 
more proliferation and survival of hippocampal stem cells. Conversely, stress 
seems to inhibit stem cell proliferation and viability in the hippocampus. 
Hippocampal stem cells appear to play a significant role in permitting the plasticity 
inherent in memory processes.  
 
e) Microtubule assembly. 
 
Another recent line of research focuses on the contribution of microtubules to 
structural plasticity. Conde and Caceres reviewed understanding of the regulation 
of microtubule assembly, organisation and dynamics in axons and dendrites, and 
                                                          
388
 Cecilia Conde and Alfredo Caceres, “Microtubule assembly, organisation and dynamics in axons 
and dendrites (Review),” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 10, (May 2009): 319-332. 
389
 M. K. Walsh and J. W. Lichtman, “In vivo time-lapse imaging of synaptic takeover associated 
with naturally occurring synapse elimination,” Neuron 37, (2003):67. 
390
 Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain,  693. 
139 
 
supported the view that microtubules are “key determinants of neuronal polarity” 
391 with a potential contribution to plasticity. Their very dynamic instability, an 
ability to grow and disassemble rapidly, lends weight to this view. Assembled as 
dense parallel arrays, bundles, microtubules have been shown to play a key 
structural role, required for both growth and maintenance, in both dendrites and 
axons.392 The regulated assembly of microtubules is evident at synaptogenesis. 
The authors suggest that this process and also the regulation of growth cone 
motility may be managed by microtubule-associated-protein 1B (MAP1B).393 
 
2.2.6 Use-induced plasticities. 
 
The projects of Michael Merzenich continue to demonstrate the vast possibilities 
for plastic change in the brain induced by activated pathways. 394 For example his 
work with ferrets has demonstrated the capacity for the auditory cortex A1 to 
wire for visual cues in the same way that V1 normally establishes a rectinotopy (a 
topographic map of the neuronal inputs from the retina) and what are called 
“orientation columns” with pinwheels of groups of specific neurons. 
Acknowledging the insights of Aristotle, he says “This is an important extension of 
issues addressed by Aristotle, John Locke, Charles Bell, Johannes Muller and 
others. Each of these added a progressively more convincing and more complete 
argument that the sources of input signals to the brain, and the activations of 
specific brain regions by those signals, underlie sensory qualities and functions.”395  
 
The well known London taxi driver study revealed that the human hippocampus is 
capable of responding to experience/environment by mechanisms of plasticity. 
London taxi drivers are required to master what is commonly known as “The 
Knowledge”, a police city navigation test that requires typically two years of study. 
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The volumes of the posterior hippocampi of 16 experienced (mean of 14.3 years 
driving) London taxi drivers were shown not only to be significantly larger than 
those of control subjects but also to be correspondingly larger in proportion to the 
amount of years of taxi driving although the increasing volume was only reflected 
in the right hippocampus suggesting that the left and right hippocampi have 
differing roles in spatial navigation. This study suggests that this posterior 
hippocampal region is utilised to store spatial representation of the environment, 
and that the hippocampus is capable of plastic change in response to the demands 
of experience.396 This is in line with current understanding of the hippocampus; 
that it codes for the storage of explicit memory. 
 
Somewhat analogously a 2005 study by Lazar et al. demonstrated that meditation 
influences experience dependent cortical plasticity. Cortical thickness in brain 
regions for attention and sensory processing were thicker than matched controls 
for the twenty participants in the study with extensive meditation experience, 
mediation understood as cultivated attention to present moment stimuli without 
cognitive elaboration.  Thicker cortical regions included the PFC and right anterior 
insula, mostly in the right hemisphere, that responsible for sustaining attention. 
The study did not reveal the source of the greater thickness. Possibilities included 
enhanced dendritic arborisation, glial volume or increased vasculature but all 
would support increased neuronal function.397  
 
The 2007 study by Desmurget et al. highlights the swiftness and comprehensive 
extension of plastic response after trauma. The authors review the literature on 
recovery from stroke and from low grade glioma (LGG), a slow growing tumour. 
They note that LGG recovery after surgery is in most cases complete within a year 
and that tumour invasions cause the brain to initiate a major reorganisation of the 
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neural functions, hence most LGG patients present as normal or only slightly 
impaired despite substantial tumours.  
  
They also record the phenomenon of acute functional remapping, the cause of 
which is unclear. They demonstrate that function control can transfer within 15-
60 mins of the resection to other adjacent regions, perhaps taking up “latent 
intracortical connections”.398 They suggest that a gradual learning process 
mediates brain plasticity, with the soon to be eclipsed areas instructing intact 
regions via indirect and direct pathways. This theory would account for 
remarkable adjustments as slow growing lesions develop and also for subsequent 
recovery after resection.399 
 
2.2.7  Exercise induced plasticity.  
 
A form of use-induced plasticity is exercise induced plasticity. It also appears to 
follow pathways mediated by chemical signalling. Energy intake and expenditure 
serve to co-regulate plasticity in the adult hippocampus, which, along with the 
temporal lobe structures, is a brain area essential in learning, memory and mood 
regulation. 400 It has been shown in animal studies that “enhancement of somatic 
metabolism by wheel running or caloric restriction improves central 
neuroplasticity,”401 and that in contrast, a high caloric diet, excessive energy 
intake, serves to reduce plastic and learning in the hippocampus by reducing the 
presence of BDNF. 402  
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BDNF, including exercise induced transcription of BDNF, is seen as a facilitator of 
neuronal excitability and function at the synapse. Vaynman and Gomez-Pinilla 
have reviewed the literature on exercise induced up-regulation of BDNF 
promoting repair and neurotrophic support. Exercise studies draw attention to the 
increase in levels of molecules such as the insulin-like growth factor (IGF), 
fibroblast growth factor 2 (FGF-2) and BDNF in regions of the brain, most 
particularly the hippocampus. “Exercise can activate specific neural circuits to 
modify the way that information is transmitted across cells at the synapse….”403 
The authors demonstrate that exercise raises neurotrophic factor levels in regions 
of the adult brain improving learning and memory.404  
 
Animal studies have shown repeatedly that exercise improves cognitive function 
especially in tasks dependent on the hippocampus. Studies also show that BDNF is 
also exercise induced in the cerebral cortex, the cerebellum and the spinal cord. 
BDNF is known to mediate synaptic plasticity, and facilitate learning and memory 
mechanisms.405   
 
2.2.8  Plasticity induced by transcranial stimulation. 
 
There is considerable current focus on the various techniques of transcranial 
stimulation and the resultant plasticities that are evident. A leader in these fields 
is Alvaro Pascual Leone.  
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A recent study co-authored by Pascual Leone reviews the current knowledge of 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) making the observation that studies 
demonstrate that tDCS is responsible for long term synaptic change brought about 
by protein synthesis, and that these changes are reversible and feature similarities 
to LTP and LTD. The authors suggest that tDCS is distinct from other transcranial 
electrical stimulation and transcranial magnetic stimulation in that it will not 
produce the rapid depolarisation and hence action potentials in neurons. It is 
likened to a neuromodulatory intervention.406 
 
A further study focuses on non invasive repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (rTMS) and the manner in which it has been applied to induct changes 
in neuronal response and short term primary motor cortex (M1) plasticity at the 
synapse. rTMS creates a sustained excitation of neurons after the original burst of 
TMS has stopped. That LTP and LTD longer term effects are present is not clear. 
On the other hand paired associative stimulation (PAS) protocols are shown to 
induce LTP and LTD like effects in the human M1. PAS induced plasticity is 
enhanced if attention is paid to the area under stimulation, and the paper 
suggests that this is possibly through attention-dependent activation of the 
ascending cholinergic pathways. It is suggested that PAS induced plasticity shares 
common circuitry with motor learning. 407 
 
Summaries of the numerous systems and mechanisms of plasticity operating at 
the cellular and molecular level are offered in Table 2.3 and Table 2.15. 408 
 
2.3. Neural bases for learning and memory. 
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Learning and memory are the key processes by which environment and 
experience alter behaviour. Learning is the process of acquiring knowledge about 
environment or experience. Memory is the process of storage and retrieval of that 
knowledge leading into some form of response: subconscious, conscious but 
impulsive, or conscious and deliberate. 
 
While some authors distinguish between mechanisms of learning and memory, at 
other times the words are used synonymously. They form two overlapping 
categories: habituation, sensitisation and conditioning leading to increase or 
decrease in the strength and efficacy of synapses; and activity-dependent 
regulation of gene expression leading to physical changes at the synapse bringing 
about pre and post synaptic alterations in membrane potential (the mechanisms 
accounting for the long term synaptic plasticity of the various forms of LTP and 
LTD). 
 
It is of specific interest to this study that implicit and explicit memory makes 
possible the learning of perceived behaviours. Alvarez et al. write, “The formation 
of memories and the acquisition of new behaviours are thought to occur through 
the activity-dependent regulation of synaptic connections in the brain.”409 
 
Both the ease of practice that is associated with virtue, and the motivational 
rewards inherent in the practice of virtue, argue for the implication of 
mechanisms of non-declarative memory. (See also 2.3.6.1.b.) Furthermore it is 
reasonable to propose that during the process of acquisition of virtue when effort 
is more conscious, that declarative memory plays a more significant role. (See 
below 2.3.5 Skill related learning for brief discussion of the progression from 
declarative to non-declarative memory during skill acquisition, a process having 
common features with virtue acquisition to the extent that both involve 
automatisation of behaviours.) 
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In this section, I focus also on imitation, as one of the core processes for learning 
from the environment and from the example of others. The neural bases for this 
are now increasingly well described. This provides some explanation for the ease 
of acquisition of virtuous behaviours by children, and also for the human capacity 
for empathy.  
 
Tables 2.4 Systems for learning, 2.5 Memory systems, and 2.6 Systems for 
imitation and empathy capture the complexity of learning, memory and imitation 
and summarise a prima facie association with the development and exercise of 
virtue. Higher brain function is supported by complex systemic interaction 
distributed across multiple brain areas. 
  
2.3.1 Learning and memory. 
 
a) Learning. 
 
Learning may be subclassified as associative and nonassociative learning.  
 
Associative learning is a broad category of learning that involves formation of 
associations. It subdivides into:  
i. classical (Pavlovian) conditioning, also known as reward conditioning, or 
appetitive classical conditioning. It was first described by Ivan Pavlov and it 
involves a conditioned stimulus (eg a bell) associated with an 
unconditioned stimulus (eg food) provoking a response (eg salivation). The 
response will continue after a time of conditioning by the conditioned 
stimulus even if no longer accompanied by the unconditioned stimulus. In 
a similar way, a shock to the foot eliciting limb withdrawal will produce 
aversive conditioning.  
ii. The second type of associative learning is known as instrumental, or 
operant, conditioning by which an organism associates consequences with 
its own behaviour, and over time thereby alters the probability that a 
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certain behaviour will be expressed. (See 2.6.4 Reinforcement in basal 
ganglia learning.) 
 
Nonassociative learning comes in three broad forms:  
i. habituation whereby when a stimulus is delivered repeatedly, there is a 
reduction in response to it;  
ii. dishabituation which is the restoration or recovery of a response that had 
been habituated owing to the presentation of another, typically strong, 
stimulus;  
iii. finally there is sensitization, the enhancement of a response evoked by a 
strong stimulus.  
 
b) Memory.410 
 
The various forms of memory and the brain areas implicated in each may be 
classified in the following way:  
i. Working memory resides in the neocortex. One theory is that immediate 
memory, the memory that holds information in the brain for a few 
seconds, for example allowing us to maintain the flow when we read, is 
based on reverberating circuits.411 
ii. Long term memory may be either declarative or nondeclarative.  
 Declarative memory (explicit memory). The median temporal lobe and 
the medial diencephalon are involved in both forms of declarative 
memory. Explicit memory may be either 
o Episodic (narrative event memory)  
o Semantic (factual)  
 There are three forms of non declarative memory (implicit  
memory):412   
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o procedural: skills and habits dependent upon the BG in 
conjunction with cerebellum and neocortex (riding a bike, 
playing an instrument) 
o emotional memory: emotional associations dependent 
upon the amygdala (the association of rewards or 
punishment with particular cues).  
o motor memory: conditioned reflexes drawing upon the 
cerebellum. 413 
 
2.3.2 The five major memory regions of the brain.414   
 
The major memory regions of the brain are the hippocampus, amygdala, striatum, 
cerebellum, and cerebral cortex. Each contributes in a unique way to memory; 
each has its own memory system, the capacity to benefit from experience that is 
presented to it in its specific role in the brain. We know too that each of these 
regions is the foundation for and is integrated with a much larger network of 
diverse brain areas with which it cooperates in the processes of memory.  
 
Behaviour is typically the product of the contributions of multiple memory 
systems. For example, the declarative memory of sporting coach’s instructions, 
modulated in the hippocampus, is complemented by repetition learning of motor 
skills founded in the striatum. In turn, other memory systems may operate in 
parallel: the amygdala could modulate hippocampal and striatal memory systems 
when sporting emotional arousal becomes involved. Systems can influence 
plasticity in other areas. For example, it is thought that amygdalar projections 
promote synaptic plasticity in linked areas such as the hippocampus, 
parahippocampal region, and certain cortical areas. There are examples too of 
collaboration between cerebellar and hippocampal systems. 
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a) The hippocampus supports declarative memory, the conscious recollection 
of events and facts. It is believed that the hippocampus initially acts as a 
retrieval system for information in widespread areas of neocortex. Scoville 
and Milner in 1957 documented the case of H.M., suffering seizures from 
the age of 10, and treated in 1953 with major removal of tissue from 
medial temporal lobe, leading to profound memory impairment with 
practically no capacity for new learning. His case demonstrated how the 
hippocampus codes for long term explicit memory.415 416 417 A current 
hypothesis is that the hippocampus codes explicit memory and that if, for 
some reason, the action of the hippocampus is impaired or blocked, there 
will be no coherent recall of the episode.418 
 
b) The amygdala is associated with emotional memory. While the amygdala 
as a whole has a general role in memory modulation for emotion laden 
content, the basolateral amygdala complex (BLA) and central nucleus of 
the amygdala (CEA) have significantly different roles. 419 The BLA includes 
the lateral, basolateral, and basomedial nuclei, and draws input from 
widespread cortical areas, and from the sensory nuclei of the thalamus. 
There are reciprocal connections to hippocampal and striatal memory 
systems. The amygdala seems able to mediate the creation and 
consolidation of memories that are made more vivid, accurate and longer 
lasting by emotional overlay. Many studies show that BLA mediates a 
system for coding memory strength by importance measured from a 
subjective position. 420  We remember important events more than trivial 
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events. This region is seen as important in tagging memories with 
emotional “markers”, but not in maintenance or call up of memories, 
which perhaps is more the work of the hippocampus.  
Memory of facts is improved when facts are learned in connection with 
an emotion, unless intense arousal is involved.421 422   
 
c) The striatum, a major constituent of BG, plays a role in reward and 
motivation, motor control.  It organises somatosensory and motor 
representations in a topographic manner, and connects also to other 
regions of the BG and also thalamus (projecting back to premotor and 
motor cortex and prefrontal association cortex). It draws cortical inputs 
from many areas of cerebral cortex. There are few projections to brain 
stem motor nuclei and none to the spinal motor apparatus “which 
suggests the system operates mainly to modify cortical motor 
representations rather than control behaviour through direct motor 
inputs”.423 The dorsal striatum lays down memory for motor habits, actions 
and outcomes, playing a key role in much stimulus-response (S-R) habit 
learning. 424 425 
 
d) The cerebellum receives direct input from spinal cord and brain stem and 
indirect sensory and motor input from various areas in cerebral cortex via 
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pontine nuclei in brain stem. It projects to spinal cord, brain stem, 
hypothalamus, and thalamus, the thalamic targets in turn projecting onto 
cortical motor and non motor areas especially in the frontal lobe. 
Cerebellar memory is involved not only in motor reflex learning, but also in 
mental processing involving precise timing. 
 
e) The cerebral cortex contains motor and sensory areas, association areas, 
integrative centres such as the PFC with its focus on motor planning, 
higher order cognition, and working memory, the general interpretive area 
and the speech centre. The cortex plays a role in many forms of memory. 
The networks of the major learning systems include cerebral cortex, 
although certain forms of learning can bypass cerebral cortex, for example, 
eyeblink conditioning mediated by the cerebellum whereby eye blink is 
associated with another conditioning stimulus. An engram or memory 
trace is the location or physical representation of memory in the brain: 
“The sum total of changes in the brain that first encoded an experience 
and that then constitute a record of that experience”.426  Various brain 
regions are involved in the representation of even a single event.427  
 
2.3.3 Mechanisms of memory. 428 
 
In both implicit and explicit memory, memory follows three stages:  
 Learning or acquisition 
 Short term memory (with associated rapid decay of the neural 
response) 
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 And finally intermediate term memory (ITM) converting to long term 
memory (LTM) after persistent repetition. In contrast to earlier phases, 
this final phase features protein synthesis. 429 
These stages are underpinned by distinct neural regions and processes. 
 
In summary, vertebrate and invertebrate studies reveal the following principles.430 
It is commonly acknowledged that forms of activity induced plasticity are at the 
core of memory. Memory operates through cellular and molecular mechanisms 
that alter membrane excitability and synaptic strength ultimately at the level of 
the individual neuron, and in complex interconnected circuits of large numbers of 
neurons. There are changes in existing neural circuits for both short and long term 
forms of learning and memory, mediated possibly by multiple cellular mechanisms 
within individual neurons. Cellular changes are mediated to some extent by 
second-messenger systems. Learning and memory often correlate to changes in 
membrane channels. New protein synthesis is involved in long term memory but 
not in short term memory. LTP and LTD are forebrain mechanisms for or 
associated with memory storage and are regarded as evidence for plasticity.431  
 
2.3.3.1 Declarative memory storage. 
 
The current understanding is that the hippocampus acts as a retrieval system for 
information in widespread areas of neocortex. It is widely held that the temporal 
neocortex is the site of long term memory storage.  The hippocampus has links to 
the medial temporal lobe. Temporal lobe association areas (the source of highly 
processed sensory information) project to the parahippocampal and rhinal cortex, 
then to the hippocampus, and then, via the fornix, to the thalamus and 
hypothalamus. These medial temporal structures are regarded as critical for 
declarative memory consolidation. There is the possibility that memories are 
temporarily stored locally here before transfer to the neocortex.  
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There is evidence that specific memories can be widely distributed in the brain. 
For example, memories formerly evoked by a stimulation of a later removed 
section of the temporal cortex have been shown to be evoked, after excision, by 
electrical stimulation of a third location. A further example: human fMRI studies 
show that extrastriate cortical area is implicated in attentive memory of material 
for which the subject has a fascination, eg cars for car buffs.432 
 
Memory in the cortex supports perceptual learning and repetition priming and is 
regarded as “highly plastic in that its representations can be altered after 
experience”433 as a result of alterations in synaptic connectivity and membrane 
excitability. Lynch writes, “There is no doubt that consolidation of memory 
requires some form of synaptic remodelling.”434 Butz et al. accord with this view, 
and referring most of all to long term memory, states that this remodelling is 
structural and that the strengthening of existing synapses occurs in the Hebbian 
sense during memory formation.435  
 
2.3.3.2 Non-declarative, or procedural memory storage. 
 
The striatum is the seat of habit learning and procedural memory, forms of non-
declarative memory. That H.M. could learn new habits despite loss of declarative 
memory demonstrates that the bases for these memories are distinct. Monkeys 
with striatal lesions exhibit impaired procedural memory. Striatal disease in 
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 Macaque monkey studies show that high order visual areas such as the inferotemporal cortex 
(IT) provide storage for certain declarative memory. Well documented cases of cerebral 
impairment demonstrate that the diencephalon and medial temporal lobe, and thalamus are 
interconnected serving memory consolidation. Much of our knowledge of the role of hippocampus 
in memory from the study of rats. It is shown to be important in spatial memory by studies 
involving the Morris water maze. O’Keefe proposed that the hippocampus creates a topographic 
map of the environment. Others suggest hippocampus is associated with working memory. Cohen 
et al developed a model of the role of the hippocampus in “relational memory”, linking spatial 
representation to things happening at the time of the experience. Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring 
the Brain, 738-745. 
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 Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 1174. 
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 M. A. Lynch, “Long term potentiation and memory,” Physiological Review 84, (2004): 117. The 
word “consolidation” suggests the author is referring to long term memory. 
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 Butz, et al., “Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 295. 
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humans, for example Huntington disease, exhibits analogous manifestations. 
Parkinsonian patients, with degeneration of SN, also exhibit impaired procedural 
memory. 436 
 
2.3.3.3 Working memory, a form of short term memory, storage. 
 
Working memory is different from both declarative and procedural memory. It is 
used for holding information required for an immediate need (eg shorter term 
recollection of a phone number). Working memory is now shown to be linked to 
planning and problem solving, as demonstrated by the Wisconsin card test. 437  
 
Many areas of the brain, besides the hippocampus, appear implicated in working 
memory. The PFC is closely interconnected to medial temporal and to 
hippocampus and seems implicated in working memory. Monkey performance on 
delayed response tasks (lifting lid on container previously demonstrated to 
contain food) in 1930s first demonstrated PFC implication in working memory. 
Nevertheless, working memory also seems linked to cortical areas outside PFC. 
The lateral intraparietal cortex (area LIP) for example seems implicated in guiding 
eye movements requiring some vision specific working memory. 
 
It is believed that working memory involves some form of synaptic facilitation, 
perhaps accompanied by tetanic stimulation, rapid repetition of signals at the 
synapse resulting in an accumulation of Ca2+ at the synaptic knob. This increases 
the likelihood of further neurotransmitter release and action potential in the 
neuron across the synapse. Forms of working memory over longer timeframes 
may involve post-tetanic stimulation, whereby release of neurotransmitter 
remains facilitated when there has been a recent history of neuronal stimulation. 
The resulting Ca2+ build up lowers the thresholds for subsequent action 
potentials.438  
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 Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 755. 
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 ed., 473. 
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2.3.4 LTP as an underpinning mechanism for memory. 439   
 
LTP leads to persistent, long lasting changes in the strength of synaptic 
connections, as measured by the amplitude of the EPSP in immediate downstream 
neuron. We have seen above that LTP was first identified in 1973 by Bliss and 
Lomo in the hippocampus of the rabbit. LTP is a form of plasticity linked to 
information storage in several regions of brain; Hebbian LTP with its quality of 
associativity seems clearly linked to retrieval of information. There is a large and 
increasing body of evidence that LTP is indeed the substrate for some forms of 
learning.  
 
LTP is found in the hippocampus, cerebellum, neocortical regions, and also in 
subcortical centres such as the amygdala. It is present in at least 17 pathways in 
the brain, not from the hippocampus to other brain areas, but also, not involving 
the hippocampus, in cortico-cortical pathways and from various areas of the 
cortex, the thalamus, the amygdala, the subiculum, the dentate gyrus, and the 
striatum. It seems reasonable to expect that plasticity in the hippocampus 
facilitating encoding for explicit memory, in the striatum for reward and 
procedural activities, in amygdala coding for emotional experiences, and in the 
cortex associated with long term memory and cognitive regulation of behaviour 
play a significant role at the developmental stage of virtue 
 
LTP is present in a variety of neural synapses and even in the same synapse under 
different conditions it may utilise different pathways. Often but not always, 440 LTP 
is linked with Donald Hebb’s classic dictum of plasticity, that the synaptic strength 
of existing synapses joining cells will increase as those cells are active.  
 
                                                          
439
 Source in this section unless otherwise cited: Lynch, “Long term potentiation and memory,” 87-
136. 
440
 An example of non Hebbian LTP: in the synapse at the mossy fibre CA3 junction in the 
hippocampus, and at the parallel fibre-Purkinje synapse in the cerebellum.  
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All forms of LTP seem suited to rapid learning but the localised nature of synaptic 
changes makes LTP hard to detect in situ. It has been possible to show that 
synaptic enhancement is linked to memory in studies of amygdala circuits that 
mediate fear. Saturation or blocking the mechanisms of LTP has demonstrated 
that learning itself has been blocked.  Whitlock has shown that learning in rats 
does induce hippocampal LTP.441 Pastalkova has also shown that inhibition of 
PKMz in hippocampus distrupts LTP maintenance and eliminates spatial 
learning.442 Learning may involve weakening of synaptic strength also.  
 
As the explanation for memory consolidation the case for LTP has not been 
proven to the satisfaction of all. 443 While some studies show that saturation of 
LTP impairs spatial learning, others have not been so conclusive.444 In a recent 
study of conscious cats, the CA1 neurons exhibited persistent reversal of 
previously induced LTP when exploring a novel and non-stressful environment. In 
other words, the links between LTP and memory were not completely clear. It is 
suggested that close linkages may be present between LTP and spatial learning in 
some but not all synaptic connections where one or the other is present.445 In 
general there is an apparent inconsistency in at least some of the data from 
various research centres, raising the question, Lynch suggests, as to whether 
experimentation requiring genetic manipulation is entirely reproducible.446 447  
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2+
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calcium channels (VGCCs). The Ca
2+
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 protein 
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Nevertheless there is now much evidence that forms of memory stimulate 
synaptic activity linked to LTP. It has been shown too that when LTP is inhibited, 
some forms of memory are inhibited by the same agents. However, the multiple 
pathways in the brain, and the multiple forms of memory, suggest that to consider 
LTP as the exclusive pathway for memory is simplistic.448 Butz et al. find 
considerable evidence that synaptogenesis is found in the close vicinity of 
synapses characterised by LTP but that “due to methodological limitations 
experimental data directly indicating that structural plasticity is involved in 
learning are rare”. 449  
 
LTP and LTD are closely associated mechanisms of plasticity.  Butz et al. affirm that 
LTP promotes spine maturation and stabilisation while LTD leads to the weakening 
of spines and synapses. The evidence suggests that learning and memory are a 
result of the complementary actions of functional plasticities and of the structural 
changes that hardwire them. Furthermore, while there is constant synaptic 
rewiring in limbic areas, this is less evident in sensory and motor areas although, 
significantly for this study, there is evidence also of synaptogenesis in motor skill 
learning.450 Recent research is focusing on the detailed workings of LTP and LTD 
through studies of gene transcription associated with enhanced spatial memory 
.451 Other research is exploring the relationship of LTP and LTD to homeostasis, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
signalling cascades that lead to expression of LTP and consolidation of memory. Both are seen as 
dependent on calcium, CaMKII, and protein synthesis. Recently the recycling of AMPA receptors 
has become an area of study.  Further studies reviewed and providing insight into the mechanisms 
of memory and in particular for the role of LTP and LTD: L. Stenho-Bittelet al. “Calcium release 
from the nucleus by InsP3 receptor channels,” Neuron 14, (1995): 163-167; M. Fisher et al. “Rapid 
actin-based plasticity in dendritic spines” Neuron 20, (1998): 847-854;  M. Ito, “Cerebellar long 
term depression: Characterisation, signal transduction, and functional roles,” in Physiology Review  
81.3 (2001): 1143-1195. R. Malenka and M. F. Bear, “LTP and LTD: an embarrassment of riches,” 
Neuron 44, (2004): 5-12. 
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+/S51A 
mice) show conversion of short term memory to long term memory. The studies showed that 
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and to homosynaptic/heterosynaptic change, in relation to the mechanisms of 
learning. Homosynaptic changes are the synaptic changes of transmission as a 
result of the specific induction related to learning, and heterosynaptic changes are 
changes at other synapses (on the same neuron) non involved in the original 
induction related to learning. 452 
 
2.3.4.1 Further factors for the synaptic facilitation involved in memory. 
 
Other current work is detailing the mechanisms underlying the cortical 
representations of the environment in the in the sensory cortex. Fromke, 
Merzenich and Schreiner demonstrate by means of in vivo whole cell recording 
that plastic changes to the receptive field of the auditory cortex are effected by 
means of electrical stimulation of the nucleus basalis in conjunction with auditory 
stimulation of the adult rat primary auditory cortex. They suggest this 
neuromodulation of the auditory cortex by the cholinergic nucleus basalis may be 
a key mechanism for receptive field plasticity, and in particular for heightened 
attention to novel or meaningful stimuli.453   
 
The work of Yasumatsu et al. (2008) indicates structural plasticity among dendritic 
spines as an additional mechanism for learning. 454 Spinogenesis and LTP are 
closely linked; LTP correlates to shrinkage of hippocampal spines. 
 
It has been shown by Leuner et al. (2006) that hippocampal dentate gyrus neurons 
undergo ongoing replacement; this has been suggested as a further mechanism 
                                                                                                                                                                 
elF2x
+/S51A 
mice in water mazes showed superior ability, indicating enhanced spatial memory, and 
also in memory of auditory and visual stimuli on behavioural tests involving prediction of foot 
shocks and nausea. Hippocampal slices from elF2x
+/S51A 
mice showed long lasting LTP, in contrast 
with the normally expected short lasting changes (not gene based, protein mediated). 
452
 Chistiakova and Volgushev, “Heterosynaptic plasticity in the neocortex (Review).” Chistiakova 
and Volgushev find that nonassociative, or heterosynaptic, plasticity of specific synapses may 
result in a neuron as a result of back propagation, where other synapses in the same neuron have 
experienced Hebbian-type associative, or homosynaptic plasticity by well understood processes of 
Ca
2+
 influx (fast large amplitude influx leads to LTP; slower low amplitude to LTD) in response to 
intracellular tetanization. 
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 Robert C. Froemke, Michael M. Merzenich, and Christoph E. Schreiner, “A synaptic memory 
trace for cortical receptive field plasticity,” Nature 450 (2007): 425-429. 
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 Yasumatsu, et al., “Principles of Long-Term Dynamics of Dendritic Spines,” 13592-13608.  
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for learning and memory. The rich expression of BDNF in the hippocampus, a 
factor in neurogenesis, has already been noted above. The significance, for virtue 
development, of mechanisms of plasticity in the hippocampus has been noted 
above. Fascinatingly also, it has been noted that newly integrated neurons pass 
through a process of changing neurotransmitter excitation, from GABA to 
glutamatergic, with evidence that plasticity is most pronounced in the first four 
months after mitosis.455 
 
2.3.4.2. The neuroscience of memory enhancement. 
 
Mechanisms of memory enhancement have also been documented. Tully et al. 
(2003) review the literature on what they call a “chemistry of brain plasticity” 
identifying gene targets for memory enhancement.  Most drugs of this nature 
involve both the cholinergic system and neurohumoral signalling, a slower form of 
signalling that takes place between the CNS and peripheral tissue influencing 
motivation and emotion. This form of signalling contrasts with the fast action of 
neurotransmitters. 456  
 
2.3.5 Skill related learning. 
 
Skills, to the extent they are intentionally acquired sequences of actions, share 
common ground with voluntarily acquired habits. Skill studies demonstrate 
consistently that automaticity brings efficiency. This efficiency is one of the major 
benefits offered by the development of good habits. For example, Romero et al. 
(2008), in a study typical of this field, investigated changes in EEG in 10 subjects 
aged 19-22 learning a pseudo-arithmetic task.457 Subjects responded faster with 
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209.-218.  
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 T. Tully et al., “Targetting the CREB pathway for memory enhancers,” Nature Reviews Drug 
Discoveries 2, 4 (2003): 267-77.267-277.  
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practice. The data suggest that there was a shift in method of processing from 
mechanical counting towards reliance on memory.458 
 
In addition to conclusions about the efficiency of habit formation, I will discuss the 
possibilities for retention of voluntary deliberation within a paradigm of habit 
development. In 2.4 I will discuss the neural bases of habits as forms of learning.  
And I will be discussing the development of automaticity through the modification 
of action-outcome (A-O) learning to S-R learning (2.4.7.2). 
 
2.3.6 Neural systems of imitation and learning.  
 
A further area of significant current research involves the neural bases of imitation 
and empathy. These insights offer an understanding of the remarkable facility 
whereby infants effortlessly imitate parents possibly in behaviours and attitudes 
as well as in simple facial expressions, and bear out the sad truth of Jefferson’s 
observation: “Man is an imitative animal.”459 
 
Meltzoff and Moore (1977) found that within an hour of birth imitation of facial 
expression is apparent.460 It is suggested that these processes of imitation provide 
a neural account for the ease by which external example, for example by parents, 
is adopted during sensitive periods. Hence it is a field of research clearly of 
interest in a study that seeks the neural bases for training in virtue. 
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 Stephen G. Romero, et al. “Electrophysiological markers of skill-related neuroplasticity,” 
Biological Psychology 78 (2008): 221-230. The authors also discussed theories of stages of learning 
with respect to skill acquisition within the paradigm of the Adapted Control of Thought Theory, a 
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The discovery of mirror neurons led to an understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms. Pellegrino et al. (1992), Gallese et al. (1996), and Rizzolatti et al. 
(1996) documented mirror neurons in the premotor cortex of macaque monkeys. 
Mirror neurons which are associated with particular actions trigger when those 
actions are observed in others and also when the actions are performed by the 
subject. I will look here at several representative studies in this burgeoning field.  
 
Iacoboni et al. (1999) tested by means of fMRI imaging whether these mirror 
neurons could be found in human subjects. The authors tested the theory that 
imitation occurs through a mechanism, “the direct matching hypothesis”, 
whereby an observed action is directly mapped to the motor cortex in a study in 
which human subjects were asked to observe finger movements. In data matching 
results already obtained in monkey studies, they found that the imitation 
mechanism was present in the left frontal operculum area (Broca’s area) and the 
right anterior parietal cortex.  The result was also compatible with the fact that 
Broca’s area is the motor area for speech, and imitation is critical in the 
development of speech. The mechanism was noted as apparently present mostly 
in the right hemisphere.461 
 
Researchers were soon turning their attention to a complex derivative of simple 
imitation, the development of empathy. A study by Carr et al. (2003) tested the 
ideas of Theodore Lipps, who had suggested that “inner imitation” played a critical 
role in the development of empathy, against the developing knowledge of mirror 
neurons.  
 
From the starting point that the fronto-parietal network in conjunction with the 
superior temporal cortex is critical for human action representation and imitation, 
the authors wished to investigate whether the limbic system also received action 
representations to allow emotional processing, and hence empathy, to take place. 
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 M. Iacoboni et al. “Cortical Mechanisms of Human Imitation,” Science 286, 5449 (1999): 2526-
2528. 
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The study showed that the amygdala and insula were also actively involved but 
the authors suggested that explicit representational content might not be present, 
and that it might be important to differentiate between the various brain regions 
implicated in the various emotions, eg disgust in the anterior insula and fear in the 
amygdala.462 Following this view there are two principal mirror networks: the 
parietal lobe and premotor cortices, and that of the insula and ACC. 
 
Hurley (2008) incorporated the provocative word “mind-reading” into the title of 
a study that sought to develop a model for perception, action and cognition: “a 
model of subpersonal architecture for control, mirroring and simulation, above 
the neural, but below the conscious.”463 This approach was not atypical of the 
cross disciplinary psychology/cognitive neuroscientific explorations into the 
function of mirror neurons. Hurley argued, “Human mirror systems may be part of 
the mechanisms for understanding observed actions and intersubjective 
empathy” and that “direct resonance... provides a fundamental similarity between 
yourself and other agents that enables the understanding of another’s actions as 
instrumentally structured.” ... a “plausible neural basis” for understanding 
others.464  
 
Casebeer linked mirror neurons and Theory of Mind (TOM), by which 
neuroscientists refer to our ability to understand the thoughts of others in order 
to assess consequences of our actions.  He suggested an integral role for mirror 
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neurons in moral behaviour: “Mirror neurons might bootstrap full-blown TOM 
into existence through an inner simulation of the behaviour of others.”465 
 
Rizzolati et al. (2009) reflected on this role of mirror neurons as direct, non-
cognitive media for grasping the intentions of others. 466 As we know our own 
reasons for action, we can infer information about the action observed and about 
the actor. Mirror mechanisms are also active in relation to visceromotor emotion-
related behaviours. Rizzolati writes, “The role of the mirror mechanism is to 
provide a direct understanding of the actions and emotions of others.”467 This 
carries profound implications for the capacity of an infant to absorb emotional 
responses for better or for worse from its parents.  
 
I find these ideas most powerful and compatible with the view that I will present 
of mirror neurons as core mechanisms in the capacity for infants and children to 
grasp their parents example of appetitive responses. 
 
2.3.6.1 Neural systems for affective feelings. 
 
Affection also plays a role in empathy. The OFC which is at the apex of a limbic 
circuit connecting the VMPFC, AC gyrus, amygdala and temporal pole, plays a 
major role processing appreciation of moral consequences of behaviour and the 
“interpersonal signals necessary for the initiation of social interactions 
betweenindividuals”.468 469 Activation of the OFC produces warm and loving 
feelings.470 The OFC can overwhelm consciousness with these feelings.471  
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Left and right OFC appear to differ in function: the right decodes mental states of 
others and is associated with empathy with others; the left reasons about mental 
states. The right OFC and right anterior insula cortex are components of a 
pathway that integrates bodily responses with attentional and emotional 
states.472    
 
Balbernie suggests that limbic circuits require use-dependent stabilisation directly 
reflecting the infant’s social environment.473 He suggests that the right limbic 
system is key to complex attachment dynamics and interpersonal coping.474 Right 
brain development in early childhood is shaped by the dynamics of attachment. 
Mother to child, and child to mother attachment relationships are now known 
also to be critical in the infant’s development of self regulatory pathways during 
the first three years when right brain development is dominant. 475   
 
The work of Schore (2001) highlights developmental aspects of the OFC areas. He 
linked attachment and positive maternal affect to initial reward stimulation in the 
infant’s brain. Once these initial pathways are established, they appear to 
contribute to mechanisms for mature affect regulation. For example, during 
positive interactions, mother-infant facial communication generated DA mediated 
arousal and elation in the right brain of the infant. DA inputs mediated reward and 
emotional response. These DA inputs established a pattern of “burst firing” as 
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opposed to “pacemaker like firing”. 476 Schore called this “caregiver induced 
organisation of the infant’s brain.” 477 There is a sequential maturing and function 
of the various limbic and orbitofrontal areas. Schore noted that the limbic circuit 
comprising OFC, AC gyrus, amygdala and temporal pole was described by Brothers 
in 1997. Schore described the OFC as the “hierarchical apex of the limbic system”, 
crucial in control of behaviour in relation to emotion, and with a major role in 
processing “interpersonal signals necessary for the initiation of social interactions 
between individuals”.478  
 
2.3.6.2 Neuropeptides and mechanisms of trust. 
 
Trust studies have demonstrated the role of oxytocin in promoting plasticity. The 
role of trust in attachment, as well as in economic transactions, has been studied. 
Kosfeld et al. (2005) focused on the role of oxytocin in the development of trust, 
in a search for possible biological bases of trust between human beings. Their 
study, in line with the view that oxytocin increases affiliation and social 
attachment in non-humans, demonstrated that the neuropeptide was shown to 
increase trust and social benefit also in humans. A single dose of oxytocin was 
nasally administered in a double blind study involving 194 male students 
participating in a trust game. 479  
 
2.4 Habit formation and the role of the basal ganglia. 
 
For summary table of the integrated contribution of the basal gangia with respect 
to habit formation refer to Table 2.7 Systems for habit formation. 
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2.4.1 The basal ganglia and related structures. 
 
The basal ganglia (BG) are the largest nuclei of the brain. They occupy a 
considerable volume of the cerebrum.480 These cerebral nuclei lie buried deep 
within the telencephalon, which in its origin is the secondary brain vesicle in the 
embryo which will later develop into the cerebral hemispheres. These bilateral 
nuclei consist of grey matter and are found lateral to the thalamus and above the 
midbrain. The BG are also known, more correctly, as the basal nuclei.481 At times 
one finds that the striatum (the input nucleus of the BG also known as the 
neostriatum) is also used synonymously with BG.482  
 
Following Da Cunha, a typical division of the BG is:  
 dorsal striatum483 
o caudate nucleus 
o putamen 
 ventral striatum alternatively known as the nucleus accumbens (NAc) 
 globus pallidus (GP)  
o internal segment (GPi)  
o external segment (GPe) 
o ventral pallidum (VP).484 
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Nomenclature in this area can be a little confusing.485 The GP and putamen 
together form the lentiform nucleus, with together with the caudate nucleus 
forms the corpus striatum486.  
 
Neuroanatomists are not in definitive agreement about which brain centres to 
include within the BG.487 There is broad agreement that at least the caudate 
nucleus, the putamen and the GP should be included in the BG proper.488  At times 
the associated motor nuclei of diencephalon (especially within the thalamus) and 
mesencephalon, the midbrain, are included within the BG.489 
The BG are functionally linked to the nearby SN (which sends axons to caudate 
nucleus and midbrain) in midbrain, and to the subthalamic nuclei (STN) which 
interconnect with the GP.490 Associated BG structures include: 
 Substantia nigra (SN) 
o Substantia nigra pars compacta (SNpc) 
o Substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr) 
 Ventral tegmental area (VTA) (closely associated with the NAc) 
 STN.491 
 
Table 2.7 summarises the brain areas, pathways and mechanisms associated with 
habit formation and the association of habit formation with the development and 
exercise of virtue. 
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Figure 2.7 
 
Location of the basal ganglia. A 3D construction of the striatum and GP within a 
translucent CNS. Note proximity to OFC and MPFC. 
Source: Nolte, John. The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy.  6th ed. 
Philadelphia: Mosby, 2009. 478. 
 
2.4.1.1 A key functional division of the basal ganglia. 
 
a) The ventral pars 
 
The ventral pars, a psychic area,492 is constituted by the NAc and the VTA.  The 
NAc receives afferents from the limbic domain and DA from VTA. It is known to 
participate in emotions.493 The ventral pars is a key component of “mesolimbic” 
pathway which is active in reward situations playing a major role in motivation. 494 
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In a ground breaking human study, MJ Keopp et al. (1998) used a radioligand C-
labelled raclopride, binding to D2 receptors and therefore evident through [11C] 
RAC-PET imaging,495 to demonstrate DA release in the ventral striatum correlating 
with performance level in playing a video game. Eight subjects played a game 
where they were required to navigate a tank receiving a monetary incentive. DA 
release was then compared with baseline levels determined by viewing a blank 
screen revealing at least a two fold increase in extra cellular levels of DA present 
in the ventral striatum. DA release in this situation was interpreted as the 
equivalent to that in animal studies in relation to anticipatory or appetitive phases 
of motivated behaviour where DA release assists in learning predictors for 
rewarding outcomes.496  
 
b) The dorsal pars. 
 
The dorsal pars, a motor area, is made up of dorsal striatum and SN.497  This 
region receives afferents from associative and sensorimotor domains. The caudate 
nucleus receives information from cortical sensory, motor and integrative 
areas498. Caudate is an area of the “associative striatum” and receives inputs from 
association cortices. The putamen is regarded as an area of the sensorimotor 
striatum. 499 DA neuromodulation inputs to this region from the SNpc. This region 
is involved in learning and movement initiation. Putamen neurons are active in 
anticipation of body movements, neurons of the caudate nucleus are active prior 
to eye movements, and the GP plays a role in regulation of muscle tone.500 
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The dorsal striatum lays down memory for motor habits, actions and outcomes, 
playing a key role in much S-R habit learning.501  
 
Monkey studies by Pasupathy and Miller (2005) found that memory in the 
striatum may instruct the PFC with respect to S-R situations.502 Human studies in 
1996 reported by Knowlton et al. showed that early Parkinson patients who 
suffered degeneration of neurons in SN and consequent loss of input to striatum, 
suffered loss of probabilistic classification learning. Their loss of declarative 
memory was impaired rather by hippocampal and diencephalic impairment.503  
 
2.4.2 An overview of the contribution of the basal ganglia. 
 
Understanding of the role of the BG has progressed dramatically in the past two 
decades.  
 
Until recent years, the sub-cortical location of the BG had greatly impeded 
effective studies of its function. Studies, for example those that have shown that 
damage to the BG leads to tremor, muscle rigidity and involuntary movements, 
relied on pathological examination. Initially the role of the BG was considered to 
be that of a relay station, facilitating unconscious actions such as arm swings or 
laughter, or inhibiting muscular activity. 504 505 The role of the BG was seen less of 
initiating movement but rather of providing the pattern and rhythm for muscular 
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movement.506 In conjunction with limbic system, the BG was known to play a role 
in regulation of emotional responses and in initiation and termination of 
attention, memory.507  
 
The work of Middleton and Strick (1994) provided decisive evidence of the non-
motor contribution of the BG to higher cortical activity by the identification of 
efferent pathways from the BG to the PFC, providing evidence of an integral role 
for the BG in higher cortical activity.   
 
An elegant series of experiments in 1994 was successful in documenting the 
neural pathways between the BG and the PFC. Using three cebus monkeys, 
Middleton and Strick effected transneuronal retrograde transport of the 
McIntyre-B strain of the herpes simplex virus type 1 (HSV1) from area 46 of the 
PFC to the GP and to the dentate nucleus of the cerebellum, and so were able to 
conclude that neurons in these subcortical areas project to the PFC, and that they 
were distinct from neurons projecting from motor areas of the cerebral cortex.508 
The authors chose area 46 of the PFC, an area implicated in spatial working 
memory, in the direction of behaviour, and also in planning of future behaviour.509   
 
In this way they were able to demonstrate that outputs from both the BG and the 
cerebellum have a role in higher cognitive function. In contrast to the theory that 
the role of the BG was merely to funnel widespread cortical outputs to the 
primary motor cortex, the authors proposed the existence of non-motor loops 
through the BG, parallel to motor loops, but with a cognitive function.510  
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The role of the BG in procedural learning and the implicit learning (learning not 
consciously recognised) that is present in stimulus response (S-R) associations, as 
well in the development of habits and addictions is well documented.511 Yin and 
Knowlton have argued that the distinct networks of the BG  “are the neural 
implementations of actions and habits, and that an understanding of these 
networks can illuminate findings from different levels of analysis, from the cellular 
and molecular mechanisms of synaptic plasticity to the conditions that favour 
habit formation and the development of compulsivity in various clinical 
disorders.”512 
 
However the role of the BG in cognitive processes has become increasingly better 
understood. It is now clear that the BG play an important role in regulation of the 
function of the cerebral cortex, with all regions of the cortex projecting to the BG 
and via the thalamus projecting back to the cortex.513 It seems that the BG play a 
major role in selection of patterns of cortical activity, and ultimately of selection 
and reinforcement of chosen motor programs.514 There is now recognition that 
the BG play a significant role not only in “starting, stopping, and monitoring the 
intensity of movements executed by the cortex”515 but in cognition, in direction of 
attention, in planning, and in motivation. Furthermore the BG are acknowledged 
to have a key role in control and modulation of social behaviours and may be 
integral to a progressive evaluation process of behaviours.516 It is now argued that 
the BG play a key role in control of “voluntary behaviour”517, perhaps in overlaying 
deliberate cognitive agendas onto habituated actions.   
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Wickens (2009) states that, by that time “It is increasingly recognised that the 
basal ganglia contribution to movement is in some way secondary (italics mine) to 
a contribution to intentional behaviour, learning and decision making”.518 
Furthermore, the implication of the BG in complex drug seeking behaviours is now 
increasingly understood. This role suggests that habits and behaviours mediated 
in the BG are not be limited to simple motor sequences, but that BG pathways are 
likely to be integral to  the pursuit of complex, purposeful, behaviour patterns. 519 
 
It is now recognised that the BG are the region of the brain with major 
involvement in skeletal motor management, for example with a key role in motor 
activity controlling motor coordination and steadiness. 520 521 522Unlike the motor 
cortex (connecting directly to motor neurons) the BG act on descending pathways 
in a fashion similar to the cerebellum in subconscious facilitation of habits, and 
automatic actions utilising procedural memory, but also, and this is significant, 
with deliberate attention, and limbic modulation of cognition and action.523 It is an 
area critical for learning, cognition and behavioural control. It is suggested that 
the BG play a significant role in key areas of interest in this current study of the 
neural correlates for virtues understood, at the simplest level, as good habitual 
behaviours. 
 
2.4.3 Connectivity to the basal ganglia. 
 
This section summarises inputs and outputs of the BG. Gradually the contributions 
of specific areas in and pathways involving the BG have been identified.524   
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a) Inputs 
 
Afferent pathways, input pathways to the BG, are from all regions of the cortex, 
from the VTA, the intralaminar nuclei (ILN) of the thalamus, and the SNpc.  
 The striatum is a key target of excitatory major projections from the entire 
cortex, and is “constantly informed about most aspects of cortical 
function”.525 The ventral striatum is the target of inputs from the limbic 
cortex, the hippocampus and the amygdala.526 Processing of motor 
commands takes place here and in the GP, with output across to thalamus 
and then back to cortical motor areas.527  
 The putamen receives input from motor and somatosensory cortical areas. 
528 
 The caudate nucleus receives information primarily from the association 
cortex.  
 The close association of the BG to the thalamus is most significant. 
Principal input to the BG is glutamatergic from cortex and thalamus. It 
should be noted that the BG and the thalamus are intimately 
interconnected by these major neural highways. Almost all sensory input 
to the cerebral cortex passes through the thalamus. The thalamus also 
features sensory nuclei. Also the thalamus assists in maintenance of 
consciousness.529 The thalamus is also known to play a key role in focusing 
attention, a process involving the ILN receiving input from the frontal 
cortex, as well as brain stem, and projecting back to the BG. It has been 
noted that lesions of the ILN eliminate awareness.530 It must be 
understood that the thalamus is not a simple relay station but itself, along 
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with the BG, is a centre for integration of subcortical motor inputs and 
feedback from the motor cortex.531 
 
The BG are a region of great biochemical diversity, exhibiting almost all the 
neuroactive agents.532 Neuromodulatory inputs include:533 
 
 DA from VTA and SNpc 
 Serotonergic from the raphe 
 GABAergic from GP and SN 
 ACh, EC, nitric oxide (NO), and adenosine.534 
 
SNpc DA afferents target associative cortex connections in the caudate. VTA DA 
afferents in a similar way target projections to the ventral striatum.  
 
As DA is a principal moderator of plasticity, DA release in the striatum and BG is 
evidence of inhibitory limbic plastic modification of BG activity.  
 
b) Outputs 
 
Efferent pathways project from output nuclei of the BG: the GPi, the VP, and the 
SNr.  
 
 Projections are inhibitory and target the thalamic nuclei (including the 
ventrolateral nucleus (VL), ventral anterior nucleus, medial dorsal nucleus).  
 The BG-thalamocortical loop. Neuromodulation effects a decisive 
modulatory effect back on the cortex via these pathways. Hence the BG 
exert a major modulatory effect on glutamatergic cortical outputs.535  
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 Projections of striatum, GP and SNr are GABAergic are inhibitory. 95% of 
neurons in striatum are GABAergic medium spiny neurons (MSNs)536. Note 
that the BG contain inhibitory GABAergic neurons, spiny in the striatum 
and aspiny in the pallidum, requiring strong and coherent excitatory 
cortical inputs from almost all cortical areas to become active. 537 Basal 
forebrain projections also innervate the hippocampus and amygdala, also 
in an inhibitory manner.  
 Outputs of the BG directly impact on motor control by affecting activity of 
motor areas in the cortex538. BG components involved in motor control are 
the GP and the SN.539 
 The ventral striatum organises somatosensory and motor representations 
in a topographic manner, and outputs to the GP which in turn outputs to 
the VLo in the thalamus, a part of the VL. The VLo in turn outputs to the 
premotor and motor cortices and to the supplementary motor area (SMA) 
in the cortex.540 There are few projections to brain stem motor nuclei and 
none to the spinal motor apparatus. Again, this is very significant and 
“suggests the system operates mainly to modify cortical motor 
representations (my italics) rather than control behaviour through direct 
motor inputs”.541 
 Some projections to brainstem motor structures such as the 
pedunculopontine nucleus exercising control over locomotion542, and to 
the superior collicus controlling neck and eye movements.543  
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Figure 2.8 
 
 
The main connections of the BG. The direct pathways from the striatum are 
associated with disinhibition on the cortex, and the indirect with inhibition. Note 
that this is a simplification of the limbic, associative, sensory and motor 
functionalities of the basal ganglia. All pathway loops however follow the cortico-
striatal-GP-thalamic sequence. Source: Yin, Henry H. and Knowlton, Barbara  J. “The role of the 
basal ganglia in habit formation (Review).” Nature Reviews Neuroscience , 7 (2006): 465. 
 
2.4.4 Loops. 
 
Through the major cortical-BG loops incorporating the thalamus, rich 
neuromodulation of the BG especially by DA reward circuitry, in turn modulates 
cortical activity. This activity further reflects the integral role of the BG in cortical, 
goal elective and reward focused activities and its involvement in habit formation 
and motor management. 
 
Loops are extensive neural pathways bridging and connecting distinctive areas of 
the brain. Multiple parallel anatomical loops link the basal ganglia, thalamus, and 
cortex. There are four categories of functional loops involving the BG: the 
177 
 
skeletomotor, the oculomotor, the PFC loop, and the limbic loop.544 There are 
multiple versions of cortico-BG-cortical loop: most prominent are the cortical 
association areas-caudate loop, the putamen-sensorimotor cortex, and the limbic-
NAc loops.545 These loops define the function of the various areas of the BG. It is 
the caudate that is mainly implicated in modulation of cognitive cortical 
function.546 There are also loops involving the ILN of the thalamus connecting with 
the BG but little is yet known of their function.547  
 
The cerebral cortex and BG appear to be essential components in the cognitive 
processes of generating anticipatory behaviour. 548 The skeletomotor loop and the 
oculomotor loop also appear to facilitate programming and effecting specific goal 
directed behaviours.  BG pathways are also important for motor skill learning.549 
Only a small proportion of the BG loops appear to have a motor management 
function.550 Under certain conditions plastic change occurs in these pathways. 551 
The most direct motor loop involves excitatory inputs to putamen from cortex, 
and may serve to “funnel the activation of widespread cortical areas” onto the 
SMA.552  One recent study finds, “Increased corticostriatal transmission leads to 
increased thalamocortical activity, and an increased likelihood of behavioural 
response expression.”553 Neurons of the “indirect” pathway, inhibited by DA, 
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project to the GPe, and thence via strong excitatory outputs to the SNr and the 
GPi output nuclei.554  
 
BG research is increasingly focusing on the interaction between the loops, such as 
limbic loop mediation of the motor loops, and on possible mechanisms. For 
example it is shown that dendrites connect the loops with all loops projecting 
back to SNpc, possibly converging on DA neurons in this area.555 In addition during 
the past decade significant further pathways connecting the BG and other brain 
centres have been identified. Cerebellar-BG connections have now been 
established, as have the hippocampal-BG pathways mentioned above.556 Haber et 
al. (2000) documented their discovery of abundant connections between striatum 
and midbrain.  
 
2.4.4.1 Frontal lobe-basal ganglia loops provide a key to complex goal directed 
behaviours. 
 
Various regions of the cerebral cortex have closed loops (loops which finish back 
in the brain area where they began): lateralPFC, orbitalPFC, and the premotor 
cortex. These closed loops allow recursive feedback. Daw et al. (2005) suggested 
that it is by means of this recursive processing that the PFC is able to link complex 
anticipated behaviours with rewards and then “cache” chunked steps to achieve 
desired outcomes in the rapid plasticities of the striatum in a “caching 
reinforcement learning system”.557 Koch explains the interaction of the BG and 
the PFC in this process: “the BG learns each fork in the road whereas the PFC puts 
together the whole route.”558  
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The fact that representations of habits in the BG are not goal dependent, 
empowers the PFC to pursue complex (my italics) goal directed behaviours 
utilising these habits. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of Pasupathy 
and Miller (2005) who noted in that changes in activity in the lateral PFC during 
visuomotor rule learning induce immediate changes in the dorsal striatum, 
whereas reflection of changes in the opposite direction were much slower. It is 
suggested that this allows the PFC, which holds the complete model of an 
anticipated activity, to capture quick “reward related snapshots” of anticipated 
actions. 559       
 
2.4.5 The role of the basal ganglia in motor learning.  
 
a) Motor learning as a form of memory. 
 
Motor learning may be understood as a form of memory. There are multiple 
memory functions performed by areas of the striatum. The striatum organises 
somatosensory and motor representations in a topographic manner; the dorsal 
striatum lays down memory for motor habits, actions and outcomes, playing a key 
role in much S-R learning; also emotional memory is also interconnected with the 
BG (via limbic pathway) and is believed to further modulate the basal-cortical 
motor management processes.  
 
As we have seen above in 2.3.2 there are multiple memory systems and brain sites 
involved in memory. Memory representations are understood to depend on 
cellular and molecular processes that alter synaptic strength; protein synthesis 
and gene translation are involved in long term memory. The view that the BG is 
identified with implicit procedural memory has been increasingly modified over 
the past two decades.560   
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There is no question that the striatum plays a key role in mediating the procedural 
memories underpinning behavioural habits.561 When implicit learning is 
emphasised in a probabilistic learning task, the striatum is more active, but for 
explicit learning, the medial temporal lobe is more active. 562 Since early 1990s, 
PET and fMRI studies have demonstrated that the striatum is critical in encoding 
motor programs. 563 This is confirmed by studies of impairments as a result of 
striatal dysfunction. Although the cerebellum seems involved in early stages of 
motor sequence learning, the striatum seems critical for retention of sequences.  
Implicit knowledge is now believed to be stored in the motor cortex and 
associated parts of the BG along with cerebellum. 564  
 
However the traditional division of multiple memory systems between 
hippocampal dependent learning and striatum dependent learning is regarded as 
no longer fully satisfactory. Poldrack and Packard argued that hippocampus 
(place) and dorsal striatum (response learning) are two competing learning 
systems (corresponding, in human studies, to declarative learning mediated in 
medial temporal lobe, and non-declarative learning in the striatum). But other 
results suggest that the hippocampus and the striatum cooperate (my emphasis) 
in a functional circuit, contrary to the former view that they compete.565 It 
appears that the implicit and explicit are not totally independent systems of 
learning, in line with recent findings that the hippocampus is closely coordinated 
with the striatum, despite its involvement in flexible, non-repetitive activity. 566 All 
this is consistent with a greater involvement of the BG in explicit cognitive activity 
                                                                                                                                                                 
conscious memories, for example of facts and episodes. There has been a growing realisation that 
storage of these different forms of memory not only takes place in different parts of the brain but 
memory and learning processes are highly interconnected and interdependent between various 
regions. 
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than had previously been thought and of a model of brain function where discrete 
areas and systems are more comprehensively integrated than had previously been 
thought.  
 
The implication of the PFC in motor memory is also now apparent. As studies 
unveil the underlying processes of motor learning, higher levels of cortical 
involvement, of the significance of various regions of the BG at various stages in 
the process, and the role of cortical-BG interconnections, are all apparent.  Motor 
learning principally involves the cortico-basal-thalamic pathways mediated by 
plasticity in the BG synapses, the cortico-cerebellar loop through the dentate 
nucleus and ventral-posterior lateral nucleus of the thalamus, the hippocampus in 
early stages of learning, and the “functional interplay... between cortico-striatal, 
cortico-cerebellar, and limbic systems in this form of learning” 567  
 
For a long time it was thought that the BG and the cerebellum played the principal 
roles in procedural motor memories, memories that either retained reflex 
responses, or explicit sequences that had become automatised: the cerebellum 
had been understood to play a role in the reflex responses to stimuli that 
characterise classical conditioning, and the oldest hypothesis involving the BG was 
that implicit memory resided in the BG, and explicit in the medial temporal lobe 
(MTL).568 This view has been modified in recent years. It is now believed that long 
term storage of explicit motor knowledge is in the PFC and associated parts of the 
BG, while storage of intermediate term explicit motor knowledge is in the MTL.569  
 
b) The learning process: from the explicit to the automatized. 
 
The BG are implicated in goal directed motor activity, and in those same motor 
activities after they are automatized. During the period of acquisition, both 
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implicit procedural habits and virtue facilitated behaviours move from the explicit 
to the automatised. Both are acquired by a process initially involving attentive, 
voluntary and repetitive action and explicit knowledge.  
 
Procedural memories are learned gradually by a process that relies on 
reinforcement; this can be the foundation for habits after further overtraining. 
Once acquired these habits show great resistance to change. The BG become 
increasingly involved in the process of learning as actions become more 
automatic. In the early stages of learning, attention to action and to the requisite 
explicit knowledge is required. Predictably, as new skills are being learned PET 
studies show increased blood flow indicating greater synaptic activity in the PFC. 
As a skill becomes learned and unconscious, the posterior parts of the cerebellum, 
570 the non primary motor cortex, and the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) are most 
involved.  
 
Note that the BG are involved in both early stages and in completed procedural 
learning. Wise and Shadmehr state that the findings of these PET studies “support 
the hypothesis that prefrontal cortex-basal ganglionic modules subserve voluntary 
movement, whereas the motor cortex-basal ganglionic modules (along with 
cerebellum and PPC) underlie the more automatic movements of the same 
kind.”571  
 
c) The comparative roles of the cerebellum and the basal ganglia. 
 
There are four essential components to the motor systems controlling skeletal 
muscles: the cortical and subcortical nuclei (primary motor and premotor cortices, 
and the brain stem) with their descending pathways, the motor neurons 
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 Floyer-Lea and  Matthews, “Distinguishable Brain Activation Networks for Short- and Long-Term 
Motor Skill Learning,” 517. The authors note the mechanisms of motor skill learning. Doyon and 
Ungerleider (2002) documented the role of the striatum in the long-term storage of well-learned 
movement sequences.
 
Hoshi et al.(2005) documented input from the cerebellum to the putamen 
(posterior striatum) via the cerebello-thalamo-striatal pathway showing that these two areas are 
far more interconnected, and therefore interactive, than has been long thought. 
571
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themselves and the interneurons, the BG, and the cerebellum. These last two 
input to the thalamus that in turn inputs the primary and premotor cortices.572 In 
other words, all executive muscular commands are modulated by the BG and the 
cerebellum. The work of Doyon et al. (2009) into the neural substrates of 
procedural memories further demonstrated an extended role for the BG both 
before and after automatisation. 
 
The authors draw a distinction between motor sequence learning (MSL) and motor 
adaptation (MA) by which we change our behaviours to compensate for changes 
in the environment.573 MSL requires a learned sequence of movements, which, 
among other methods of acquisition, may be “learned implicitly through repeated 
practice”.574 Acquisition of skills follows several phases: fast learning stage, a slow 
stage, through to the automatized stage when movements are effortless and 
carried out with much reduced attention. It is shown that motor sequence 
learning requires repetition but then “continues to develop over time after 
training has ended”.575 The authors suggest that the striatum is not necessary for 
retention and execution of MA tasks, and that the cerebellum and BG play 
inversely complementary roles in MSL and MA tasks.576  
 
These results are consistent with the view that the cerebellum is active in 
establishing new patterns of behaviour but that once these patterns are 
committed to memory, it becomes inactive. On the other hand, the BG continue 
to mediate the representation for the behaviour. 577  
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d) Numerous brain areas are implicated at both acquisition and completion 
stages of this learning process. 
 
Motor skill learning is a highly complex neural process involving plastic change in 
very many brain areas and pathways.578 Procedural learning pathways involve 
sensorimotor messaging to the association cortex and thence to BG and on to 
thalamus and premotor cortex. The premotor cortex has a key role in the 
acquisition of motor skills involving repetition and patterns of activity, 
coordinating the muscles involved via the primary motor cortex. One author 
describes the premotor cortex as “the memory bank for skilled motor activities.” 
579 Memory formation in this region is triggered by ACh release from the basal 
forebrain. The premotor cortex has involvement also in planning complex 
voluntary actions that require fine coordination.  
 
The work of Floyer-Lea and Matthews (2005) confirmed this remarkably complex 
interplay of brain areas in both short and long term learning. They sought to study 
the distinct brain networks mediating fast, short-term and slow, long-term motor 
learning of the same motor task.580  Their research found that short-term motor 
skill learning was associated with some plasticity in the cortical network specific 
                                                                                                                                                                 
control movement of knitting needles. fMRI imaging demonstrated that the cerebellum and BG 
were initially involved in learning the new method, but that once learned, the cerebellum became 
inactive with the long lasting representation of the behaviour involving only the BG and associated 
motor cortical regions. 
578
 While it is totally incorrect to equate motor skill learning to the acquisition of virtue, it is 
suggested that the behaviours automatized in various simple potentially virtuous actions, for 
example of greeting others courteously, or of coughing into a handkerchief, rely in part, for the 
neural basis on such motor learning. I write of these actions “potentially virtuous” for the habitual 
intention with which the action is performed is also highly relevant. 
579
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for the learned movements. They suggested that increased traffic in a subcortical 
circuit (cerebellar dentate, thalamus, and putamen) could be a critical element in 
development of greater movement automaticity with short-term learning. They 
confirmed the implication of the putamen in processing movement timing, and 
suggested that the motor cortex–putamen circuit could be crucial in encoding 
movement sequences. 581   
 
They found that long-term learning involved pronounced plasticity in the primary 
somatosensory and motor cortex and increased activation in the loop between 
motor cortex and basal ganglia “after a motor sequence is practised 
extensively.”582  
 
e) Emotion and procedural memory. 
 
Further evidence of the highly integrated nature of brain systems is apparent in 
studies which demonstrate that procedural memory consolidation appears 
associated with the reward systems of the brain. DA release from the SN is 
believed to trigger memory formation in the BG. Monkey studies, documented by 
Romo and Schultz (1990) and Montague et al. (1996) confirmed that striatal 
neurons are conditioned by DA (reward) signalling. 583 
 
Doyon et al. note evidence for emotional facilitation of memory in the BG.584 
Processes of cellular consolidation of limbic dependent memory traces, also 
appear to consolidate motor memories. They note the synthesis of proteins in the 
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motor cortex after training enables motor skill learning. This seems to indicate 
that processes of system consolidation, as demonstrated in the cortico-
hippocampal circuit, are also applicable to the circuitry for motor sequence 
learning.585 
 
2.4.6 Habit formation, a particular form of learning. 
 
Against this review of procedural learning, it is enlightening to look in more detail 
at habit formation.  
 
By way of introduction to this section, a parenthesis about the nature and 
features of habits in their relationship to the BG is warranted. Habits are well 
characterised: they are learned, (ie a result of mechanisms of experience 
dependent plasticity), they are robust after they are fixed by repetition, there can 
be a lack of behavioural flexibility, they allow for virtually unconscious 
performance, they demonstrate insensitivity to outcome devaluation and 
contingency degradation, they tend to manifest as an ordered sequence elicited 
by a specific context or stimulus, and may be either cognitive or motor.586 Habits 
have similar features to, but are distinct from, fixed action patterns (FAPs) in 
animals; symptoms of Tourette syndrome, and OCD.587 One OCD circuit has been 
documented. Not surprisingly it is a cortico-subcortical pathway and is implicated 
also in drug addiction. The focal nature of tics suggests an origin in specific sites in 
the striatum and in specific cortico-basal ganglia subcircuitry. In general habits are 
recognised now as systems with distinct brain substrates. Computational 
approaches, pioneered by Sutton and Barto in the 90s, have added a powerful 
instrument to studies in this area.  
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Classically habits have been seen to fall in the domain of procedural learning as 
opposed to declarative learning. Compulsive habits manifest similar neural 
programs of development to addictions (2.6.6). They may be acquired either by 
behavioural routines and rituals that have been learned, through innate 
mechanisms, or though neurological or neuropsychiatric illness or addiction. The 
skilled procedural actions of a morning routine, or of driving to work, also have 
much in common with habits as such.  
 
Graybiel points out that proceduralisation, movement sequences, can occur in 
both cortical and subcortical, widely distributed brain regions where they exhibit 
many neural parallels to habit learning, most significantly:  
 dynamic involvement of neocortex and striatum,  
 shift from anterior/ventral regions of striatum to caudal zones as the 
proceduralisation is acquired,  
 with a corresponding shift from anterior/ventral cortical regions to more 
posterior zones.  
The line between compulsive habit formation and a cortically integrated facility 
for behaviour is indistinct. 
 
Graybiel argues that BG-mediated habits fall somewhat ambiguously between 
voluntary, conscious, higher-order, deliberative behavioural control, and lower-
order control almost inaccessible to consciousness.588 She suggests that habits 
affect not only behaviours but cognitive activity. In taking the above position, she 
seeks to resist what she sees as a narrowing of the definition of habit.589  
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In keeping with this broadened understanding, Tang et al. (2007) document a 
significant contribution that habit formation makes to the wellbeing of the 
organism. They studied the striatal neuronal output in 26 rats during the 
formation of a motor habit. Rats were surgically implanted with 12 microwires, 
each for single neuron recording. The aim of the study was to observe changes in 
output by striatal neurons related to vertical head movement during the process 
of motor habit acquisition.590 They were able to demonstrate a growing efficiency 
of neuronal activity in the course of learning: “Our data suggest that the striatum 
may shift from facilitating acquisition of efficient movement with a large 
population of neurons early in training to modulating or maintaining habitual 
movement with stronger firing by fewer neurons after overtraining, consistent 
with evidence that lesions of the striatum impaired formation (Yin et al., 2004) 
and expression (Packard and McGaugh, 1996) of a habit.”591 
 
In other words, habit learning provides the organism with a way of producing 
movement that is more efficient at the neuronal level, and therefore conducive to 
the flourishing of the organism. (See 6.2.1.2.) 
 
2.4.7 Plasticity in the basal ganglia and related structures. 
 
It is appropriate, having reviewed the anatomy and role of the BG, that we now 
turn our attention specifically to plasticity in this region. Within the argument of 
this study is that various mechanisms of plasticity constitute the material 
underpinnings for learning, including habit formation, in the brain. It is activity 
dependent plasticity, the “long lasting change in the functional efficacy of synaptic 
connections that is induced by certain patterns of brain stimulation”592  that most 
interests us; and this is totally consistent the view that repeated behaviours assist 
in the formation of both habits and virtue itself. 
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Although an understanding of the internal workings of the BG is very much a work 
in progress, 593 nevertheless, much progress has been made in unravelling the 
complexities of BG plasticity, and in identifying component regions and their role 
in facilitating implicit learning.   
 
There are numerous and distinct forms of plasticity that underpin learning and 
cognitive processes mediated by the striatum when specific behavioural tasks are 
being learned. These forms include LTP, LTD, shorter forms of intrinsic plasticity 
(such as lateral inhibition and modification of neuronal membrane properties) and 
STDP, which “encodes salient information in neuronal networks”.594  
 
2.4.7.1 Forms of basal ganglia plasticity.595 
 
i) The reward signal DA is believed to be the principal mediator of striatal 
plasticity. DA has been shown to strengthen synapses in the striatum 
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They go on to argue that these processes hinge on “distinct 
learning rules and, accordingly, distinct forms of plasticity”, and that it is variations in synaptic 
plasticity and at times the absence of synaptic modification in the dorsal striatum that are 
implicated in procedural learning, stimulus response association, habit formation and motor 
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that are currently active, producing synaptic strengthening shown to 
relate to operant learning. 596 
ii) In ventral pars, 597 LTD and LTP plasticities are present in various forms, 
by specifically different induction mechanisms, featuring changes both 
pre- and post-synaptically, and even on the same synapse mediated by 
different receptors. ACh, DA, EC, GABA, glutamate, opioid, and 
nicotinic plasticity are all present, some in a wide variety of forms. 
“LTD/LTP induced modification of firing discharge (change from single 
spike to burst) could control alertness, volition, responses to natural 
rewards, and drugs sensitisation.” 598   
It is possible that the striatum plays a key role in reward related 
memory.599 Two classes of striatal neurons have been identified in 
signalling reward related events, in each case utilising DA, but it should 
be recognised that the mechanisms underlying “striatal neuroplasticity 
and reward-related behaviours and learning are still far from being 
elucidated.”600 
Plasticity in the form of LTD and LTD, “probably the two main forms of 
synaptic plasticity”,601 is found at corticostriatal-MSN synapses. 602 MS 
neurons seem much more susceptible to LTD than LTP owing to their 
very negative resting membrane potential.603 Now “almost all forms of 
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Hebbian plasticity have been demonstrated at excitatory coticostriatal 
synapses onto striatal projecting neurons and some seem to be 
expressed by striatal interneurons”.604 
Intrinsic plasticity has been observed in striatal MSNs: “Synaptic output 
can also be modulated by enduring changes in neuronal intrinsic 
excitability resulting from changes in voltage gated ion channels 
function.”605  The result is an amplification or attenuation of the EPSP 
amplitude. This form of plasticity changes the probability of PSP and 
duration, and secondly mediates metaplasticity, the capacity to induce 
consequent plasticity at the synapse. Thirdly it may be involved in 
efficient tuning of output in relation to repeated synaptic inputs. The 
complexities of intrinsic plasticity are under current study.606 
Plasticity in the NAc reinforces spatial memory, consolidates links 
between emotion and context cues in relation to planning in the PFC 
and motor behaviours, plays an underlying role in natural reward 
processes, and also provides the neural basis for craving after drugs of 
abuse. 607  Note that the link to drug seeking shows that habits in the 
BG need not be simple motor sequences, but may involve the pursuit 
of complex purposeful behaviour patterns. Limbic DA inputs are from 
the VTA. 
Plasticity in the VTA establishes a reward memory with respect to 
behaviours caused by natural incentives (food, water, sex) or 
dysfunctional processes such as those caused by drugs of abuse 
(craving, sensitisation, dependence).  
iii) The dorsal pars features links to associative and sensorimotor cortical 
areas especially in medial and lateral areas. Activity in the dorsal region 
is modulated by DA from SNpc. The role of LTP and LTD in movement 
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initiation and learning in this area have been well described. 608 In the 
dorsal pars LTD is the dominant form of plasticity in the cortico-striatal 
pathway, in various forms, at D2 receptors.609  
Plasticity is evident in the SN. Postsynaptic LTD in SNpc has been 
identified. This is independent of NMDAR but dependent on Ca2+ 
intracellular signalling. Tetanic stimulation of subthalamus has been 
shown to lead to LTP in SNpc, suggesting that the subthalamus can 
thus play a role in motor activity. The relationship between movement 
and plasticity in SN DA neurons has not yet been described.  
Plasticity in STN appears significant in motivation for natural rewards 
and for craving for drugs. Plasticity in this nucleus has a major role in 
motor function control. 
 
2.4.7.2 DA: principal mediator of plasticity in the basal ganglia. 
 
DA was initially hypothesised to mediate reinforced learning by strengthening 
synaptic connections in the striatum in the presence of a reward.  In complement 
to information in the preceding section, the following mechanisms associated with 
DA are apparent.  
 In the early 80s Schultz and colleagues demonstrated that rewards elicited 
phasic DA midbrain responses by strengthening synaptic connections in 
the striatum. Later electrophysiological response to reward stimuli of DA 
cells in the SN and the VTA was documented, and DA-invoked plasticity in 
the striatum detected in vitro. 
 Recent experimental data shows that the rapid onset of phasic activity 
seems to be a key mechanism of DA mediated plasticity and seems to be 
present in both stimulus-outcome (S-O) and A-O learning.610 Sustained 
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reverbatory loops appear to facilitate appropriate motor action by 
maintaining activity in the cortical movement related cells. It is suggested 
that DA mediated binding assists in establishing behavioural sequences. 611   
 LTD and LTP both are mediated and triggered by DA release, although LTP 
is inhibited by activation of D2 receptors (mainly present in the indirect 
pathway). Hence DA release is more likely to lead to LTP in direct pathway 
and LTD in indirect. Higher levels of DA favour induction of LTP.612  
 Cannabinoid and adenosine receptors also play a part in striatal LTD.613 
Wickens notes that DA and EC signalling mediate plasticity in the form of 
LTD and LTP, with intracellular calcium signalling also significant. DA “plays 
a crucial role in determining the magnitude and direction of plasticity”614. 
 Learning in the striatum is driven by novelty.615 Schultz and others suggest 
that phasic DA release is triggered by rewards that are unpredicted. It has 
been shown that there is a steady tonic low level of DA release “to run the 
motor programs already set up”; phasic DA release seems to be a “learning 
signal” 616 that induces plasticity. The phasic release of DA appears 
implicated in instrumental learning, Pavlovian conditioning, and various 
forms of associative and reinforcement learning.617. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
of milliseconds beyond responses to salient non reward events. Note that Horvitz refers to A-O 
goal directed learning as R-O. 
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 “Depotentiation”, the reversal of an LTP that has already been established, 
has been identified as a further form of synaptic plasticity. It is now 
believed too that DA mediated binding may assist in establishing 
behavioural sequences, and that sustained reverbatory loops appear to 
facilitate appropriate motor action by maintaining activity in the cortical 
movement related cells. 618. 
 DA timing is significant. Precisely timed pulses of DA “coinciding with the 
time of pre-synaptic stimulation and post synaptic depolarisation of the 
striatal cell-corticostriatal synapses show potentiation rather than 
depression” that would normally be the case with high frequency 
stimulation.619 Furthermore, DA mediated corticostriatal synaptic 
strengthening seems to work to maintain the movement direction coding 
in the frontal cortex until the trigger stimulus occurs.620  
 DA synapses are normally found on the neck of spines with the excitatory 
synapse on the head of the same spine. 621  
 
2.4.7.3 Insights from plasticity within the hippocampus 
 
Hippocampal studies of plasticity shed further light on the nature of plasticity in 
the BG. Beretta et al. note the differences of plasticity between the BG and and 
the hippocampus.622 Hippocampal plasticity is dependent upon synaptically 
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released glutamate, whereas striatal plasticity involves DA activity, release of ECs 
and ACh.623  
 
Beretta et al. note that the groundwork for synaptic plasticity studies in BG, and in 
all vertebrate CNS, was laid by Bliss and Lomo, who, as we have seen, detected in 
vivo LTP in the hippocampus following on repetitive excitation. “Activity 
dependent synaptic potentiation occurs within milliseconds, can persist for hours 
or days and is expressed as a persistent increase in the size of the synaptic 
component of the evoked response, recorded either from individual neurons or 
from a larger cell population.”624 Bliss and Lomo’s work was complemented by 
Schwartzkroin and Wester (1975) who used brain slice preparations to 
demonstrate LTP under controlled in vitro conditions. Plasticity in both areas 
obeys the Artola-Brocher-Singer rule: “induction of LTP or LTD depends on the 
ability of the postsynaptic membrane to reach different sequential threshold for 
LTD and LTP induction.”  This observation possibly reflects progressively higher 
levels of postsynaptic free calcium.  
 
2.4.8 Initial reflections on the possible role of the basal ganglia in virtue 
acquisition.  
 
With cortical, limbic and motor interconnections providing a capacity for reflective 
action, reward based goal reinforcement, and the development of habitual action, 
the BG, noted by Di Filippo as the “brain centre for habit formation”,625 appear 
highly implicated in the neural underpinnings of virtue.  
 
The neuronal processes of habit formation are of relevance to this study. Habits, 
acquired in the BG, are the result of experience driven plasticity in basal ganglia-
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based circuits.626 The pathways that facilitate habitual behaviours, highly 
interconnected with limbic and cognitive areas of the brain, would seem to have 
much in common with pathways related to the development of good habits, 
virtues. Both begin with simple goal-oriented behaviours, both are experience 
acquired, requiring consolidation by repetitive action, both require 
interconnection to motor, motivational, cognitive and executive areas. During 
acquisition there is a movement from attentive explicit behaviour to the 
automatised. Both show great resistance to change once acquired. 
 
Not only are the implicated limbic, cortical and basal-thalamic regions, (brain 
regions supporting motivation, automatisation of action, and executive goal 
direction) functionally required for both habit and virtue formation, but the 
efficient interconnection of these brain regions is shown to be present  in the 
brain.  
 
The BG with their thalamic pathways to both the limbic system and the cortex are 
a crucial piece in the puzzle, and it is only in little more than the last decade that 
the complex involvement of the BG in cognitive and motivational processes has 
become apparent. The cognitive connection is particularly important in the case of 
virtue. As will be seen in Chapters 3 and 4, motivation in virtuous action is a 
complex interplay of initial reward incentives (for example in the case of a child 
developing a virtue), previously established pathways for patterns of behaviour, 
and what we could call a cognitive evaluation of goal. In particular, Graybiel’s 
reflections on habit, described above, emphasize that this evaluative component 
is potentially present via pathways involving the BG.  
 
Di Filippo writes, “It is widely accepted that animals, including humans, shape 
their behaviour on the basis of experience and that motivation is characterised by 
action, either to increase the probability of an outcome (appetitive motivation), or 
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to reduce it (aversive motivation)” 627 These motivations shape our actions via the 
mediation of the BG pathways. Reward and motivation will be discussed below 
(2.6).628   
 
At the heart of the capacity of the brain to wire for habit and ultimately virtue are 
mechanisms of plasticity. Beretta writes, “It is widely accepted that the complexity 
and adaptability of neuronal communication, which is necessary for integrative 
and higher functions of the brain, is amply represented by plastic changes 
occurring at the synaptic level. Therefore long term modifications of synaptic 
efficacy between neurons have been considered the cellular basis of learning and 
memory.”629 
 
Virtues, it will be seen are stable capacities for habitual action... they empower 
the owner to act in the world effectively. Da Cunha captures this notion: “Since 
the output of the basal ganglia is almost exclusively to frontal cortex and 
brainstem motor nuclei, the memories encoded by this system must be expressed 
as actions. This explains the procedural nature of these memories.”630 
 
2.5  Neural bases for emotional control. 
 
In this section we overview representative current research into emotional self-
regulation. This will shed further light on role of the cortico-limbic connections of 
the BG, and on the possibilities for pathways of the emotional self-regulation that 
characterises virtue in the Aristotelian vision. 
 
Since the 1930s the cerebral cortex has been acknowledged to play an inhibitory 
influence on emotional behaviour. In the last fifteen years much has been written 
                                                          
627
 Di Filippo et al., “Short term and long-term plasticity at corticostriatal synapses: implications for 
learning and memory,”115. 
628
 For an overview of the neurobiology of appetitive and aversive responses, see Leknes 
andTracey, “A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure,” 314-320. 
629
 Beretta et al., “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia: A similar code for physiological and 
pathological conditions,” 343. 
630
 Da Cunha, “Learning processing in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,” 163. 
198 
 
about the pathways of emotional control, in particular distinguishing the cognitive 
pathways allowing cortical modification of limbic responses, and the direct 
cognitive-bypass routes, the “quick and dirty” routes, that manifest impulsive 
reactions of rage, flight, etc.631  
 
2.5.1 Theories of emotion.  
 
An initial overview of emotion, drawn principally from psychology, is 
appropriate.632 
 
According to the James-Lange theory of emotion, from the start of the twentieth 
century, the physiological changes are the emotion... we feel sad because we cry, 
for example. If we remove the physiological changes, we remove the emotion. 
Although this seems counter intuitive, it does place emphasis on the integration of 
mind and body, and recent studies have, in fact, shown that faking emotions can 
produce emotion. For example, Strack, Martin, and Stepper documented in 1988 
that most people rate cartoons funnier if they hold a pen in their teeth, thus 
forcing a smile, rather reading the cartoon while holding the pen in their lips and 
preventing a smile.   
 
Walter Cannon in 1927 and Philip Bard proposed a more subtle model, known as 
the Cannon-Bard theory, whereby emotional experience is understood to be able 
to occur independently of bodily changes.633 Cannon proposed a special role for 
the thalamus. According to the Cannon-Bard theory the thalamus and 
hypothalamus, possibly inhibited by the cerebral cortex, are responsible for 
emotional responses to stimuli. Subsequently it is apparent that  these areas and 
the sympathetic nervous system do have involvement in certain aspects of 
emotional response and control.  
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Other more recent theories have modified, and continue to modify these two 
fundamental attitudes towards emotion.  
 
In the 1930s Papez proposed a circuit responsible for emotion, with emotion 
governed by the hypothalamus. The circuit involved a circular loop connecting 
hypothalamus to thalamus, to ACC to hippocampus. He proposed that the ACC is 
responsible for emotional experience. Links to the neocortex provide for a rich 
emotional life. The hippocampus is no longer given the prominence in emotion 
accorded to it by Papez. Nor does it seem that there is a single system responsible 
for emotion. 634   
 
The Schachter-Singer theory allows for self-knowledge of the degree of one’s 
emotional arousal through observation of one’s own physiological changes.635 In 
1999, Antonio Damasio, aided by these direct insights into the emotional brain, 
proposed a model to distinguish between observable behaviours, the emotions, 
and the private experiences of feelings.636 
 
2.5.2 Emotion and memory. 
 
Context and emotional state are known to modify memory.637 Memory 
reciprocally affects emotional state. Joseph LeDoux, a pioneer in the neural bases 
of emotion, says, “My work is as much about memory and plasticity as 
emotion.”638 
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Recent studies have further explored the area of the interconnection of emotion 
and memory. 639 Kalueff has reviewed the literature on the interplay between 
memory and anxiety, and mechanisms of plasticity linked to anxiety, focussing 
especially on the role of neurotransmitter systems and neuropeptides in 
regulation of memory and anxiety processes.640  
 
The author notes that brain synaptic plasticity is now known to be modulated by 
both neurons and glial cells with glial Ca-binding protein S100B, and PACAP 
(pituitary adenylate cyclase-activating polypeptide), noted as regulators of 
synaptic plasticity. The connection of the latter with the expression of 
neurotrophins is noted.641 
 
LeDoux studies the area of the amygdala involved in the storage of emotional 
memories, the lateral nucleus. Importantly he has described how subcortical 
sensory inputs to the amygdala can drive emotional responses that precede 
cortical awareness.642 We can react emotionally before rationally assessing the 
situation. 
 
2.5.3 Human brain areas associated with regulation of emotion. 
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Figure 2.9 a. 
 
 
Areas associated with the limbic system. Source: Saladin, Kenneth S.  Anatomy and 
Physiology. 6th ed. NY: McGraw Hill, 2012. 537. 
 
 
Figure 2.9b 
 
 
Location of key limbic areas. A 3D construction of the hippocampus, fornix 
and amygdala within a translucent CNS. Source: Nolte, John. The human brain. An 
introduction to its functional anatomy.  6th ed. Philadelphia: Mosby, 2009. 595. 
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Emotion is processed in the brain primarily in regions including several parts of 
the PFC, namely dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), ventromedial PFC 
(VMPFC), OFC, as well as the amygdala, hippocampus, ACC, and insular cortex.643. 
The limbic cortex is found “on the medial brain surface, in the cingulate gyrus and 
medial frontal lobe, and on the orbital surface of the frontal lobe”.644  
 
Neuroimaging (see Appendix 3) shows that distinct subregions of the PFC have 
specific function in relation to emotion regulation. fMRI imaging, which detects 
brain activity with resolution down to 1mm3, can show areas that are active but 
not necessarily all areas necessarily involved. The limbic cortical areas, those areas 
of the cortex adjacent to the limbic area, have been identified as the DLPFC, the 
VMPFC, and the OFC. These areas now believed to be a “cerebral association area 
for the control of behaviour”.645  
 
It appears that there are brain circuits for specific emotions, for example, 
implicating the insula in disgust, the amygdala in fear, and the PFC in conscious 
representations of emotion. The hypothalamus also carries out a number of 
functions associated with emotion, the basic drives for thirst and feeding. It 
directs motor patterns associated with various emotional responses such as pain, 
pleasure, sexual arousal, and rage and it has a role in coordination of autonomic 
functions affected by emotional arousal. It also coordinates release of a number of 
hormones such as oxytocin.646 
 
The amygdala plays a key role in particular emotional experience. The nuclei of 
the amygdala “mediate the effects of sensory stimuli on emotional behaviour”; 
“through interconnections with other cortical and subcortical structures it 
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controls emotional expression and behaviour.”647 The amygdala is particularly 
active in mediating early attachment relationships, and reaction to stress and non 
conscious emotional memories.648 Building on studies by Jerome Kagan who had 
demonstrated that traits such as timidity and shyness persisted from childhood 
into adulthood, Schwartz et al. (2003) conducted fMRI scans of some of these 
inhibited babies, now in early adulthood. The scans showed that the amygdala of 
this group tended to be overactive, reflecting fear and anxiety, in the presence of 
novelty.649  
 
The interconnections between the limbic cortical areas and the limbic areas 
themselves are becoming increasingly well defined. The amygdala is now known 
to receive neuronal signals from all limbic cortical areas, and from the temporal, 
parietal and occipital cortex (most especially the auditory and visual association 
areas).650 Efferent connections return to these cortical areas as well as to the 
hippocampus, the septum, the thalamus and the hypothalamus. The anterior 
cingulate gyrus has anterior connections to the amygdala and posterior 
connections to the hippocampus.651 
 
Of the neurotransmitters in the brain, the amines  - DA, 5-HT and norepinephrine 
(NE) -  have been shown to play a role in modulating the individual’s emotional 
responses.652 These are critical to the brain’s excitatory and inhibitory 
mechanisms of control: NE from the locus ceruleus is usually excitatory, DA 
(inhibitory in the BG, and possibly excitatory elsewhere in the cortex) is critical in 
the body’s reward systems (see 2.6.1), 5-HT from the raphe nuclei released in the 
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hypothalamus and limbic structures is known to inhibit aggression, and ACh from 
the gigantocellular neurons of the reticular excitatory area is excitatory.653  654 
 
2.5.3.1 Involvement of prefrontal cortex in emotional regulation.655 
 
Here we look at the implication of the cortical areas in management, or more 
properly, inhibition of emotion.656 Pollak points out that most emotion studies 
take a top down approach because of the fact that damage to PFC leads to poor 
emotional regulation.657   
 
Nevertheless, recent studies in emotion regulation do note the interdependence 
of brain areas and integration of systems. For example, Salzman and Fusi found in 
2010 that the “functional and the electrophysiological characteristics of the 
amygdala and the PFC overlap and intimately depend on each other. Thus, the 
neural circuits mediating cognitive, emotional, physiological, and behavioural 
responses may not truly be separable and instead are inextricably linked.”658 
Furthermore Ray and Zald (2012) argue that  PFC-limbic interaction is more 
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reciprocal than the conventional top-down models would suggest,659  as the 
ventral and dorsal PFC are in rich reciprocal communication with the amygdala.660  
 
The complexity of pathways implicated in emotional regulation is being 
progressively revealed. A major magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study of 1900 
14 year old teenagers noted seven cortical and subcortical networks implicated in 
inhibition of activity and six networks implicated in failed inhibitions.661  
 
There has been a growing body of knowledge about the role that the PFC, and its 
constituent implicated areas, play in managing emotion. Specific areas of the PFC 
implicated in emotional processing have been identified, with specialised roles 
attributed to them. Barbas and Zikopoulos noted, “The three distinct prefrontal 
sectors, namely the lateral, orbitofrontal and medial, are interconnected, and 
provide the basis for interaction of pathways underlying cognitive and emotional 
processes.” 662  
 
Davidson explains that the PFC "represents emotion in the absence of 
immediately present elicitor, playing an important role in assessing affective 
consequences of actions, and in persistence of emotion.” 663 Particular sections of 
the PFC seem to play a major role in regulation of the duration of emotion, and 
the suppression of negative emotion once elicited, essentially an affective working 
memory. These areas work together to generate information and behaviour 
related to emotion.  
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He states that individual affective and regulatory differences are attributable to 
“asymmetries” in the PFC and in the contribution of the amygdala.664 As a general 
rule, the left hemisphere appears to play a greater role than the right in cortical 
regulation of emotion. Pronounced right frontal asymmetry in young adults, 
evident in electroencephalography (EEG) scans showing disproportionate activity 
of right over left against controls, is associated with negativity and withdrawing 
behaviours. Even sad and crying infants show greater EEG activity in the right 
hemisphere. Happy infants show more left frontal EEG activity. 665 Left and right 
side damage to the PFC areas reveals the differing function of these areas. Left 
side damage leads to greater incidence of depressive symptoms, as it normally 
plays a role in positive affect. 666 The right hemisphere of the brain tends to favour 
the immediate, limbic response prior to cerebral modification. 667 
 
The VMPFC appears to play a key role in predicting positive and negative affective 
consequences.668 Both the experience of pain and witnessing the pain of others 
leads to activation of the mPFC and the insula, as well as the lateral cerebellum.669  
Morgan and colleagues in 1994 documented a study of 36 rats designed to 
evaluate the role of the mPFC in the phenomenon of fear extinction by means of 
classical fear conditioning. The mPFC is a region commonly understood to play a 
role in emotional reactivity and autonomic regulation. The study demonstrated 
that the mPFC plays a significant role for fear extinction in rats.670  671   
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The ACC, within the mPFC, has been called the “major outflow of the limbic 
system, also involved in evaluating pain and distress vocalisation” 672 The ACC also 
plays a role in directing attention, inhibited impulsive behaviours, and in 
generating goal-directed behaviours.673 It appears to play a role in analysing 
conflicting options.674  
 
The OFC is the limbic gateway to the cortex. Balbernie suggests that it is through 
the OFC that the limbic system and the cortex interact. This view is now widely 
accepted and as such the OFC plays a central role in cortical regulation of 
emotion,675 and is activated when we are making decisions on the basis of 
emotion laden information.676  Brain imaging studies have also shown that the 
OFC plays a role in the brain’s reward systems, 677 consistent with the view that 
OFC functions pertain to the emotional component underlying and individual’s 
reaction to events in the environment.678 Imaging studies of orphans (See 2.2.4.1) 
revealed abnormalities consistent with the behaviours that appear to follow upon 
being raised in environments of social deprivation, in particular, the manifestation 
of an underactive OFC in comparison with normal children.679  
 
The PFC, and especially the OFC, receives inputs related to emotion from various 
brain locations including amygdala, thalamus, VTA, and olfactory system. Major 
connections from the OFC include to the hippocampus, the amygdala and the 
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hypothalamus. Damage to the left OFC of Phineas Gage, appears to have been a 
significant factor in his reduced inhibition and heightened irresponsibility.680 
 
Arden and Linford described clinical therapies for neuroplastic remodelling of the 
frontal lobes. They reported that as affect regulation in the PFC improves, the OFC 
can effectively inhibit activation of subcortical areas such as the amygdala.681  
 
Conscious regulation of emotion utilizes both the DLPFC and VMPFC. It is believed 
that the DLPFC recruits input from the VMPFC (which includes the OFC) when 
there are conflicting emotional situations.682 It has been shown that the DLPFC, 
interacting with ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC) and ACC, is active in choosing not to 
follow “prepotent behaviour” or in choosing a novel behaviour.683  Studies to 
determine volitional control of behaviour have found that impairment in monkeys 
is analogous to that in humans.  Monkeys seeking reward by moving a joystick in a 
particular way in specific response to a visual cue are shown to be greatly 
impaired if there be damage to the VLPFC and orbital PFC. 684   
 
Recent papers analysing regulation dysfunction by Bennett (2011), and 
Heatherton and Wagner (2011), offer insights into pathways for cortical regulation 
of emotion. Both studies confirm the role of DA induced cortical plasticities in 
cortical regulation and the contribution of cortico-striatal circuits. Bennett reports 
that modulation of the prefrontal-limbic network (including ACC, amygdala and 
hippocampus) is principally through the hypothalamus, BG and midbrain. 
                                                          
680
 Phineas Gage, in 1848, suffered the loss of much of his medial PFC. His behaviour changed, 
becoming irreverent and profane, socially inappropriate, and unable to plan. Frontal damage leads 
to disinhibition, emotional impairment, difficulty in planning, and impaired working memory. 
681
 Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 31-40. 
682
 Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 88. 
683
 Tatia M. C. Lee, et al., “Regulation of human behaviours (Review),” Future Neurology 2, 2 
(2007): 190. The lateral PFC is activated by cognitive tasks, the VLPFC by tasks requiring 
information in working memory, and the DLPFC when information must be manipulated. Anterior 
areas of PFC may have a role in information transfer between these other areas.  
684
 Tomita et al., showed that disconnecting the PFC from temporal cortex prevented in monkeys 
the activation of stored memories.Although there is a need for some caution in drawing direct 
parallels between monkey and human PFC function some limited conclusions are possible: that 
monkeys with PFC damage are impaired on conditional learning tasks, show emotional 
impairment, and are impaired at object recognition. H. Tomita, et al. “Top down signal from 
prefrontal cortex in executive control of memory retrieval” Nature 401, (1999): 699-703. 
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Dysregulation of this network gives rise to major depression disorders.685  
Dysregulation tends to follow one of three pathways: the hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal (HPA) axis, through the BG, and consequent to modulatory change in the 
midbrain VT and Raphe nucleus.  
 
The high levels of cortisol evident in adolescent suicidal patients are attributable 
to failure of the glutocorticoid receptor inhibiting release of corticotrophin 
releasing factor and adrenocorticotrophic hormone. Epigenetic causes 
attributable to abuse lead to decrease in the glutocorticoid receptor. Suicidal 
patients are also characterised by reduced grey matter in the ACC and increased 
grey matter in the amygdala linked directly to reduced or increased formation of 
synaptic spines.  
 
Later life depressive mood appears related to dysfunction in the caudate that 
disrupts the DLPFC-subcortical connectivity normally involved in goal election and 
suppression of negative thoughts. Furthermore another loop (the OFC, subgenual 
ACC, ventralmedial striatum and amygdala) normally associated with goal directed 
behaviour, is disrupted by hyper activity most probably as a result of 
hyperintensities in the caudate. In schizophrenia reduced levels of DA in the PFC 
(and high activity in the amygdala) are associated with depression and increased 
levels in the striatum are associated with positive affect.686  
 
Heatherton and Wagner found two independent pathways mediating frontal 
regulation of emotion: a more successful frontal-striatal pathway, and a frontal-
amygdalic pathway that was less successful in regulation.687 
 
Another recent area of investigation into cognitive control has involved self 
regulation of amygdalic activation. Twenty-eight right-handed, medically- and 
                                                          
685
 M. R. Bennett, “The prefrontal-limbic network in depression: Modulation by hypothalamus, 
basal ganglia and midbrain,” Progress in Neurobiology 93, (2011): 483. 
686
 M. R. Bennett, “The prefrontal-limbic network in depression: Modulation by hypothalamus, 
basal ganglia and midbrain,” 470. 
687
 Todd F. Heatherton and Dylan D. Wagner, “Cognitive Neuroscience of Self-Regulation Failure,” 
Trends in Cognitive Science 15, 3 (2011): 132–139.  
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psychiatrically-healthy male volunteers (age 28.0±9.0 years), were used.  
Participants were given real-time fMRI neurofeedback and demonstrated most 
clearly the capacity to downregulate activity in the left amygdala while 
contemplating positive autobiographical memories.688   
 
Attentional processes in the brain predispose for emotional self regulation. A 2001 
study by Beauregard et al. had 10 young adult males with an average age of 23.5 
years watch erotic films but in contrasting scenarios. In the first they were asked 
to watch naturally, in the second, they were asked to suppress sexual responses. 
In the first, fMRI imaging detected increased activity in right temporal pole, right 
amygdala and hypothalamus. In the second, no increased activity was detected in 
these areas but in the DLPFC and ACC.689 Posner and Rothbart state, “Top down 
mechanisms, such as attention, may serve as models of how neural activity may 
be increased or decreased in networks to establish processing priorities”.690 
Beyond the PFC areas already mentioned (DLPFC, VMPFC, ACC, the insular cortex, 
and the OFC) Pollak and Eslinger note that the integrated systems of emotional 
control further involve the cognitive management of areas for attention, memory, 
and action. 691 Posner notes that executive attention is associated with activity in 
the midline frontal areas in the anterior cingulated gyrus. 692 (See 2.5.5.) 
 
These views with respect to cognitive management of fear responses are 
consistent with recent findings of Hartley and Phelps.693 They find, “Many 
different cognitive strategies can be used to regulate emotion, including 
                                                          
688
 Vadim Zotev et al., “Self-Regulation of Amygdala Activation Using Real-Time fMRI 
Neurofeedback,” PLoS One 6, 9 (2011). 
689
 Mario Beauregard, et al., “Neural correlates of Conscious Self-Regulation of Emotion,” The 
Journal of Neuroscience 21, (2001): 1-6.  
690
 Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation” 427-441. 
691
 Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with 
developmental approaches to psychopathology,” 747. 
692
 Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” 429. 
693
 Catherine A. Hartley and Elizabeth A. Phelps, “Changing Fear: The Neurocircuitry of Emotion 
Regulation,” Neuropsychopharmacology 35, 1 (2010): 136–146. Hartley and Phelps describe neural 
bases for four techniques of emotional regulation successful in management of fear: extinction, 
cognitive regulation, active coping, and reconsolidation. Reconsolidation notes the linkage 
between memory and fear, and refers to the capacity to reconsolidate and reconstruct memories 
more positively. Again these techniques can be taught. They note the role of the striatum in active 
coping strategies. 
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reappraisal,694 selective attention, and suppression,” noting that regulation 
strategies can be learned through cognitive therapy. Significantly with respect to 
this study, they note that, “once habitual (my emphasis), these strategies become 
easier to easier to enact over time.” Cognitive regulation relies on DLPFC 
projections to the VMPFC inhibiting amygdalic acitivity. Ochsner discusses the 
various pathways involved in reappraisal mediated by DMPFC and VLPFC 
downregulation of the amygdala. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10 
 
 
Phineas Gage and the role of the medial PFC in emotion regulation. A 
reconstruction of the injury suffered by Phineas Gage indicating extensive 
damage to the VLPFC. It appears the DLPFC was largely untouched.  
Source: Damasio, H. et al. Science 264 (1994): 1102. Cited in Nolte, John. The human brain. An 
introduction to its functional anatomy. 6th ed. Philadelphia: Mosby, 2009. 136. 
 
 
2.5.4 Plasticity in the mechanisms of emotional regulation. 
 
The various mechanisms of plasticity underpin the patterns of emotional 
expression and regulation that develop in the individual.695 Pollak says that “the 
                                                          
694
 Reappraisal involves “reinterpreting the meaning of a stimulus, including one’s personal 
connection to it, to change one’s emotional response.” Kevin N. Ochsner, et al., “Functional 
imaging studies of emotion regulation:a synthetic review and evolving model of the cognitive 
control of emotion,” Annals Of The New York Academy Of Sciences 1251, (2012): E1–E24. Ochsner 
et al. offer a current comprehensive review of emotion regulation.  
695
 Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,” 
1196-1214. Animal studies attest to the pronounced plasticity of emotional circuitry, showing that 
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heuristic of plasticity refers to how experience leads to changes in these affective 
neural networks, including the efficiency, activation thresholds, and time courses 
of those activations.” 696 He argues, in alignment with Goldman-Rakic et al. (1997), 
that dopaminergic and serotonergic induced, experience-based, changes take 
place in the neural pathways involved in emotional regulation. 697 
 
He identifies the following features of plasticity in the affective pathways:  
 The VMPFC and OFC are needed for associating incoming information with 
existing response contingencies, linking information to motivational 
importance, and for working memory... plasticity in these areas is 
necessary for object reward association memory, and contextual fear 
conditioning. 
 In primate studies, the amygdala has been shown to project directly to 
medial thalamic nucleus and thence to VMPFC, facilitating involvement in 
processing social information requiring plasticity dependent learning and 
memory.  
 He argues that although complex social behaviours are unlikely to be 
centred in one place, the amygdala seems to be critical in stimulus-
reinforcement conditioning, whereby “neural cues acquire positive and 
negative incentive status and emotional meaning.” 698  
 
He notes the contribution of DA induced plasticity in the emotional pathways, and 
highlights associations with attentional mechanisms: 699  
                                                                                                                                                                 
early experience exercises extraordinary role in determining the final characteristics of the nervous 
system. 
696
 Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with 
developmental approaches to psychopathology,”735. 
697
 Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with 
developmental approaches to psychopathology,”747. 
698
 Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with 
developmental approaches to psychopathology,”742. Hence lesions to the amygdala impair 
performance on associative learning tasks involving emotional expressions. This is also relevant to 
the next section focusing on reward pathways. 
699
 Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with 
developmental approaches to psychopathology,”735. Pollak also draws conclusions the role that 
mechanisms of attention play.  
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 The mPFC, especially the ACC, has abundant links to the limbic system via 
the hippocampus, the shell region of the NAc and the amygdala. There is a 
likely contribution of this pathway to DA and 5-HT modulation of cortical 
socioemotional areas.  
 He notes that release of DA, as we have seen a recognised mediator of 
plasticity, is triggered by corticolimbic afferents. He notes that repeated 
stressful experiences seem to alter the balance of both excitatory and 
inhibitory inputs from the limbic system and that the basolateral amygdala 
system may receive stress messaging from the VTA facilitating learning 
through DA neurons within the VTA, NAc and other areas. 
 He notes the work of Passetti et al. suggesting that DA in the mPFC 
facilitates attention. And he suggests that the mPFC provides goal directed 
motor plans informed by context from the hippocampus.  
 Following the work of Schultz in 1998 he argues that the DA system acts as 
a learning signal for behavioural reinforcement but also may well be 
involved in attention and motivation before all important events, both 
positive and negative. He notes also the work of Pruessner et al. (2004) on 
DA release in humans caused by psychological stress, and of Mayberg who 
insists that loops of brain activity need to be understood as part of the 
mechanism.    
 
Systems for emotional management are summarised in Table 2.8. 
 
2.5.5 Development of attentional mechanisms. 
 
Attention facilitates cognitive regulation of emotion.700The psychology of 
attention goes back to William James at the end of the 19th century. He drew 
together the notions of attention and choice: “Volition is nothing but attention” 
                                                          
700
 Ironically training for mindfulness seeks to reduce habitual evaluative processing down the PFC 
midline, and direct attention to limbic in-the-moment sensory pathways.  Norman A. S. Farb et al., 
“The Mindful Brain and Emotion Regulation in Mood Disorders” Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 57, 
2 (2012): 70–77. 
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and that “effort of attention is the essential phenomenon of will”.701 He defined 
attention as “the taking possession of the mind in clear and vivid form of one out 
of what seem several simultaneous objects or trains of thought.”702  Attention may 
be seen on the one hand as a neural mechanism, albeit at the higher end of 
cognitive activity, for selection of stimuli or tasks. 703 It is also linked to 
consciousness and a facilitator of free choice.  
 
Posner reviews the evidence that the development of attentional mechanisms 
constitutes the essential feature of affect regulation; “Within cognitive 
psychology, the mechanisms thought to be involved in self-control are collectively 
called attention.” 704  He notes particularly the work of Broadbent in the late 50s 
who first proposed that we have the ability to filter unwanted inputs so as to 
attend. He notes six forms of attentional plasticity are discussed, principally from 
the neurosystems level, dealing with mechanisms related to voluntary control of 
thought. 705 
 
                                                          
701
 Quoted in Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain, 317. 
702
 Quoted in Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain, 325. William James argued that the 
essential achievement of the will was to fix the attention on a stimulus or thought and hold it fast 
before the mind, and that “Volition acts through attention – which magnifies, stabilizes, clarifies, 
one thought out of many. The essential achievement of the will is to hold one thought/attend to 
one object and hold it clear and strong before the mind, letting all others – its rivals for attention 
and all subsequent action – fade.”
 
 
703
 For overview of attentional mechanism see: John H. Reynolds, et al. “Attention” in Larry Squire, 
et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3
rd
 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008). 
704
 Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” 428. This view is based on 
the observation that parenting involves teaching children to pay attention to specific desirable 
behaviours and to be aware when personal behaviours become undesirable is looks on attentional 
networks, themselves affected by the social environment, as a key to developing regulation. 
705
 Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” 429. First, effortful control of 
attention means that we attend and amplify “the amount of neural activity within the area 
performing the calculation.”
 
The second mechanism of plasticity is priming, whereby we are able 
to retune our attention in another direction because of a trigger event or word. Priming may occur 
independently of previous attention. Third, practice consolidates pathways to material which is 
already known. Fourth, new connections are established when new associations are being made. 
Fifth, are strategies of chunking, decoding, and sounding out. Finally changes in brain structures 
may develop over the early life of a person eg development of attentional structures in a young 
child over the course of several years... eg orienting and development of executive control.  
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Studies provide convergent evidence for a fronto-parietal attentional control 
system. 706 Structures in the parietal, frontal and cingulated cortices at the top of 
the visual system hierarchy, appear to generate signals guiding selective attention, 
providing feedback signals that influence sensory processing at the more physical 
level. Michael Merzenich regards the nucleus basalis, and the attention system in 
which it plays a critical part, as “the modulatory control system of plasticity”. 
Learning in critical periods is effortless because the nucleus basalis is always on 
during these periods. Furthermore it has been shown that critical periods can be 
reopened by artificially turning on the nucleus basalis.  ACh from the nucleus 
basalis appears to be responsible for the mediation of vivid memories. 707  
 
NE is important in the brain’s attentional systems, with afferent distribution by 
two significant pathways to the frontal lobes. The first is via the cingulate gyrus 
and favours the right hemisphere, appearing to be associated with internal body 
states and sense of self. The second is from the amygdala to the OFC, favouring 
the left. It appears to be linked to close monitoring of behaviour.708  
 
Certain forms of learning, and the plasticity associated with learning, are closely 
linked to the exercise of attention.709  Intense concentration and full attention can 
provide a “necessary condition for plastic change”.710 Developmental plasticity 
                                                          
706
 See for example: S. Kastner, et al., “Increased activity in human visual cortex during directed 
attention in the absence of visual stimulation,” Neuron 22, (1999): 751-761. 
707
 Observations of neuroscientist Michael Merzenich quoted in Doidge, The brain that changes 
itself, 84-88. See also: Koch, “Consciousness.” Further studies reviewed and providing insight into 
attentional mechanisms: C. J. McAdams and J. H. Maunsell, “Effects of attention on the reliability 
of individual neurons in the monkey visual cortex,” Neuron 23, 4 (1999):765-773. J. H. Reynolds 
and L. Chelazzi, “Attentional modulation of visual processing,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 27, 
(2004): 611-647. 
708
 Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 207. The EEG results are 
consistent with the view that attention facilitates emotional control. 
709
 ADHD studies reveal the significance of linkages between the PFC and the striatum. Further 
studies reviewed and providing insight into reward mechanisms involving the PFC: R. A. Barkley, 
“Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder” in Child psychopathology, 2
nd
 ed., eds. E. J. Mash and A. 
Barkley, A (NY: Guildford Press, 2006); F. X. Castellanos, et al., “Anatomic brain abnormalities in 
monozygotic twins discordant for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,” American Journal of 
Psychiatry 160 (2003): 1693-1696; J. N. Giedd, et al., “Anatomic brain imaging studies of normal 
and abnormal brain development in children and adolescence” in Development psychopathology, 
Vol 2, eds. D. Cicchett and D. Cohen (New Jersey: Wiley, 2006). 
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 N Doidge (2008) The Brain that changes itself. Melbourne: Scribe p249. 
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studies in the developing mechanisms of attention in children offer further 
insights. Children develop both reactive and self-regulatory mechanisms, 
balancing self-expression and conformity with basic social norms. There are 
various proposals why attention is necessary: to avoid bottlenecks, and avoid that 
several objects in a given spatial field activate the same neuron.  
 
Executive attention is associated with activity in the midline frontal areas in the 
anterior cingulated gyrus. Nevertheless, even though hypnosis had been used to 
lessen anterior cingulate activity and the perception of pain without reducing the 
activity in the somatosensory cortex, when subjects were subjected to heat 
stimuli,711 emotional regulation was not simply about learning not to pay 
attention. Genetic studies have shown Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) genetic trait affecting the DA4 receptor expressed in Layer 4 of the 
cingulate. There is reciprocal interplay between affect and attention; studies show 
that anterior cingulate attention mechanisms automatically turn on as sadness 
heightens. 712 
 
Furthermore there are striking contrasts between universal trajectories of 
development and those of the individual child.   Of particularly interest is the work 
of Kochanska et al. linking development of conscience to temperamental 
differences in effortful control. 713 Eigsti et al. note the ability to direct attention 
away from rewarding stimuli during a delay of gratification task in toddlers 
predicts cognitive control later in life.714  
                                                          
711
 Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” 427-441. 
712
 Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” 427-441. 
713
 Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” 427-441, for discussion of 
Kochanska’s work. They documented in 2000 that obedience at nine months predicts effortful 
control at 22 months. It seems that temperament and self regulation (including control of 
emotion) each follow a remarkably stable developmental trajectory in the first three years.
 
Based 
on his studies of conflict resolution in children below 3 years using a modified Stroop test, Posner 
documents rapid gains in executive attention and executive control at about 30 months allowing 
the child to exercise inhibitory control over behaviour on his own. Yet in subsequent years, there 
are remarkable variations, typified perhaps most strikingly by Mischel’s marshmallow test of 1972 
which successfully predicted adolescent self control on the basis of infant capacity for delayed 
gratification. Mischel, et al., "Cognitive and attentional mechanisms in delay of gratification". 
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 I. M Eigsti, et al., “Predicting cognitive control from preschool to late adolescence and young 
adulthood,” Psychological Science 17, (2006): 478–484. 
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In short, attentional mechanisms are amongst those neural pathways critical to 
effective affect regulation. 
 
Attentional systems are summarised in Table 2.9. 
 
 
Figure 2.11 
 
 
Links between attention and emotion regulation. An example of imaging 
that demonstrates the underdeveloped capacity of adolescents (in 
comparison with adults) to suppress fearful emotions in response to images 
of fearful faces (example in a), and also to attend to non emotional stimuli.  
Adolescents showed increased activation of the ACC and left OFC in 
comparison with adults. When attention was to the nose (not directly 
conveying emotion) only ACC showed increased activation. These results are 
consistent with the view that adolescents, in general, have underdeveloped 
capacities for attention and fear suppression, in comparison with adults.  
Source: Monk C.S. et al. Adolescent immaturity in attention related brain engagement to 
emotional facial expressions,” Neuroimage 20 (2003) 420-428. Cited in Blakemore, Sarah-Jayne. 
“The social brain in adolescence.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9 (2008): 273.  
 
 
2.6 Neural bases for goal directed behaviours and reward activation.  
 
Having reviewed current research into the neural bases for habit formation and 
the role of emotions, we now turn to a closely related topic, the neural bases for 
goal directed behaviours and reward activation. There are various psychological 
theories accounting for motivation. The various approaches tend to reduce to 
two: behaviourists think in terms of drives whereas cognitive theorists consider 
goals. The anthropology of this study fits more comfortably with cognitive 
suppositions about human freedom. Within this view, human motivation is 
characterised by behaviours either to increase the probability of a desired result, 
or to reduce it. We can call the first appetitive motivation and the second aversive 
motivation. This view is broadly compatible with an Aristotelian-Thomistic 
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understanding of human action: it sits most comfortably with the a recurrent 
theme in Aristotle’s psychology: that we must raise children to seek pleasure in 
those things that are good for them, and to endure difficulties for a worthy goal. 
 
Neuroscience has identified various reward pathways that facilitate both goal 
directed actions and reward based conditioning. DA modulation of activity in the 
BG is believed to be critically involved in mediating reward activation and 
associated goal directed activities. An appreciation of recent research in these 
areas is particularly important to this study if we consider that virtue is not simple 
habit but the acquisition of habits that during acquisition, or at least after 
acquisition (if those habits have been acquired as an infant), are the subject of 
appetitive motivation.    
 
Converging research also identifies the close alignment of the neurobiology for 
pleasure and pain.715 As neural bases of reward as well as for certain aversive 
events exhibit a “common currency” we gain insights into the processes of cortical 
regulation, “action selection between competing pleasant and aversive events”.716   
 
In this section I look at recent insights into forms of learning and motivation 
mediated by DA, and the interplay of the cortical regions with the reward and 
limbic emotional centres. I also draw some conclusions based on recent work on 
addiction.  
 
In particular I note the involvement of cortical centres and the BG in the process 
whereby A-O goal oriented behaviours, with automatisation, change to S-O 
actions. I suggest that this provides a model for the development of virtuous 
behaviours which are resistant to reward devaluation, retain a certain intrinsic 
motivation, and for which we have developed an ease of action.   
 
                                                          
715
 Leknes andTracey, “A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure,” 314-320. The article 
reviews current literature in the field. 
716
 Leknes and Tracey, “A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure,” 318. 
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2.6.1 Reward pathways and motivation. 
 
There are two chemical driven pleasure systems in the brain:  
 The “exciting” pleasure system which is appetitive and involves tension. 
This is DA driven. Surges of DA consolidate reward associations in our 
brains particularly in the cortex and in the NAc. 
 The “satisfying” pleasure system which is consumatory, calming, blissful 
and fulfilling. This is endorphin (opiate) driven.717 Opiates are in four 
categories of neuropeptides: endorphins, enkephalins, endomorphins, and 
dynorphins.  
These two systems are interactive. -opioid signalling is evident in pleasurable 
and antinociceptive (pain-killing) mechanisms, but also is mutually reinforcing of 
phasic DA release that is also associated with preparation or consummation of 
pleasurable reward.718 Not only does DA facilitate goal election and emotional 
control, but as an initiator of plasticity, it holds a key to the consolidation of 
choices enabling future choices.  
 
In addition the hormone oxytocin also seems to play a role upregulating mood, 
signalling affirmative social connection and facilitating bonding. (See 2.3.6.2.) 
 
There are two major dopamine systems in the brain:  
 one projecting from the SNpc to the caudate and the putamen in the 
striatum and in a minor way to the NAc;  
 another, the mesocorticolimbic DA system, sometimes known as the 
mesolimbic dopamine system, originating in the VTA and innervating the 
NAc, the amygdala and the various parts of the cortex, particularly the PFC. 
This second system is regarded as central to the brain’s reward circuit.719 It 
                                                          
717
 N Doidge (2008) The Brain that changes itself. Melbourne: Scribe p108. 
718
 Leknes and Tracey, “A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure,” 318. 
719
 Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 3
rd
 ed., 390. 
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is phasic DA signalling in this latter system that is is reciprocally reinforcing 
of -opioid release. 720  
 
The complex neuronal mechanisms of motivation have by no means been fully 
documented but there is a well founded view that DA release in the NAc, 
associated with specific outcomes either by anticipation or possession, is a 
powerful motivator.721 This is of particular significance in this study as the NAc is a 
region of the BG and well connected with other regions.  
 
LTP and LTD at the synapse seem implicated in positive reinforcement and habit 
learning. In the dorsal striatum, DA inputs especially in the medial and lateral 
areas that link to associative and sensorimotor cortical areas are received from 
the SNpc. The role of LTP and LTD in movement initiation and learning in this area 
have been well described. In the ventral striatum, although “mechanisms 
underlying the potential association between striatal neuroplasticity and reward-
related behaviours and learning are still far from being elucidated”722 hedonic 
reward has been long believed to be mediated by DA projections from the VTA of 
the basal forebrain. 723 Two classes of striatal neurons have been identified in 
signalling reward related events, in each case utilising DA.  
 
DA as we have seen, along with ACh, Epi, Histamine, NE and 5-HT, constitutes the 
amines, neurotransmitters which are associated with the muscular interface, 
emotions, motivation and cognition. None seem to play a mediating role in the 
CNS, rather all have specific modulatory roles. Animal research supports the view 
that variation in a single amine can profoundly affect behaviour, and the 
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 Leknes and Tracey, “A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure,” 318. 
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 Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 526. 
722
 Di Filippo et al., “Short term and long-term plasticity at corticostriatal synapses: implications for 
learning and memory,”115. 
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 Di Filippo et al., “Short term and long-term plasticity at corticostriatal synapses: implications for 
learning and memory,”116. 
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functioning of neural networks. This is confirmed, for example, in studies showing 
that variation in 5-HT is powerful predictor of human behavioural variation. 724  
 
2.6.2 Classical conditioning and DA reinforcement. 
 
As we are focused on the development of virtue as a learned behaviour, it is 
appropriate for us to look at varieties of learned behaviours. We have seen that 
learning can be non associative (habituation and sensitisation) or associative 
(classical or operant conditioning, where reinforcement or punishment changes 
the probabilities of a given behaviour in the future).  
 
Classical conditioning was discovered by Pavlov in 1927. As we have seen, the 
hippocampus is shown to be implicated in initial stages, and the cerebellum 
critical, at least for intermediate retention of the learned response.725 
Instrumental conditioning, a variety of operant conditioning, was first identified by 
Skinner in 1938 who showed that the provision of pleasurable consequences 
made it more likely that behaviours be reinforced or repeated. This reinforcement 
may be positive (involving rewards) or negative (withdrawal of a reward). It is 
noted that punishment is not as effective for learning as negative reinforcement.  
 
Olds and Milner noted in 1954 that rats will self stimulate (by pressing a lever 
causing an electrical stimulus to the limbic system) in a highly repetitive way (2000 
presses per hour). Monkeys have been noted at 8000 presses per hour. Humans 
wired for the same form of test found the stimulation pleasurable in a non specific 
way.  
 
The median forebrain bundle has been shown to provide for reliable stimulation in 
humans through enhanced DA release. “The median forebrain bundle reinforces 
                                                          
724
 Depue andCollins, “Neurobiology of the structure of personality: Dopamine, facilitation of 
incentive motivation, and extraversion,” 514. 
725
 Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 844. Note that the hippocampus 
appears implicated in explicit recall of memories that affect current goal setting. Roles of the 
hippocampus and cerebellum were initially identified by Thompson, et al. 
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the connection between the system that detects the pleasurable stimulus (eg 
seeing some food) and the motor system that carries out the desired behaviour 
(eg eating). In other words, this region of the brain carries the mechanism of 
reinforcement.” 726  
 
This is of relevance on two counts. First, when a baby or an animal is trained in a 
good habit, there is a degree of conditioning involved. An incentive is provided. 
Forms of incentive learning can be central to the way in which we train children, 
and learn ourselves. We will see that this concept is of relevance to the 
development of fortitude and justice. Second, we will see that incentive 
conditioning can lay foundations in the striatum for habit, a critical component for 
both virtues and vices; behaviours which are resilient to removal of the incentive.  
 
The relationship between DA and impusivity is an area of active current study.727 
Pine et al., for example discuss the role of disordered DA neurotransmission in 
mediation of impulsiveness in behaviours that include addiction, gambling 
compulsively, ADHD and dopamine dysregulation syndrome. They found that 
increased sensory quality of rewards increases DA uptake leading to increased 
impulsivity during decision making.  
 
2.6.3 Goal directed plasticity in the amygdala. 
 
It is apparent that the amygdala is involved in complex positive reward circuitry.728  
The research of Tye and colleagues (2008) finds evidence linking cue-reward 
learning and synaptic plasticity in the lateral amygdala (LA), and suggests that this 
is a decisive mechanism underpinning goal directed behaviour.  
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728
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The LA is recognised to associate emotional and motivational values to specific 
environmental cues including those associated with rewards.  The authors were 
able to show in studies performed on adult male Sprague-Dawley rats (250-
350gm) trained to self administer sucrose as a reward, that, within the space of 
one training session,  reward learning was proportional to cue induced firing of 
amygdala neurons, and that this cue-reward learning highly correlated with 
induced strengthening of AMPA thalamic synapses. They demonstrated that 
NMDA receptor (NMDAR) blockade within the LA impaired these processes, 
consistent with established knowledge that the activation of NMDARs leads to 
increased AMPAR currents.729 (For discussion of NMDA mediated plasticities see 
2.2.5.1 a) 
 
2.6.4 Reinforcement in basal ganglia learning. 
 
The BG are shown to be decisive in reward learning. Konorski notes that while 
lesions of sensorimotor cortex impede skilled movement, and lesions of premotor 
cortex “impaired the chaining of action repertoires”, lesions of the BG affected the 
instrumentality of actions so that tested animals could no longer act for reward to 
avert adverse outcome. 730  
 
The two main forms of instrumental behaviour are associated with goal directed 
actions (A-O behaviours), with an intended consequence, and stimulus driven 
habits (S-R behaviours) essentially triggered by antecedent stimuli.731 In this 
section we look more deeply at these types of instrumental behaviours, and the 
evidence for each of these in the BG. Each has different neural substrates within 
the BG.732  
 
These insights are of significance in the present study for several reasons:  
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 Kay M. Tye, et al., “Rapid strengthening of thalamo-amygdala synapses mediates cue-reward 
learning,” Nature 453, (2008): 1253-7. 
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 Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 465. 
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 Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation.”  
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 Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain,” 364. Evidence suggests that learning in the 
BG is a dynamic process, facilitated by highly redundant parallel pathways.  
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i) They help to explain the facility with which actions can be carried out. 
A-O behaviours transform to S-R behaviours. 733  The interconnected 
loci of A-O and S-R circuitry in the BG is now reasonably well mapped 
both in human studies and in animal studies. “Human imaging studies 
of habit learning have found that overtraining of a behaviour shifts the 
cortical substrate.”734 The neural footprint during this process migrates 
from ventral to dorsal regions of the striatum. Ventrally based limbic 
reward becomes less significant; the dorsal striatum characterised by 
habit formation and addictions becomes associated with management 
pathways of actions. 735   
 
Studies by Dickinson et al. of habit formation in animals demonstrate 
that goal directed, A-O behaviours give way to S-R behaviours, with 
motivation of a current or future goal replaced by relation to a 
previous goal, under what is known as the reward devaluation 
paradigm.  
 
A similar process happens in human beings. Learning of new motor 
responses, for example, activates the caudate and DLPFC, whereas 
with well learned sequences, the site of activation shifts to the 
putamen and motor cortices. When well trained participants were 
asked to pay attention to their actions, the caudate and the more 
ventral PFC again were activated.”736 The reward that is “devalued” is 
the external reward. This process of automatisation begins with 
greater cortical attention and activity, and as the S-R behaviours take 
over, is associated with a reduction in cortical activity. The S-R 
behaviours are carried out more by habit than by focussed attention. 
This explains the ease with which we perform habits that have 
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previously taken considerable effort to acquire, and also how we can 
catch ourselves doing things by routine.  
 
ii) This process offers insights into how emotion can be better regulated, 
a further process at the heart of virtuous activity. That ventrally based 
limbic reward becomes less significant as habits are learned fits most 
aptly with the nature of virtue that is resilient against reward 
devaluation as it is consolidated. External rewards are supplanted by 
intrinsic rewards. 
 
iii) They offer an understanding of how repetitive, automatized actions 
can still be voluntary and chosen. It is a mistake to think that S-R 
behaviours are necessarily less free than A-O behaviours; established S-
R behaviours are compatible with the free choice that underpins 
virtuous action. It is well understood that parents use forms of 
instrumental conditioning to train children in good habits (that are 
incomplete from the perspective of virtue because they lack free 
choice by the subject) but teens and adults themselves are able, of 
their own volition, to commit themselves to a regime of instrumental 
conditioning to build up a disposition in their own nature for behaviour 
in certain ways. So, for example, a high school student may decide that 
she will reward herself for the completion of three hours of study by 
permitting herself time on Facebook. This reward in turn becomes an 
incentive for the desired behaviour and a means to achieve the more 
remote positive outcome of maximising exam performance, etc. In 
other words we have the capacity to choose to condition ourselves for 
an intended positive outcome.  
 
Yin and Knowlton raise significant questions about methodology in 
many studies of motivation.  They argue there has been confusion as to 
the meaning of instrumental learning: ignoring for the most part, 
purposeful behaviour, that behaviour may be directed to a goal, the A-
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O contingency.737 In summary they claim, “The pervasive influence” of 
this thinking on neuroscience cannot be underestimated. “It remains 
powerful in many of the implicit assumptions made by researchers who 
interpret all neural activity solely as a function of antecedent stimuli 
presented before the motor response.”738  
 
In a model of the human brain where functions are highly integrated in 
a web of interconnection, the idea that S-R conditioning can still be 
voluntary presents no obstacle: the cortex (associated with conscious 
behaviour) will be involved in every action in any case. If furthermore, 
this model of the human brain is married to an Aristotelian-Thomistic 
anthropology in which the person, not the brain nor a part of the brain, 
acts, then all difficulties in this regard should disappear.  
 
Further to the discussion of above (2.4.4) Yin and Knowlton have proposed a 
framework whereby the loops which project to striatum are associated with 
specific types of learning. Anticipation of reward is a key factor in striatal activity. 
This accords with the fact that S-R cannot explain speed of learning; furthermore 
the motivational compulsion of addiction is poorly explained by S-R alone.739 (See 
2.6.6 for more detail.)  
 
Table 2.10 synthesises and summarises the role of the BG in instrumental 
learning.  
 
2.6.4.1 DA modulation in striatum for goal directed action 
 
We are considering forms of reinforcement learning, a form of operant 
conditioning, which describes the way in which initially goal directed, reward 
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seeking behaviours, are conditioned to a habitual preferential response; for 
example, a rat learns to prefer a particular pathway in a maze because it has 
found food in that pathway on previous occasions. This reward reinforcement is 
believed to be DA dependent. The NAc-cortical reward pathway has been well 
documented. DA is released into the striatum leading to limbic modification of 
neural transmission. DA modulation in the BG in turn effects a decisive 
modulatory effect back on the cortex via the cortical-BG-cortical pathways. The 
BG modify glutamatergic cortical outputs. Hence, DA, a principal mediator of 
plasticity, is decisive in development of habits of goal directed action.  
 
Wickens writes: “There is growing evidence for the hypothesis that activity and DA 
dependent plasticity at (synapses in the cortico striatal pathway) is important for 
learning on the basis of reinforcement.”740 He identified the DA neurons of the 
midbrain VTA and the SN as the key component, and the striatum itself as the 
locus for the “cellular mechanisms of  reward-related learning.”741 742  
 
Horvitz has documented the role that DA plays in this conditioning. He refers to 
the need for a conjunction of “specific movement and reward expectation 
conditions” and that, “The acquisition and performance of learned movement 
sequences is severely disrupted by lesions or temporary inactivation of the deep 
limbic system (DLS), and by striatal DA depletion, consistent with the notion that 
establishment of striatal sequence coding requires DA-mediated strengthening of 
input-output connections corresponding to consecutive segments of a behavioural 
sequence.” 743  
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Horvitz further presents a view that DA mediated plasticity in the striatum is 
instrumental in directing activity of cortical cells. 744  He notes that DA mediated 
plasticity is involved in both S-R and A-O learning and that synapses in the DLS 
regions are strengthened through the mediation of DA in accord with “previously 
emitted movement”, contributing thus to the selection of further movement in a 
behavioural sequence. DA striatal cells receive convergent inputs of reward 
expectation and movement direction, and establish activity of cortical cells coding 
movement direction occurs until the trigger stimulus initiates movement at which 
point persistent reverbatory activity may be established.745  
 
The complexities of this finely balanced process are only starting to be 
documented. There is also evidence of retrograde signalling pathways, thalamo-
striatal circuits, which hold striatal neurons just below action potential thresholds. 
Horvitz suggests there may be a similar mechanism acting on the cortical cells of 
the pathway. 746   
 
Da Cunha et al. (2009) suggested that DA release, triggered by the novelty of 
reward stimuli, is central to the creation and reinforcement of associations and is 
the condition for synaptic plasticity in the BG synapses between corticostriatal 
neurons and MSNs, possibly involving reverberation in the cortico-striatal loop.747 
The role of the BG in action selection and storage of non declarative memories is 
mediated by convergent projections, synchronised by the timing of ACh release by 
giant cholinergic aspiny neurons, which are tonically active neurons (TANs). 
Projections from various locations in the striatum signal via the GPi to the SNr and 
                                                                                                                                                                 
skills at an elementary or gross level, but of motor skills offering the possibility of considerable 
complexity and refinement.  
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thence into the thalamo-cortical pathway.748 They propose that the high 
concentrations of DA, which are slower to clear from the NAc than the dorsal 
striatum, explain the fact that learning in the NAc is driven by reward.749    
 
Recent trait acquisition studies have highlighted a key role for motivational 
neuromodulation by DA in the SN. 750 751 Other studies have shown that the NAc is 
a major terminal area for representation of rewards modulated by VTA DA. 752 
 
Other studies have focused on the role of the OFC (particularly area MOC13 
containing abundant reciprocal connections to areas of the amygdala) in 
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This projection system innervates some 20-30 structures and regions in the brain.  
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integrating “the most complex level of associations of reinforcement with both 
stimuli and responses…. MOC13 forms higher-level conditional representations of 
sensory events by associating them with existing or newly developing response-
reinforcement contingencies; more simply, MOC 13 may abstract an integrated 
structure of appetitive and aversive behavioural contingencies from the 
environment." 753  
 
2.6.5 Frontal cortex and reward systems.  
 
Theories of cognition almost all agree that the capacity to set specific goals and to 
direct one’s actions to those goals is central to cognition. The PFC, which has been 
called “the great integrator, a brain region that synthesises information about the 
external and internal world for the purposes of producing goal directed 
behaviour”754, seems to play a central role in this process of taking control of 
one’s actions. The PFC takes in converging information from many brain systems 
processing information from within and without the body, and targets motor 
system structures that will be involved in voluntary action. The association of the 
PFC with intentional action is clear. Virtue is described as “a habit of choosing”755, 
and hence is closely associated with intentional behaviours.  
 
With projections to and from the forebrain systems associated with sensory data, 
voluntary motor movement, long term memory, and systems processing affect 
and motivational state, the PFC is well placed to contribute to cognitive control. It 
is interconnected to brain areas processing sensorimotor information as well as to 
centres associated with affect, memory and reward. 
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Cognitive control requires ready selection of sensory, memory or motor processes 
to be activated at any one time.756  This single mindedness has advantages and 
suppression of goal irrelevant issues is a part. The capacity to focus attention is 
closely associated with this command capacity. Also the capacity to deal with time 
delay before the achievement of the goal is necessary: some form of working 
memory. Voluntary and goal directed behaviours require the capacity to interact 
with experience for rapid learning and adaptability. Cognitive control systems 
must be plastic and flexible, in contrast with automatic behaviours that are 
typically rigid.  
 
PFC neurons encode rewards linking behaviours to goal directed consequences. 
Miller and Wallace state, “Feedback about consequences of actions is a key to 
acquiring new goal-directed behaviours. A large proportion of PFC neurons 
encode information about rewards.”757  758 PFC neurons appear to have the 
capacity to keep a spatial or object cue “on line” during memory delay. This short 
term memory function appears to depend on dopaminergic receptors which 
provide a gating signal to the PFC; precise timing permits the strengthening of 
current PFC representations.  PFC neurons also demonstrate flexibility: the 
capacity of PFC neurons to modify their properties seems linked the primates’ 
ability to learn behaviours.  
 
Neural loops between PFC and BG play a role in motor control and support 
decision making. They are also significant in recursive thought. Fast plasticity in 
the striatum favours learning the “snapshots” of action that capture immediate 
circumstances, favoured alternatives, and how to get there; slow plasticity of the 
PFC favours links to other centres and creation of entire models, future scenarios, 
of action. 
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2.6.5.1 The role of the OFC.759 
 
The OFC has been termed the “gatekeeper” to the PFC.760  We have seen above 
(2.3.6.1) Schore described the OFC as the “hierarchical apex of the limbic 
system”.761 It is not surprising to find that it is implicated in the brain’s reward 
systems, 762 and in fact is one of the main reward centres of the brain, along with 
the dorsal and ventral striatum, the amygdala, and the DA neurons. 763 Leknes and 
Tracey summarise the accumulated evidence that the regions of appetitive and 
aversive processing include the NAc, the pallidum and the amygdala in the deep 
cortical regions, as well as in the OFC to which they are interconnected. 764 They 
point out that DA and opioid systems are “neuroanatomically related”, and that 
“they are prime candidates for systems that transmit signals relating to 
motivational and hedonic aspcts of both pain and pleasure.”765 The effects of 
these systems are felt by direct DA release in the OFC and other PFC regions, as 
well as by cortical modulation resulting from subcortical release. 
 
It is well documented that the OFC codes for the reward value of stimuli, 
responding to anticipation of future events and so are shown to have access to 
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representations of the external world. 766  Reward representations are observed in 
the OFC and PFC, as well as amygdala.767 The OFC responds to rewards in each of 
the sensory modalies but also with respect to abstract rewards such as money or 
praise. Possibly the medial OFC is implicated in reward and the lateral OFC in 
punishment. 768  
 
Left and right OFC appear to differ in function: left is associated with empathy, 
right with TOM.  The role of the OFC in affective feelings has been discussed. 769 770 
(2.3.6.1) 
 
The OFC links to cortical areas implicated in memory.  
“Connectivity often offers important clues to the critical 
function of a brain region. Just as the ventral striatum is 
critically positioned to serve as an interface between limbic 
and motor systems (Mogenson et al. 1980), the OFC is 
uniquely located to serve as the gateway between these 
limbic areas, which are concerned with passively encoding 
associations between cues and likely outcomes or 
consequences, and the active, representational memory 
systems of the prefrontal cortex.”771  
The OFC is reciprocally linked to other areas of the PFC “which are involved in the 
regulation of behaviour through representational memory and it sends output to 
the ventral striatum.” 772  Representations of memory play a key role in all 
cortically mediated conscious action, and therefore also in the development of 
conscious habitual action.  
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It was suggested in the 1990s that the OFC stores associations between cues and 
outcomes on behalf of the amygdala and other brain areas but the contribution is 
apparently more complex than this with the OFC processing expectations for likely 
outcomes and allowing associative information from the amygdala to be 
processed in representational memory of the PFC. 773  It would seem that the OFC 
is not critical in simple cases of instrumental learning or Pavlovian conditioning, 
but only when information regarding outcomes requires further processing and 
integration for the generation of an appropriate response. 774  The end result of 
the gateway role that the OFC appears to play allowing association information to 
access representational memory is the promotion of “voluntary, cognitive, and 
goal directed (not stimulus driven) behaviour and facilitating new learning.” 775  
 
The representation of the value of anticipated events and actions is a form of 
memory mediated by the OFC. Also, we have already noted the central role that 
attentional mechanisms play in self regulation. (2.5.5 Development of attentional 
mechanisms) The OFC is well placed to coordinate peripheral and central arousal 
mechanisms.776 
 
2.6.5.2 Close alignment between OFC and striatum.  
 
Current research notes the close alignment between the OFC and striatum. The 
architecture of the brain facilitates the close cooperation of NAc and OFC.777 
These two structures are adjacent, with the NAc sitting immediately on the inside 
of the OFC. The NAc, as we have seen, the area of the striatum most closely 
associated with reward, receives inputs directly from the adjacent mOFC. Via the 
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limbic loop this region connects back to the cortex via VP and the medial dorsal 
nucleus of the thalamus to the anterior cingulate gyrus and the orbitofrontal gyrus 
itself. Information in this loop is integrated in the VP with inputs from the 
hippocampus and the amygdala. The OFC transfers information via the lateral 
prefrontal cortices to the premotor areas for decision and action.778 Further motor 
output is via the VP.779  
 
The lateral OFC, the OFC, and mPFC are interconnected and play a critical role in 
cognitive and emotional processing and in the formation of motivation for the 
selection of behaviours.780 The OFC and the mPFC are distinct but interrelated 
systems, with different but related functional roles. The OFC has reciprocal 
connections to the limbic system and to the striatum (including via the cortico-
basal-thalamic loop) similar to a loop assocated with the mPFC. 781   
 
Like the OFC the striatum is activated in association with movement for an 
expected reward. 782 “Just like the OFC and the amygdala, the NAc is the site of 
convergence for numerous sources of motivational information, including the BLA, 
the OFC, the mPFC, and the dopaminergic VTA neurons.” 783 Note that conclusions 
of interactions between the PFC, the amygdala, the striatum and the DA 
modulated VTA neurons are based on rat studies.  
 
Horvitz draws attention to the sustained activity in cells of the striatum in 
anticipation of reward as a mirror of reward coding in the OFC.784 He further 
argues for a close association between the striatum and the OFC by observation of 
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differences between the sustained activity in striatal cells in comparison with the 
hundreds of millisecond activations of DA cells of the midbrain. 785  
 
The role of the OFC is quite specialised in these tasks. Some comparison to the 
roles of the striatum with which it is closely connected is enlightening. OFC 
neurons do not seem to have any direct involvement in initiation, planning or 
execution of motor processes whereas the striatum is implicated in these roles 
and thus facilitates OFC involvement in behavioural output mechanisms.  “The 
neural activities in the striatum are examples on how motivational and motor 
processes can converge to produce mechanisms related to the acquisition of 
rewarding goals.” 786  
 
Reward representations in the OFC are associated with goal-directed conscious 
choices of action; “In order to choose between different actions it is necessary to 
maintain a representation of the likely predicted future reward associated with 
each action. Such predictions need to be compared and evaluated to select the 
action with the highest overall predicted reward value.” 787 Lesion studies by 
Bechara et al. (1994), Rolls et al. (1995) and Hornak et al. (2004) suggest that the 
OFC plays a role in action selection for reward either by maintaining 
representations of the predicted rewards or by participating in the actual process 
of decision making. Grace wrote that the “mPFC provides goal directed motor 
plans selected within the NAc on the basis of contextual and emotional 
associations from both the hippocampus and the amygdala”.788  
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 Horvitz, “Stimulus-response and response outcome learning mechanisms in the striatum,” 133. 
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  Schultz and Tremblay, “Involvement of primate orbitofrontal neurons in reward, uncertainty 
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  O'Doherty and Dolan “The role of the human orbitofrontal cortex,” 276. 
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 Citation and quotation in Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating 
affective neuroscience with developmental approaches to psychopathology,”738. 
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This relationship between the PFC and the BG appears special not only because of 
the projections into the striatum, in common with much of the rest of the cortex, 
but because PFC inputs to the thalamus are modulated by signals from the GPi.789 
 
The findings of this study, with respect to reward processing and cognitive control 
of reward systems, are consistent with recent findings of Buitelaar who, in a 2012 
review, summarises biological mechanisms at work in risk taking, and risk 
avoidance in teenagers, He finds teenage choices are assisted by the “dynamic 
interaction of the cognitive control system (medial/ventral prefrontal cortex), the 
reward system (nucleus accumbens), and the harm-avoidant system 
(amygdala)” He says, “Increased risk taking might then be the consequence of 
either a weak control system, or an easily activated and pushing reward system, 
or a weak harm-avoidant system, or combinations of these.” He offers no 
information directly about any biological basis for habits that could dispose for 
improved rationality.790  
 
Buitelaar notes that reward processing in striatal brain regions, if unmoderated by 
cognitive control, lead to greater risk taking. He suggests the balance of evidence 
is that the reward system is hyper-responsive in adolescence. He notes that 
adolescents show the ability to modify risky decisions when they put themselves, 
a capacity that improves on average in later adolescence. 791   
 
Recent studies continue to demonstrate the close relationship existing between 
the OFC and the striatum.  
 Hetherington and Wagner conclude in a recent study, “Cognitive 
neuroscience research suggests that successful self-regulation is 
dependent on top-down control from the prefrontal cortex over 
subcortical regions involved in reward and emotion.” They develop an 
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Adolescent Psychiatry 21, 7 (2012): 357. 
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analysis of effective regulatory responses to the most common causes of 
self-regulation failure: negative emotions, escalation of indulgence, cue 
exposure, and impaired control.792 They review inhibition studies and show 
that there is a pattern whereby intentional behaviour in addicts increases 
lateral PFC activity and reduces striatal and OFC activity. 
 Somerville and Casey also find that cortico-striatal pathways are crucial for 
successful cognitive control. However, they harness mounting evidence for 
the counter intuitive position that striatal reward areas are capable of 
upregulation of cognitive control to win reward. 793 
 
2.6.6 Addiction studies offer insights into the reward systems. 
 
Neuronal addictive processes are of relevance offering insights into how pathways 
of permanently heightened motivation for action can exist. Is it possible that the 
profound and life moulding changes at the striatal and cortical synapses that 
underpin addiction have common features with virtue learning?  
 
I have used the work of Robinson and Berridge in reviewing current explanations 
for addiction: the hedonic view emphasizing the search for pleasure and 
avoidance of the unpleasant;794 the view that addiction is brought about by 
aberrant learning;795 Robinson’s and Berridge’s own incentive-sensitization view, 
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 Heatherton and Wagner, “Cognitive Neuroscience of Self-Regulation Failure,” 132-139. 
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 Leah H. Somerville and B. J. Casey, “Developmental neurobiology of cognitive control and 
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794
 The hedonic view suggests that drug use leads to DA release (required for rewards and 
motivational control of behaviour) from projections from the VTA and SN into the NAc and 
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leading to further acute drop in DA and serotonin levels. There are grounds to think that persistent 
drug use engages the stress system on the hypothalamicpituitary axis. In response to stress 
corticotrophin releasing factor (CRF) is released by the hypothalamus; only small priming injections 
of the drug are sufficient to set off the whole addiction cycle even after the original neural 
responses are extinct. 
795
 The aberrant learning view provides valuable insights into habit formation in the striatum. This 
is the “most prominent implicit learning view of addiction”. It suggests that the automatic S-R 
habit hypothesis provides a more plausible account for addiction than A-O or goal directed 
processes.
 
In this view, addiction involves a transition from explicit and cognitively guided 
behaviour, such as the memory of a pleasurable drug-induced experience, to comparatively 
automatic behaviour that is essentially a S-R habit, a behaviour that takes little or no account of 
expected outcomes and which can play out automatically, and for which the neural substrate is 
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focusing on neural sensitization as the cause for compulsion;796 the explanation 
for addiction centring on a dysfunctional PFC acting in concert with impulsivity 
and poor judgement.797  
 
Several insights become apparent.  
 Addiction studies help us to understand the contribution of the BG and BG 
pathways to complex habitual behaviours in which the subject remains 
fully aware of what he is doing. These studies emphasise that drug seeking 
may involve the pursuit of complex purposeful (my emphasis) behaviour 
patterns:  habit formation in the BG is not reducible to simple motor 
sequences. 798   
 Addiction studies are consistent with the view that DA reward pathways, 
striatal or cortical, may have a role in triggering or initial reinforcement of 
virtuous behaviours.799  
                                                                                                                                                                 
found in the corticostriatal loops operating through the dorsal striatum.  It is argued that with 
sufficient practice any task can be automatised and that over-learned habits of drug use become 
so automatic that they become compulsive. Terry E. Robinson and Kent C. Berridge, 
“Addiction,”Annual Review of Psychology 54, (2003):25–53 
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“Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia: A similar code for physiological and pathological 
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 An integral role for the BG in virtue formation is not contradicted by 
addiction studies. Striatal plasticity essential to the processes of addiction 
and also normal reward processing.800 Dysfunctional plastic change in the 
BG leads to compulsive behaviours, impacting on cognitive capacity to 
regulate emotion and reward craving.  
 The close relationship between reward expectation and emotional control 
is emphasised. Addiction essentially involves dysfunction in the basal-
cognitive circuitry that would normally facilitate emotional control. 
Addiction studies have uncovered substantial evidence for cognitive-basal 
dysfunction when addiction is present, with abundant evidence for 
“persistent drug-induced neuroadaptations” in the NAc at molecular, 
cellular, and neural system levels, in other words, plasticity.”801  
 
Table 2.11 summarises the reward and motivational systems operating and their 
relevance to the development and exercise of virtue.  
 
2.7 Cognition and executive function. 
 
2.7.1 The PFC coordinates executive function.  
 
As we have seen, the PFC plays a central role in complex cognitive and executive 
function, involving many aspects of personality, and planning, insight and 
foresight. 802 803  The PFC is one of the four functional areas of the frontal lobe: the 
primary motor cortex, the premotor and supplementary motor areas, Broca’s 
area, and the PFC. The PFC is extensively and directly interconnected with the 
parietal, temporal, and occipital cortex via fibres in the subcortical white matter.  
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The PFC, particularly the lateral PFC, is oriented towards action.804 For example, at 
the cortical level, the premotor cortical regions, the association cortices, the PFC 
itself, the posterior parietal cortex and the limbic cortex all play a role in 
movement planning. 805  The activity of numerous cortical regions is orchestrated 
and coordinated by the PFC.  
 
The PFC interacts with other brain areas, especially posterior and subcortical 
regions, in cognitive and emotional management. PFC and ACC seem to be the key 
neural substrates for response regulation. “The ACC works with the frontal cortex 
through the reciprocal cortico-cortical connections of the anterior cingulate cortex 
and the lateral PFC to monitor human volitional mental activity.”806 807  
 
In this section we overview significant lines of current research into cognition and 
executive function which appear relevant to this study.  
 
2.7.2 Functional studies of the PFC. 
 
(Refer also: 2.5.3.1 Involvement of cortical areas in emotional response.) 
 
The PFC is clearly involved in behavioural regulation via inhibition of responses. 
Tatia et al. review various recent studies of response inhibition and find that 
response inhibition seems to involve DLPFC, VLPFC and parietal cortex, that the 
right hemisphere predominates in response inhibition along with the lateral and 
medial OFC, superior temporal gyrus and ACC. It appears inhibition of impulsive 
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  Barbas and Zikopoulos, “Sequential and parallel circuits for emotional processing in primate 
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 ed., 239. 
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behaviour may be localised to the right OFC. The authors note that response 
regulation involves both response inhibition and the election of goal appropriate, 
though as yet non-habitual, responses.  
 
Functionally the PFC divides into DLPFC, at the top and sides of the forward lobes 
and the VMPFC. The lateral and medial areas are densely interconnected.808 
 
Tasks of executive function and working memory are mediated by DLPFC function.  
The DLPFC is the “key neural substrate in the regulation of cognitive processes”. 
809 The DLPFC is greatly interconnected to the parietal multimodal cortex as well 
as to the somatosensory, visual and parietal association areas, and has 
involvement in cognitive strategies and planning.  
 
The DLPFC, which is one of the last brain regions to develop, plays a key role in 
manipulating various sources of information for decision making. It appears to 
draw together experiences, memories, anticipations, self evaluation, long and 
short term planning and measurement of personal conduct against norms; a 
damaged DLPFC impairs choice of behaviour, leading to disregard of context and 
opting for pursuit of familiar courses of action.  
 
The VLPFC and OFC are closely linked.The VLPFC “can exert a bidirectional top-
down modulation of activity for the regulation of cognitive processes”.810 
 
Tasks of emotional processing and social decision are mediated by VMPFC. The 
VMPFC extends into the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal areas and is closely 
connected to the limbic areas. Damage to the VMPFC leads to impulsive 
behaviours as well as to socially inappropriate behaviours and inappropriate 
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emotional responses. 811 It was the VMPFC of Phineas Gage that was substantially 
damaged.   
 
The dorsalmedial PFC (DMPFC) links with inferior parietal cortex, the DLPFC and 
the posterior cingulate. It receives limbic inputs and, with its linkages to other PFC 
areas, integrates the emotional reaction and experience with cognitive processing 
which is “critical in the emotional regulation and adjustment of behaviour on the 
basis of emotional cues”.  DMPFC also seems active in perspective taking and 
“theory of mind”, when learning rules associated with goal-directed actions, 
problem solving and planning. These will be stored in the lateral PFC areas.  
 
In addition there is the OFC (see above 2.6.5.1) situated behind the eyes. It was 
first believed to be involved in olfactory processing. In recent years there has been 
intensified interest on this area which now seems essential in risk taking and 
decision making. The OFC links the PFC to striatal and limbic areas in regulation of 
motivated responses.812  
 
Spindle cells link the OFC and the ACC. These cells have been associated with the 
capacity to make quick decisions. Spindle cells display rich interconnections, high 
velocity of transmission characteristics, and are well endowed with receptors for 
DA, 5-HT and vasopressin. Watson and Allman (2007) note, “At the cellular level, 
humans and apes are the only primates that have a type of neuron, the spindle 
cell, in the anterior cingulated, and frontoinsular cortex.” The number of spindle 
cell in the human cortex is one thousand fold in excess of its presence in apes and 
implication of the cell in mechanisms of attention and self control are 
suspected.813 
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The OFC also links with the insula, the third site where spindle cells are found. This 
frontal cortical area within the lateral sulcus is adjacent to both the temporal lobe 
and the parietal. It appears to integrating various sensations: viscerosensations, 
taste, pain, and feelings of disgust.814 The linkage is believed to facilitate rational 
processing of raw emotion.   
 
There are significant linkages between the BG and the PFC through the OFC. It is 
now apparent that pathways for cognition and executive function do not reside 
solely in the outer cortical layers. “Recent evidence suggests that circuits through 
the BG have a role beyond motor control, including cognition, reward evaluation, 
motivated behaviour, learning, and memory which may be traced to pathways 
through the PFC.”815 As we have seen, interconnections with the BG via thalamus 
on the return pathway, and with the limbic system itself are now recognised as 
playing significant contributions. The PFC has extensive interconnections to the 
dorsomedial nucleus of the thalamus, lesions in which can have the same effect 
on executive function as lesions to the PFC itself. 816 
 
The PFC, along with the other cortical areas, requires continuous electrical 
stimulation from the lower brain areas for conscious activity to take place.817 
Excitatory signalling (utilising ACh), and reverbatory excitatory signalling, via the 
thalamus, to almost all cortical areas, are critical in this process. 818 In addition 
there are excitatory and inhibitory mechanisms of control.819 (See also 2.5.3 for 
other neurotransmitter and neuromodulatory agents affecting the PFC.) 
 
Table 2.12 summarises the domains of executive function. 
 
2.7.3 Prefrontal plasticity. 
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Only recently has the potential for plasticity in the PFC been recognised.820 Recent 
studies have confirmed however that association learning leads to plastic changes 
in the OFC, as well as medial and lateral PFC, and implicate both the medial and 
lateral areas in executive functions such as tuning of attention, and decision 
making.821 
 
Insights are accruing into the functional differences between the lateral PFC and 
the medial PFC areas. Anderson et al. (2000) described the long term sequelae for 
two young adults, F.D. (female), whose head, when she was 15 months of age, 
had been run over by a car tyre, and M.L. (male), who, at 3 months suffered a 
resection of right frontal malignancy.  Despite relatively unimpaired cognitive 
function, both had exhibited intractable chronic social maladjustment from early 
childhood, suggesting damage to the ventromedial area. F.D. showed little 
remorse for dishonesty and theft, precocious sexual activity, insensitivity to her 
infant’s needs and inappropriate emotion; M.L. exhibited poor attention, 
impulsivity, difficulties interacting with others, inability to manage money, work or 
independence, obesity, substance abuse, sexual irresponsibility and little remorse 
for actions. The authors concluded that there may be limited plasticity in the 
sectors of the PFC that link emotion and decision making. The findings are 
consistent with the view that infantile damage to PFC can lead to “severe 
disruption of adaptive behaviour” without noticeable effect on standard 
educational and psychological testing and support the suggestion of Schwartz and 
Goldman-Rakic (1990) that several aspects of PFC neuronal organisation seem 
well specified in early development and not dependent on environmental 
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stimulation for determination.822 Recent work also focusses on developmental 
plasticity of the PFC. 823 
 
Of great importance to this study, it is now accepted that cortical areas are vastly 
more interdependent and interconnected than had been previously thought. 
Moghaddam and Homayoun suggested that even apparently modular structure is 
actually a manifestation of the parallel networks that underpin brain activity. Their 
hypothesis was that the DLPFC, regarded as the executive regions of the PFC, 
respond in parallel to the limbic and limbically connected regions such as the OFC, 
and thus direct behaviour that is consistent with context and expected 
outcome.824  
 
Table 2.13 summarises systems for cognition, consideration of consequences, 
planning, goal election and executive direction. 
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2.7.3.1 Plasticity studies in the motor cortices. 
 
Not within the PFC, but within the frontal lobe, the motor cortices are increasingly 
seen as an important site of plasticity.825 There have been numerous studies 
demonstrating plasticity in the motor cortical areas. For example Michael 
Merzenich has pioneered this field with many studies into somatosensory cortical 
map plasticity. Further insights are now at hand from studies of subjects with 
prostheses. Hochberg et al. (2006) demonstrated that a human subject (M.N.) 
with tetraplegia, three years after spinal cord injury, was capable of cortical 
movement signals, and was able to effect control of neuromotor prostheses 
(NMPs) via intention driven neuronal activity converted via decoders linked to a 
100 electrode sensor implanted in an area of the M1, the right precentral gyrus, 
into a control signal. By imagining certain hand movements M.N. was able to 
successfully activate control signals allowing him to open simulated email, operate 
television, and work a prosthetic hand.826 
 
This study followed a ground breaking study, documented by Ramachandran and 
Rogers-Ramachandran (1996) of three subjects who had suffered amputation and 
were suffering from phantom limb pain. Subjects were exposed to virtual limb 
movement. Results suggested that this exposure brought about plastic changes in 
the motor cortex area pertaining to the impaired limb and that these changes had 
an ameliorating effect on phantom pain. Phantom limb movements, experienced 
as real by the subjects, led to significant M1 changes.    
 
Table 2.14 reviews the brain areas, mechanisms and pathways implicated in the 
execution of motor commands and the relevance of these systems to the 
development and exercise of virtue.  
 
2.8 Conclusion. 
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This review of recent studies demonstrates that it is possible to identify 
mechanisms which modify the specific regions and pathways in the brain on the 
basis of conscious experience. I argue that these mechanisms, areas and pathways 
are essential to the acquisition and exercise of virtue.  
 
This chapter has developed as follows:  
 
After an initial overview of current lines of investigation into neural plasticity, the 
foundational mechanism which underpins all learning in the brain, I have 
overviewed contemporary lines of research in learning and memory. I have 
reviewed understanding of the BG, a subcortical structure integral to reward 
processing and habit formation, and implicated also in emotion processing and 
motor management. I then reviewed systems for regulation of emotion, reward 
processing and executive function in the brain.    
 
Some initial observations about the aptness of task of this study can be offered. 
 
 The development of virtue will reflect processes of experiential learning: 
experience-based learning follows Hebbian principles of synaptic 
strengthening and reinforcement of connections through use, or anti-
Hebbian principles of refinement of pathways. The development of 
qualities of character, virtues, are a form of experience based learning 
acquired by repetition.  
 Structural plasticity offers an attractive explanation for the Aristotelian 
principle that virtues in some way “make us who we are”. It is reasonable, 
given the relative stability of the personality changes implied in virtue 
acquisition, that the plastic changes involved are structural not only 
functional. There are various mechanisms of structural change in the brain, 
but these appear to involve gene expression mediated by second 
messenger processes from the synapse. (Table 2.15 summarises the 
various mechanisms for plasticity that have been throughout this chapter. 
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This table completes the discussion of 2.2 and Table 2.3 in the light of the 
later sections in this chapter.) 
 The development of myelination in the frontal cortex  and motor 
pathways, offers a further mechanism of plasticity; in the first case to 
assist in understanding the development of self control, and in the second 
to better account for efficient action.  
 Virtue is understood as the capacity for self-management. Cortical 
pathways for management of emotion are necessarily implicated in the 
neural correlates of virtue. We find that these pathways in the BG-
thalamo-cortical loop already associated with habit formation and in the 
limbic loop entering the cortical domain via the OFC and the ACC.  
 The architecture of the brain presents as a highly evolved and efficient 
network of complementing functionalities manifesting the Hebbian 
corollary that, where neural pathways exist, then neural communication 
has been present. The adjacent location of the NAc and the OFC, and rich 
connection between them consolidates a prima facie explanation of 
emotional management. Not only do the BG have the capacity, on the 
basis of reward representations, to modify cortical activity and motor 
commands, but by reciprocal cortical loops, they are themselves modified 
in their goal proposals. This offers a compelling mechanism for cortical 
management of emotion. The more pathways of emotional regulation are 
revisited, the more they are reinforced.   
 Reward processing and habit formation are interlinked systems associated 
with the basal cortical pathways. This offers an explanation for the 
development of habitual behaviours that are consciously elected, with the 
flexibility to account for reward incentives in childhood. We have seen that 
conscious and reflective behaviours may be mediated by the basal-cortical 
pathways.   
 DA signalling facilitates goal election and emotion regulation, and, as an 
initiator of plasticity, is critical in consolidation of regulation pathways 
through structural changes. 
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 Mechanisms of habit and procedural learning appear to offer some 
understanding for the phenomenon of established behaviours that remain 
robust in the absence of immediate rewards. The BG-thalamo-cortical 
loops with their widespread cognitive-emotional interaction offer insights 
into processes of planning, goal selection, self regulation, attention and 
motivation. The growth of intrinsic motivation over external reward as 
virtue is carried out for its own sake, resilience against reward devaluation, 
is consistent with the development of automaticity. That ventrally based 
limbic reward becomes less significant as habits are learned aptly fits with 
the nature of virtue.  
 The ease with which virtuous action is completed argues for the forms of 
automatisation evidenced in habit. The ease of practice that is associated 
with virtue aligns readily with the greater speed, accuracy and efficiency 
associated with pathways reinforced by mechanisms of neuroplasticity. 
The neural motor underpinnings of automatisation are reasonably well 
described.  
 The function and efficient interconnection of the limbic, cortical and basal-
thalamic regions satisfy three pre-conditions for the presence of virtue, 
that the neural bases for emotional regulation, automatisation of action, 
and motivation and goal election, all integral to the expression of virtue, be 
present.  
 An understanding of the attentional systems of the brain offers powerful 
insights into mechanisms in neural support of affect management and will 
power. Focussed attention permits directed plasticity in the brain: it is “the 
modulatory control system of plasticity”.827 
 Studies of addiction reinforce the view that basal procedural function can 
be conscious and volitional. In a state of wellbeing the frontal cortex and 
the BG cooperate in conscious, volitional action. In an addicted state, 
plastic changes in the BG and the basal-cortical pathways lead to cortical 
dysfunction.  
                                                          
827
 Observations of neuroscientist Michael Merzenich quoted in Doidge, The brain that changes 
itself, 84-88. 
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 New insights into brain function, including new appreciation of the 
functions of the BG and the OFC, offer insights into how the discrete 
components of virtuous action (motivation, automatisation of action, and 
executive goal direction) may be integrated into a neural network. It is 
now understood that the role of the BG is far more complex than as a relay 
station for motor commands. It is now understood to play a key role, in 
modulating conscious motor activity, integrating planning with reward and 
motivational factors. The OFC is now understood to involved with limbic 
modulation. 
 The capacity to set specific goals, to direct one’s actions to those goals, to 
reason about consequences and means, appears central not only to 
cognition but to rational acts disposed by the virtue of prudence. 
 The links between cognition, rationality and virtue are direct. Cognition 
implies a capacity for goal setting, reasoning, deliberation as to 
consequences and means, and final election. That one chooses goals fitting 
for one’s nature is a mark of rationality. And virtue is essentially the 
habituation of this capacity. Hence the exercise of virtue requires rightness 
and perfection of reason, the operations of which are perfected by the 
virtues of prudence and justice. 
 Specialist neurons such as spindle cells that are implicated in mechanisms 
of self control and cortical areas associated with appreciation of 
consequences, and mirror neurons that have been associated with 
imitation and empathy, appear to offer fruitful linkages to virtue theory. 
Aristotle wrote of the role of example in the acquisition of virtue; there is 
evidence at the neural level of mirror systems that facilitate adoption of 
example. Plasticity in the systems for empathetic response appears 
integral to the development of sensitivity for the rights and needs of 
others, and an understanding of the consequences of one’s actions, which 
appear to be are at the core of the virtue of justice. 
 To find pleasure in appropriate activities is the mark of virtue; appetitive 
responses to pleasure, aversive responses to fear and pain, reward 
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expectations, emotional responses, and conscious goal election, are all 
finely tuned in the state and exercise of virtue.  A habit of appropriate 
reward expectation is directly linked to the development of the virtue of 
temperance. 
 Amygdalic-cortical pathways of fear management, associated with sound 
goal election, appear to support the virtue of courage.  
 Aristotle insisted on the ease with which children acquire virtue. This 
seems to be a reference to aspects of what we now understand to be 
sensitive periods for the development of qualities. Of particular interest in 
the field of virtue education are sensitive periods evident in 
responsiveness to affection, in the development of an affinity for the 
content of early experience, in ease of imitation, and in the adoption of 
new behaviours during early years. First impressions are lasting 
impressions; experiences during upbringing, particularly when the stimuli 
are associated with emotional significance, can be virtually indelible.  
 In the exercise of virtue, memory of past behaviours, of reward, of 
contextual and emotional resonances, and of principles of right and wrong, 
are all required. Memory systems are functionally implicit to learning, to 
response to reward and emotion, to habit formation, to goal election, and 
all cognitive function. Mechanisms of non-declarative memory appear to 
facilitate the ease of practice and the inherent motivational rewards in 
virtue, while during the more arduous process of acquisition of virtue, 
declarative memory plays a significant role.  A degree of explicit 
emotional/aesthetic/social/moral education, sometimes in the form of 
guided behaviour and sometimes through conceptual communication with 
relevant concrete illustration, is required for the development of virtue. 
 Virtues empower action in ways tailored to the flourishing of our being. 
This includes disposing us to execute movement towards worthy 
objectives. Therefore the neural bases for virtue require effective 
connections with motor control, even though not all virtuous activity 
requires expression in motor activity.   
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 Habit, in providing a mechanism for the organism to act more efficiently at 
the neuronal level, dedicating attention elsewhere, and absorbing fewer 
cerebral resources, seems to satisfy Aristotle’s litmus test for virtue, that it 
is attuned to the flourishing of the person.  
 There is a strong inductive case to be made that wellbeing of the organism 
requires effective integration of systems of the brain. It is most reasonable 
to argue that the life of virtue, manifested as the integration of the cortical 
with the limbic, is an indicator of flourishing.   
 
These correspondences between characteristics of virtue itself, and the neural 
structures and processes of the brain, will be developed in greater detail in 
Chapter 5. I suggest that these features present a strong inductive, empirical case 
in favour of specific neural bases implicated in the development and exercise of 
virtue. The weight of evidence argues that an alternative view appears 
incompatible with the neuroscience. 
 
Given the myriad manifestations of virtue across the categories of the cardinal 
virtues (habits of sound judgement, of respect and responsibility, of self control, 
and of resilience and fortitude in the face of difficulties) the neural expression of 
virtue is likely to involve many different regions of the brain. The approach of this 
study, first by considering the nature of virtue, and then by study of the likely core 
neural processes at work, appears more appropriate than a methodology based 
on isolated imaging experiments. It is hoped however that the generalised 
findings of this study will be borne out by specific empirical investigation in due 
course.  
  
254 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Investigating the characteristics of virtue. 
 
“To be a great and virtuous man appeared the highest honour that can befall a 
sensitive being; to be base and vicious, as many on record have been, appeared 
the lowest degradation, a condition more abject than that of the blind mole or 
harmless worm.”  
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus 
Mary Shelley 
 
 
Introduction 
What did Aristotle mean by describing someone as virtuous?  
 
To be virtuous is more than to perform, like a sports car, at one’s full design 
specifications. Human beings are more than performance; they are more than 
what they can do. The perfection of virtue is an intrinsic good suiting our very 
nature; we are perfected in our nature as composite beings of body and soul. To 
be in this state of virtue is to flourish according to our nature.  
Aristotle held that to be virtuous is to be in a state of natural perfection: virtue is 
that which “makes its possessor good and his work good likewise”.828 It is an 
arête, an excellence of character. This state is characterized by intellect, will and 
sensitive appetites - the active powers of the human person - perfected in their 
biological development, and thus able to perfect intrinsically our operation as 
rational beings. Perfection of rationality disposes us to, but is not subordinated to, 
perfection in action.  
 
Some elaboration is helpful here at the commencement of a chapter which 
focusses on the characteristics of virtue. As the starting point of his Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle explained that all human actions seek goods that we deem will 
fulfil or perfect us. Therefore the very task of ethics is to distinguish in these goods 
what is really a good for us from the apparent. He proposed that fundamental 
                                                          
828
 NE, 1106a15. 
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desires of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain are the primary motivations in our 
lives and he insisted that these basic appetites must either allow themselves to be 
guided by our rational understanding of what is truly good for us, or they can and 
will exert an undue influence on our choices. Habits of self indulgence come at a 
price, and timidity in the pursuit of worthy goals will also leave us unfulfilled - 
rogue desires can deprive us of freedom and happiness. 
 
Aquinas built on foundations laid out primarily by Aristotle. He too understood 
virtue as a state arising from the possession of habits perfecting the active powers 
of the sensitive appetites (the concupiscible appetite attuned to pleasure and the 
irascible to pursuit of arduous goals), of the intellect, and of the will. These 
perfecting habits enable us to act rationally despite appetites that draw us in 
contrary directions and despite external pressures seeking to turn us from our 
elected goals.829 He taught that the most fundamental moral virtues are prudence 
(perfecting our practical judgements about how to act) justice (the habitual 
disposition of making choices that accommodate the needs and welfare of 
others), fortitude (the habit in the irascible appetite) and temperance (in the 
concupiscible appetite).  
 
Aristotle argued that the highest end of a human agent lies in performing rational 
activity “well”, activity that “aims at what is truly perfective of the human 
agent”.830  In other words not only the external end result is good, but the human 
agent is himself perfected. (1.4.2 and 1.6.3.)  I argue in this study that this 
perfection includes our very neuronal activity, pathways and processes, and that 
this state of maturity is a natural and fitting state for human beings - when our 
neuronal development falls short of a consolidation of virtues, our personal 
fulfilment is compromised. 
 
Organisation of this chapter 
                                                          
829
 Virtues are “habits by which a person acts well.” ST, Ia-IIae, Q.55, Art.3. 
830
 Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Virtue: Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi and 
Quaestio disputata de virtutibus cardinalibus, ed. Ralph McInerny (South Bend Indiana: St 
Augustine’s Press, 1999), xii. 
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Chapter 3 should be read in the light of earlier discussions of Aristotle’s notion of 
the hylomorphic nature of reality, the introduction to the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
account of virtue with a particular focus on the contribution of virtue to human 
flourishing, and the arguments for the unity of the person. In Chapter 1 I noted 
the need to develop a methodology by which I can identify the core characteristics 
of the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of moral virtue. This methodology and this 
identification are the tasks of Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
I commence with a case study from real life, a study of an exemplary figure from 
Japan living in the first half of the twentieth century, Takashi Nagai.  
 
Recalling Elizabeth Anscombe’s advice that, before we lose ourselves in ethical 
theory, we must account for the richness and complexity of real people who 
manifest the tension between rationality and emotion, free and impulsive 
behaviours, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and fulfilled and unfulfilled lives,831 
it is fitting to begin our discussion in the world of real people and actual 
behaviours. Real life scenarios are drawn from the life and autobiographical 
writings of Nagai, medical doctor and nuclear physicist who, in the years after 
WWII through his writings under the most difficult circumstances, was a great 
force for spiritual healing in a country gutted by the horrors of war. 832   
 
In 3.1.4 in the light of an understanding the human act and how it is perfected by 
virtue, I note features of virtuous action that are in evidence in the case studies 
presented. These observations ground subsequent discussion in 3.2 and 3.3 in the 
real world. In 3.2 and 3.3 I identify key characteristics of virtue, according to the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic account. In these two sections the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
account of virtue is dissected utilising primary texts and commentary, with some 
                                                          
831
 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 26-44. 
832
 Introductory texts for an understanding of Takashi Nagai’s life: Takashi Nagai, The Bells of 
Nagasaki, trans. William Johnson (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1984); original title: Nagasaki no 
kane (1949). Paul Glynn, A Song for Nagasaki (Hunters Hill, Sydney: Catholic Book Club, 1988). 
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illustration from the glimpses in 3.1 into Nagai’s life and mind, and from his 
approaches to fostering virtue in the lives of others including his own children.833  
 
The goal of 3.2 will be a review of the nature of virtue and its ordination to human 
flourishing. In 3.3 I review the development of virtue. My aim here will not be to 
enter into nuances of interpretation nor controversies, but rather to provide an 
efficient review of the principal characteristics of virtue in the Aristotelian-
Thomistic account. In the process I hope to capture something of the brilliance of 
the insights that Aristotle and Thomas have placed before us noting their 
applicability to real life scenarios in the life of a most admirable man. 
 
Hence my methodology to identify the characteristics of virtue involves an 
analysis of Aristotelian and Thomistic texts, in the light of the actual behaviour of 
a virtuous man, and of an understanding of the human act. In Chapter 4 the initial 
list of qualities identified in Chapter 3 will be further refined in the light of the 
distinct roles of the cardinal virtues.  
 
What are we looking for? 
'Cheshire Cat,' she began, rather timidly...' would you tell me, please, 
which way I ought to go from here?'   
'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,' said the cat.  
'I don't much care where...' said Alice.  
'Then it doesn't matter which way you go,' said the Cat. 
Lewis Carroll 
Alice in Wonderland 
 
We need to know where we are going, what we are looking for. I have suggested 
that a great challenge facing the Templeton award winners is the imperative for 
them first to clarify the meaning and features of virtue. Without a well articulated, 
authoritative notion of virtue successfully reconciling the respective roles of the 
rational and non-rational in the development and practice of virtue, those studies 
must be at serious risk of failing in their endeavours.  The task of this chapter is to 
                                                          
833
 A source for information about Nagai’s life with his children will be Takashi Nagai, Leaving my 
beloved children behind, trans. M. M. Tatsuoka and T. Takai (Strathfield, NSW: St Paul’s Press, 
2010); original title: Kono Ko o Nokoshite,94. 
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identify characteristics of moral virtue able to be mapped against neurobiological 
knowledge of the human brain. A philosophically rigorous, defensible, 
understanding of virtue ordered to human flourishing, according to the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic account will be described and presented as an essential 
prerequisite to an identification of neural part-constituents. In the process I hope 
to convey something of the magnificence of virtue theory as a superlative account 
of rational behaviour and human fulfilment.  
 
3.1 Dr Takashi Nagai (1908-1951). 834 
 
This first section presents glimpses into the inspiring and extraordinary life of Dr 
Takashi Nagai in order to demonstrate the remarkable relevance of virtue theory 
in its ability to account for human behaviour. In so doing, I will seek initial insights 
into the characteristics of virtue.  
 
We will see, from his life and writings, that the nobility of Nagai’s mature, 
considered actions and the richness of his emotional life typify what most would 
agree to be a state of virtue. It will be argued that virtue ethics provides a far 
more convincing model for the subject’s actual behaviour than is provided by 
either deontological or consequentialist explanations.  Whether or not the actions 
of others could be better described by observance of rules or duty, or by a 
preoccupation to achieve certain outcomes, it will be shown that in Nagai’s case 
virtue theory stands out as a powerful explanation for his rational behaviour, for 
his ability to live with peace of heart in the midst of great difficulty, and for the 
richness and balance of his emotional life. 
 
As virtue is known through its acts,835 it is also highly appropriate that we 
commence with human acts demonstrating virtue. Actual scenarios of noble 
action are described and analysed. This serves to anchor our discussion of virtue, 
                                                          
834
 My sources for this section are Nagai, Leaving my beloved children behind; Nagai, The Bells of 
Nagasaki; Glynn, A Song for Nagasaki; and Masao Shiotsuki, Doctor at Nagasaki (Tokyo: Kosei, 
1987), original title: Hasushigoto wa Anrakusatsu data. 
835
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.56, Art.2.: “Habits are known through their acts.” 
259 
 
from the very start, in the real world of sensation, passion, apprehension, 
deliberation, choice and action. In so doing, I hope to reinforce the conviction in 
the reader that virtues are not theoretical constructs for understanding 
behaviour, but manifest, objective, attributes of the person that facilitate 
behaviours which are good for us as human beings.  
 
These scenarios drawn from the life of Dr Takashi Nagai will be revisited in the 
course of the current chapter in order to illustrate characteristics of virtue in a 
systematic overview. In the process I distinguish between the human act itself and 
that which pertains to particular virtues within the act. This will be of particular 
assistance, towards the end of Chapter 5, where one scenario will be used to 
illustrate the contribution of neural part-constituents to human behaviour.   
 
Nagai’s response to the cataclysmic event of August 9, 1945 led to his subsequent 
fame. His personal account of the immediate aftermath of the blast in Nagasaki 
became a best seller in Japan, and the subject of movie and popular song. He 
wrote some twenty books in the six years after the war. 
 
Importantly for our purposes, Nagai demonstrated that he was a man of deep 
convictions and intelligence, concern for his fellow man, austerity of life, and 
courage. Greatly influenced by Pascal’s Pensées, by his wife and perhaps also by 
his experiences as a doctor with the Imperial Army during its invasion of China, 
Nagai had become a Christian before the war. He was a devoted father and 
compassionate doctor; zealous for the advancement of medicine, he carefully 
documented the effects and effective treatments of radiation illness. Through all 
his suffering he manifested no bitterness towards the Americans for the bombing 
that destroyed half the urban areas of Japan and millions of lives. In post war 
Japan during the six years he lay dying of leukemia Nagai rose to prominence as a 
national spiritual leader as much for his extraordinary writings encouraging 
reconciliation and peace, as for his remarkable humility, inner peace, and absence 
of bitterness. “In the postwar years Nagai became a symbol of strength and 
optimism, a central figure in the spiritual and moral reconstruction of Japan. … His 
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influence on the collective unconscious of Japan was very great.” He was praised 
in the contemporary press as the “Gandhi of Japan”.836 He was in the common 
sense of the word, and in the sense understood by Aristotle and Aquinas, a man of 
virtue.  
 
  
 
Figure 3.1 Dr Takaski Nagai 
 
Figure 3.2 Nagai with his two children. 
 
3.1.1 Context: August 9, 1945. 
 
On the morning the bomb fell, Nagai was at work in his laboratory in the hospital 
of Nagasaki choosing X-ray films to teach students the art of diagnosis. Without 
warning, at 11.02am, there was a flash of blinding light. Nagai’s scientific training 
gave us this description. 
Tremendous energy was released. And this energy, a 
tempestuous blast of air travelling at a rate of two thousand 
meters per second, smashed, pulverised, and blew apart 
anything in its path. The void created at the centre of the 
explosion sucked up everything on the ground, carrying it high 
in the sky, and hurled it back violently against the earth. The 
heat of 9000o Fahrenheit burned the surrounding area. 
Fragments of incandescent metal rained down in balls of fire 
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 William Johnson in preface. Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, xx and xxii. 
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immediately setting everything alight. It is estimated that 
30,000 people lost their lives. 837 
 
Nagai survived because, although only 500m from the epicentre, he worked in one 
of the few concrete buildings in that area. 838  
 
Everywhere there were dead and dying, convulsing, strangely swollen, skin 
peeling. Soon fires were raging. Weakened by previously contracted leukemia, 
and despite his own grave injuries, Nagai worked to utter exhaustion caring for 
the dying and injured through the day of the blast and the days that followed. As 
the hospital was gone he had to improvise everything. Only after three days did he 
return to his family home finding the charred bones and melted rosary of his 
beloved wife, Midori.   
 
Nagai’s scientific training and a sensitivity to psychological experience enhanced 
by his medical training are present throughout in his writing including in the 
extracts which follow.  His capacity to describe with precision internal states and 
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 Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, 28. This is typical of numerous passages in his account where he 
dispassionately and accurately analyses the event. Nagai’s writing is in the spirit urged by another 
first-hand witness, Masao Shiotsuki: “The atomic bomb must not be elegised or sentimentalised. It 
is not romantic fiction. It is not poetry. Its terrible workings and devastation it wrought must be 
approached and described as scientifically as possible and viewed as a pressing concern for all 
mankind.” Shiotsuki, Doctor at Nagasaki, 82. This effort to be truthful and objective will be 
commented upon later. The final toll was of course much higher than 30,000. The memorial in the 
Peace Park records 73,884 dead and 74,909 injured. 
838
 Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, 11. Nagai recalled his own experiences: 
I immediately tried to throw myself to the ground, but before I could do so, 
the glass of the windows smashed in and a frightening blast of wind swept 
me off my feet into the air – my eyes wide open. Pieces of broken glass came 
in like leaves blown off a tree in a whirlwind. I felt that the end had come. … 
It was as though a huge invisible fist had gone wild and smashed everything 
in the room. The bed, the chairs, the bookcases, my steel helmet, my shoes, 
my clothes were thrown into the air, hurled around the room with a wild 
clattering noise, and all piled on top of me as I lay helpless on the floor. Then 
the blast of dusty dirty wind rushed in and filled my nostrils so I could 
scarcely breathe. I kept my eyes open, looking always at the window. And as 
I looked everything outside grew dark. There as a noise like a stormy sea, 
and the air everywhere swirled round and round. My clothes, the zinc roof, 
pieces of wood, and all kinds of other objects were performing a macabre 
dance in that dark sky. Then it gradually became cold, as at the end of 
autumn, and a strange and silent emptiness ensued. Clearly this was no 
ordinary event. 
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subjective responses, as well as external events, make his writing ideal for the 
purposes of this study. 
 
3.1.2 Acts of virtue. 
 
In the four scenarios which follow I focus on incidents drawn from Nagai’s first 
hand accounts, and from biographical writings based on his own accounts.  
 
Each scenario describes his own actions which specifically, in some way or other, 
could universally be acknowledged as noble and good. Each provides some 
psychological insight also. Commentaries below each offer a preliminary analysis.  
 
In the first he describes carrying out a difficult task and a subsequent moment of 
insight. This experience occurred during his years as an army doctor in China. The 
second and the third are of intense experiences in the immediate aftermath of the 
bomb. In each of these, searing memories etch truthful vivid descriptions. The 
fourth scenario deals with Nagai’s maturing attitudes in the last years of his life, 
and in particular with the composition of a short poem.  
 
These examples also flag the danger of underestimating the complexity of 
virtuous actions. Bear in mind that any short real life description must necessarily 
be a gross simplification of actual events. In these four scenarios convey the great 
complexities possible in a moral act facilitated by virtue, as well as the difficulty in 
separating what is essential to virtue from what is additional in the act.  
 
a) Scenario 1. Treating a prisoner.  
 
A biographer describes a moment of enlightenment during his years in China. 
 
Nagai remembered his inner turmoil during the 1933-34 
fighting in Manchuria. Yet now, though the fighting was far 
worse he enjoyed peace and freedom in his heart. He certainly 
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had changed! One night he jotted an entry in his notebook 
about the exhilaration that flooded him that day when he was 
washing the gangrenous foot of a Chinese soldier-prisoner 
before an operation. He suddenly realised he felt the same 
compassion for a wounded Chinese as for a wounded Japanese, 
and wrote: “I now know I have come to China not to defeat 
anybody, not to win a war. I have come to help the wounded, 
Chinese as much as Japanese, civilians as much as 
combatants”.839 
 
Commentary 
Nagai’s “peace and freedom in his heart”, his fulfilment as he dedicated himself 
compassionately to the care of the wounded, shines brightly on the pages of his 
journal.  He reveals his consciousness of having grown greatly in interior peace, 
overcoming “inner turmoil” despite the increasing wartime danger. The moment 
described captures his flooding “exhilaration” at realising that he cares for soldiers 
of either side with equal respect and compassion.  This moment of insight occurs 
precisely as he carries out the objectively repulsive task of washing a gangrenous 
foot, with all the associated stench and aversion to the task.  
 
It will be shown that this growth towards inner fulfilment is an important facet of 
the virtuous life. Furthermore, the phenomenon of a flash of insight will be 
significant in later discussion about the virtue of justice.  
 
b) Scenario 2. The Rising Sun.  
 
Survivors worked frantically to assist survivors in the hours following the blast. Yet 
the task was too great. Nagai writes of his profound helplessness and 
discouragement. “I stood helplessly in the middle (of the wounded), doing 
nothing. … It was an utterly disheartening scene.” 840 Most of his colleagues and 
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 Glynn, A Song for Nagasaki, 78. 
840
 Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, 36.  
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students dead, survivors losing their nerve, ten years of academic work 
incinerated, Nagai collapsed, greatly weakened by loss of blood. “My knees 
trembled and I felt my strength ebbing away. ‘It’s the end,’ I murmured and 
collapsed.” 
 
When he came to, despite his own dire situation, Nagai grasped the need to lift his 
followers, unite them in purpose, and rally them to the task of helping others. He 
called for a flag. Nothing was to be found, so he took a hospital sheet: 
Taking a handful of blood that was dripping from my chin, I 
traced a huge circular sun on the sheet, which now became a 
Japanese flag. Attaching this “Rising Sun” to the bamboo pole, 
we lifted it up and watched it flutter loudly as the hot wind 
blew around.  
 
With sleeves rolled up and a white band around his head, 
young Nagai841 grasped the pole with both hands and raised the 
flag high in the air. And then he moved slowly forward carrying 
the bloody Rising Sun up that hill covered with black smoke. 
And we all followed in solemn and silent procession. It was five 
o’clock in the afternoon.842 
 
One witness recalled long afterwards, “Suddenly we had our ‘headquarters’ to 
rally around, a centre that put order back into the picture.” Another wrote, “It was 
so simple an act and yet the psychological act was profound.”843 By this action 
Nagai assembled the remnant of the medical staff to lead and carry survivors 
away from immediate danger to a hill overlooking the burning university. 
 
Commentary 
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 Another Nagai: a student who had survived the blast. 
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 Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, 42-3. 
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 Glynn, A Song for Nagasaki, 101-102. 
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Nagai overcomes his own weakness and discouragement in order to fortify his 
followers, and himself, with the improvised symbol of a Japanese flag.  
 
Note how the qualities that Nagai shows are profoundly integrated in the action 
he carries out, a point carrying some significance in the discussion below in 3.4. In 
this single action Nagai demonstrates prudence, fortitude, remarkable self 
control, and remarkable selflessness. He presents himself with a motive to 
overcome his lethargy, forms a practical plan, and launches into action. His 
fortitude is inseparable from his capacity to see the needs of others and from his 
own practical insight.  
 
The insight of the witness is significant: “order” was restored by this inspirational 
action, a mark of rational direction. The mere sight of the flag has a remarkable 
restorative effect on all. The survivors’ own self-directed and ordered actions 
follow their sight of the flag. The symbol sparked an effective response of loyalty 
and responsibility, in which it seems practically no words were necessary. The 
sight of the flag alone heartened them, somewhat restored peace of heart, and 
they were again able to move purposefully drawing on their long cultural and 
family traditions of self control and fortitude. 
 
To further unpack the complexity of this moment: sense input, in this case the 
sight of a flag charged with emotional resonance, triggers a cascade of practical 
action, solidarity, self control and fortitude. Emotion laden input has imparted to 
the consciousness of each member of the group a truth on the basis of which each 
can act. Thus this scenario also demonstrates the complex relationship between 
emotion and considered action: at times emotion can initiate considered and 
virtuous action.  
 
c) Scenario 3. The pamphlet. 
 
This scenario presents a contrasting moment in which it was necessary to master 
emotion rather than capitalize upon it, for virtuous action. 
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On the day following the blast Nagai describes a moment when the truth dawns 
upon him that the destruction has been wrought by a nuclear device and 
consequently Japan must be defeated: 
 
The chief nurse came running up and handed me a sheet of paper. It was 
one of the leaflets dropped by enemy planes the previous night.  As I 
glanced at it I shouted out spontaneously: “The atomic bomb!” 
 
In the depth of my being I felt a tremendous shock. The atom bomb has 
been perfected! Japan is defeated!  
 
… Conflicting emotions churned in my mind and heart as I surveyed the 
appalling atomic wasteland around me. … A bamboo spear lay on the 
ground. I kicked it fiercely and it made a dull, hollow sound. Grasping it in 
my hand, I raised it to the sky, as tears rolled down my cheeks. The 
bamboo spear against the atomic bomb! What a tragic comedy this war 
was! This was no longer a war. Would we Japanese be forced to stand on 
our shores and be annihilated without a word of protest? These are the 
words written on the leaflet:  
 
To the People of Japan 
 
Read carefully what is written in this leaflet. The United States has 
succeeded in inventing an explosive more powerful than anything 
that has existed until now. The atomic bomb now invented has a 
power equal to the bomb capacity of two thousand huge B-29s. You 
must reflect seriously on this terrible fact. We swear that what we say 
here is the solemn truth.  … The President of the United States has 
already given you an outline of thirteen conditions for an honourable 
surrender. We advise you to accept these conditions and to being 
rebuilding a new and better peace-loving Japan. … If you do not do 
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this, we are determined to use this bomb and other excellent 
weapons to bring this war to a swift, irresistible conclusion. 
 
I read the leaflet once and was stunned. I read it a second time and felt 
they were making fools of us. I read it a third time and was enraged at 
their impudence. But when I read it a fourth time I changed my mind and 
began to think it was reasonable. After reading it a fifth time I knew that 
this was not a propaganda stunt but the sober truth.844 
 
Commentary 
The emotional significance of this moment is in the thunderclap insight that the 
war is inevitably lost. It is interwoven with a sense of burning shame, associated 
with defeat, inculcated through Nagai’s culture since childhood.  Nagai’s 
description of how his passionate reaction subsides on successive readings of the 
leaflet gives us a remarkable insight into how deliberation can enable mastery of 
passion. What is initially less obvious is the interior battle that Nagai has to fight in 
order to respond rationally to the news. Had he torn up the leaflet after the first 
readings, he would not have come to the same conclusion. Unsaid is any reference 
to his education and upbringing that empowered him to exhibit the self control 
required to allow the news to sink in.   
 
Acceptance of the truth about the existence of the bomb, is followed by very swift 
reasoning and insight that the Japanese defenders would be powerless on 
beaches against landings supported by atomic weapons. He then deliberates over 
whether he should accept the demand of the leaflet. Only in his fourth reading he 
“changes his mind” and finds the words “reasonable”. Grasp of one truth leads to 
deliberation and reasoning that leads to the grasp of another truth. During the 
period of deliberation he keeps his emotions under control sufficiently to continue 
his deliberation. 
 
                                                          
844
 Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, 52-3. 
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Complexity is further added by the fact that, although it is not explicitly a factor in 
his deliberations, he has an audience. He has already demonstrated that he is 
finely attuned to his responsibilities to those he leads. It is reasonable to surmise 
that this sense of responsibility as well as his training in scientific objectivity 
assisted him in applying sufficient deliberation before committing himself to 
judgement.  
 
d) Scenario 4. Nyokodo. 
 
Nagai lived out his days in a humble hut that he christened Nyokodo meaning 
“Love-your-neighbour-as-yourself-house”. 845  It was on the site of his former 
home, close to the epicentre. It was a mark of Nagai’s fame that the Divine 
Emperor himself visited Nagai in that one room hut where he studied, wrote, 
meditated, and delighted in the roses he had growing, the stars above him and 
the mountains visible through his window.  
 
Nagai advised his young visitors:  
Go to the mountains and meditate! If you stay in the hurly-burly of this 
world, you’ll run around in circles without ever finding your way. You’ll 
become the kind of person who just stamps and screams. But the blue 
mountains are immovable and the white clouds come and go. I look 
constantly at these mountains of Mitsuyama and continue my meditation. 
 
A biographer remarks on the transformation of his life during these last six years:  
This professor who before 1945 had written nothing but scholarly reports 
with dry statistics now became a writer, a poet, an artist, a humanist, a 
mystic. Lying on his sickbed with his writing pad suspended over his head, 
he writes no less than twenty books before his death in 1951. He also 
writes poetry. Though Japanese poetry does not translate well into English 
let me refer to one.  
                                                          
845
 For discussion of the historical and cultural significance in Japanese tradition of the humble 
ascetic’s hut as a place of purity of heart and solitude see Glynn, A Song for Nagasaki, 125. 
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The girls of the Junshin School died in the atomic blast chanting psalms 
under the leadership of one of their Japanese nuns, just as the twenty six 
martyrs of Nagasaki had died centuries before on crosses chanting psalms 
under the leadership of Paul Miki. About the schoolgirls Nagai wrote: 
Virgins like lilies white 
Disappeared burning red 
In the flames of the holocaust 
Chanting psalms  
To the Lord 
 
Nagai was also a master of calligraphy. As love for peace became an all 
consuming passion he would write for his visitors the characters heiwa wo, 
meaning “Grant us peace!”846 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3   Nyokodo. The hut in which Nagai lived during his last years. 
 
                                                          
846
 Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, xvii-xviii. 
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Commentary 
The words of Nagai to his young visitors insist on the importance of meditation in 
order to put sense into the events of life. He presents reflection as an antidote to 
childish emotional tantrums, purposeless activity, and the distraction of life. It is 
clear from his own example that meditation however moves from contemplation 
to action. His remarkable output, during his years of illness, demonstrates this 
productivity.  
 
The short poem, especially the  use of the word “holocaust” and the comparison 
of the school girls with the 17th century martyrs of Nagasaki, manifests a 
conviction that there can be meaning behind tragedy, that there can be reasons 
that explain or help to explain difficulties, perhaps even that some pains are worth 
enduring. The simple beauty of the imagery, and the conclusion of the final line, 
suggest inner tension is resolved and that the poet, and also the girls themselves, 
are at peace.  
 
In total, the scenario allows us to reflect on the phenomenon of growth in virtue. 
In his enlightened maturity, Nagai moves from preoccupation with the speculative 
to the exercise of contemplation which he channels through art and writing into 
powerful messages for his contemporary world. 847 Thereby too, he manifests his 
own peace of heart. 848 
 
3.1.3 Virtue and the human act.849 
                                                          
847
 Excellence in these activities is a demonstration of virtue according to the Aristotelian 
understanding. Aristotle describes art as the virtue of making, while effective writing and poetry 
require application of the practical intellect perfected by prudence. Cf NE, 1103a, 32-33. 
848
 Glynn, A Song for Nagasaki, 130. In these years his calm and peaceful attitude was constantly in 
evidence. Above we see this in his calligraphy and his constant concern to send visitors away with 
this message of peace. Towards the end of his life he wrote for his small son and daughter, “Being 
pure in spirit and pure in heart might not win you a lot of money but will give you something even 
more precious, peace of heart.” Biographers describe his affection for his children, typified by such 
beautiful letters full of encouragement, tenderness and tranquillity. 
849
 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1961), 
253. 
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Each of the scenarios above has focused on a rational act, what Aquinas calls a 
“human act”.850 Before I seek to discern what is common to virtue across the 
various scenarios, it will be helpful to review briefly a Thomistic understanding of 
the human act. (See also 3.1.4).  
 
Our goal here, in association with the subsections immediately following, is to 
identify more precisely the specific characteristics common to the state and 
practice of virtue, isolating from them the many other features present in any act 
of virtue which are not necessarily specific to virtue. I will comment also on the 
observed role of cardinal virtues at work in these scenarios. 
 
Table 3.1 suggests that the human act itself divides into no less than twelve 
successive moments. At first this representation of the psychological steps I follow 
prior to acting may appear needlessly complex, yet, this structure is derived from 
                                                                                                                                                                 
As this study of a neural substrate contributing to virtue will need to account for the presence of 
biological aspects and representations, we must distinguish that which is material from that which 
is properly rational. For the sake of precision, the use of some terminology drawn from the rational 
psychology of Aquinas (1.4.2) is helpful here. In Thomistic psychology there is no psycho-
physiological mechanism in the very act of knowing; the operation of the agent intellect renders 
the phantasm intelligible in the possible intellect. Note that although we use the term “agent 
intellect” there is only one agent, the person. “Agent intellect” refers to one function of the mind 
which can be identified in order to discuss the structure of thought. The proper object of the agent 
intellect is to dissociate the universal from the particular. Yet, a human act deals by necessity with 
both universals and with particulars. Hence, inextricably linked with this intellection and rendering 
it possible are very material processes. Furthermore, deliberation, in its duration, necessarily 
involves material cooperation at what we now understand as the neural level. Where the 
particular is present, the material must also be in evidence; “Human actions always have to do 
with the particular and the contingent.” (Gilson, 253) Although we say that an act of the will is 
“indecomposable” (Gilson, 253) we do not deny that concrete imagery in the brain requires some 
material mediation. Hence we also say that the will involves “some kind of experience of the 
object to which it is attaching itself”, “quasi experientiam quondam sumens de re cui inhaeret” (ST, 
Ia-IIae, Q.15, Art.1). These words are significant. They indicate that the will, through the sensitive 
appetite, is affected by the representations, phantasms, of the particular goods. As we have seen 
briefly in Chapter 1, a phantasm is an image of a particular thing: “similitude rei particularis” (ST, 
Ia, Q.84, Art.7.2). Phantasms are preserved in corporeal organs: “similitudines individuorum 
existents in organis corporeis” (ST, Ia, Q.85, Art.1.3). They are individual species residing in the 
imagination. Without question, phantasms associated with specific biological representations are 
integral to the human act, and therefore also to the operation of virtue. 
850
 It is evident too, that while the action of rallying followers by an improvised flag is, in this light, 
a single act, it could also be regarded as a sequence of completed acts: an urgent request to a 
follower to find a proper flag, the improvisation of the sheet-flag, the communication of the action 
to followers, the formation of the column heading up the hill, etc. 
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observation of reality, accommodating the need for actions to be refined and 
finally elected on the basis first of initial attraction, initial information, and then of 
practical deliberation about alternatives and means to be employed. Furthermore 
this model accommodates the need for perfections of these steps if the act itself 
is to be well performed. These perfections are the virtues.  
 
 
Table 3.1 
The Human Act
851
 
 
Mind Will 
Intention 
About ends 
1. Judgement that the end exists 2. Wish or want 
velle, simplex voluntas 
3. Judgement that it can be achieved 4. Determination to achieve it 
volition, volo, voluntas efficax 
About means 
5. Deliberation about ways and means 
consilium 
6. Approval 
consensus 
7. Discrimination and selection 
proairesis 
8. Choice 
electio 
Executio 
9. Practical and effective command 
imperium 
10. Application to deed 
usus activus 
11. Performance by appropriate power or powers 
usus passivus 
12. Fulfilment 
quies 
  
Table 3.1 illustrates that the human act is a complex reflexive process involving, as 
Gilson puts it, the intellect and the will, “acting and reacting upon each other”. 852 
All the steps up to 11 are completed prior to executive action, prior often to 
anything apparent to the observer. Only the last steps involve manifest execution 
of the task and consequent fulfilment. 853 854 
                                                          
851
 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1a2ae. 18-21, ed. Thomas Gilby OP (Cambridge: 
Blackfriars/McGraw Hill, 1965), Volume 18, Appendix 5. 
852
 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 253. 
853
 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1a2ae. 18-21, ed. Gilby, Appendix 5.  
854
 These steps are not discrete events in a chronological succession.  McInerny holds that Aquinas 
presents the three acts of the will in order of intention as volition, enjoyment, and intention; and 
in the order of execution, as above, consent, choice and use. (Ralph McInerny, “Ethics” in 
Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzman and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: 
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Gilson explains that the process of the human act is initiated by “an 
indecomposable movement of our will”855 (step 2 above) in the concrete 
apprehension of some goal (step 1 above).  This indecomposable, and therefore 
non-material, enlightenment is an “intention” such as, for example, “I want to 
help this person with the gangrenous foot”, “I want to communicate the 
importance of peace”. ‘In wishing the end, it necessarily wills the means, 
therefore the intention of the end and the willing of the means constitute but one 
single act....To will a remedy in view of health is one act of willing’.856 These initial 
steps pass through refining stages (steps 4 and 5). 
 
The intellect then provides preliminary deliberation defined as counsel (step 5). 
This “deliberation concludes with a judgement of the practical reason” 857 
presenting several judgements with good under various aspects (step 7). For 
example Nagai could consider the various merits of calligraphy, poetry or prose to 
impart a message of peace.  
 
The will is moved to what is good in each of the options (step 6). The will attaches 
itself to these choices offered by deliberation in the step we call consent (step 7). 
For example, in the scenarios above consent would be present just prior to the 
readiness to wash the foot, at the moment the plan is settled that will result in 
putting pen to paper, etc.    
 
Finally the choice of one means to an end is made (steps 9-11). It depends “in part 
upon the intellect and in part upon the will”858 which Aquinas concludes primarily 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 205-208.) It is of course not reasonable to suggest that an 
action can actually be subdivided into watertight compartments. Nagai’s creation of a poem would 
defy this discrete categorisation, and McInerny, to illustrate variations possible in the framework, 
points out that often in real life consent and choice are in the one step. 
855
 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 253. 
856
 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 253. 
857
 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas,) 253. 
858
 “appetitivus intellectus, vel appetitus intellectivus”. NE, II 5 2. 
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must be an act of the will,859  because substantially this election is the movement 
of the soul towards the good which it chooses.  
 
Note the complex interplay of the intellect and will in the lead up to the actions 
central to the scenarios above. Intellect, will, sensitive appetite, imagination and 
memory (for example in memory of the symbol of the flag) each play clear 
respective roles in the process of the human act. Let us now look specifically at 
the contributions of emotion and virtue.  
 
Where do emotions fit into the human act? Sense appetite acts upon the will 
particularly at step 2 and to some extent at steps 4, 6 and 8. Undue sense 
appetition can negate effective use of the intellect as we see for example in 
Nagai’s original struggles to overcome his passionate reaction to the flyer. In the 
exercise of a virtuous act, temperance and fortitude ‘respond to the direction of 
reason’.860 Appropriate sense appetition in the form of inspiring emotional 
symbolism, contributes to reason, motivating the followers of Nagai to retake 
rational control of their behaviours. 861  
 
Where do the virtues fit in to the human act? The active powers of intellect, will, 
and sensitive appetite are perfected by practical reason in the intellect, justice in 
the rational appetite, and the virtues of the sensitive appetite.  These virtues, and 
in this study I focus on the cardinal virtues, are dispositions in some way 
facilitating the governance of reason. Gilson explains that when there is 
insufficient formation of these appetites they can distort the reasoning process.  
The person in whom concupiscence is the master judges his own 
desires to be good, even when such a judgement contradicts the 
                                                          
859
 ST, Ia, Q.83, Art.8 and Ia-IIae, Q.13, Art.1. 
860
 Aquinas, Disputed questions on virtue, xiii. 
861
 Understandings of the contribution of reason to rationality are a major area of interest in 
philosophical psychology. 
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universal judgement of reason. It is to neutralise such sophistries of 
passion that man must be strengthened with moral habits.862 
 
McInerny observes that prudence perfects the whole reasoning process: “This 
analysis of the complete human act into its components is another look at 
practical discourse as issuing in the command of prudence.”863  This overarching 
involvement of prudence at the various stages of the human act will have 
considerable significance in discussion in later sections of this chapter, as will 
justice which perfects the will with a disposition to act always taking one’s duties 
to others into account. 
 
Virtuous acts derive from an appetite inclined easily by reason perfected by 
prudence. In differing contexts they can be both cause and result of the “training 
of our emotions to respond to the direction of reason… a most difficult task”.864 
McInerny clarifies that temperance and fortitude respond to the direction of 
reason, but are dispositions of the sensitive appetites: “The habit or disposition in 
the concupiscible appetite to respond to the direction of reason, and thus to 
pursue pleasures rationally, is called temperance. The habit or disposition to react 
rationally to threatened harm is called courage.”865  
 
3.1.4 Some observations about the characteristics of virtue. 
 
In the light of this understanding of the human act and how it is perfected by 
virtue I am now in a position, by analysis of the scenarios above, to suggest a 
number of features of acts of virtue and of the relationship between the virtues. 
These initial observations based on common features evident in the various 
scenarios will be complemented by a systematic review of the central 
characteristics of virtue according to Aristotle and Aquinas in 3.2 and 3.3.  
                                                          
862
 I have drawn in this section from the masterful overview of the Thomistic analysis of the human 
act by Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 
863
 McInerny, “Ethics,” 208. 
864
 Aquinas, Disputed questions on virtue, xiii. 
865
 Aquinas, Disputed questions on virtue, xiii. 
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i. Acts of virtue may be accompanied by a deep  sense of peace, fittingness, 
and joy. 
We see this in the exhilaration experienced by Nagai in China, by the 
calming effect of the focused orderly response to Nagai’s example and to 
the symbol of the flag, in the calming of Nagai’s passion as deliberation 
conquered raging emotion, and most of all, in Nagai’s stable resolute 
peace in the face of his impending death. 
ii. Effective action is evident in each scenario.  
Each scenario presented above leads to a “successful” outcome because of 
Nagai’s actions. The success of the outcome is certainly found in the 
effective cleaning of an enemy’s foot, creation of an improvised flag, 
comprehension of the message of a leaflet, and completion of a work of 
art. The prudent election of means to perform planned actions is a 
constant element in these examples.866  
iii. Due regard for the needs of others is evident in each scenario.  
Preoccupation with the rights and needs of others appears to be an 
abiding motivation in virtuous action. The interpersonal dimension, 
arguably perfected by justice, is inseparable in each scenario: Nagai 
measures and devises his own actions by their impact on others.  Hence, 
the cleaning of the foot is a demonstration of the conviction to serve 
without discrimination. The creation of the flag has the result of unifying 
and giving hope to the survivors.867  
iv. Virtues appear to operate in an integrated way, in concert, with each 
other.  
In the first scenario Nagai compassionately washes the enemy soldier’s 
gangrenous limb, apparently moved by principles of duty and humanity. 
His action brings together prudence which is reflects the practical 
execution of the deed, justice which is the virtue by which he is disposed 
                                                          
866
 Of the examples, the fourth scenario provides the best demonstration of calmly considered 
actions tailored to the achievement of specific goals for a range of desired outcomes. 
Nevertheless, each demonstrates the directive role of reason in execution of the task.   
867
 Further examples: the deliberation over the leaflet allows him to demonstrate to another the 
need for calm rationality in a crisis; and the composition and publication of the poem allows him to 
inform others with his refined insights. 
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to fulfil what he sees as his duty towards others, and self control and 
fortitude in suppression of his revulsion and his readiness to face 
difficulty.868   
v. It would appear that virtue can consist not only in rational management of 
emotion, but also in refined attention to one’s emotional state.  
In the third scenario we see emotion and an overactive imagination 
clouding reason. We see too, Nagai’s response of deliberation to manage 
that emotional inflammation so that he can act rationally and nobly. In 
contrast we observe in the episode with the flag that an emotion laden 
symbol can trigger virtuous actions.869  
vi. Prudence and justice may involve instantaneous insights.   
Although we have seen that, as in the third scenario, prudence may 
contribute to protracted deliberation and reasoning, at other times there 
is evidence of instantaneous flashes of conviction, of recognition of truth. 
For example Nagai himself describes the moment, while bathing a putrid 
foot, that the dignity of his calling to all without exception dawned upon 
him.  Such instantaneous comprehensions of truth are consistent with the 
Aristotelian/Thomistic account of rational operations perfected by 
prudence and justice.870 
vii. Acts of virtue appear to arise from and lead to refined sentiments of self 
sacrifice, beauty and nobility.  
Note for example his generous self sacrifice as Nagai feels the conviction of 
serving the enemy wounded. Later in the conflict he would risk his very life 
and career, disobeying explicit orders, to save the lives of prisoners. We 
                                                          
868
 Three further examples. In the second scenario, Nagai’s sense of duty and concern for his 
colleagues lead to an act of great fortitude. His followers are in turn overcome their disorder and 
lack of self control by the symbolic reminder of needs greater than their own. Again we see all the 
virtues operating in an integrated manner. In the third, Nagai overcomes a response of great 
passion through great will power and determination to deliberate before passing judgement. It is 
evident that prudence and justice cooperate in the effective direction of emotion. Finally, in the 
fourth, Nagai’s habitual self control and fortitude provide a platform for calm reflection. From that 
calm reflection comes an abundance of acts of service to his fellow man.  
869
 Similarly in the fourth scenario Nagai’s simple poem can evoke in us as we read it our own inner 
acts of compassion, essentially acts of love of fellow man, akin to justice.   
870
 Similarly the mere glimpse of the flag, with its inherent truth of patriotism and solidarity, 
moved Nagai’s companions. 
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also witness the refined love of country that underpins Nagai’s 
inspirational action with the flag, and his love of humanity that drives him 
to insist tirelessly on peace after the war.871 
viii. The state of virtue appears to culminate in a higher, more refined capacity 
to act well.  
The last six years of Nagai’s life are marked by prodigious industry under 
the most difficult circumstances, conducted in a spirit of deep humanity 
and cultural sensitivity, amidst personal austerity, and all the while 
maintaining mastery over wayward emotions of anger, revenge and 
bitterness, and manifesting a deep peace of heart to all despite personal 
and national tragedy. In total these portray a man who is a paragon of 
established, stable, personal qualities.  
ix. A life of virtue may find its culmination in a refined capacity to love others 
with deeds. 
It appears that Nagai, in his maturity, successfully channelled his energies 
into effective love of others.872 Nagai’s constant example through his 
illness, to his children, to visitors and to readers, was of loving concern. 
Such a disposition requires effective judgement, a highly refined capacity 
to measure one’s actions against the needs of others, and the self control 
and tenacity necessary for the achievement of the goal. These final years 
of Nagai’s biography suggest the capacity to love others with deeds to be 
the very crowning of the virtuous life.  
 
3.1.5 The superiority of virtue ethics in accounting for noble human behaviour.  
 
I have presented some detailed glimpses into the life of Takashi Nagai. His own 
account of actual behaviour appears to be reflective of the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
                                                          
871
 Furthermore, Nagai appears to draw strength from natural beauty: flowers, stars, and 
mountains. He is drawn to artistic expression to better communicate the refined sentiments that 
occupy his mind. 
872
 It is reasonable to expect that such a selfless disposition has a prior history. Such selflessness is 
evident even the four scenarios: profound respect for others evident in his actions during the 
Chinese war; tireless attention to the victims of the bomb; and solicitude to provide effective 
leadership by example. These things demonstrate his dedication to others in years preceding his 
final illness. 
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understanding of virtue and the human act, from initial deliberation, through 
choice, to execution. It seems clear that the doctrine of virtue accounts effectively 
for the interplay of rationality with appetite and emotion, and thus offers an 
accurate understanding of human action. 
 
In 1.6 it was noted that contemporary accounts of moral philosophy fall broadly 
into three groups:  consequentialist ethical theories, deontological (duty based) 
theories, and virtue ethics. It is most interesting to compare these theories against 
Nagai’s own moral decision making and his moral worldview.  
 
If we study the four scenarios as test cases, examining them for whether Nagai 
acts out of an observance of rules or with an eye to bringing about a determined 
outcome, neither approach fits well with his behaviour without doing violence to 
the facts. 
 
There was obviously no rule book for Nagai to follow to act well. For example, he 
explains that his treatment of the enemy soldier was prior to a realisation that he 
was observing any rule for his own behaviour. Similarly, the spontaneous action of 
improvising a flag could not be scripted; the unprompted conception of the action 
defies any explanation based on “duty” as an overriding motivation. Nor may 
Nagai’s deliberation over the leaflet be interpreted as acting out of duty or 
observance of rules.  It is clear that the various actions described arose from 
qualities in his character based on previously established behaviours, and from 
well formed convictions upon which he could draw.873  
 
It is also clear that Nagai regarded his actions as intrinsically important, rather 
than as a simple means to an end. The creation of the flag was noble in itself, and 
integral to any positive outcome; it was not instrumentalised for some other 
consequence. His deliberation over the leaflet was prior to any goal setting. The 
                                                          
873
 There are of course literally infinite possibilities for individual moral acts: they may or may not 
be complex; they may be virtually instantaneous, or of considerable duration, and it is apparent 
that a virtue based ethical system allows flexibility in its response to moral dilemmas, to act well 
regardless of context. 
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prodigious output of Nagai’s final years cannot be explained alone by a utilitarian 
framework; just as his literary and artistic endeavours and his advice for visitors 
transcend results. His very serenity is evidence that they are fulfilling in 
themselves.  His dedication for the wounded without discrimination, his concern 
for those he was leading, and his love for his children and fellow countrymen, 
were all actions intrinsically important to Nagai, neither reducible to a sense of 
duty, nor to the expectation of a positive outcome. The love for others shown in 
these actions goes far beyond the strict reciprocity of some narrow conception of 
justice, highlighting the deficiencies of duty and consequence based measures in 
accounting for truly noble behaviour.  
 
The concordance we have been seeing between these real scenarios and virtue 
theory demonstrate that an understanding of virtue is not an arbitrary or out-of-
date framework which struggles to describe complex behaviours arising from 
either rational deliberation or emotional reaction. In fact, it would appear, prima 
facie, that it is virtuous character, not rule articulation nor outcome calculation, 
that is the well spring of spontaneous noble behaviours. 
 
This ability for virtue ethics to account for noble behaviour and for the 
characteristics of noble personality in the real world is striking:  
 
i. Nagai himself has adopted the view that moral behaviour is a consequence 
of character, the essence of a virtue ethics based approach. He advises the 
young men who come to see him that they should meditate, to change 
themselves, lest they become “the type of person” who stamps and 
screams. It is clear that moral behaviour, in Nagai’s conception, is a 
consequence of character. Also, it is impressive to note that, even some 15 
years before in China, his biographer noted his delight in realising the 
“change” in his personality, taking delight equally in treating allies and 
enemies.  Nagai’s own words reflect this discovery. 
ii. Nagai’s very qualities of character stand out as the most psychologically 
attuned explanation for Nagai’s freely chosen behaviours, within a broader 
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understanding of human nature. This approach adequately accommodates 
rationality, free choice, motivation, and human fulfilment.  
iii. Finally, Nagai’s character based worldview of ethical behaviour was 
formulated not because of training in western classical philosophy but 
intuitively in a culture so different to that of the West. Nagai was a man of 
his times and nation, patriotic with what we might call a stoicism or even 
fatalism in handling difficulty typical of the nurture of a Japanese 
upbringing, and he still regarded moral decision making as an extension of 
character. This suggests that a virtue based view of human personality 
satisfies something deeply attuned to our nature; this is absent or less 
evident in a consequentialist or duty-observant paradigm for assessment 
of behaviour.  
 
On any reasonable measure, Nagai is indisputably a noble and admirable human 
being: this study demonstrates that virtue ethics is well able to account for the 
moral growth, for the the decision-making and actions, for the stable qualities of 
character, and for personal fulfilment in maturity, of such a person. The study 
suggests that consequentialist and deontological approaches may be less effective 
in accounting for behaviour, character and fulfilment in such people.  
 
In the balance of the current chapter the matter of these scenarios will also be 
used in illustration of characteristics of virtue. In Chapter 5 I will return to one of 
these scenarios to illustrate the neural bases of virtue in actu, and in Chapter 6 I 
will revisit the comparative evaluation of ethical paradigms.  
 
3.2 The state of virtue. 
 
In 3.2 and 3.3 I apply texts from Aristotle and Aquinas concerning the nature of 
virtue to these reflections about Takashi Nagai.  First some contextual insights:  
 
We know more about the man Alexander the Great than about his tutor Aristotle, 
but of course Aristotle’s fame does not hinge on the achievements of a 
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hyperactive pupil. As the Britannica puts it, Aristotle “perhaps more than any 
other thinker has characterised the orientation and content of all that is termed 
Western Civilisation”. His Nicomachean Ethics is one of the great texts of 
civilization. In it Aristotle gave us the first systematic vision of virtues as the basis 
for perfection of the human character, a view that has prevailed in all but the 
most recent decades of western civilisation, a view too that many have argued is 
universal to human experience.874   
 
Some say the book was composed for Nicomachus, Aristotle’s son, others that the 
son was the editor; but how attractive it is to think that the great Philosopher may 
have written this beautiful account of human fulfilment for his own son. The 
argument of the work hinges on crucial linkages: between habit and virtue – 
“Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit”875 - Aristotle goes to lengths to 
explain that virtues are deeply rooted habits of action, not just “values”, or nice 
sentiments; and between virtue and happiness – “Happiness is the reward of 
virtue”.876 Aristotle realised too that fostering virtue requires personal effort, and 
if they are to be formed in a young person, parental expertise and example are 
important. He emphasised the importance of building these good habits in the 
early years of a child’s life. 877    
 
There are many beautiful passages in this work: close analyses of the various 
moral virtues, an insistence on intellectual virtues, a whole section dedicated to 
explaining the link between true friendship and happiness. And in culmination, the 
meaning of happiness, eudaimonia, itself is studied. The ten books of the work 
commenced with an inquiry into the meaning of happiness and they conclude by 
drawing the distinction between pleasure and happiness. Joseph Pieper saw this 
                                                          
874
 See discussion in section immediately above with reference to Nagai. Martin Seligman and 
Christopher Peterson, Character Strengths and Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and 
C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (1943); 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/augustine/arch/lewis/abolition1.htm#1 (accessed 6 November, 
2012).  
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 NE, 1103a. 
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 NE, 1099b16. 
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 NE, 1103b. 
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discovery and articulation of virtues as a turning point in civilised 
consciousness.878  
 
The Nicomachean Ethics is more than just another book on a dusty classics shelf! 
Surely we disregard such a heritage at our own peril.  
 
In forming my views for the sections that follow, in addition to the primary texts 
of Aristotle and Thomas, I have drawn from a range of commentators, including 
Sherman, Irwin, Broadie, Hutchinson, Pieper, Porter and McInerny. My intention 
has been to steer clear of controversial matters providing a systematic, succinct 
review. I rely on key source passages in order to identify essential characteristics 
that will be a focus for the task of Chapter 5.  
 
Essential characteristics for the state of virtue are identified below in 3.2, and 
features associated with the development of virtue in 3.3. Then, in the light of a 
discussion of the cardinal virtues in Chapter 4, my aim will be to distill from this 
list the characteristics of virtue that we may reasonably understand to have a 
biophysical basis. 
 
3.2.1 Virtues dispose the appetites, the source of all human acts, to 
rationality.879 
 
In Scenario 3 we witnessed Nagai’s emotional response to the leaflet calling for 
Japanese surrender. He described his repeated efforts to consider the American 
demand and he described his unwillingness to accept what he was reading. Finally 
only on the fourth and fifth readings did he accept the truth of what he was 
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 J. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1966). “This particular intellectual framework, the formula which is called the “doctrine of virtue,” 
was one of the great discoveries in the history of man’s self-understanding, and has continued to 
be part and parcel of the European mind. It has become a basic component of the European 
consciousness, and the result of centuries of persistent intellectual endeavour by all the creative 
elements of the emerging West, both the Greeks (Plato, Aristotle) and the Romans (Cicero, 
Seneca), both Judaism (Philo), and Christianity (Clement of Alexandria, Augustine).” 
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 Emotions are neither good nor bad in themselves but we must manage them. Aquinas wrote: 
“Passion, to Aristotle, is something to which we must choose to react.” (ST, Ia-IIae, Q.59, Art.2) 
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reading. This effort to confront something deeply unpalatable bespeaks qualities 
of character, and a habitual restraint that withholds final judgement and 
continues deliberation without committing to an unbridled emotional response 
until a matter has been thoroughly considered. It illustrates well the capacity for 
trained passion to accept the guidance of reason, albeit with initial reluctance. In a 
similar way Nagai controlled his revulsion towards the gangrenous state of the 
enemy soldier’s foot, and overcame his severe weakness to inspire his fellow 
workers by means of the improvised flag.  
 
In these examples we are witnessing the habitual dispositions first of all in Nagai’s 
sensitive appetites to respond to his direction, and also in his rational appetite, his 
capacity for make well deliberated choices responsive to the rights of others.  
 
For clarification, let us return briefly to the model of the human act and to the 
notion of motivation. Whenever we act, we act for some purpose, we move 
toward something that we find appealing for some reason. Aristotle and Aquinas 
suggest that our appetites, both sensible and rational, themselves need to have 
been trained if a person is to possess such restraint and self control as we see in 
Nagai.  
 
At the foundation of all good human activity is self management of the passions 
by temperance and fortitude. For this reason too, the will, or rational appetite, 
also “needs to be disposed to its operations by means of habits”.880 Aristotle had 
taught that it was by these habits, by the moral virtues, that “We are directed well 
or ill in reference to the passions.”881 Justice is a disposition of the rational 
appetite, the will, whereas fortitude and temperance are of the sensitive appetite. 
As we have seen in the overview of the human act, virtuous acts are commanded 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.49, Art.4.1.  
881
 NE, ii 4 
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by the rational appetite disposed by justice in concert with the intellect disposed 
by prudence.882  
 
Habitual dispositions of these powers of the sensitive and rational appetites are 
the key to living well, to living according to reasoned choices.883 “Knowing what is 
right does not make a wise man.”884 But, “Habits are necessary in order to act 
well.”885 Further Aquinas explains, “Human virtue is an operative habit, a good 
habit, productive of good works”. 886 Aquinas explains that the particular type of 
habit that is virtue is “a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of 
habit.”887 This differentiates it from a passion which is “a movement of the 
sensitive appetite”. In other words, virtues in the sensitive appetites are 
dispositions in our passionate reactions.  
 
In the two subsections which follow I examine the nature of the dispositions first 
of the sensitive appetites, and then of the rational appetite. 
 
3.2.1.1 The virtues of the sensitive appetite refine our habitual dispositions 
to pain and pleasure. 
 
In his final years, having suffered the loss of his wife, friends and colleagues, 
having seen the accomplishments of years of research vaporise before his eyes, as 
his life ebbs away through the inroads of leukemia, and in the midst of national 
humiliation and tragedy, Nagai demonstrates the most remarkable capacity to 
transcend his circumstances. We have read how, in the fourth scenario, he 
maintains his equanimity and a prodigious output of work in the service of his 
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 Aristotle described virtue as the “habit of choosing the rational mean as a prudent man would 
discern it.” NE, 1106b36. 
883
 Nagai’s self mastery includes not only articulated convictions of respect for fellow man, and his 
medical expertise, but also his mastery of his disgust at the unpleasantness of his task: actions in 
the sensitive as well as the intellectual domain. 
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 NE, 7.10. 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.51, Art.1.3. 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.55, Art.3. 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.59, Art.1. 
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countrymen in a great work of national healing and reconciliation. He exemplifies 
the refined emotional life that Aristotle suggests is central to human wellbeing. 
 
Virtue consists in rejoicing and hating and loving aright, there is 
clearly nothing we are so much concerned to acquire and to 
cultivate as the power of forming right judgements, and of 
taking delight in good dispositions and noble actions.888 
 
What exactly is this “hating and loving aright”? Aristotle insists that human 
motivation reduces to seeking pleasure and avoiding pain: “What affirmation and 
negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire.”889 He reflects on the 
danger of poor choices when “we choose the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain 
as an evil.”890 
 
That man has control over pleasure and pain differentiates him from the 
animals.891 Aristotle argues that the capacity to control appetite is the mark of 
rationality. We see this in Nagai’s self discipline, both in the face of a natural 
distaste for washing a putrid wound, and in maintaining equanimity in the face of 
his illness and separation from his children. 
 
Pleasure and pain are universal in human experience… but it is how we react to 
them, and how we direct them that leads to peace or frustration. 892 893 
...every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure 
and pain....it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men 
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 Aristotle, Politics, 1340a18. 
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 NE, 1139a18-26. 
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 NE, 1113b1. 
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 NE, 1111b13-16. “Choice is not common to irrational creatures, but appetite and anger are. The 
incontinent man acts with appetite but not with choice; while the continent man on the contrary 
acts with choice but not with appetite.... appetite relates to the pleasant and the painful, choice to 
neither the pleasant nor the painful.” 
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 NE, 1105a12. “The whole concern both of virtue and of political science is with pleasure and 
pains; for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly bad.” 
893
 NE, 1104b11. “...moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the 
pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones.” 
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become bad by pursuing (the wrong pleasures) or avoiding 
(worthy pains)...894   
 
It is in how we manage these experiences that virtue resides, “Virtues and vices 
are dispositions to find certain things pleasant and certain other things 
unpleasant. ... virtue is good taste in practical matters.” 895 And ultimately, 
therefore, this is the making of character, “Character is good or bad by pursuing 
and avoiding certain pleasures and pains”.896 
 
3.2.1.2 Virtue is a habit of choosing. 
 
Time and again, Aristotle insists that virtue is a habit of choosing, “a prohairetic 
state”.897 He says, “The virtues are choices or they involve choice”898 and, that 
“virtue is a habit of choosing the rational mean as a prudent man would discern 
it.”899 It is choice in accordance with right reason, orthos logos.900 901Aquinas 
echoes this: “The principal act of virtue is choice.” 902 
 
Choice is principally an act of the rational appetite, the will.  
Choice is substantially not an act of reason but of the will: for 
choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul 
toward the good which is chosen. Consequently it is evidently 
an act of the appetitive power.’903 
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 NE, 1104b13. 
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 D. S. Hutchinson,The Virtues of Aristotle (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), 5. 
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 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1221b32-34. 
897
 See perceptive summary discussion of the prohairetic state in Sarah Broadie, Ethics with 
Aristotle (Oxford: OUP, 1991), 78-82. 
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 NE, 1106a3-4. 
899
 NE, 1106b36. 
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 A further masterful summary of orthos logos, right reason, is to be found in Broadie, Ethics with 
Aristotle, 82-87.  
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 Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Virtue, 4 ad 2. 
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In short, virtuous action is characterised by well informed, right desires. The 
glimpses into Nagai’s life illustrate some important clarifications about choice. 
Note, for example in the Chinese field hospital, the series of choices that make 
possible Nagai’s powerful and articulated conviction that he is now a doctor for 
both friend and enemy. He chooses to carry out a repulsive task in the treatment 
of an enemy, he chooses to focus not on the disagreeable nature of what he is 
doing or a natural fear in treating an enemy, and instead he chooses to broaden 
this isolated incident into rule for his general behaviour; finally he chooses to 
write about the moment that night further reinforcing the conviction about what 
he has done and will do in future.  
 
Sherman comments extensively on the complexity of the range of tasks and operations 
associated with choice. She holds that all have a role to play in virtuous action:  correct 
perception, consideration of all issues, comparison of compelling ends, 904 sound 
deliberation about means905, choice of actions “for their own sakes”,906 sensitivity to 
ethical salience.907 She writes,  
Virtuous action will combine a judgement of circumstances, 
reactive emotions, and some level of decision about how to act. 
(Virtuous action may involve the following) emulated models... 
general precepts and rules of thumb. ...  (Also required will be) 
cognitive skills, imagination, sensitivity...(Furthermore being) 
sensitive to the circumstances in which action is called for as 
well as flexible in one’s conception of the requirements of a 
precept is all part of practising virtuous action.908 
 
Ultimately, this habit of choosing requires rectitude in the sensitive appetites, in 
the rational appetite and in the intellect: “Since moral virtue is a state of character 
concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the 
                                                          
904
 Sherman, The Fabric of Character (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 174. 
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 NE, 1113a14. 
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 Sherman, The Fabric of Character, 175. 
907
 Sherman, The Fabric of Character, 28. 
908
 Sherman, The Fabric of Character, 179. 
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reasoning must be good and the desire right, if the choice is to be good. Desire 
must pursue just what the reason asserts.”909 
 
3.2.2  Virtue lies in choice of the mean. 
 
Virtue lies at the intermediate point, between excess and defect in relation to 
passions and actions.  
To feel (passions) at the right times, with reference to the right 
objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in 
the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is 
characteristic of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean.910 
 
We see this exemplified in the circumstances of Nagai’s fabrication of the flag, an 
act of soundly considered fortitude. He accepts help from others and allows 
someone else to lead with the flag, but he sufficiently overcomes his own life 
threatening weakness to carry out the decisive actions required to restore hope to 
his shattered friends. Although, given his very great blood loss, the exertion is life 
threatening, the risk is warranted because the circumstances are dire. 
Nevertheless where he can step back and pass the responsibility to others he does 
so.  
 
Aristotle argues that it is of particular importance to note that the mean is 
understood in relation to the particular person and his circumstances, and is 
dependent upon the correct deliberation and evaluation of the subject acting.  
Virtue then is a state of character concerned with choice, lying 
in a mean, that is the mean relative to us (my italics), this being 
determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by 
which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.911 
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In Nagai’s situation, it was essential for him to assess his own physical state, 
judging the extent to which he needed to rely on others to sustain his own 
capacity to lead, yet provide the effective leadership required.  
 
3.2.3 The motivation of virtue: “Virtuous actions are done for the sake of the 
noble.”912  
 
Motivation is the end to which we aim in an action. Gilson explains the need we 
have for fortitude and temperance perfecting the sensitive appetite, and of justice 
in our rational appetite, at the commencement of the human act: 
Ends are, in human acts, what principles are in the speculative 
sciences. To will the fitting end depends on a moral virtue. Once 
the end is willed, it is an intellectual virtue which will deliberate 
and choose the means suitable to the end. This virtue is 
prudence.913 
 
In the scenario involving the flag, Nagai envisages his goal and the important 
impact it will have. He then he sets about fabricating a flag when an actual flag 
cannot be found. Prudence perfects the practical intellect in its deliberation and 
election of means.  
 
Aristotle holds that virtuous actions are carried out “for their own sakes”914, but 
this expression needs to be understood correctly. We must reconcile this with the 
understanding, time and again in Aristotle, that virtuous actions are carried out 
for noble reasons: “Virtuous actions are noble and done for the sake of the 
noble.”915 
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A brave man will face death, “as the rule directs, for honour’s 
sake… it is for a noble end that the brave man endures and acts 
as courage directs.916 917 
 
Aristotle makes clear that noble reasons are not extrinsic optional goods such as 
fame and wealth, but intrinsic goods such as one’s own true welfare, and service 
to others. Virtuous actions are carried out “for their own sake”, for intrinsically 
good reasons, whereby the very action of the virtue brings about the good 
outcome intrinsic to the action. Such intrinsic goods are manifestly present 
underpinning Nagais’ actions: his very service to another in washing his foot, the 
very action manifesting remarkable dedication to duty and self control, is the end 
of his action. Intrinsic to this action also is the good respect for fellow man, 
perfected by justice. Therefore actions can be virtuous, “even if these actions do 
not ultimately achieve their planned goals.”918 
 
3.2.4 Virtues bring about states of character.919 
 
Our character is the sum total of our behaviours arising from our habits. Virtue 
characterises who we are. An isolated action, perhaps an anomalous deed, does 
not define our character but habituations towards certain actions do. From their 
actions we know what things are. 920 921   
 
Aristotle argues that virtues are a fundamental feature of soul: 
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Things that are found in the soul are of three kinds – passions, 
faculties, states of character, virtue must be one of these..... by 
states of character (I mean) the things in virtue of which we 
stand well or badly with reference to the passions eg with 
reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too 
weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with 
reference to the other passions.922 
 
Virtues are distinct from faculties: “We are not made good or bad by nature.”923 Nor are 
they passions. “We feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are modes of 
choice or involve choice.”924  Rather “a virtue is a state (hexis)”925  being  neither a faculty 
nor a passion. 
 
A virtuous character may be understood as a person habitually with desires in 
accord with his good. Following discussion of just acts, courageous or cowardly 
acts, and temperate or self indulgent or irascible acts, Aristotle writes: “States of 
character arise out of like activities... this is why the activities we exhibit must be 
of a certain kind”.926 Consistency is required to build qualities of character. 927 
 
In a real sense our choices that make us who we are: “Choice is closely bound up 
with virtue and discriminates characters better than actions do.”928  
Virtues are… means, states of character, tending by their own 
nature to the doing of acts by which they are produced, and 
they are in our power and voluntary, and act as right rule 
prescribes.929 
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Although in particular situations a man may act under the compulsion of 
unregulated passion, if he was responsible for the choices that led to this state, 
there is an argument that the subsequent state of compulsion is freely chosen: 
“By their slack lives (they are) responsible for becoming men of that kind, and men 
make themselves responsible for being unjust or self indulgent.”930 
 
Of relevance here is a comment from one of Nagai’s biographers, Glynn, who 
points out that at a point in the early 1930s Nagai stopped drinking heavily. He 
accepted responsibility for character and therefore modified his actions to bring 
about a different habitual state with respect to temperance and, in his last years, 
a most remarkable self control. By this action he would win praise from Aristotle. 
Not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on 
particular objects that states of character are produced is the 
mark of a thoroughly senseless person.931 
 
3.2.5 Virtues accord with the natural perfecting of the person. 
 
We have seen that the capacity to act habitually in accord with right reason is the 
hallmark of goodness, hence, the virtuous man is good: “It is impossible to be 
practically wise without being good.”932 Aristotle understood a virtue as an 
excellence of character, making “its possessor good and his work good 
likewise”.933  
 
He argues that the development of virtue is a perfection according to nature, 
represented, for example, by Nagai in his maturity, who presents as the “true and 
finished man of character”.934 
                                                          
930
 NE, 1114a3-8. 
931
 NE, 1114a10-11. 
932
 NE, 1144a37. 
933
 NE, 1106a15. Good is understood as that which is in keeping with nature. 
934
 Pius XI, Divini Illius Magister (1929).  This is a document focussing on education of the person.  
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Virtue implies directly a disposition whereby the subject is well 
disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the 
Philosopher says (Physics vii, 17) that “virtue is a disposition of 
a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect I mean that 
which is disposed according to its nature”.935  
 
By inclining us to “that which accords with reason”, 936 virtues order the organism 
to self management, and are therefore a natural perfection of the person.937  Note 
that Aquinas quotes Aristotle’s insistence that virtue involves not only good 
actions, but that the agent be perfect in itself, a rational being must not act below 
itself.  
 
There is an increasing amount of literature linking ethical behaviour, self control, 
comprehension of consequences, empathy with others, and so on, to brain 
activity, and in a similar way, a growing literature linking anti social behaviours to 
other distinctive characteristics of brain activity. But this study goes two steps 
further than this.  
 I argue that the development of a virtuous character itself has stable and 
predictable neuronal concomitants.  
 Second, I argue that this rational creature is fulfilled by the perfected 
development of his rationality through changes in neurobiological 
activities, processes, and pathways and that this development of virtuous 
character is the natural and fitting trajectory for human development. 
Therefore persons who fail to develop in this way, have, in a real sense, 
failed to flourish.  
 
3.2.5.1 Virtue is pleasant.938 
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In the following sections we review the Aristotelian notion that virtuous action 
brings pleasure and ease of action in the short term, and in the longer term a 
stable disposition towards rational action, deep peace, and natural fulfilment in 
the perfection of the body itself.    
 
There is a pleasure that arises simply because we pursue what we love and this 
pleasure results for all choices, virtuous or otherwise. All choices are accompanied 
by a certain pleasure. We choose according to what is noble, advantageous, and 
pleasant… most of all, pleasant, “for pleasure accompanies all objects of choice; 
for even the noble and advantageous appear pleasant.” 939 In contrast, Aristotle 
urges us to appropriate pleasure and pain, the characteristics of virtue. “It is the 
mark of virtue both to be pleased and to be pained at the right objects and in the 
right way.”940 
 
The pleasure of virtue must be understood correctly.941 Irwin explains further that 
virtuous people “take pleasure in facing the dangers that brave people have to 
face, and in avoiding misguided pleasures that intemperate people avoid. This is 
an important difference between virtue and mere continence.”942 The virtuous 
person has effectively come to a reassessment of what is pleasurable. 
 
Broadie holds that this pleasure is distinct from the pleasures of enjoyment of an 
activity. She says that the virtuous person acts “freely, unreluctantly, 
ungrudgingly... taking satisfaction” in the activity:  
The virtuous person takes pleasure in his virtuous acts because 
they do not go against the grain; and because they express his 
moral stature which is metaphysically anxious (so to speak) to 
be expressed in action.943 
 
                                                          
939
 NE, 1104b33-35. 
940
 NE, 1121a4. 
941
 Terrence Irwin, Classical Philosophy (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 260. 
942
 Irwin, Classical Philosophy, 291. 
943
 Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 91. 
296 
 
This refined ability for pleasure and pain is more pleasurable, in the Aristotelian 
account, than the pleasures of non virtuous activities. The greater pleasure 
accompanying virtuous action is attributable to “increasingly fine powers of 
discernment”.944 Sherman writes,  
The pleasure which arises from virtuous activity945 is the 
pleasure of realising a virtuous state without either internal 
impediments (ie insufficient or conflicting motivation) or 
external obstacles. In this way, the pleasure of virtue falls under 
the general account of the pleasure of excellent activity.946 
 
She notes Aristotle’s view that virtue leads to more complete actualisation in an 
activity with therefore greater pleasure forthcoming, although “even the learner 
gains pleasure from the exercise of his abilities”.947 
 
Ultimately, in a state of highest virtue, “that which is virtuous is pleasant or free 
from pain.”948  The hallmark of exquisitely virtuous action is that it is effortless and 
intrinsically rewarded. 
Lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by 
nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these 
are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their 
life has... pleasure in itself.949 
 
This intrinsic reward is seen in the joy that Nagai exhibits in treating the enemy 
soldier and most of all in the calm he communicates despite his illness. We also 
see in evidence a pleasure derived from the effortlessness of the action, the 
absence of internal impediment. Hence the energy that Nagai applies to his 
fabrication of the Rising Sun belies, is virtually oblivious to, his precarious physical 
state.  
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3.2.5.2 “Happiness is the reward of virtue”.950 
 
Ultimately however, not even the heightened pleasure of virtuous activity 
necessarily brings happiness. “Aristotle agreed with Plato’s claim that pleasure is 
insufficient for happiness. ... The goodness of pleasures must be measured by 
standards other than pleasure and pain.”951  
 
In this section I look at the subjective peace of soul that virtue bestows. In the 
following section, at the objective perfection of the organism. Both enjoy a 
relationship to rationality and self management.952 
 
The happiness of virtue may be understood at a richer level beyond pleasure. In in 
1.6.3, we have seen that, according to the Aristotelian-Thomistic view, human 
flourishing requires the development of intrinsic qualities of self management. 
Virtues are seen as constitutive elements of human wellbeing. Virtues enable man 
to be self directing,953 and to reach his full potential in this life:954  “The happy life 
is the life according to virtue lived without impediment.”955 Ultimately virtue is 
ordained to flourishing.956 
 
Because a virtue is essentially the facility for carrying out with ease a chosen 
action, virtues free us to act: releasing us from external pressures and also from 
debilitating bad habits, or vices. Virtues enable us to be self directing in life… 
education in virtue gives us the freedom to chart our own course in life. Baring 
misfortune, virtue allows the fulfilment of potential, self directed activity 
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298 
 
governed by right reason, and the choice and attainment of real goods: 
“Happiness depends on ourselves.”957 Virtue brings a certain self sufficiency, 
desirable in itself and conducive to peace of soul. 
 
On this broad canvas, virtue is a decisive factor in human flourishing. Aristotle 
wrote, “Happiness is an expression of the soul in considered actions.”958 The 
Aristotelian notion of happiness requires activity, not merely potential for action. 
Aristotle pointed out that happiness is not found in being in a particular state, but 
rather in activities that are made possible by being in that state. 959 “Happiness lies 
... in virtuous activities.”960 This may be understood not simply as the pleasure 
intrinsic to a virtuous action, but as the sum happiness accruing in a life of virtue.  
 
This is the long term view, transcending the simple pleasure of an isolated activity, 
but finding habitual fulfilment in the activities of virtue. Virtue empowers us to be 
happy in the long run:  
For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; 
and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man 
blessed and happy.961 
Nevertheless, Aristotle argued that the life of virtue cannot guarantee external 
goods and so happiness is still unstable and subject to good fortune. 962   
 
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle listed constituent parts of happiness: good birth, 
numerous good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, 
bodily excellences such as health, beauty, strength and athletic powers, large 
stature, fame, honour, good luck, and virtue.963 Apart from those that are natural 
endowments such as stature and health, these constituent parts, most particularly 
friendships, good children and honour, derive from character itself.  
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However, Aristotle added the significant proviso that the virtuous person, as he 
will never act in a base or hateful way, cannot be unhappy. 964  He summed up: 
“We have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action.”965 
 
This deep seated, subjective happiness, even despite external circumstances is 
exemplified in Nagai’s habitual peace of soul in his last years. His capacity for self 
management, although ultimately taken from him by physical deterioration, 
appears largely unhindered by fears or by the pursuit of illusory pleasures. He 
shows, on the contrary, an astounding capacity for the energetic pursuit of 
demanding goals.966 
 
3.2.5.3 Virtue brings about human fulfilment. 
 
Nagai’s mature years demonstrate the objective flourishing integral to the life of 
virtue. The Aristotelian and Thomistic view is not only that the development of 
virtue empowers us to act freely and therefore take control of our lives, but also 
that this development is fitting for the nature of the organism itself; the virtuous 
life is a state of maturity, at both organic and personal levels.  
 
We witness that Nagai, his character perfected by the dispositions of virtue, is 
empowered to act freely and knowingly in ways that further enrich him as a 
person. Jean Porter insists: 
The human person’s capacity to act well will be a component, 
and not merely a disposable means, of her attainment of 
perfection as a human being. Thus virtue … enables the human 
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person to act well, that is to say, in accordance with her specific 
nature as a rational animal.967  
 
It is suggested that the attainment of human goodness requires not only 
intellectual grasp of the human good, but this mastery must also reach into the 
passions and will in addition to intellect. Human goodness is both attainment of 
“an external standard of rationality or perfection and intrinsically consists in the 
perfection of the human capacities which are exercised in act”.968  
 
Nagai’s state of virtue entails not only acts that are objectively good, but acts 
carried out with highly developed individual powers of action. Nagai’s incisive and 
practical intellect and his will, which is finely attuned towards the rights and needs 
of his fellow man, operate within the context of an enriched and enriching 
emotional life. His life therefore accurately reflects the understanding that in 
virtuous activity it is insufficient that the right things be done, but they must also 
be done well, ie “out of well formed passions, a good will, and intelligent 
judgement”.969 Not only the external act must be good, but its execution will be a 
“manifestation of the perfection of the individual’s powers of action.” 970 There 
are, then, complementary outcomes accompanying a state of virtue: that the 
actions be good, and that virtuous activity make the agent good, formed as nature 
intended.   
 
As the soul united to the body “perfects the soul”,971 it is reasonable to argue that 
virtue, in its biological and rational elements, perfects the person.  Aquinas tells us 
that the development of virtue, in all its bodily implications, is for the perfection 
of the person:  
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Virtue implies not only a perfection of power, the principle of 
action; but also the due disposition of its subject.972 
 
“Due disposition” implies a disposition suited by nature, a flourishing of the 
organism at the biological level, hence the teaching of Aquinas is that virtue 
implies a material biological ordering of the matter that is in keeping with nature, 
in keeping with the way it is meant to develop. This suggests a further dimension 
to the notion of flourishing when applied to virtue. Virtue permits man to develop 
in the way that he is meant to.  
 
We find insights into this term “due disposition” in Aquinas’ speculation about the 
presence of virtue after the resurrection of the body. He holds the virtues of 
fortitude and temperance to be compatible with man’s perfection, arguing that in 
the resurrected state,  
...the irrational powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they 
are now. Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the 
irascible, and temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as 
each power will be perfectly disposed to obey reason.973  
 
Hence, in Thomas’ vision of the perfected man, virtue has an integral role to play 
for it is none other than a rightly ordered management of the body. He writes,  
...the function of virtue (is)... to make (the sensitive appetite) 
execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper 
acts. Whereby just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due 
external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its 
proper regulated movement.974 975 
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3.3 Acquisition of virtue.976 
 
Aristotle refers with frequency to children and to the process whereby they 
acquire virtue. By nature, the child’s deliberative capacities are “in an 
underdeveloped form”,977 and so the child lacks the reflective capacities for choice 
and action that characterise the adult. 978 As a consequence children pursue 
pleasures “not unqualifiedly good”.979 Therefore a child requires external reason 
to guide him or her.980 The virtue of the child is “relative”981 to the one in 
authority over him.  
 
Of course it is not only children who are able to learn virtue. All of us can develop 
new behaviours and eliminate previous behaviours. Nevertheless the process of 
raising a child in virtue, involving as it does, not reformation of bad habits, but 
formation from a state of absence of habit, the state of childhood is naturally prior 
                                                                                                                                                                 
b. At the more immediate level, by rational actions the person is able to modify his organism 
in a way that the execution of future acts of the same type are facilitated. In this second 
sense, the person acting rationally, orders what Thomistic philosophers have 
called”secondary matter”.   
c. A third implicit consequence makes clearer the relationship of this ordination to human 
flourishing. Virtue orders passion. Just as the role of virtue is to bring about right order in 
bodily actions, fortitude and temperance, facilitated by acts of prudence and justice, give 
rise to passionate acts of the corresponding virtue. This right ordering includes “ordinate 
passion” (ST, Ia-IIae, Q.59, Art.5.1.)
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bring about right order in bodily actions, fortitude and temperance give rise to passionate 
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to that of an adult. Fittingly the formation of children in virtue receives much 
attention from Aristotle.  
 
The points which follow are not intrinsic to virtue, but contextual factors, in most 
cases, necessary contextual factors for the development of virtue. They are 
inherently associated with the development of virtue and represent, in most 
cases, the normal trajectory for its development. As such they reveal to us 
characteristics of virtue itself.  
 
In many cases illustrations from the life of Nagai for a point in question 
immediately spring to mind. A source in this section is Nagai’s most beautiful 
writing left for his children, published posthumously under the title Leaving my 
beloved children.982 Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s understanding of the process of the 
acquisition of virtue are reflected in Nagai’s life and writing; these parallels further 
strengthen the case for the doctrine of virtue as a model of human development. 
 
3.3.1 Both “training” and “education” are needed to build virtue.  
 
Aristotle explains that virtues develop as a result of training, understood as 
habituation, and education, moral tuition.983 This is true in adults and children 
alike although a time of training is particularly appropriate in laying foundations 
for virtues. Habituation and teaching are presented as both necessary and 
complementary. A correct understanding of the distinction between habituation 
and teaching is important. 
Intellectual virtue in the main owes its birth and its growth to 
teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), 
while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit.984 
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In total, Aristotle’s vision of moral education is of an education which “involves 
the rational understanding and appropriate training of one’s emotions.”985 
 
Habituation is primarily associated with the moral virtues; teaching, with the 
development of prudence, and to some extent justice. Aristotle relates these tasks 
respectively to training and education. Within training he includes the role of 
parents and tutors in habituating certain behaviours, he includes compliance with 
demands placed by laws and family culture and affection, and he includes the 
virtually subconscious role of imitation and example. 
 
Education is the process of developing the mind of one’s charge, of nurturing fine 
and noble ways of seeing and responding to the world, of giving criteria. Broadie 
holds that this education does not lie in a teaching “which is a business of words, 
reason and explanations, but by a process called ethismos, the inculcation of ĕthe 
understood as habits or customs.”986  In turn ĕthe is the building material of ēthe, 
moral qualities.  Hence education also employs strategies of habituation. 
 
These features are found in the approach Nagai takes with his own children. He 
forms his children (his fellow survivors, visitors to his hut, and readers of his 
works, as well) in refined emotional responses: to difficulties, to self indulgence, 
and to the needs of others. He insists that they think their way through difficulties.  
He strives to provide example, teachings, affection, inspiring goals and 
experiences that will reinforce the formation he offers.  
    
3.3.2 An emphasis on the early years assists in fostering virtue.  
 
Nagai is dedicated to the training and education of his own children even in their 
youngest years.987 This approach is certainly in keeping with Aristotle’s insistence 
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that the habits underlying virtue are more easily learned in younger years and that 
the opportunity must not be missed. 
It makes no small difference, then whether we form habits of 
one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very 
great difference, or rather all the difference.988 
 
Aristotle argues that children are particularly suited for education in virtue. There 
are a number of reasons for this: the affection and attentive care of parents 
assists in the process; children are disposed to imitate; and the practice of 
obedience is training for obedience to one’s reason. Furthermore the very fear of 
dishonour, which he calls shame, is more prevalent in youth (at least in those of 
ancient Athens) curbing excesses.  
Young people ... live by feeling and therefore commit many 
errors, but are restrained by shame; and we praise young 
people who are prone to this feeling.989 
 
Early training then has the aim of fostering self regulation and independence of 
thought. It should be carried out with an eye on the future: “with a view towards 
the next stages”,990 looking forward to the day when this person possesses the 
intrinsic and extrinsic goods necessary for happiness.991 Texts also suggest that 
early impressions are virtually indelible and that these first impressions must be 
well managed.992 
 
The earliest years are years where training must take place if the process is to be 
most successful. Aristotle draws a distinction between virtues of intellect which 
require time and experience, and virtues of character, for which “no time should 
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be lost before inculcation begins”. 993 Sherman is also quick to point out that the 
pre-rational years of childhood are also a rich period for moral attitudes, the 
development of refined attitudes towards others which will play such a part in 
later prudential assessment of situations.  
 
3.3.3. Imitation can assist the formation of virtue.994 
 
Nagai’s consciousness of the importance of imitation shows in his example to his 
followers in the tragic days following the bomb. He is careful to model bravery, 
calm deliberation, self control, and loyalty and patriotism. With his own children 
we see that he reinforced explanations with his own abiding serenity. 
 
That children are impressionable and superb imitators was lost neither on Nagai 
nor on Aristotle. Aristotle noted how life experiences play such a great part in the 
training for virtue that is required in the young. He wrote of how natural it is for us 
all to derive joy from the perception and discrimination of sight.  
Imitating is natural to humankind from childhood up and 
human beings differ from animals in this, that they are the most 
imitative of creatures and learn first through imitation.... 
learning is the greatest of pleasures... we delight in seeing 
representations... 995  
 
We see an echo of this in Nagai’s encouragement to young visitors to find peace in 
natural beauty. Aristotle linked the joy in natural discovery found in children to 
their propensity for imitation, “this discriminatory activity will often take the form 
of mimesis.”996 He noted that first impressions are often the strongest. He noted 
that experiences can also dispose to vice. 
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We always like best whatever comes first… and therefore youth 
should be kept strangers to all that is bad, and especially to 
things which suggest vice or hate.997 
 
Note Nagai’s warning to his young visitors that unless they take deliberate action 
to manage their emotion, there will come a point where their emotions will 
manage them, they will become the type of persons who just “stamp and 
scream”.998  
 
Aristotle insisted on the corrupting effect of bad example.  
Banish indecent speech, and indecent pictures and speech from 
the stage, from the sight and hearing of the young. The 
Legislator should not allow youth to be spectators of iambi or of 
comedy until old enough to sit at the public tables and drink 
strong wine; by that time education will have armed them 
against the evil influences of such representations. 999 
 
This impressionability requires great responsibility on the part of those 
responsible for the child, whether they be family or in civil roles. He stressed the 
role that example can play in teaching adult responsibilities.  
The Directors of Education, as they are termed, should be 
careful what tales or stories the children hear, for all such 
things should be designed to prepare the way for the business 
of later life, and should be for the most part imitations of the 
occupations they will pursue in earnest.1000  
 
We see Nagai’s preoccupation to publish, to influence national culture in the 
crucial years after the war. He realised that if calm reconciliation did not prevail, 
anger and bitterness would exact a further terrible toll on his people. 
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3.3.4 Virtues are acquired by repeated acts.1001  
 
In Nagai’s life there is abundant evidence that steady application to particular 
tasks is required to consolidate behaviours. He shows, from his reading and 
rereading the leaflet, that he had developed a facility for staying with a task until 
mastered. We know too from his biographers that he that treated wounded 
enemy soldiers consistently in an even handed, compassionate manner.  We know 
too that he asked of his children what he demanded of himself: he encouraged his 
children to be persistent. 1002    
 
These are examples of the process of habituation described by Aristotle. We have 
seen that moral education consists of habituation and education. Habituation is 
possible because behaviour builds a greater facility for subsequent behaviours of 
the same type. “We get the virtues by first exercising them.”1003  
 
We become just by performing just actions, temperate by 
performing temperate actions, brave by performing brave 
actions.1004 
 
Children, most of all, learn by doing.1005 Children, although not understanding all 
the reasons can still perform correct behaviours... to share, to wait patiently, to be 
satisfied with what one has eaten. 1006 All these behaviours are the stuff of habit, 
which in turn is the stuff of virtue. Children do not have the maturity to analyse 
what a situation requires, desire right action and enjoy its accomplishment. 
Instead we train them to behave correctly according to situations.1007  
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This habituation in the concupiscible and irascible appetites is central to the 
acquisition of moral virtue, and, in a sense, to the development of virtuous 
character, being in the state of virtue. 
Character, being as its name indicates, is something that grows 
by habit. That which is under guidance other than innate is 
trained to a habit by frequent movement of a particular kind...  
in things inanimate we do not see this..... Consider, then, 
character to be this: a quality in accordance with governing 
reason belonging to the irrational part of the soul which is yet 
able to obey the reason.1008 
 
A further dimension of ethical habituation is discussed by Broadie, that of the 
child’s growing awareness of the need to manage impulses. Broadie explains that 
getting a small child to act in a certain way out of obedience teaches a vital lesson.   
(The child) becomes aware that his own not anyway wanting to 
do it is not a consideration for the parent.... we learn that 
things are good in a way which belongs to a world beyond the 
world of impulse.1009 
 
Critical practice is required.1010 So for example, we are told it is not just a question 
of playing the lyre but of measuring our performance against real expertise, and in 
the same way moral excellence is attained. This guided experience is crucial. Life 
experience of particular cases is for the development of practical wisdom.1011 
There is no short cut to virtue.  
 
3.3.5 Obedience to others empowers for obedience to one’s own reason. 
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As we have seen, children are directed by the reason of their parents and minders. 
Through obedience in childhood, Aristotle’s argument is that they develop the 
facility to obey their own reason later on.   
 
He writes on the necessity of the habit of obedience.  
The rich find it hard to follow the rational principle, being 
neither willing nor able to submit to authority. The evil begins 
at home; for when they are boys by reason of the luxury in 
which they are brought up they never learn, even at school the 
habit of obedience.1012  
 
Training for the rationality of desire is a “kind of obedience”1013 to a separate and 
higher power “as a child listens to his father”.1014 The father’s bonds of affection 
with a child assist his son in obeying.  
As in cities, laws and prevailing types of character have force, so 
in households do the injunctions and the habits of the father, 
and these have even more because of the tie of blood and 
benefits he confers; for the children start with a natural 
affection and disposition to obey.1015 
 
The rule of a father over his children is ‘royal’, for he rules by virtue both of love 
and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. His authority is 
moral as well as social. But he is called to moral virtue in perfection. Aristotle tells 
us,  
Homer has appropriately called Zeus “Father of Gods and men”. 
If the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well?1016 
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Habituated obedience would appear to have a clear biological dimension that is 
analogous to that of a dog trained to obey its master. 
 
A dog develops by training the capacity for obeying the command of another to sit 
at the kerb, etc. Children are like dogs, in that they too are trained to obey the 
reason of others, of their parents; the difference is that they will, unlike Fido, 
develop as they grow the capacity to rule from within.  Before reason is 
developed, in either the dog or the child, only the biological is present, albeit in a 
state of developing also. The dog and the child are only capable of exercising, of 
the cardinal virtues, temperance and fortitude. With developing reason, the child 
will develop the capacity for justice and prudence, to take others into account and 
to rationally self manage. 
 
The suggestion that obedience habituated in a pre-rational child lays foundations 
for the rule of reason over desire for pleasure and aversion to pain is of great 
interest to us in this study and we will return to this.  
 
3.3.6 Affection assists in fomenting virtue. 
 
We gain a glimpse of Nagai’s affection for his children in the short extract above in 
commentary on Scenario 4, but some of his writings are motivated almost 
exclusively by his love for them. In Leaving my beloved children behind Nagai 
wrote a personal message to his children in the face of his approaching death. He 
seeks to pass on to his son and daughter his main discoveries about life. He 
describes, in a typical understated manner, the encompassing love he feels for his 
children. These words of Nagai exemplify the powerful educative effect Aristotle 
has observed in the affection children feel for their fathers: 1017  
It is an affection born of flesh and blood, which for some 
strange reason seems akin to the steam that bursts forth from 
the hibachi at the head of my bed. … As I continued pretending 
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to be asleep that day, Kayano became bolder and held her 
cheek against mine. Her cheek gradually became warmer. As 
though she were secretly enjoying a little treasure that she was 
hiding from others, Kayano softly whispered, “Daddy.” She 
wasn’t really calling me. It was rather that the thoughts that 
were stuffed into her little breast had leaked out just a little. 1018  
 
Aristotle insisted on the importance of a loving home atmosphere as the preferred 
place of early moral education.1019 Moral education requires great rectitude from 
the parent, and respect for the person of the child. This rectitude is fostered in the 
home where each family member is valued for who they are, rather than what 
they can do. The parent must be careful not to manipulate the child’s beliefs and 
emotions to conform with whim and opinion, but to guide the child to form true 
judgements. The child “borrows the eyes of wisdom”,1020 “listens to the words of 
elders and the more experienced”,1021 and to their reasoned admonition and 
exhortation.1022 In turn the child discovers, as Sherman says, “the intrinsic 
pleasure of approximating virtue through action and emotion.”1023 Note the 
imitative aspect is linked to the parent child relationship. 
 
3.3.7 Development of virtue requires formation in what is appropriate in 
respect to pleasure and pain… emotional education.1024 
 
Nagai entitles one chapter “Words of wisdom I gave my children”.1025 He 
encourages them, “Don’t scream out just because the light went off in a power 
blackout.”1026 Elsewhere he writes for them, “Physical pain is relatively trivial. It 
can be borne, and it’s gone when you die. Spiritual pain is more serious. You can’t 
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cure it on your own. Furthermore it’s still there after you die.” 1027 His parenting 
intuition is that he must form his children in these matters. Note that it is not 
simply a question of stoically gritting one’s teeth. Rather intellect is engaged. It is 
a question of analysing the type of pain and making a judgement. He explains the 
lesson to his child, and reinforces it with his own example.   
 
This view is very much in step with Aristotle and Plato on the necessity for 
formation of children in appropriate emotion, and the suggestion that the virtues 
should also be considered as dispositions to feel appropriately. Broadie argues 
that Aristotle is interested in feeling because feeling will often lead to action; also 
he is concerned with appropriate and inappropriate feeling on its own account.1028 
We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasures or 
pain that ensue on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily 
pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate.... Hence 
we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our 
very youth, as Plato says,  so as both to delight in and to be 
pained by the things that we ought; for this is right 
education.1029 
 
In its simplest form this appropriate emotion is the expression of what is 
appropriate in respect to pleasure and pain. He writes, “All moral virtue has to do 
with pleasures and pains.”1030  Virtue is not simply about maximising pleasure and 
minimising pain, “but within the limits of ‘as one ought to’, and ‘when one ought 
and ought not’”.1031  Here he is referring to action according to the right rule.1032   
 
He argues that parental training involves a range of guided experiences.  
In educating the young, we steer them by the rudders of 
pleasure and pain; it is thought too that to enjoy the things we 
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ought and to hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing 
on virtue of character.1033 
 
Finding appropriate pleasure and pain consists in an emotional education with a 
focus on such emotions as compassion, solidarity, right admiration and 
appreciation, appropriate shame, appropriate contrition, pleasure in obedience, 
pleasure in self control, and pleasure in generosity and sincerity in the right 
occasions. Appropriate intellectual delight at discovery, also constitutes 
appropriate emotion and an introduction to “non procedural” reasoning and 
inference.1034  
 
3.3.8 Laws, culture and expectations assist in fostering virtue. 
 
We have seen a little of Nagai’s persistent efforts to build a culture of peace and 
reconciliation amongst his countrymen. He understood that to foster such 
personal attitudes on a widespread basis would take enormous work and energy. 
He threw himself into the task despite his leukemia.  
  
Aristotle’s view too was that the culture prevailing in any environment has a 
profound effect on the development of virtue. Family and parental expectations 
on the one hand, and social mores and laws on the other, must assist in training in 
virtue.  
The man who is to be good must we well trained and 
habituated... (hence there is a need for laws) proceeding from 
practical wisdom and reason.1035 
 
Good laws “providing for the education of individuals and of groups and good 
occupations are an important factor that should not be neglected. However, 
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Aristotle warns, if the state helps little it is still up to each man to help his children 
and friends to virtue. 1036 
 
Aristotle’s concern was not solely with children but also with grown citizens prone 
and even hardened to ignoble behaviours.   
Laws not only necessary for the young: most people obey 
necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than 
the sense of what is noble.1037 
 
Sound laws and wise lawmakers are needed.  
Arguments alone are insufficient. They may have the power to 
encourage and stimulate the generous minded among our 
youth, and to make a character which is gently born, and a true 
lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by virtue, ... but 
they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and 
goodness (who have not shame but fear of punishment, but live 
by passion and have no conception of what is noble and truly 
pleasant).1038 
 
Right laws create a regime where certain behaviours of virtue can be inculcated. 
The focus is on laws promoting temperance and a healthy hardiness: 
To live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most 
especially to the young... hence there is a need for training 
“under right laws” as this lifestyle will not be painful if 
customary.1039  
 
Yet this training must not simply demand conformity but must be accompanied by 
internal formation as well, of the type we have seen above.  
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The best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen in the state, 
will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and 
education in the spirit of the constitution.1040  
 
The role of environment and early experience in the inculcation of virtue, in 
general, has already been noted. Aristotle would argue that home environment 
and family culture (even institutional culture at grandma’s, at pre-school, and at 
boarding school) play a clear role in establishing an environment of security and 
affection, as well as clear expectations for children, both for formation of 
conscience (one aspect of prudence) and in order to establish effective regimes of 
practice for habituation. 
 
We shall now see that the developmental trajectory of virtue, moving from a 
young child’s habituated behaviours to fitting affectivity and judgements, was 
recognized by Aristotle. 
 
 
3.3.9 The development of virtue takes place over time and respects the 
development of the body. 
 
We have already seen that training, to the moral virtues, is as education, to the 
practical reason. 1041  Until a certain point is reached, a baby has no effective 
capacity for education in the Aristotelian sense, but only for training. Thereafter, 
progressively, the capacity for education develops. Aristotle is most conscious of 
the developmental trajectory established at the biological level. 
As the body is prior in the order of generation to the soul, so 
the irrational is prior to the rational. The proof is that anger and 
wishing and desire are implanted in children from their very 
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birth, but reason and understanding are developed as they 
grow older.1042  
 
In the development of virtue, nature, nurture and the rational principle,1043 all 
play their part.  
 
Nature involves a process of anatomical development that is a precondition for 
human flourishing at the biological level. Aquinas acknowledges what we 
understand today as the normal processes of neural development occurring as 
part-constituent of rational operations beginning to take place in the maturing 
human being. In his discussion about whether children in state of innocence 
would have had the perfect use of reason, Aquinas argues that in babies and 
young children there is a “special impediment” to the use of reason deriving from 
the immaturity (which he describes as “humidity”) of the brain. 
Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their 
natural powers as they have later on. ... birds teach their young 
to fly. Moreover a special impediment exists (for man to 
exercise his natural powers of reason) in man from the 
humidity (immaturity) of the brain, as we have said above.1044 
 
This concept of “special impediment” is in keeping with the view that biological 
development is a condition for the development not only of intellect, but of 
virtue. Man’s trajectory of development is not purely genetically programmed, but 
it reflects man’s free interplay with nature.1045 States of virtue and vice may be 
understood as the natural endpoint of a man’s experiences. The self-actualisation 
of this biological “history” brings with it the potential for human flourishing or 
frustration.  
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Sherman observes that Aristotle adopts “a developmental conception of the 
cognitive and affective capacities, as well as a conception of habituation in varying 
degrees reflective and critical.”1046 Initially a child develops, in an incremental 
way, perceptual and discriminatory capacities. As he grows the cultivation of 
these cognitive capacities becomes an essential task in his affective development. 
Nevertheless, “he will not yet, in a substantive way, cultivate the more 
deliberative skills that enter into complex choice making.” 1047 
 
The time arrives when there is a change of ruler. Adopting an Aristotelian idea, 
Plutarch writes:   
For intelligent people the passage from childhood to adulthood 
is not an abandonment of rules, but a change of ruler.1048  
The young person’s own reason takes over from the guidance of her carers. 
Personal and biological maturity permits responsible, autonomous action. 
Nevertheless, adolescence is a time when children “have strong passions and tend 
to gratify them indiscriminately.”1049 Youth are, “owing to the growth that is going 
on, in a situation like that of drunken men.”1050 It is a time of uneasy tension.  
 
In the next chapter we will seek explanations at the biological level that assist in 
understanding this development.1051   
 
3.3.10 Practice of virtue requires effortful attention.1052 
 
Amongst Nagai’s advice to his children he writes,  
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Don’t start anything that you can’t make into a first-rate job.  
Don’t quit anything you’ve started until you’ve made it into a 
first rate job. 1053   
 
Virtues are acquired by means of effort. At the heart of effort is sustained attention. “It is 
easy to perform a good action but not easy to acquire a settled habit of performing such 
actions.”1054  
 
Recall the view of William James - our will is manifested in the attention we pay. When 
the will is underdeveloped, or biological maturity inadequately supports rationality, we 
may struggle to give attention where our reason tells us we should (as opposed to where 
our sensitive appetite takes us). 
 
This steadfastness requires the application of patience and constancy. Repetition 
can be hard work. The acquisition of virtue is arduous. 1055   
 
Virtue requires some process of learning or training ... all who 
are not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win 
it by a certain kind of study and care.1056  
 
It is difficult enough for young men to develop virtue in depth, owing to the relationship 
between wisdom and experience.  
It is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be 
found... The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only 
with universals but with particulars, which become familiar 
from experience, but a young man has no experience, for it is 
length of time that gives experience1057 
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Yet, if the foundations of patience, constancy and determination, have not been laid in 
childhood, it can be difficult for older children and teenagers, in the adolescent tempest 
of emotion, to make moral headway at all.  
 
3.3.11 Virtue requires intrinsic motivation.1058 
 
We have observed in Nagai’s actions that he acts for intrinsically rewarding 
reasons. This does not mean that there may not be a desirable positive outcome, 
but that the performance of the action is rewarding independent of the outcome.  
Would Nagai have sought to rally his workers around the Rising Sun even should 
their efforts have been pointless in saving lives? Given the patriotism shown in his 
initial rejection of the message on the leaflet there seems every indication that he 
regarded this action as worthy for its own sake. Would he still have treated the 
enemy compassionately even if the wounds were mortal?  No doubt he would 
have.  Would he urge peace even if the message fell on deaf ears? Again without 
question this would have been the case.   
 
Virtue fosters intrinsic rewards.1059 As we have seen, Aristotle proposed that 
virtue is its own reward, and that the fulfilment ensuing on virtue, the acquisition 
of genuine goods, is intrinsic to the practice of virtue. Virtue is “a prerequisite to 
happiness and at the same time, happiness itself.” 1060 Virtue is not a means to an 
end. Rather the end results of virtuous action are implicit in the very activities of 
virtue.  
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3.3.12 Education specifically in wisdom and beauty is necessary in the 
formation of virtue.1061 
 
Nagai advises his visitors to find pleasure in natural beauty as an antidote to a 
frenetic and aimless lifestyle that takes away peace. This advice is in close accord 
with Aristotle’s view, noted immediately above, that moral education includes 
learning to feel appropriately. This sophisticated moral education extends to an 
appreciation, first lived and only then understood, of what worthy and noble. The 
soul must be cultivated by habits of loving and hating finely.1062 
 
Aristotle’s argument is that perceptual, affective and deliberative capacities will all 
be most effectively fostered within such a refined education. “Full virtue is not 
simply the excellence of the non rational part but itself combines the excellence of 
character and of practical reason”.1063 
 
It cannot be argued that “rationality emerges in an instant”; Sherman notes that 
Aristotle refers to clear stages of child development, from an early period of 
affective development and then the “more active development of the rational 
(and deliberative) capacities, and then eventually the emergence of full 
rationality.”1064 
 
Aristotle urges an education which elevates the spirit. “There is a sort of education 
in which parents should train their sons, not as being useful and necessary, but 
because it is liberal and noble.”1065 
 
He writes of the need not to vulgarise children in their upbringing.  
Hence we may infer that what is noble, not what is brutal, 
should have the first place. And parents who devote their 
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children to gymnastics while they neglect their necessary 
education, in reality vulgarize them. For they make them useful 
to the art of statesmanship in one quality only.1066 
 
Rather than passing on a set of pragmatic skills, we must raise children to aspire to 
what is good, true and beautiful. Wisdom implies this deep respect for the truth. 
Not surprisingly Nagai echoes this sentiment in his advice for his children: “Science 
means falling in love with the truth.” 1067   
 
In the Aristotelian vision music had an important role in moral education. The 
emulative and empathetic mimetic enactment combined with positive 
reinforcement from the music itself leads to a certain habituation.1068. This is a 
reminder for our own times, that literature is a powerful medium for refined 
education, and a warning that Lady Gaga’s words and actions do more damage to 
young minds than we might be prepared to admit. “To judge rightly and to delight 
in good characters and fine actions” is the very stuff of moral education. 1069   
 
3.3.13 Overcoming incontinence and unlearning vice. 
 
Nagai is of the view that persons in maturity can change their behaviours and 
attitudes. He devotes much time in his final years to urging his fellow countrymen 
to paths of peace and reconciliation. It is also apparent that he regarded the effort 
to build peace as a difficult task that had to be attempted. It would be all too easy 
to surrender oneself to the bitterness and hatred for the occupying forces. He saw 
that such an unleashing of negative emotion would ultimately be counter 
productive as explicitly he argued that man has a calling to love,1070 and that love, 
and a character disposed to love, fulfil our human nature.  Again Nagai’s intuitions 
are in step substantially with the accounts of Aristotle and Aquinas.  
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The nature of vice is instructive of the nature of virtue.1071 Vice is the state of no 
longer having within oneself noble desires and a noble end for one’s actions. The 
vicious man deliberates and chooses a course of action for a good that will harm 
him or others, taking pleasure in this. While virtue and vice are both habits, vice is 
contrary to nature.1072  
 
Hence, while virtue is freedom from those passions “that are not as they should 
be as to manner and time”1073, vice is the disposition to give free rein to some 
passion. Applying to this context the insight that reason is the form of virtue,1074 
that rationality provides for the ordering of material constituents to establish the 
virtue, it would seem that vice can be seen as a lack or absence of right ordering 
of the material constituents indirectly by our rationality and directly by the person 
through the use of reason.  
 
Essentially vice represents a complacent failure to have developed capacities for 
self management; capacities which could reasonably have been expected to have 
been developed are absent. This insight will have implications when we consider 
the neural substrate of virtue.  
 
3.4 Conclusion. 
 
In this chapter I have reviewed the principal features of the Aristotelian and 
Thomistic conceptions of virtue.  On the basis of the scenarios from Nagai’s life 
                                                          
1071
 Aristotle also develops the notion of incontinence, of less direct relevance here. “The 
incontinent man, knowing that what he does is bad, does it as a result of passion; the continent 
man, knowing that his appetites are bad, refuses on account of his rational principle to follow 
them”(NE, 114510-11) “Incontinent people are not criminal, but they will do criminal acts.” (NE, 
1151a10) The incontinent man knows he is doing what is not good for him but is too weak to avoid 
it, whereas the vicious man is complacent in his choice.   
1072
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.71, Art.2. 
1073 
NE, ii 3. 
1074
 It will be seen below that Aquinas specifies reason as the “form” of virtue (4.1.1.2 ).  I would 
suggest that “to give free reign” could take place two ways: the deliberate choice to follow 
inappropriate passion, either for the recognised benefits of immediate gratification, or from 
motives of self love despite awareness of duties to others; the complacent refusal to exercise the 
reflection and judgement required to moderate the passion.  
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presented in 3.1.2 I identified prominent characteristics of virtue evident in real 
life in 3.1.4. Then, in 3.2 and 3.3, I identified broad characteristics of virtue 
distilled from texts from Aristotle and Aquinas. The 23 qualities identified will, at 
the conclusion of Chapter 4 and in the light of the content of that chapter, be 
distilled into Table 4.1, in which they are cross referenced to the observations 
from Nagai’s life, providing a simple demonstration of the effectiveness of the 
Aristotelian/Thomistic template in describing superior personal qualities 
encountered in real life. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Understanding the cardinal virtues. 
 
“...we are unfashioned creatures, but half made up, if one wiser, 
better, dearer than ourselves - such a friend ought to be - do not lend 
his aid to perfectionate our weak and faulty natures.” 
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus 
Mary Shelley 
 
 
The illustrations above, drawn from the life of Dr Takashi Nagai, demonstrate a 
complex interplay between the cardinal virtues in each of his deliberate actions. In 
Chapter 4 I investigate the distinctive qualities of each of the cardinal virtues. In 
4.1 I argue for a restricted reading of Aquinas’ notion of “rational by 
participation”1075  in reference to the dispositions of the sensitive appetites and 
examine the case for and against whether fortitude and temperance may be 
considered essentially biophysical qualities; in 4.2 I seek to clarify the specific 
tasks of the cardinal virtues; and, and argue that each has a distinguishing 
biological constitution. Finally, in the light of preceding discussion, in 4.3 I present 
the case for the unity of the virtues. 
 
I conclude by identifying 17 characteristics of virtue that will, in Chapter 5, be 
aligned with neuroscientific data.  
 
4.1 The cardinal virtues.  
 
The argument. 
In this following section, the differences between these virtues are analysed in the 
light of Aristotelian and Thomistic texts.  
 
I argue that: 
 Each cardinal virtue has a distinctive biophysical “signature”. 
                                                          
1075
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.50, Art.4.See also Q.59, Art.4, and Q.61, Art.2. 
326 
 
 Prudence and justice consist in habits perfecting the rational faculties: in 
the performance of a virtuous act, their role is consequent to the 
presentation of arduous goods and pleasurable goods to the intellect and 
will by the sensitive appetites. The habits of prudence and justice are 
corporeally manifested in perfections of certain biological structures that 
are necessarily associated with rationality in the embodied life.  
 Fortitude and temperance are essentially perfections of biological 
structures of the body which facilitate the presentation of appropriate 
arduous goods and pleasurable goods for rational consideration.1076  
 Consequently it may be concluded that in actions of perfect virtue all four 
cardinal virtues are present, not simply because Aquinas said it should be 
so, but rather because the four cardinal virtues each perform different 
roles, all of which are needed for the completion of a good action.  
 These arguments form a compelling case for the notion of the unity of the 
virtues. 
 
And these clarifications are essential if we are to identify that which is bodily in 
relation to each of the cardinal virtues, the task which is the role of this study. 
These views will inform Table 4.1 and therefore the work of Chapter 5 where 
pertinent biological structures will be discussed in detail, and the actual part-
constituents of virtue will be sought – the specific regions, neural pathways and 
biophysical processes – that underpin virtue, in the sense already explained in 
Chapter 1.  Hence a necessary task of this chapter is the delineation of the roles 
specific to each of the cardinal virtues.   
 
Overview 
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It is essential now to look closely at the individual cardinal virtues in order to 
better understand their individual characteristics.  
 
I argue that fortitude and temperance are essentially biophysical qualities of the 
human body disposing the sensitive appetites to seek good that is in keeping with 
reason. They are caused by reason either in that they are developed through 
childhood training obedient to the reason of their parents, as simplistically 
speaking, a dog develops obedience; or they are developed as a consequence of 
one’s own rational actions. 
 
Aquinas states, following Aristotle, that the moral virtues are rational “by 
participation”.1077  This section argues for a restricted reading of this notion. It is 
argued that fortitude and temperance should be understood most properly as 
dispositions of the sensitive appetitive faculties, obedient to reason disposed by 
its own proper virtues – in other words, that fortitude and temperance do not 
pertain to rationality as their subject, and in themselves they do not moderate 
rationality properly speaking, which is the task of both prudence and justice. 
Rather, in their formation they require the ordering contribution of rationality. In 
disposing acts of temperance or fortitude, the virtues of temperance and fortitude 
are guided by reason disposed by knowledge of first principles, as well as the 
virtues of prudence and justice.  Although the virtues of fortitude and temperance 
may be said to be caused by rationality and to dispose the body to rationality, 
they are not dispositions of rationality. 
 
Prudence and justice are habits of the operative (rational) powers, distinct from 
fortitude and temperance (habits of the sensitive appetites). In the performance 
of acts of virtue, it is argued that rationality itself is perfected only by the specific 
virtues of the operative powers.  It will be argued that the contribution of the 
virtues of the sensitive appetite is prior, properly speaking, to the dialogue 
between intellect and will as the human act unfolds.  
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This preclusion of direct involvement of rationality in the intrinsic operation of the 
moral virtues of the sensitive appetites, and the integrated involvement of the 
four cardinal virtues in all virtuous acts, will be seen in Chapter 5 to be most 
consistent with the neural structures associated with the operation of the virtues. 
It will be suggested in Chapter 5 that an analysis of the biological part-
constituents of virtue supports the views developed in this section and adds a 
dimension of experimental proof to the distinction between moral virtues. 
 
There will be continued emphasis on the human act serving to emphasise the 
interdependence of the virtues and their integral operation in the completion of 
the human act.  Further illustrations will be drawn from the life of Nagai, serving 
to test the discussion against reality, demonstrate the complex involvement of 
virtues within individual good human actions, and illustrate the integrated 
cooperation of various virtues in the exercise of such actions.   
 
I now present the case for a restricted reading of Aquinas’ notion of  
“participation” in reason by the moral virtues of the sensitive appetites. In 4.1.1 
we will examine the principal arguments opposed to a restricted reading and 
these arguments are answered systematically in 4.1.2. Specifically, the discussion 
is focused on arguments for and against the view that fortitude and temperance 
are more than ordered biophysical qualities of the human person. Clarity on this 
issue will enable us, in 4.2 to look in turn at each of the cardinal virtues identifying 
distinct features, and in 4.3 to reflect on the way in which the cardinal virtues 
work together in the completion of the human act. 
 
4.1.1 Arguments opposing the view that fortitude and temperance are ordered 
biophysical qualities of the human person. 
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Note that arguments presented below in 4.1.1.1-10 are answered in turn in 
4.1.2.1-10.1078 
 
4.1.1.1 Virtue is of the soul.1079 
 
Virtue is properly of the soul. A good action is “activity of the soul in accordance 
with virtue.” 1080 Human habits may only reside in the soul. 
They cannot reside in the sensitive powers as such. These 
powers, considered independently of reason, are determined 
to their act by a kind of natural bent.... Only in the intellect do 
we encounter that multiplicity of indeterminate powers 
capable of being combined and organised among themselves. 
... (These habits) are super added determinations which 
establish definite relations between the intellect and its objects 
or possible operations.1081 
 
Hence virtuous action is freely elected; not only is habit “that which one uses 
when one wills,”1082 but virtue is the facilitation of the rule of reason. It would 
appear therefore that fortitude and temperance are necessarily more than 
ordered biophysical qualities of the person.   
 
4.1.1.2 Reason is the “form” of the virtues. 
 
Aquinas offers a most perceptive insight into the structure and nature of virtue in 
his discussion “Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?” In this topic he 
addresses the challenge of distinguishing that which in virtue is biophysical, and 
therefore prone to decomposition, from that which is formal. Aquinas argues “the 
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formal element is precisely this order of reason”,1083 that the formal element of 
virtue is the ordering of the material organism to facilitate the management by 
reason of passion.  This is a consequence of the notion that the soul, the 
intellectual principle, “is united to the body as to its form.”1084  “Form,” insists 
Aquinas “causes matter to be.”1085  
 
As virtue represents an ordering its association with reason seems inescapable. 
Aquinas explains that the virtues consist in the ordering, according to reason, of 
the various powers of the soul, an ordering to each other and to external ends:  
Virtue ... is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to 
wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one 
another, and to that which is outside.1086  
Elsewhere we read: “Moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part of 
the soul in regard to some determinate matter.”1087  
 
Rationality is the form of virtue, according to Aquinas. Rationality disposes matter 
to support virtue, to sustain the operations of the soul, including understanding, 
choosing, and more broadly, forming and exercising virtue. It seems therefore 
reasonable to suggest that fortitude and temperance may not be understood 
simply as ordered biophysical qualities of the human person. 
 
4.1.1.3 Virtue is a “habit of choosing” and therefore all virtue would appear to 
be a disposition of the rational appetite.  
 
Quoting Aquinas, Jean Porter seems to insist that moral virtue resides in the 
reason.  
Thomas distinguishes the intention of the end, which belongs 
to the moral virtues, from the specific choice, which belongs to 
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prudence.1088 “Finally, according to the Ethics, the principal act 
of moral virtue is choice.”1089 Choice, however, is not an act of 
the irascible and concupiscible powers, but of reason, as has 
been said above. Moral virtue, therefore, is not in the irascible 
and concupiscible powers, but in the reason.1090  
 
In fact, as has been seen Aristotle presents each of the virtues as a “habit of 
choosing”. This leads commentators to adopt the view that all virtues are 
essentially about the perfection of the will: “the moral virtues perfect the will.”1091 
Thus, even the virtues of the sensitive appetites seem to play a direct role in 
perfecting the rational appetite.  
 
Furthermore, at the most refined level, Aquinas specifies the connection between 
love and virtue. Virtue ensures that our loves are under the sway of rationality. 
When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we 
refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love is 
set in order by virtue.1092 
 
To love is an operation proper to the rational appetite, and therefore it would 
appear that all virtue is ordered to love, and that rationality is inseparable from 
the virtues. 
 
4.1.1.4 Aquinas appears to suggest that the moral virtues are rational. 
 
Texts of Aquinas appear to reinforce the notion that reason operates intrinsically 
within virtue. In Aquinas’ vision of the perfected man, virtue has an integral role 
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to play for it is none other than a rightly ordered management of the body. He 
writes,  
Whereby just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due 
external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its 
proper regulated movement.1093  
This view, appearing to attribute the ordering of reason to the virtues of the 
sensitive appetite would seem difficult to reconcile with the view that fortitude 
and temperance are essentially biophysical. 
 
4.1.1.5 The practical intellect appears to play an intrinsic role in the virtues. 
 
Christine Swanton appears to ascribe an intrinsic role to the practical intellect: 
Aristotle (rightly) regards practical wisdom as the glue which 
not only integrates the components of the profiles of the 
individual virtues, but also unites those virtues one to 
another.1094 
If by “integrates the components of the profiles of the individual virtues”, 
Swanton means an agent that is intrinsic to virtue, and use of the word “glue” 
seems to suggest just this, then practical reason would seem to play some form of 
intrinsic role in each of the virtues. 
 
4.1.1.6 The speculative intellect appears to play a role within each of the 
virtues.   
 
It would appear that the speculative intellect is also necessary for virtue. We read 
for example: 
Moral virtue can stand without wisdom, science, or art, but not 
without the habit of first principles and prudence.1095  
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Hence, it would appear that speculative intellect plays an intrinsic role in each of 
the virtues.  
 
4.1.1.7 It would appear impossible to hold the view that acts of individual 
virtues are not rational.  
 
Aquinas appears to suggest that each virtue is instrumental in the exercise of its 
own acts. 
The function of virtue (is)... to make (the sensitive appetites) 
execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper 
acts. 1096   
If the moral virtues were not inherently rational it would seem difficult to argue 
that there could be, for example, acts of temperance or fortitude.  
 
4.1.1.8 Virtue results from the ordering of corporeal processes by reason. 
 
Although the virtues of the irascible and concupiscible reside in the sensitive part 
of the soul we also read that they are in the reason and will according to their 
“origin and beginning”. Aquinas argues that the rational constituent of virtue 
consists in the ordering of the sensitive appetites by reason.  
 ...habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers, 
according as they are moved by the reason….1097  
So, it would appear that the co-constituents of virtue to be reason and biophysical 
processes.  Hence it would seem that the notion of virtue must embrace reason.  
 
4.1.1.9 As virtue is “perfection of a power to act”, therefore it “belongs to 
that which is proper to the soul”. 1098 
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Aquinas argues that as virtue is a power to act, it would appear to be necessarily 
of the soul.  
Virtue implies some perfection of power... power in reference 
to being is on the part of matter... power in reference to act, is 
on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since 
everything acts in so far as it is in act... the body holds the place 
of matter, the soul that of form. ... only those forces proper to 
the soul, namely the rational forces, belong to man alone. And 
therefore, human virtue... cannot belong to the body, but 
belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore 
human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to 
act.1099 
 
4.1.1.10 The habits of virtue all enjoy a certain durability. 
 
It would appear that the habits of virtue all enjoy a certain durability: 
No bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible 
species residing in the intellect; since the intellect 
independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; 
for which reason it is held that habits are not lost either 
through old age or death. ... For the same reason neither can 
habits of virtue be corrupted, since they are also in the rational 
soul, and as the Philosopher declares (NE, 1, 10) “virtue is more 
lasting than learning”. 1100 
 
Ramsay suggests that, even after dissolution of the body, both the rational and 
sensitive appetites shed corporeal aspects but that the moral virtues, as rational 
dispositions, all are retained: 
After mortal life the absence of needs and disorder among the 
bodily passions means that the material aspects of the virtues 
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will not endure, but since the Blessed will possess perfect 
rationality concerning every part of their existence and 
complete conformity of their appetites to this, virtue will still 
endure formally. Perfect virtue, the perfectly rational 
disposition, is not a habit in the passions or the will, but a 
unifying experience of reason which is extended to every 
intellectual operation and with which every appetitive 
operation conforms.  The virtues, then, point towards Virtue as 
an experience of reason.1101 
 
This view seems incompatible with a conception of fortitude and temperance as 
essentially corporeal. 
 
4.1.2 Arguments supporting the view that fortitude and temperance are 
ordered biophysical qualities of the human person. 
 
4.1.2.1 Virtues “in the soul” must be understood correctly.  
 
Even our superficial glance at the life of Nagai demonstrates that Nagai is the man 
with these personal qualities. There is a grand inescapable reality about the 
virtuous man… that he is the sum of his habits, and the corollary: that he operates 
therefore through his habits. The person acts, in a moral sense, through his 
virtues. Virtues empower us to act well.  Because members of the body are organs 
of the soul’s power, moral virtue is said to be of the soul.1102   
 
The fact that the moral virtues are all “rational” should not lead to an assertion 
that fortitude and temperance have no basis in the biophysical qualities of the 
human person. As there is an obediential relationship, in a state of virtue, of the 
sensitive powers towards reason, it is not necessary to assert some intrinsic role 
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for reason within fortitude and temperance. 1103  Aristotle and Aquinas maintain a 
clear distinction between what is rational and what is sensitive.1104 Aquinas 
demonstrates the distinction between virtues perfecting the rational as their 
subject and those of the irrational part of the soul, by speculating on the state of 
the human soul after death. 1105 Aquinas clarifies that the powers of the sensitive 
soul cannot exist without the body and therefore these virtues do not either. 1106  
 
All human acts require operation of the rational appetite informed by the 
intellect; it is therefore clear that the virtues of justice and prudence, associated 
with these rational operations, must be powers of the soul.1107 This is so because, 
“Habit needs to be in that power which is the principle of the act”, and hence for 
example, “the possible intellect is the subject of intellectual habits”.1108 
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… (These moral virtues nevertheless) 
perfect man as man. These are the intellectual and moral virtues of intellect and sense and 
intellectual appetites.”  
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Ultimately that virtues are “in the soul” means that they can be utilised by the 
human person to facilitate his wellbeing, they are not a rule unto themselves. It 
does not imply that all virtues belong to the soul as their subject.   
 
In summary, it is clear that moral virtues are properly “in the soul” as they are 
acquired and directed by the person. Yet, as these moral virtues of fortitude and 
temperance are habits of management of bodily emotion, they must corporeal. 
The argument of this study is that this substrate consists in anatomical parts, 
processes, and pathways which may reasonably identified within the organism.  
 
Specifically, the virtue of fortitude will exhibit part-constituents with roles 
mediating apprehension and management of fear, pain and anxiety. The virtue of 
temperance will exhibit part-constituents mediating reward systems and 
apprehension of pleasure. In common they will consist in part-constituents which 
link emotional centres with cortical regions implicated in imagination, memory, 
deliberation, and goal election. Each also will feature part-constituents which 
account for habit formation, habituation of specific processes, etc. These 
characteristics will be explored in Chapter 5. 
 
4.1.2.2 Reason as the “form” of virtue correctly understood. 
 
That reason is the “form” of the virtues may, at first sight, seem to suggest that 
reason, as a matter/form co-constituent, is intrinsic to all virtue. But I suggest this 
is an erroneous reading of this key source passage: 
The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of 
the appetitive part to the passions and operations according to 
a certain mode:- and since this mode is fixed by reason, the 
formal element is precisely this order of reason.1109 
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The material element absent after death, is “a certain inclination of the appetitive 
part to the passions and operations according to mode fixed by reason”.1110 It is 
this “certain inclination” that is the very subject of this study.  Aquinas’s words, “a 
certain inclination of the appetitive part”, are consistent with the view proposed 
by this study that the human organism is able to develop neural pathways that 
dispose for self directed higher cortical modification of emotional reactions.   
 
The formal element is not reason itself but “the order of reason”1111 which has 
fixed the material element in a certain way.  
 
In the life of Nagai, we witness extraordinary qualities of character in his later 
years; his impressive peace and self-control have been noted above. It is 
eminently clear that these qualities have a material element for they include the 
ability to transcend fears of death, and separation from his deceased spouse for 
whom he held a passionate love.   
 
The position of this study is that our free and conscious efforts form, or reform, 
our very biophysical constitution. By the effort we invest in good behaviours we 
actually build virtue, we order our material constitution into neural structures, 
better capable of supporting effective self management at the rational level. 
Fortitude and temperance are habits caused in the sensitive appetite by repetition 
of actions, actions which are repeated owing to the settled rational conviction 
that personal actions for human flourishing must demonstrate fortitude and 
temperance. It would appear that reason, perfected by prudence, the habitual 
disposition of the practical intellect for right counsel, judgement and command, 
plays a role in ordering the biophysical processes that are part-constituents of the 
other cardinal virtues. Reason, human thought, directs the very ordering of 
matter.  
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For reason to be the form of the virtues of temperance and fortitude poses a 
further challenge. These virtues are “of the soul” because they are at the free 
service of the person, but they are dispositions of the sensitive appetite, and 
these facts seem difficult to reconcile. A key to the solution lies in the fact that, as 
we have seen in the life of Nagai, the cardinal virtues operate together. Acts of the 
virtues of fortitude and temperance, dispositions of the sensitive appetites, will be 
directed by rational operations which are themselves disposed by justice and 
prudence. Without acts of prudence and justice there can be no rational direction 
of the sensitive appetites; without prudence and justice rationality is unable to 
inform the acts of these pathways of habituation. Therefore, as virtues are known 
through their acts, acts of temperance and fortitude will be informed by acts of 
prudence and justice.  It would seem then that reason directing the individual acts 
through acts of prudence and justice, builds up and characterises as virtues, the 
virtues of fortitude and temperance.  
 
The canine analogy can help. A dog has a trained disposition to obey the reason of 
his master. Yet the dog is wholly material. So too fortitude and temperance are 
acquired (and finely attuned) dispositions to obey our rational choices.  
 
4.1.2.3 A correct understanding of “habit of choosing” is required.  
 
It is true that virtue is presented by Aristotle and Aquinas as a “habit of choosing”, 
yet this notion also must be reconciled with the clear distinction between virtues 
of the sensitive appetites and those of the rational appetite and intellect.  
 
The human act is a team effort: deliberation of the will informed by the intellect 
leading to choice, and all with the prior input from the lower appetites, appetites 
that to a greater or lesser extent have been already schooled in rational 
management, to the extent that they are already disposed by pre-existing habits.  
Choice resides formally in the will, but it does result from a 
concurrence of the intellectual and volitional powers through a 
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mutual causality in the orders of specification and exercise 
respectively.1112 
 
A key to clarification of the various roles of the virtues, the good moral habits, lies 
in a correct understanding of habit. Habits hold a very special place in the 
anthropology of Aquinas. 
 
Habit is presented as a most broad category. Etienne Gilson observed: 
Habits are not only qualities and accidents, but they are 
qualities and accidents which lie closest to the nature of a 
thing, and which come closest to entering into its essence and 
integrating themselves into its definition.1113 
Each power, rational and sensitive, is disposed by its distinctive and corresponding 
habit. It is apparent that habit is a most broad category, simply indicating the 
disposition appropriate to the power that it perfects.  
 
Aquinas wrote: 
Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a 
habit whereby it is well disposed to its act.1114  
Within this broader category of habit Aristotle positioned virtue. Each faculty 
directly involved in moral action is disposed by its appropriate habit. The 
appropriate habits for the sensitive appetites are moral virtues of the 
concupiscible and irascible appetites.  The rational appetite, too, has its own 
proper disposition, justice. The practical intellect is disposed by its own habit, 
prudence.  
 
The good habit, or virtue, appropriate to the nature of each power (the 
speculative and practical intellect, and the rational and sensitive appetites) assists 
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in the operation and function of that power, in integrated concert with the action 
of the other habits, with the outcome that the whole organism flourishes.  
 
It therefore stands to reason that wherever rational operations coincide with 
sensible powers the rational operations can only be disposed by their own proper 
virtues. Therefore, strictly speaking, it is incorrect to assert that all virtues pertain 
to rationality as their subject. 
 
A certain imprecision of terminology abounds in this area. We read: 
concupiscence “judges its own desires to be good”1115, yet it is clear that 
unmoderated sensual pleasure cannot judge. At best we can say that the intellect 
presents to the will the principle that pleasure is to be pursued, and so pleasure in 
the will is then pursued.  But in this case it is clearly the rational appetite, not the 
vice of intemperance, that does the choosing.  
 
The capacity for choice does not properly reside in temperance and fortitude as 
they are perfections of material appetites. For virtue to be a habit of choosing, it is 
necessary, as a minimum, that every virtuous action be guided by rationality. This 
is achieved by the contributions of prudence and justice in every action of perfect 
virtue.  
 
4.1.2.4 The moral virtues of the sensitive appetite are rational “by 
participation”.  
 
Aquinas argues that: “According to the mind of Aristotle... it is manifest that the 
sensitive powers are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic 
i 13).”1116  
 
I propose that to say of virtues that they are rational “by participation” is to say 
that they are biologically grounded habits which reflect the right ordering of 
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reason as their cause, and which perfect their respective appetites to desire 
pleasures and avoid pains in keeping with right reason. Therefore I propose a 
restricted reading  of rational “by participation”; this view contrasts with a certain 
accepted reading of Aquinas that suggests, wrongly in my opinion, an intrinsic role 
of reason in the virtues of the sensitive appetites. 
 
Fortitude and temperance, as habits of the sensitive appetites, lack in isolation the 
necessary intrinsic rationality to be described properly as “rational”. Aquinas says 
that “in so far as they obey reason the sensitive powers are said to be 
‘rational’.”1117    Elsewhere we read: “Appetite is the principle of human acts 
insofar as it partakes of reason.”1118  
 
They are not even dispositions of the intellect or will, properly speaking.  
 
Yet, again Thomistic terminology can be frustratingly equivocal. For example, 
Aquinas makes cardinal virtues, instead of the agent, the subject of active verbs: 
for example, he writes that prudence brings about the good respecting the 
consideration of reason; that justice brings about what is due and upright in 
operations; that temperance “restrains desires for the pleasures of touch”1119; 
that fortitude brings about firmness of soul against any of the passions. This 
transfer of agency can somehow give the impression that the virtues are in 
command, or that somehow they are synomymous with reason. Yet only the 
person acts; and properly speaking, for example, it is only with the assistance of 
temperance that the person restrains desires. 1120 
 
The view that all four cardinal virtues contain in some way an intrinsic rational 
element appears to adopt this, unintended, transfer of agency. Such imprecise 
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readings of Thomistic texts appear to reinforce mistaken assumptions about 
virtue.  
 
What Aquinas means by “participation” may be further clarified by reference to 
the doctrine of “participation in being”, introduced in Chapter 1, as analogously 
relevant.1121 Participation implies exercise and enjoyment of certain benefits that 
are not properly one’s own. It should be remembered that Aquinas taught that 
substances possess being only by participation -  being is predicated of finite 
creatures by participation:1122 “All other beings that are not their own being but 
have being by participation must proceed from that one thing.”1123  
 
We can relate these reflections back to our discussion of Nagai. It has been noted 
a number of times that each of the actions of Nagai appear to reflect dispositions 
of various virtues, both at the material and the rational level. For example, the 
compassionate treatment of the enemy soldier reflects not only justice but also 
temperance (understood in a broad sense), fortitude, and prudence. Hence it may 
be argued from this example that habits of the sensitive appetite are able to be 
guided by habits of rationality, and in this sense we are able to say that these 
habits are rational “by participation”. 
 
4.1.2.5 The practical intellect is perfected by its own proper habit, prudence. 
 
In a tightly argued text, Aquinas provides insights into the operation of prudence, 
a “habit of the reason”. The text attributes to prudence an explicit ordination to 
human flourishing, a direct consequence of the rectitude, the perfection, of 
reason resulting from exercise of the virtue. He argues that prudence is needed to 
perfect reason and so provide effective guidance to the other virtues. He 
concludes, “An intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, 
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and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is 
prudence.”1124 
 
Nagai’s consistent mastery of his own actions demonstrates the presence of a 
perfecting habit of the practical intellect. It makes no sense to hold that this habit 
is intrinsic also to the perfecting habits of the sensitive appetites, which demand 
their own perfecting habits which by necessity must be distinct from habits 
perfecting rationality.  
 
Reason exercises royal command. Reason governs the virtues of the sensitive 
appetite not directly, or “despotically” as Aquinas would say.1125 Rather, he 
explains, the appetites may or may not obey. Aquinas holds that fortitude and 
temperance obey reason “royally”. This principle may also be used to 
demonstrate what we could call the “exteriority” of reason to the sensitive 
appetites.1126  
 
The bottom line is that rationality, which must be present in any human act, will 
have its own proper disposing virtues. When rationality is involved in acts of 
fortitude and temperance, it will be disposed to act well by its own proper virtues 
of justice and prudence. Fortitude and temperance are rational virtues, not 
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because rationality is intrinsic to them, but rather because they are dispositions of 
their respective appetites to obey reason.   
 
There are intimations of this distinction in the scenarios presented about the life 
of Dr Nagai. The process whereby he brings his emotions under the rule of reason 
is demonstrated in his response to the Allied leaflet dropped from the plane. This 
contrasts with the apparently instantaneous insight to treat friend and foe with 
the same kindness.  
 
4.1.2.6 If in addition to prudence, the speculative intellect plays a role in virtue, 
the speculative intellect will be perfected by its own proper habits. 
 
Keenan clarifies the relationship between the speculative intellect, the practical 
intellect and moral virtue. Each is distinct. He writes of “an implicit hierarchy” in 
Aquinas: synderesis,1127  prudence, and then the moral virtues.1128  It is “Natural 
reason known as synderesis (that) appoints the end to moral virtues.”1129 Each is 
distinct: “Prudence relies on the moral virtues to dispose themselves to those 
ends that synderesis has appointed.”1130  
 
That the speculative intellect disposes moral virtue to its end, does not mean that 
the speculative intellect is somehow internal to moral virtue. In fact we read that 
the speculative intellect is perfected by its own appropriate habit: there are three 
habits of the speculative intellect: wisdom, science and understanding.1131 
Although we read that the virtue of understanding1132 (habitual awareness of first 
                                                          
1127
 Porter, “Contested categories: Reason, Nature, and the Natural Order in Medieval accounts of 
the Natural Law,” 218. Jean Porter notes that synderesis is not the natural law but “the habitual 
knowledge of the fundamental principles of the natural law” 
1128
 James F. Keenan, “The virtue of prudence” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope 
(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 260. See ST, IIa-IIae, Q.47, Art.6. 
1129
 “The moral virtues tend to an end appointed by human reason.”(ST, IIa-IIae, Q.47, Art.6.3.) 
1130
 Keenan, “The virtue of prudence,” 261. 
1131
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.57, Art.2. 
1132
 “Sometimes, in the context of practical intellect (this is) called synderesis” Naus, The Nature of 
the Practical Intellect according to St Thomas Aquinas, 87. “The habits from which conscience is 
informed, although they be many, nevertheless all have efficacy from one first source, sc., from 
the habit of first principles which is called synderesis.” ST, Ia, Q.79, Art.13.3. 
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principles) is necessary for the operation of virtue, we return to the fundamental 
principle that each power is perfected by its own specific virtue. In summary, the 
speculative intellect does play a prior role in the exercise of moral virtue but is, 
itself, perfected by its own distinct virtue, understanding. 
 
Understanding and prudence do not operate like justice, nor justice like 
temperance or fortitude. The rational virtues operate in modalities quite different 
from those of the virtues of the sensitive appetites. A disposition of the sensitive 
appetites must itself have exclusively sensible characteristics. Again consider the 
analogy of the “self control” of a dog sitting on command, a self-control founded 
on biological processes and elements; on the other hand, a disposition of the 
reason, or of the rational appetite, may be expected to manifest less “materiality”.   
 
4.1.2.7 Rather than of “an act of an isolated virtue” it appears more appropriate 
to think in terms of “a moral operation perfected by the integral 
involvement of multiple virtues”.  
 
Although it is common usage, strictly speaking it is a misnomer to think or write in 
terms of “acts of individual virtues”. Virtues do not act, rather they are 
dispositions that perfect moral action. Furthermore, it would appear that “moral 
acts disposed by individual virtues” itself is a rather theoretical construct. In 
practice, every moral act requires prudent judgement and deliberation, 
consideration of impact of the actions on others, and habitual self management 
disposed by the virtues of the sensitive appetites.  
 
It is evident from the scenarios presented in the life of Dr Nagai, that each of the 
actions we examined in detail could be interpreted as an action in which 
dispositions of the four cardinal virtues were all in evidence. For example, his 
fabrication of the Japanese flag from his own blood demonstrates prudent action, 
a concern for those he leads, as well as remarkable fortitude and self control. 
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It is more accurate for us to utilize language such as, “a moral operation perfected 
by various virtues.” If we think in terms of “moral operations”, actions disposed by 
virtues in concert, rather than actions disposed by “moral virtues acting in 
isolation from each other” there is no longer any difficulty in ascribing rationality 
to the actions of temperance and fortitude.   
 
In contrast to a view that each of the individual moral virtues requires its own 
internal “package” of rational and corporeal components, let us think rather in 
terms of moral operations. Aquinas seems to suggest as much when he writes, 
As much as the intellect considered in its purity differs from the 
composite of soul and body, so much does speculative 
operation differ from operation which takes place according to 
moral virtue.1133 
 
Note that he applies the term “operation”, specifically reserved to the action of 
the intellect and will, to virtuous action in general which he suggests in the 
analogy has a corporeal as well as rational dimension, a dimension extending into 
the domain of the virtues of the sensitive appetites.  If this reading is correct, he 
therefore suggests the integrated complicity of various virtues in the completion 
of one moral operation. 
 
Furthermore, complexity of motivation suggests that virtues are present in 
concert. Considerations of motivation are a useful lens through which we can 
study whether or not “actions of individual virtues” may be said to occur. The 
appropriate motivation of any action is that the deed be worthy in itself and 
carried out for a noble end, that is, an end which is according to right reason and 
which takes into full account one’s duties towards others. Hence the simple act of 
a doctor carrying out a most unpleasant act is disposed by fortitude, and carried 
out therefore according to right reason (prudence) with perfect regard for their 
                                                          
1133
 Aquinas, In X Ethicorum, trans. C. I. Litzinger (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964), 1, 11.  
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impact on others (justice); yet while it may be disposed by fortitude, it is clearly an 
operation involving the contribution of all the virtues.  
 
And is temperance involved in this action? Most definitely. One of the reasons 
Aquinas offers for separate virtues for the concupiscible and irascible appetites is 
that at times these appetites operate at cross purposes: the ardous and 
nauseating good of treating a putrid wound is undermined by one’s desire for 
delectable sensation. Both virtues are required.  
 
It is clear that in this arguably-single action, Nagai is motivated by a variety of 
intentions: to exercise his duty of leadership, to withstand pain sufficiently to 
accomplish the action, to lift his own spirits. These intentions suggest the 
involvement of various virtues, respectively justice, fortitude and perhaps some 
virtue associated with temperance. Hence in this action of Nagai all the virtues are 
arguably present.  
 
4.1.2.8 As it is the cause of virtue, reason is necessarily external to moral virtue. 
 
The moral virtues of the sensitive appetites may only exist properly speaking in 
ensouled matter; the human body enjoys its capacity virtue because human 
beings are rational. At the metaphysical level, the soul animates the body, 
rationality disposes matter for virtue; and at the biophysical level, virtue is 
“caused by human acts... (proceeding) from reason, by whose power and rule the 
aforesaid good is established.”1134  The very acquisition of virtue is natural to a 
human being. These insights offer far reaching implications for this study. 
 
There is no question that reason, guided by the rationality of the agent, plays a 
decisive role in the formation of the virtues. We read: “Habits of moral virtue are 
caused in the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason.”1135  
 
                                                          
1134
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.62, Art.2. 
1135
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.51, Art.2. 
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Yet another, short, fascinating passage assists us in interpreting this “according to 
mode fixed by reason”1136. Aquinas allows either for habits acquired by training as 
a young child, or acquired by deliberate personal choice of repetition of acts. He 
states that virtue is caused by human acts carried out at the direction of reason. 
He writes,  
Human virtue.... can be caused by human acts... (proceeding) 
from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is 
established.1137   
 
This is born out also in a passage where Aquinas differentiates between the 
material presence of the virtue and the origin of the sensitive virtues whereby 
they are in reason and will, virtually, as a root. He uses the case of the separated 
soul to illustrate the limitations of the virtues of the sensitive appetites. 1138 
 
Of course, and here is the crux of the argument, if reason is decisive in giving 
virtue its form, in being “origin and beginning”, then it is extrinsic to virtue. 
Reason in such a role, would need to be perfected itself by previously existing 
habits.   
 
At times Nagai takes decisions that subsequently serve to build up his virtuous 
character. For example, the decision to treat enemy patients with compassion and 
the subsequent exercise of this decision, led to an habituation of these selfless 
actions and to the discovery of the joy intrinsic to the virtue. In this we see an 
example of how reason gives rise to virtue as its cause. 
 
4.1.2.9 Analysis of the human act supports the view that various virtues are 
present in concert in a single human act. 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.67, Art.1. 
1137
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.62, Art.2. 
1138
 Aquinas, Disputed questions on virtue, 4 ad13. “Powers (of the sensitive part of the soul) … do 
not remain in the separated soul, save virtually, as in a root, because the powers of the soul flow 
from its essence. But these virtues are in the irascible as far as their derivation goes, but according 
to origin and beginning they are in reason and will, because choice is the principle act of moral 
virtue and it is an act of rational appetite. But by a kind of application this choice terminates in the 
passions of the irascible and concupiscible because of temperance and fortitude.”
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Virtue empowers us to act, but it is incorrect to conclude that therefore all virtue 
pertains to the soul as its subject. It is argued here, in considering the elements of 
the human act, that all the virtues are required for a perfect human act, and that 
these virtues perform quite distinct contributions within the human act as it 
evolves.  Again the moments we have studied from the life of Nagai appear to 
bear out the view that the various virtues are all present. Also, we see, for 
example in his consideration of the leaflet, that it was only after he mastered his 
anger and sensitivity to the enemy leaflet’s wording, that he was able to rationally 
assess the message.  
 
i. Input from the sensitive appetite precedes the rational in the human act.  
Aquinas states clearly that in the completion of good human acts, both 
intellectual and moral virtues are needed.  
…for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only 
that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of 
intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well 
disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue.1139 
But what is the relationship between these virtues as the act “evolves” 
through the steps of intention and execution as outlined in Table 3.1? 
 
Reflection on the “structure” of the human act suggests that input from 
the sensitive appetite takes place prior to the interplay of intellect and will 
that is present in every human act. Therefore it would be incorrect to 
confuse the virtues of the sensitive appetite and the various virtues 
disposing rationality.  
 
At their origin, there are two basic kinds of appetitive potencies, one 
pertaining to sense knowledge, the other to intellectual knowledge.1140  
                                                          
1139
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.58, Art.2. 
1140
 H. D. Gardiel OP, Introduction to the Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas (III Psychology), (St Louis: 
Herder, 1956), 82. 
351 
 
In man there are but two principles of human actions, 
namely, the intellect or reason, and the appetite: for 
these are the two principles of movement in man as 
stated in De Anima iii text 48. Consequently every 
human virtue needs be a perfection of one of these 
principles.1141  
 
The appetitive potency relating to sense knowledge has its own proper 
disposition.  
Sensitive appetite tends only towards particular goods 
as such, but intellectual appetite, which is the will, 
always desires these goods under some universal aspect 
of good.1142  
Thomas argues the sensitive appetites is composed of the concupiscible, 
attracted to easily attained goods, and the irascible, attracted to arduous 
goods. The concupiscible appetite is moved by the imagination and the 
common sense, the irascible by the cogitative and the memory. 1143  
Gardiel reflects, “Since the faculties eliciting these acts are organic powers, 
the acts necessarily involve bodily changes,” 1144 changes, according to 
Thomas, in the passions.1145   
 
These organic powers present input to the rational appetite, by way of 
phantasm, in the first steps of the human act.  
 
Because these steps precede the interactions of the intellect and will that 
have been outlined in Table 4.1. Because of this temporal precedence, in 
actu it is evident that rationality and the sensitive appetites are distinct.  
 
                                                          
1141
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.58, Art.3. 
1142
 Gardiel, Introduction to the Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas (III Psychology), 82. 
1143
 Gardiel, Introduction to the Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas (III Psychology), 83. 
1144
 Gardiel, Introduction to the Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas (III Psychology), 84. 
1145
 Aquinas enumerates 11 passions:  love or hatred, desire or aversion, hope or despair, courage 
or fear, anger, and joy or sorrow. See ST, Ia-IIae, Q.22-48. 
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ii. The contribution of emotion to rationality also argues for a “moral-
operations view” rather than of a view of actions disposed by isolated 
virtues.  
Analysis of the human act will not only account for rational action but for 
rational action enriched with emotional input. In illustration we see in the 
life of Nagai that the remarkable fabrication of the flag is propelled by 
patriotic emotion. An analysis of how this happens can assist us in defining 
the respective roles of the virtues.  
 
There is necessarily a point in the deliberation preceding the completion of 
a human act where emotional readings of the situation and an 
appreciation of context of action come into play. I suggest that this can 
happen at two points.  
 
First, positive emotion associated with an action can provide stimulus prior 
to the action. For example, a love of nature leads Nagai to write poetry 
with imagery drawn from nature. Note that this refined pleasure is prior to 
the actual choice to act. (Also prior to the action proper, negative 
emotions can be mastered, as we have seen in his reaction to the leaflet.) 
 
Second, positive emotion can be generated at the level of relationships 
with others. Pertaining to the virtue of justice, and therefore in the rational 
appetite, this takes place within the steps outlined of the human act. This 
contribution takes place, it would appear, at the stage in the human act 
which some term the practico-practical judgement in Aquinas’s psychology 
(Steps 6-8 in Table 3.1), in which the will adds its own particularising 
content to the input it receives from the intellect (correspondingly the 
speculative-practical judgement) prior to its act.1146 This particularising 
content is arguably moderated by the virtue of justice. 
                                                          
1146
 For clarity of understanding about the role of the practico-practical judgement (not extending 
however to implications for the virtue of justice) I have drawn on an article of Alice Nelson, Centre 
for Thomistic Studies teaching materials: http://www.cts.org.au/articles (accessed 24/10/2012). 
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This is a further argument for the complex interplay of all the virtues in 
each act of virtue and a further compelling argument that no fully moral 
action can be performed without taking the impact of one’s action on 
others into account.  
 
iii. Furthermore, discrete ascription of a particular action to a single virtue is 
problematic. Actions in real life manifest the constellation of virtues.  
Actions in the real world defy discrete classification into boxes of one 
virtue or another. For example, Jean Porter has drawn attention to the 
folly of considering acts of temperance as if these are pursuits distinct 
from concern for others. It is not possible to consider sexual temperance in 
isolation from justice understood as a consideration for how one’s actions 
impact on others.  Every sexual act impacts potentially, and often 
immediately, on others. Both notions, and therefore both virtues, are 
present.1147  
 
It would seem too that acts of perfect virtue must be enriched by justice. 
Nancy Sherman draws attention to the need for virtuous acts to be 
moderated by justice: “Virtuous agents act taking into account the 
wellbeing of others, the common good.”1148 This is in accord with the 
intuition that it is necessary to take into account the impact of our actions 
on others for a given action to be just. In fact, acts of prudence will not be 
perfect unless they take into account “circumspection”. I suggest that to 
do so, in those matters relating to the rights and good of others, the habit 
of justice is required in the will.  
 
Jean Porter insists that it is recurring real life actions that provide the 
matter for virtues. “Justice is concerned with actions which involve others, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Accessed 24/10/2012 
1147
 This is of course in keeping with the Thomistic view (ST, Ia-IIae, Q.61, Art.4). 
1148
 Sherman, The Fabric of Character, 4. 
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and not just the agent herself”.  We should consider that all actions require 
require rationality informed by justice for their perfection.1149 
 
Note that Porter contrasts virtuous actions in real life with a rarefied 
theoretical perspective that would like unrealistically to see a neat 
delineation of virtues. Surprisingly she finds fault in Aquinas’s view of acts 
of temperance, suggesting that such acts seem to exclude justice. Yet it is 
Aquinas himself who insists that in a perfect act of one virtue all virtues are 
present. (See also 4.3.1.) 
However a perfect moral virtue is a habit directed to a 
good work, done well. And taking the moral virtues in 
this way, we ought to say that they are connected, as 
nearly everyone agrees.1150  
 
4.1.2.10 The “durability” of the individual virtues differs in meaning 
according to the specific virtue.  
 
The hypothetical discussions in Aquinas about the duration of the virtues in the 
disembodied state are most illuminating on this question of the differences 
between the virtues. He makes crucial distinctions between the virtues perfecting 
rational operations and those perfecting the sensitive appetites.  
 
Aquinas argues that the habits of virtue all enjoy a “certain” durability but draws 
significant contrasts. In what does their durability variously consist?  
 
Prudence retains a “quasi-formal element”1151, the intelligible species that remain 
after corruption of the body. Aquinas naturally holds that, at the decomposition of 
the body, any corporeal substrate of prudence and of the moral virtues 
decomposes. Although Aquinas refers specifically to the phantasms the position of 
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 Porter, Moral Action and Christian Ethics, 143. 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.65, Art.1. 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.67, Art.2. 
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this study would be that the bodily substrate should be considered more broadly 
to include the array of neural processes, pathways and mechanisms assisting 
virtue. Aquinas writes:  
…the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this 
life by applying the intelligible species to them,1152 cease as 
soon as the body is corrupted.1153  
Similarly justice, although a disposition of the rational appetite, has a bodily 
element that must ultimately decompose. 1154 
 
Aquinas argues that, after the corruption of the body, in the state preceding 
resurrection of the body, justice nevertheless will have a presence. 1155 
 
Justice, then, enjoys an immateriality comparable to that of prudence, although 
the operations of acts of justice and prudence stand somewhat in contrast. 
Prudence is a habit of intellect. Justice is a habit caused in the will by reason, by 
the settled conviction that personal actions must respect the rights of others. Acts 
of justice will implicate specific part-constituents in memory, imagination and 
presentation of the phantasm, motivation, empathy to others, reward systems of 
the body, etc. 
 
Justice will only operate in concert with prudence and the virtues disposing the 
sensitive appetites. Aquinas says that the will is always implicated in the exercise 
of moral virtues: “...since the will is a rational power, it may be variously directed 
to act.”1156 On the one hand, as the virtue properly of the rational appetite and 
through the involvement of reason, it would seem that biophysical pathways and 
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 cf ST, IIae, Q.84, Art.7 and IIae, Q.85, Art.1.5. 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.67, Art.2. 
1154
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.53, Art.2.3. “The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, 
but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore in the course of time it undergoes change as 
to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the 
Philosopher says (Phys iv text 117) that time makes us forget.” 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.67, Art.1.3. “Justice however will remain because it is in the will. Hence of justice 
is it specifically said that it is perpetual and immortal; both by reason of its subject, since the will is 
incorruptible; and because its act will not change, as stated.” 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.50, Art.5. 
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processes are concurrently implicated in the reasoning processes of rational 
judgment and command, presenting particulars at the service of rationality. On 
the other hand, justice is not present without the presence of the virtues of the 
sensitive appetite. In sum, a constellation of part-constitutional processes 
accompany the exercise of every virtue. 
 
On the other hand, Aquinas draws a complete distinction between virtues of 
prudence and justice, and the virtues of the concupiscible and irascible 
powers.1157 Aquinas writes, “In these (moral) virtues (in the afterlife) there is a 
formal element, which is the ‘order of reason’ (as we have seen above), and a 
quasi-material element.”1158 Note the contrast with prudence, which he explains 
retains a “quasi-formal” element.  
 
The intellectual appetite is quite distinct from sensitive appetite “since what is 
apprehended by the intellect is different from what is apprehended by the 
senses.”1159 This is consistent with the view expressed elsewhere by Aquinas that 
justice endures when the body and soul are separated.  He explains that “the 
intellectual appetite ... tends to individual things which exist outside the soul... as 
standing under the universal; as when it desires something because it is good.”1160 
The virtues of the sensitive appetites do not continue to exist except for the 
“order of reason”, which as we have seen exists externally to the virtue, and in the  
somewhat perplexing “quasi-material element”; yet after death, material goods 
themselves are absent, nor is there any biological substrate to present phantasms 
of that which is pleasurable and that which is painful. 
 
In answer to Ramsay’s suggestion that the moral virtues, as rational dispositions, 
continue to exist after dissolution of the body, it would seem important to clarify 
the meaning of “rational disposition”. The only truly rational dispositions are 
prudence and justice, or understanding, which perfects the speculative intellect 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.57, Art.4. 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.67, Art.1. 
1159
 ST, Ia, Q.80, Art.2. 
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and establishes the end of the moral virtues. Aquinas makes it very clear that 
fortitude and temperance are in fact dispositions of the material appetites, albeit 
orderly dispositions caused by reason.   
 
In summary, what is the role of reason with respect to the sensitive appetites? 
Reason appears to interact with the sensitive appetites in two principal ways, 
which we can refer to, for the sake of clarity, as the micro level, and the macro 
level. 1161 
i. At what we can consider as the micro level, Aristotle argues that in 
each human act motivated by the sense appetites one is moved by the 
desire for appropriate pleasures and to avoid specific pains regarded as 
inappropriate and disproportionate to a worthy outcome. Reason then, 
in bringing to completion the human act, responds to the initial 
appetitive stimulus, either by legitimising the choice, or rejecting it. 1162 
Secondly, also at this micro level of individual acts, reason is able to 
harness the energy of the passions at the service of the person. 
ii. At what we could call the macro level, a further outcome of this 
process is that reason “trains” the sensitive appetites over time in what 
is appropriate pleasure and pain.1163 
 
4.2 Biological and functional distinctions between the virtues. 
 
Now, having presented a systematic case for a restricted reading of “by 
participation”, in the section which follows, I summarise Aquinas’ understanding 
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 Naus, The Nature of the Practical Intellect according to St Thomas Aquinas, 73. These two 
processes appear described (albeit in a rather muddy fashion) by one commentator in the 
following text: “Therefore reason, which moves the sense powers of appetite, and the appetites 
themselves need habits in order to operate well. So in the concupiscible appetite there is the 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.57, Art.4. “... it is a requisite for prudence....that man is well disposed with regard 
to the ends; and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is 
need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite.” 
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 This also corresponds to the process of “training” that Aristotle identified, along with 
“education” which is more to do with the rational appetite and intellect, as one of the two key 
methods of bringing about virtue. 
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of the distinctive characteristics and role of each of four cardinal virtues.  
Throughout I argue that Aquinas’ understanding of the moral virtues of the 
sensitive appetites is indeed one in which reason plays a causal role in the 
formation of virtue, but that in themselves, the dispositions of the sensitive 
appetites are founded exclusively on the biological.  
 
In order to better understand the relative roles of the cardinal virtues, and in 
particular, to develop a clearer understanding of areas where we will expect to 
find biophysical part-constituents for each, it is highly advantageous to utilise the 
lens of hylomorphism. 
 
This section builds upon, and should be read in the light of 1.4 in which the 
hylomorphic underpinnings of this study and certain principles of rational 
psychology are discussed.  
 
An hylomorphic analysis of virtue, following Aristotle and Aquinas, will assist us in 
discriminating between aspects of virtue associated with the operations of 
rationality, and aspects pertaining to sensitive activity. Such an analysis provides 
insights into the specific contribution of rationality to the formation and exercise 
of virtue, into the ordering or “disposition” of anatomical structures and dynamics 
which appear to facilitate virtue, and insights also into the distinction between the 
various virtues in regard to their “corporeality”. Such an analysis is essential 
prerequisite for Chapter 5, in which neural locations, pathways and processes will 
be suggested, on the basis of current neuroscientific knowledge for the material 
substrate of virtue. As neuroscience can only shed light on the material aspects of 
virtue, a prerequisite for resolution of this task is to distinguish between the 
rational and material characteristics of virtue. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that while the cardinal virtues are regarded as the 
principal umbrella categories of virtue, other virtues may or may not neatly 
categorise under one or other of the cardinal virtues. Nevertheless, for the 
purposes of clarity, this study focuses almost exclusively on the cardinal virtues.  
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4.2.1 The cardinal virtues have distinctive roles in the operation of virtue.  
 
As an introduction to an examination of the exercise each of the cardinal virtues, 
let us turn to some elegantly condensed argument from Aquinas where he 
explains their distinctive roles: 
Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal 
principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and 
either way, we find there are four cardinal virtues. For the 
formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good 
defined by reason; which good can be considered in two ways. 
First as existing in the very act of reason; and thus we have one 
principal virtue called Prudence. Secondly, according as the 
reason puts its order into something else; either into 
operations, and then we have Justice; or into passions, and 
then we need two virtues. For the need of putting order of 
reason into the passions is due to their thwarting reason, and 
thus the passions need a curb, which we call Temperance. 
Second, by the passions withdrawing us from following the 
dictate of reason, eg through fear of danger or toil: and then 
man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, 
lest he turn back; and to this end there is Fortitude.  
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the 
subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we 
speak of now; viz, the power which is rational in its essence, 
and this is perfected by Prudence; and that which is rational by 
participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of Justice, the 
concupiscible faculty, subject to Temperance, and the irascible 
faculty, subject to Fortitude.1164 
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In the sections below, in turn we will focus on the specific role of each of the 
cardinal virtues: prudence the virtue perfecting rationality, justice perfecting the 
will, fortitude the irascible appetite, and temperance the concupiscible. 
 
a) The distinction between the virtues properly of the soul and those 
properly of the body. 
 
In the examples from the life of Nagai we saw moments of instantaneous insight, 
convictions, and dispositions towards his fellow men, that are seemingly 
independent of time and place, and any process of clarification; other actions both 
of deliberation and of self control appear to take time with the subject acquiring 
progressively greater lucidity. An example of the first is the powerful conviction 
that he must treat all men equally; of the second, his ruminations on the import of 
the leaflet. These contrasting examples suggest fundamental differences between 
some virtues and others. Some appear to pertain to a truth that is grasped, 
another to a process of managing one’s emotions.  
 
First let us consider the broader contrast between the prudence and justice on the 
one hand, and fortitude and temperance on the other. The cardinal virtues appear 
to be part-constituted to differing extents by a material substrate. As we have 
seen, habit is a broad term, denoting simply some form of disposition. The various 
cardinal virtues are not habits in the same fashion. It is helpful to distinguish 
between those cardinal virtues more closely associated with rationality, namely 
prudence and justice, and those directly associated with the sensitive appetites. 
 
b) Prudence and justice, as they are associated more directly with the 
rationality, are more removed from the biophysical substrate.  
 
Aquinas argues, 
Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds 
the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and will; 
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whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the 
body.1165  
 
I suggest, on the basis of reasoning that “of the soul” can be understood broadly 
as “of the person”, that it is within a reasonable understanding of this passage to 
affirm that prudence and justice are, in part, neurobiological modifications of 
pathways, processes and mechanisms, and that it is within the very nature of the 
ensouled body, animated matter, that these pathways, processes and 
mechanisms perfect rationality.   
 
Aquinas goes on to suggest,  
Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore 
each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but 
only in that part of the body which is adapted to the operation 
of such a power.1166  
In other words, powers common to the soul and body, and by this we can 
understand all the virtues, are quite localised. Of course this view is compatible 
with the view that the virtues, including fortitude and temperance, are also 
powers of the soul, just as any other material organ able to be directed by the 
rational appetite (for example the eye) operates as a power of the soul.  
 
c) Fortitude and temperance have a dual dependency: on the soul and on 
the corporeal organs.  
 
The soul is the principle of the act of virtue; the corporeal organs are material 
causes of rational operations.  Aquinas explains: 
Every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ, depends not 
only on a power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that 
corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power of 
sight, and on the condition of the eye, which condition is a help 
                                                          
1165
 ST, Ia, Q.76, Art.8.4. 
1166
 ST, Ia, Q.76, Art.8.4. 
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or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive 
appetite depends not only on the appetitive power, but also on 
the disposition of the body.1167 
 
In other words fortitude and temperance, habits by which the irascible and 
concupiscible sensitive appetites are docile to reason, achieve their effect wholly 
by means of corporeal processes and pathways that have been ordered by 
reason.1168   
 
d) Temperance and fortitude are at the heart of a rational response to pain 
and pleasure and therefore to appetition that is truly human. 
 
Examples from the life of Nagai demonstrate just how fundamental to human 
existence are the dual challenges of curbing wayward passions and overcoming 
difficulties in the pursuit of difficult goals. We see this time and again: Nagai’s 
repulsion to the putrid wounds is overcome in order for him to put into practice 
his noble goal of ministering to the wounded; he overcomes his exhaustion and 
concern for his safety in order to give positive leadership to his workers; he 
masters his humiliation and anger to consider the implications of the Allied leaflet; 
he masters his self pity and apathy in his illness to deliver a prodigious output of 
writing aimed at helping others. There is no question that direction and mastery 
of our sensitive appetites are the very matter of our daily lives. 
 
On the one hand, the four cardinal virtues are concerned with management of the 
realms of human activity... intellect, will, and sensitive appetites. But we must 
remind ourselves that the intellect and will operate in this material world. To 
some extent it is true to say that prudence and justice exist so that temperance 
and fortitude are well guided. Aristotle’s emphasis on pleasure and pain in his 
discussion of virtue helps us to see this clearly, and also this constitutive view of 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.17, Art.7. 
1168
 Ordered by reason in two senses: first informed by rationality and therefore matter that is 
“special”, and second because reason has contributed to the very development. (cf notion of use-
induced plasticity leading to the development of neural complexity).  
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virtue, with its emphasis on the role of rationality in managing the biological 
aspects, can add clarity. 
 
Aristotle places fortitude and temperance, ordered to the cultivation of man’s 
passions,1169at the very heart of human appetition: to seek pleasure and avoid 
pain.  At this most elemental level temperance in response to hedonism, and 
fortitude in response to fear and pain, are dispositions to self mastery. These basic 
motivations are widely accepted by clinical psychiatry and supported also by 
neuroscience. For example, the dominance of fear in the unregulated person has 
been noted in contemporary psychopathology:  
Brain scans show that many violent adults are still driven, just 
like infants, by their ancient rage/fear and defence/attack 
responses deep in the mammalian and reptilian parts of the 
brain. The brain scans show all too little activity in the parts of 
the higher brain that naturally regulate and modify raging 
feelings. 1170  
 
Aristotle and the psychopathologists would agree on many things. In a similar 
way, children lack the wherewithal to manage their passions: The lives of children, 
as much as that of intemperate men are governed by their desires.1171  
 
Aristotle explains that pain and pleasure enter into both temperance and 
fortitude.   
The self indulgent man craves for all pleasant things or those 
that are most pleasant, and is led by his appetite to choose 
these at the cost of everything else; hence he is pained when 
he fails to get them and when he is merely craving for them (for 
appetite involves pain).1172 
                                                          
1169
 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 308. 
1170
 M. Sunderland, The Science of Parenting (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2006), 25. 
1171
 NE, 3.12. 
1172
 NE, 1119a1-5. 
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Yet, the specific distinction between temperance and fortitude is clear. 1173  
The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those 
passions which are most difficult to curb, viz, in the pleasures of 
touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by 
reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in perils 
of death, which are most difficult to withstand.1174 
 
Aquinas stressed that these emotional responses are positively good but only if 
they are managed by reason. 
Emotion leads away from moral behaviour in so far as it is 
uncontrolled by reason; but in so far as it is rationally directed, 
it is part of the virtuous life.1175 
 
Now I review the specialized roles of the four cardinal virtues below with a view to 
gaining insights into the biophysical contribution of the body in the development, 
state and expression of virtue.  
 
4.2.2 Prudence.1176 
 
The contribution of prudence, perfecting each action, has already been noted in 
the four scenarios pertaining to Nagai above. Prudence on the one hand it is the 
habit of readily recognizing and acknowledging what is right and true, and on the 
more practical side, it is the habit of making sound judgements about what we will 
do. The first refers to recognizing reality; the starting point of prudence is 
                                                          
1173
 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 263. This text from Gilson serves as a 
further guide: “(Fortitude and temperance) bear upon the quality of acts, considered in relation to 
the one performing them. Thus, they deal with the interior dispositions of the agent at the 
moment of acting. They deal, in a word, with passions.”
 
Hence he explains, “If the agent is actually 
prevented from acting by fear of danger or of effort or the like, he needs fortitude to strengthen 
him in the resolutions his reason dictates.” Analogously, temperance moderates the concupiscible 
appetite allowing one to act according to right reason.  
1174
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.61, Art.3. 
1175
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.24, Art.2. 
1176
 Aristotle and Aquinas held that prudence, auriga virtutum, drives the chariot of the virtues. 
Aquinas writes, “Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command 
well.”  
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knowledge of reality.1177 Second, prudence pertains to making decisions on right 
principles. It is an essential virtue for effective action: “practical wisdom is 
concerned with action.” 1178 What should also be evident are the common 
characteristics of deliberation, judgement and action.1179   
 
The goal of the practical intellect is “truth in agreement with right desire”.1180 And 
the intellectual habit of the practical intellect is prudence, having “something in 
common with the moral virtues; for it is right reason about things to be done.”1181 
The role of prudence is quite distinct from that of the moral virtues. 1182   
 
Most importantly, we have seen that prudence is ordained to human flourishing: 
“Prudence is a virtue of the rational part capable of procuring all that tends to 
happiness.”1183 1184 
 
4.2.3 Justice  
 
a) A broad understanding of justice 
                                                          
1177
 “that which is prudent is in keeping with reality”: Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 9.  
1178
 NE, 1141b21; Aristotle, De Virtutibus et Vitiis, 1250a30-37: “To prudence belongs right 
decision, right judgement as to what is good and bad, and all in life that is to be chosen and 
avoided, noble use of all the goods that belong to us, correctness in social intercourse, the 
grasping of the right moment, the sagacious use of word and deed, the possession of experience of 
all that is useful. Memory, experience, tact, good judgement, sagacity – each of these either arises 
from prudence or accompanies it.” 
1179
 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 72: “Prudence implies a transformation of the knowledge of 
truth into decisions corresponding to reality. This transformation is achieved in three steps: 
deliberation, judgement, decision.” Cf Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 288. 
Gilson writes of the facets of prudence: deliberation (eubuilia) and good judgement (synesis, 
gnome). It is not simply concerned with abstract truths. Aquinas says practical wisdom issues 
commands, distinct from understanding which judges the objects of practical wisdom. (NE, 
1143a10) 
1180
 NE, 11139a30 
1181
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.58, Art.3.1. 
1182
 Aquinas writes, “It is not possible (for prudence to operate effectively) unless the impediment 
of the passions, destroying the judgement and command of prudence, be removed; and this is 
done by moral virtue.” ST, Ia-IIae, Q.58, Art.5.3. 
1183
  Aristotle, De Virtutibus et Vitiis, 1250a30. 
1184
 Gilson explains: “Prudence is a practical presence of mind.... well trained reason, capable of 
working out the particulars of a problem, of foreseeing the probable consequences of an act, of 
using powers of circumspection, of weighing the individual circumstances of a situation, of 
exercising caution lest good intentions ultimately do more harm than good. Reasoning, foresight, 
watchfulness, precaution are all essential elements of prudence, and there is no real prudence 
without them.” Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 288. 
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A broad notion of justice is exemplified in the scenes presented from the life of 
Nagai. His service to his enemies, his patriotic leadership, his faith, his concern for 
his countrymen, his diligent parenting… all of these are not strictly reciprocal, but 
they all reflect a deep abiding concern to respect others and to live up to one’s 
duties towards them.   
 
In this study I adopt the broad understanding of justice that is in best keeping with 
the spirit of the discussion in both Aristotle and Aquinas, and is also most 
consistent with the neuroscientific insights on offer.  
 
In The Recovery of Virtue Jean Porter argues for a broad notion of the virtue of 
justice extending beyond strict reciprocity. Such an understanding, a justice by 
which we measure our actions by the love and respect we have for others, is able 
to demonstrate the deficiencies of duty and consequence based measures in 
accounting for truly noble behaviour. Such a view is very attractive to this current 
study which proposes for justice a contributory role in every perfect human act 
whereby the impact of one’s actions on others is considered prior to the decision 
to act.   
 
Justice on this broad understanding is the disposition to act at all times offering all 
others the respect due to them, with full acceptance of all our responsibilities in 
this world. A parenting author who structures much of his work around the 
development of virtue prefers to write of justice as just this: “respect and 
responsibility”.1185 Another has founded the Institute for the 4th and 5th Rs – 
denoting respect and responsibility.  
 
Gilson describes justice in this broad manner.  
(Justice) regulates the content and nature of the operation of 
the will... assuring the moral value and rectitude of all 
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 James B. Stenson, http://www.parentleadership.com (accessed 10 May 2011). 
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operations in which ideas of what is due and not due are 
implied.1186  
This second of the cardinal virtues” ensures rectitude in the election of the will for 
means required in the pursuit of goals. Aquinas describes justice as the 
psychological and moral state of a man who “firmly and permanently chooses to 
render to each one his due.”1187 Aristotle teaches, “The best man is he who 
exercises his virtue towards another”.1188 He dubs justice “the complete virtue” 
because it orders one’s acts with respect to others.  
Justice is often thought to be the greatest of the virtues... 
proverbially “in justice is every virtue comprehended”.  
We must not define justice in terms of tangible transaction, nor narrow the scope 
of justice. Justice manifests externally but as a virtue it concerned with inner 
dispositions, with choices. 1189 Universally, the just denotes what is lawful; and 
particular case, what is fair and equal. It is a complete virtue because “it is the 
actual exercise of complete virtue... because he who possesses it can exercise it 
not only in himself but towards his neighbour also”.  
 
It would appear that Aquinas, by aligning justice to the good of reason, himself 
favoured a broad interpretation.1190 1191 Aquinas argues that justice is the state of 
character that makes people disposed to do what is just, and makes them act 
justly and wish for what is just.1192He explains the role of the virtue of justice.  
Justice is “a habit whereby men will and do that which is just” 
(Ethic v 1). Therefore the will is the subject of habit. ...The will is 
inclined to the good of reason. But because this good is varied 
                                                          
1186
 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 263. 
1187
 ST, IIa-IIae, Q.58, Art.1. 
1188
 NE, 1129b25ff. 
1189
 NE, 1134ff. 
1190
 It is true that Aquinas explains a taxonomy of justice, corresponding to the three basic 
relationships: reciprocal justice (individuals to one another), distributive justice (community to the 
individual), and general justice (individual to the community). 
1191
 Pieper opcit p.27 Pieper, a close follower of Aquinas was of this opinion. “‘It is the function of 
justice to carry out the order of reason in all human affairs.” “The other virtues – fortitude and 
moderation – serve the conservation of this good; it is their function to preserve man from 
declining from the good. … Fortitude protects this realization (of the good made compelling 
evident through prudence) and clears the road for it.” 
1192
 NE, 1129a7ff. 
368 
 
in many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a 
habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action 
may follow more promptly.1193 
In writing about the various forms of debt that give rise to justice, it is clear that 
he goes beyond strict reciprocity, including duties of religion and of filial 
gratitude.1194  
 
Aquinas explains that the rational appetite, being naturally attracted to the good 
of the subject, requires no virtue to exercise this natural operation. The virtue 
which disposes the rational will to act for the good of another, in contrast to that 
of oneself, is justice.  As we have seen, justice will always act in concert with 
prudence, and that the moral virtues are “rational by participation”.1195 
 
In summary, it is the position of this study that all moral acts require the 
deliberations of justice. Every moral act has a dimension impacting on others and 
so requires the exercise of justice if it is to be a good act. It is also apparent that 
prudence is not possible without deliberations of justice, nor temperance nor 
fortitude. It is perhaps for this reason Gilson suggests that justice incorporates the 
other virtues: “Justice is a kind of general virtue which includes all other 
virtues.”1196 
 
4.2.4   An understanding of the biophysical dimensions of prudence and 
justice.  
(Read in conjunction with 4.2.1 a and b.) 
 
a) What is the matter? 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.50, Art.5. 
1194
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.60, Art.3. “Corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various 
virtues…. Religion whereby we pay our debt to God, piety (respect) whereby we pay our debt to 
our parents or to our country; gratitude, to our benefactors, etc.” 
1195
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.59, Art.4. 
1196
 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 292. 
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Acts of prudence and justice are acts of rationality with indirect material 
cooperation to extent that each inform our reasoning processes involving material 
assistance of memory, phantasm, imagination, etc. To the extent that these 
biologically based processes are necessary (but not sufficient) for these virtues to 
operate, they may be understood as part-constituents of virtue.  
 
Various arguments support this view. 
 
i. It is important to understand that the management of the concupiscible 
and irascible appetites is normally the product of a reasoning process.  
Reasoning implies a process of thought disposed by habit. 1197  In our 
exploration of this issue it is essential to distinguish reason from 
immaterial rationality.1198 
ii. A reasoning process implies that there must be biophysical elements that 
enable the process of reasoning: “the irascible and concupiscible are said 
to obey reason rather than the intellect.”1199  Bodily elements imply 
duration in decision making. We have seen in the examples from the life of 
Nagai, for example in his consideration of the leaflet dropped from the 
Allied plane, that deliberation as a precursor to virtuous action can take 
just such duration.  
iii. The significance of phantasms has already been noted. Aristotle reminds 
us that prudence involves assessment of particulars, necessitating 
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 “Excellence in deliberation is clearly a kind of correctness.”(NE, 1142b9) It involves reasoning.  
It is “correctness in thinking”(NE, 1142b12).
 
But it is not simply following formal rules of logic 
which could lead a bad man to evil deeds. Excellence in deliberation is that which pertains to a 
worthy end. 
1198
 DA, 427b27-28. In De Anima Aristotle addresses the interaction of intellect with the internal 
senses of memory and imagination. He is of the view that the activity of “thinking” is partly in the 
imagination and partly in the judgement of the intellect itself. “Thinking is different from 
perceiving and is held to be in part imagination, in part judgement.” 
1199
 ST, Ia, Q.81, Art.3. 
The full quotation: “The irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason... universal reason directs 
the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible... but to draw particular 
conclusions from universal principles is not work of the intellect , as such, but of reason: hence it is 
that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey reason rather than the intellect…. Man is not 
moved at once according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the command 
of the will.” 
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complicity of the material. 1200 The same may be said of justice. Aquinas 
quotes Augustine’s view that while the intelligible species can be held in an 
intellectual memory, intelligence itself “that by which we understand when 
actually thinking”,1201 only exists in actu.1202  This supports the view that 
the act of understanding is concurrent with and immediately dependent 
upon the presentation of the phantasm. This appears to constitute a 
further argument that there is no independent intellectual operation, of 
the body and soul united, without biophysical complicity. 1203  
iv. The role of the intellect and rational appetite in voluntarily calling up 
memories is contrasted with the formation of opinions (which Aristotle 
holds is not voluntary as it is a reflection of perception of truth in the 
intellect.) 1204 This interaction between imagination and reason, between 
the concrete representation and the universal, is present in every human 
act. Hence, every human act is carried out with the part-constituent of 
neural complicity. Aristotle insists on this. 1205  
v. All this sits perfectly with the earlier discussion about the role of reason in 
pursuit of the pleasurable and avoidance of pain. 1206    
vi. Furthermore, Aquinas tells us that “Words signify the conceptions of the 
intellect”.1207 It would appear that language facilitates reason. Without 
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 NE, 1141b15-25. “Practical reason is not concerned with universals only – it must be concerned 
with the particulars: for it is practical and practice is concerned with particulars.” 
1201
 ST, Ia, Q.79, Art.7.2. 
1202
 Cf Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV. 
1203
 ST, Ia, Q.79, Art.8. Aquinas sheds further light on material complicity in the virtue of prudence. 
He writes, “Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly 
if we consider their respective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: 
and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible 
truth.” Hence, Aquinas defines reason as the progression from one thing understood to another; 
such a process of advancing from an understanding of “one thing” to another “thing” necessarily 
would require constant reference to the phantasm, and interdependence on the material. This 
opens the door to material processes that enable the process of reasoning, not of course the 
understanding itself that is the product of reasoning.  
1204
 DA, 427b20. 
1205
 DA, 431a17. “To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of perception (and 
when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). That is why the soul 
never thinks without an image...” 
1206
 DA, 431b4-5. “The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the images, and as in the former 
case what is to be pursued or avoided is marked out for it, so where there is no sensation and it is 
engaged upon the images it is moved to pursuit or avoidance.” 
1207
 ST, Ia, Q.85, Art.5. 
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language, utilising, as we have seen in Chapter 2, specialised locations in 
the brain and specific biophysical processes for memory, our capacity for 
intellectual thought could be largely curtailed. 
 
b) Biological perfections.  
 
In summary, prudence and justice utilise biophysical processes and pathways 
(associated with reasoning, memory, imagination, etc) that themselves are 
identified with localised regions and processes in the brain.   
 
Human action is rational action. Prudence and justice dispose our rational 
responses. They dispose the intellect to act with habitual sound judgment and the 
rational will to act with habitual respect for the rights of others. The rational 
operations of truth and love require the assistance of biological part-constituents 
in two senses:  
i. The very operation of reason requires the assistance of imagination, 
memory, and other cortical systems and sensitive faculties. 
ii. Because, as it is proposed, the virtues all operate in harmonious 
integration in support of rationality, it would appear that the part-
constituents of the virtues disposing the sensitive appetites may also be 
understood, to the extent that they offer necessary assistance, as part-
constituents of the rational operations. 
 
In conclusion, it is proposed at the neurobiological level, prudence and justice are 
perfections of specific biological structures that are necessarily associated with 
rationality in the embodied life. These perfections of bodily structures are 
essentially neuronal facilitations of counsel, deliberation, judgement, command, 
and disposition to accommodate the good of others, as required by the virtues of 
prudence and justice.1208  
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 Counsel may be understood as a having a sound grasp of reality and duty in both physical and 
ethical dimensions. Judgement implies the capacity to evaluate the intrinsic and extrinsic benefits 
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4.2.5 Fortitude 
 
As we have seen, the moral virtues of justice, fortitude and temperance reside in 
the appetites.  
 
Courage, as we have seen, is not about having the loudest war cry, but rather 
about having a particular quality of self management. This latter notion of courage 
is shown in the life of Nagai: risking his life to treat enemy soldiers with care and 
dignity, overcoming his pain, discouragement and disorientation to push himself 
to the limit in helping the victims of the bomb. Courage denotes a reflective 
bravery… not simply the bold actions of an impulsive person under pressure. 
Virtues are inner states. Aquinas says simply: “Endurance is more the essence of 
fortitude than attack.”1209 
 
An Aristotelian understanding of courage presents the virtue as:  
The habitual choice of the golden mean that resides between 
cowardice and recklessness in situations of danger that really 
merit some fear.1210 
The right management of one’s fear and its concomitant sorrow is at the heart of 
the virtue. The essence of the virtue of courage is mastery of one’s emotions of 
fear, to puts one’s life knowingly and calmly on the line. Joseph Pieper writes that 
“the man of fortitude relinquishes, in self forgetfulness, his own possessions and 
his life.”1211 Pieper, following Aristotle, argues that courage always contains an 
element of a preparedness to risk one’s neck for a good cause1212. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
of an action taking into account the good of others. Command implies the executive capacity to 
carry decisions into action.    
1209
 ST, IIa-IIae, Q.123, Art.6. 
1210
 NE, III, focusses on courage and temperance and their corresponding vices.  
1211
 Josef Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance (London: Faber and Faber, 1955), 54. 
1212
 “… all fortitude has reference to death… readiness to fall, to die, in battle. … Fortitude that 
does not reach down into the depths of the willingness to die is spoiled at its root and devoid of 
effective power. Readiness proves itself in taking a risk, and the culiminating point of fortitude is 
the witness of blood. … Without this readiness there is no Christian fortitude.” Pieper argues “the 
cornerstone of the Christian ethical teaching is the concept of the bonum arduum.” Pieper, 
Fortitude and Temperance, 14-16. 
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Acts of fortitude are exercised in concert with acts of prudence and the other 
virtues. Hence courage is exercised in making habitual choices, good choices put 
forward by the virtue of sound judgement. Aquinas explains, in overcoming 
danger, fortitude seeks not danger itself, but the realization of a “rational 
good”1213, a rational good proposed by prudence. Without sound judgement there 
can be no effective fortitude. St Ambrose, a man of both action and learning, said 
simply, that fortitude must not trust itself. 1214 
 
Aquinas held that reason ought to be the ruler of the passions. He held that since 
the passions can be controlled by reason they should be controlled by reason1215. 
This is not semantics… he held that all those activities of man that can be guided 
by reason must be guided by reason, or else man acts below himself; he acts in a 
sub-human way. Hence, “fortitude without prudence is not fortitude”.1216 Rash 
action not guided by prudence, even if wearing a Victoria Cross, would not qualify. 
The Athenian admiral Thucydides has Pericles proclaim this very doctrine:  
For this too is our way: to dare most liberally where we have 
reflected best. With others, only ignorance begets fortitude; 
and reflection but begets hesitation.1217 
 
Once the necessary link between true fortitude and reason is accepted, the link 
between fortitude and freedom follows; it is man’s spiritual powers, the will 
making rational choices, that allow him freedom. In his saying, “Those who are 
brave are free,” Seneca reminds us not only of the link between fortitude and 
reason, but also that it is in the exercise of virtues, (viz. sound, habitual, rationally 
guided choices) that man finds his freedom.  
 
4.2.6 Temperance 
                                                          
1213
 Aquinas, Virt Card, 4 ad 5. 
1214
 Ambrose, De Officiis, (http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/0339-
0397,_Ambrosius,_De_Officiis_Ministrorum_Libri_Tres_[Schaff],_EN.pdf  accessed 22.11.12.) 1 35. 
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 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.24, Art.3. 
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 Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance, 23. 
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Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, Bk 2, quoted in Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance, 26. 
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Temperance is “the virtue whose particular function is to restrain and check 
passion,” 1218  “a virtue of the appetitive part, by which men cease to desire bad 
sensual pleasures.”1219 Strictly speaking, as we have seen, it is “a mean with 
regard to the bodily pleasures of touch.” 1220  
To temperance belongs absence of admiration for the 
enjoyment of bodily pleasures, absence of desire for all base 
sensual enjoyment, fear of just ill repute, an ordered course of 
life, alike in small things and in great. And temperance is 
accompanied by discipline, orderliness, shame, caution.1221 1222 
 
Lack of self mastery in these areas carries serious implications, because as 
Aristotle argues, self indulgence is a more voluntary state than cowardice. Unlike 
pain, pleasure does not “upset and destroy the nature of the person who feels 
it.”1223 We are more responsible for our actions when we are seeking pleasure 
than when we are fleeing fear and therefore failings in this area is all more 
blameworthy. We will be seeking for reasons, at the neural level, of this greater 
domination of the person, this greater obliteration of reason, caused by fear in 
comparison with intemperance.  
 
Temperance is a sine qua non for the truly rational life, for a life that is able to 
show love for others effectively and with constancy. Aquinas writes of the inner 
peace, the tranquillity of right order, which is the fruit of temperance. Order is a 
mark of rationality; temperance as we have seen is “of the soul”. Aquinas says 
that a meaning of temperance is “serenity of spirit”.1224   
                                                          
1218
 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 263. 
1219
 Aristotle, De Virtutibus et Vitiis, 1250a30-37. 
1220
 NE, 1117b24ff. Note that Aristotle includes taste as a form of touch. 
1221
 Aristotle, De Virtutibus et Vitiis, 1250b7-11. 
1222
 NE, II 8-9. “The habit of choosing the best course of action between the two extremes of 
overindulgence and impulsivity on the one hand, and of failure or inability to integrate one’s 
passions and emotions into one’s actions; it is the golden mean between self indulgence and 
insensibility.” 
1223
 NE, 1119a25. 
1224
 ST, IIa-IIae, Q.141, Art.2.2. 
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In the examples we have seen from the life of Nagai, these fruits of temperance 
are clearly seen. Pieper refers to inner order, a quality that shines through in 
Nagai’s calm, self control: 
The purpose and goal of temperantia is man’s inner order, from 
which alone … “serenity of spirit” can flow forth.1225 
In other words, it is through the virtue of temperance that man is able to discover 
unity of life1226. 
…The primary and essential meaning of temperare, therefore is 
this: to dispose various parts into one unified and ordered 
whole.1227 
Temperance enables rationality to shine through, manifesting the order and 
serenity of soul.  Without temperance these qualities will not surface; they require 
a bodily docility, a capacity of the organism to obey the judgements of reason. 
 
4.2.7 Biophysical aspects of fortitude and temperance.  
(Read in conjunction with 4.2.1 c and d.) 
 
a) Subordination to reason.  
 
Moral virtue assists the sensitive aspect to “obey” reason.1228  As we have 
already touched upon, Aristotle explains that the essence of this 
conformity of the sensitive aspect is the “royal” and voluntarily accepted 
obedience to the reason, as a king governs his subjects and as a man 
                                                          
1225
 Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance, 53. 
1226
 Pieper writes, “Temperance is conceivable only on the basis of the fact that man has lost, 
together with his original sanctity, his integritas, his ‘intactness’, the self evident inner order of his 
nature.” Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance, 12-13. 
1227
 Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance, 53. Pieper writes, “Wherever forces of self preservation, 
self assertion, self fulfillment, destroy the structure of man’s inner being, the discipline of 
temperance and the licence of intemperance come into play. The natural urge toward sensual 
enjoyment, manifested in delight in food and drink and sexual pleasure, is the echo and mirror of 
man’s strongest natural forces of self preservation.”  
1228
 Sarah Broadie poses the question whether practice leads to expertise or addiction, and 
concludes that the answer is expertise, given the rationality inherent in the exercise of virtue 
bringing freedom of action. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle,  71. 
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governs his children. Broadie elaborates at some length on this analogy of 
royal governance.1229It is “a hierarchical relationship but one between free 
people”.1230  The will speaking, on all matters, “with the same voice as 
reason,”1231obeys reason “as one does one’s father”.1232 It is a mistake, 
however, to think that an obedient child is only imperfectly or potentially 
in harmony with its parent. 1233  
 
Rather, the non rational part in the virtuous state is fully integrated with 
reason, including physically (the very point of this study), through part-
constituents: “There is in human beings something capable of heeding 
reason even though not itself the rational source.”1234 
 
While fortitude and temperance, in themselves, are essentially biophysical 
bodily qualities, they are ordered by reason and to reason. The “royal” 
governance of reason is facilitated by virtue. 
The irrational element ... appears to be two-fold. For the 
vegetative element in no way shares in a rational 
principle, but the appetitive and in general the desiring 
element in a sense shares in it, in so far as it listens to 
and obeys it.... that the irrational element is in some 
sense persuaded by a rational principle is indicated also 
by the giving of advice and by all reproof and 
exhortation. 1235     
It is clear that Aristotle views temperance and fortitude as irrational, and 
therefore, material in constitution. Nevertheless he emphasises their 
docility to reason and the role that reason has in their formation as habits. 
 
                                                          
1229
 Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle. 
1230
 Aristotle, Politics, 1259a 37-41, and 10-17. 
1231
 NE, 1102b28. 
1232
 NE, 1103a1-4. 
1233
 Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 65. 
1234
 Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 65. 
1235
 NE, 1102b28-34. 
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b) Biological perfections. 
 
Fortitude and temperance are modifications at the biological level of our 
emotional circuitry; they level the playing field, so to speak, so that right 
reason is in the game. This will not involve a dampening of pain or of 
pleasure. Aristotle and Aquinas are intent on bringing the passions into 
right order with respect to reason, not with destroying them. Aquinas 
insists that a brave man is not who does not feel fear, but who, without 
losing his equanimity, can master that fear. 
 
Aquinas explains that,  
The patient man is not the one who does not flee from 
evil, but the one who does not allow himself to be made 
inordinately sorrowful.1236  
Similarly, temperance has not the aim of diminishing the intensity of sexual 
pleasure or of eating fine food, but of managing the pursuit of those 
activities according to reason.  
 
Within the neural bases of fortitude and temperance we will be looking for 
evidence of cortical inhibition of emotional signalling, as well as pathways 
for cortical enrichment by emotional centres, and cortical executive 
function enriched by emotional input.   
 
As there is no courage without prudence, at the neural level, we will be 
looking for forms of inhibition of emotional signalling from between 
regions and along pathways associated with fear, pathways and regions 
having rich connectivity to cortical regions identified as implicated in 
deliberation, memory, goal election, consideration of consequences, etc. 
                                                          
1236
 ST, IIa-IIae, Q.136, Art.4.2. 
Teddy Roosevelt (1858-1919) captures this same admiration for the perseverance inherent in 
fortitude and courage: “It is not the critic who counts, nor the man who points how the strong man 
stumbled or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man 
who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives 
valiantly.” 
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In conclusion, it is proposed at the neurobiological level, fortitude and 
temperance are perfections of specific biological structures that are 
necessarily associated with rationality in the embodied life. They are 
predispositions for rationally consistent responses to pain and to pleasure. 
In the first place they are habitual responses, which when established, 
allow a person more easily to manage fear of bodily danger and pain, and 
inappropriate attraction to sense pleasures of touch. 
 
4.3 Unity of the virtues.  
 
Aquinas explains that the four cardinal virtues cannot be isolated from each other; 
they form a unity. He asks whether the four (cardinal) virtues differ from one 
another, and goes on to explain, quoting Gregory the Great:1237 
There is no true prudence unless it be just temperate and brave; no 
perfect temperance that is not brave just and prudent; no sound fortitude 
that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence, 
fortitude and temperance. 1238 
 
In the preceding section, in the light of an examination of virtue taking into 
account Aristotle’s doctrine of pain and pleasure as primary motivations of action, 
I have argued for this unity of the virtues. I have suggested that fortitude and 
temperance, as habitual dispositions to pleasure and pain developed and guided 
in their activity by reason, contribute to every good human act. Further I have 
argued that justice, the habitual facility for assessing one’s actions by their impact 
on others, is also necessarily integrated into every good human act. And of course, 
as sound judgement is required for an act to be good, prudence must also be 
                                                          
1237
 Gregory. Moralia, xxii 1. 
1238
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.61, Art.4. 
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integral.  All four cardinal virtues perform different roles, and each is needed for 
the completion of a good action.1239 
 
Only if the cardinal virtues act in concert can we account for fulfilment of the 
human person, as a unity of soul and body living in a community with others.  Any 
view which deprives acts of individual virtue of the benefits of mutual enrichment 
by the other virtues cannot satisfy these three conditions for the flourishing of the 
human person: 
 the interdependence of rationality and personal fulfilment (most 
associated with prudence)  
 the interdependence of relationships, responsibility and personal 
fulfilment (most associated with justice) 
 the interdependence of our bodily states and  personal fulfilment 
(most associated with fortitude and temperance). 
 
Further, we have seen that Aquinas insisted that each operation or faculty 
requires its appropriate disposing habit: for moral agency, a habit for the practical 
intellect, a habit for the rational intellect, and habits of the irascible and 
concupiscible appetites. Some who prefer not to take this text at its literal value 
ascribe a non-materiality to the habits of the sensitive appetites. I suggest that 
such an approach seems to question the role of the body in human fulfilment, and 
deprives the body itself of necessary habits.1240  
 
4.3.1 The virtues are “integrated distinct elements”1241 united in the person. 
 
                                                          
1239
 Should someone object to this position by arguing the possibility, for example, of man, unjust 
but endowed with the virtue of courage, I would answer that without the dispositions of justice his 
rationality is necessarily defective, and his courage therefore directionless and incapable of acting 
for a good end. 
1240
 Of course, recent neuroscientific contributions to the biological understandings of passion, 
attention and learning, memory and habit formation all appear to emphasise the distinction 
between as well as the linkages between habits of mind and habits of body. 
1241
 Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 65. 
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Freedom clearly resides in the rationality of the person himself, but truly rational 
decisions can be undermined if the cognitive power errs in preferring a lesser 
good, or if the appetitive power is not obedient to reason.  Habitual dispositions 
are needed in both the cogitative and appetitive powers. 1242  Sarah Broadie 
reflects on the dilemma of applying a matter-form analysis of rational substance. 
She points out that without a clear Aristotelian understanding one can very easily 
confuse what are “integrated distinct elements, with mere uniform unity.”1243 The 
key lies in the understanding of “person” as the subject of action and of 
rationality. 
 
In considering rationality, one can easily fall into one of diametrically opposed 
views: that either matter itself, or the mind, be the ultimate cause of rationality. 
Both are wide of the mark as discussed in Chapter 1. Nor is it a question of uniting 
in the person what is material with what is non-material: rather rational existence 
is a seamless integration of the material and the non-material. Rationality, by its 
nature, requires a whole new way of looking at substance. Aquinas writes, 
“Everything has unity in the same way that it has being.”1244  
 
4.4 Conclusions. 
 
Section 4.1 and 4.2 have sought to separate biophysical qualities of virtue from 
that which is more directly in the rational domain. I have argued, within the 
hylomorphic understandings provided in Chapter 1, that prudence and justice, to 
the extent that they are dispositions of the rational powers, have only a 
contributory corporeal aspect, while fortitude and temperance are exclusively 
corporeal, though rational in cause. I have further argued, in 4.3, for the unity of 
the virtues, that the cardinal virtues are all integral to good human acts.  
                                                          
1242
 ST, Ia, Q.83, Art.3. 
 “We must consider the nature of free will by considering the nature of choice. Now two things 
concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive 
power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be 
preferred to another; and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that that the appetite 
should accept the judgement of counsel.”  
1243
 Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 65. 
1244
 ST, Ia, Q.76, Art.2.2. 
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Some observations are pertinent. 
i. A “restricted reading” view of the term “rational by participation”1245 
appears perfectly compatible with argument that virtues act in concert 
respecting the unity of the virtues. The view that fortitude and temperance 
are exclusively biophysical, though rational in cause, appears to 
significantly strengthen the case for the unity of the virtues.  
ii. An understanding of the nature of, and the degree of, biological 
contribution to the particular virtues,1246 accords adequate recognition to 
the hylomorphic constitution of the human person. Such recognition is 
essential if one is not to underestimate the importance of the contribution 
of the body and the biological to human activity, and ultimately if one is 
not to misrepresent human nature.   
iii. There is a grandly satisfying logic evident if one links the unity of the 
virtues with the need for a notion of virtue which respects the composite 
view of human nature. This composite view will be, not only with respect 
to the composite nature of virtue in itself (having both rational and 
material aspects), but also in the way in which those virtues disposing 
rationality, operate in concert with the virtues disposing the sensitive 
appetites.  
iv. A neurobiology of virtue appears to offer insights into fulfilment at the 
rational, the interrelational, and the biophysical levels. (See discussion in 
6.2.) 
v. There are important conclusions at the level of parenting and self 
education. For example, the importance of training infants in behaviours 
reflecting temperance and fortitude and the need to emphasise to children 
the need for consideration of the needs and rights of others in every 
action, are noted.  
 
                                                          
1245
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.50, Art.4.See also Q.59, Art.4 and Q.61, Art.2. 
1246
 As has been constantly emphasized according to the hylomorphic understanding, discussion of 
the “material” or the “biological” in the human constitution must be understood an integral 
contributor to higher operations.  
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It has been argued that the distinct tasks of the specific cardinal virtues and their 
integrated role in each human act are necessary consequences of our hylomorphic 
constitution. These conclusions inform the tabulation of characteristics of virtue in 
following section and in turn will guide the neurobiological analysis in the next 
chapter. 
 
4.4.1 Characteristics pertaining to the state of virtue. 
 
In Table 4.1 I refine the qualities identified in Chapter 3, in the light of the findings 
of Chapter 4, into distinct characteristics pertaining to the state of virtue and to 
the acquisition of virtue. Note that Nos 1 and 2 pertain to specific virtues.  
 
 
Table 4.1 
Characteristics pertaining to the state of virtue 
As proposed by Aristotle and Aquinas (3.2 & 3.3) and cross referenced to qualities evident in 
Nagai’s actions (3.1.2). 
 
 Characteristics pertaining to the state of virtue See 3.1.2  See 3.2 & 3.3 
1 The virtues of prudence and justice dispose the 
practical reason and the intellectual appetite 
facilitating rationality and appropriate choices. 
iii, iv, vi 
 
3.2.1 
 
2 The virtues of fortitude and temperance dispose 
the irascible and sensitive appetites to endure 
appropriate difficulties and to seek appropriate 
pleasure. 
i, iv, v 
 
3.2.1 
3.2.1.1 
3.3.7 
3 A capacity for rational goal election is evident. ii 3.2.1.2 
3.2.2 
4 “Virtues change us.” The acquisition of virtue 
creates a state of character, a way of being, that 
tends to be permanent. 
vii 3.2.4 
5 The virtuous state is in keeping with our human 
nature. 
iii, iv, v  3.2.5 
 
6 In the exercise of virtue intrinsic motivation takes 
priority over extrinsic motivation. Virtue is 
motivated by that which is worthy to man’s nature. 
 
vii 
 
3.3.9 
3.2.5.1 
7 Virtue facilitates effective action. ii, viii  3.2.1.2 
3.2.5.3 
8 Virtue brings about ease of action. viii  3.2.1.1 
3.2.5.3 
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9 Virtue facilitates the flourishing of the person. 
Virtue brings about a state of excellence: an 
excellence of the person, inclusive necessarily of 
both neurobiological flourishing and the exercise 
of rationality.  It is a state whereby reason and 
rationality are empowered to manage activity. It is 
a capacity for rationality that is reflective and 
emotionally enriched and able to be carried 
through into noble humane behaviours.  
i, v, ix 3.2.5.2 
3.2.5.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics of  virtue in its acquisition  
Essential features pertaining to virtue in its 
acquisition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 The virtuous state results from habituation and 
education. 
 3.3.1 
11 Repetition, understood as critical practice, plays an 
essential role in the acquisition of virtue: repetition 
in appetitive responses, in responses manifesting 
noble sentiment and attentiveness to others, and 
in reasoning, deliberation and sound decision 
making. 
 3.3.4 
 
 
12 Education specifically in wisdom and beauty is 
necessary in the formation of virtue. 
vii 
 
3.2.3 
3.3.8 
13 Effortful attention plays a significant role.  
 
 3.3.10 
 Characteristics of  virtue in its acquisition  
Features that may not necessarily be present in 
every case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 Advantage must be taken of the early years both 
for training and provision of appropriate example. 
 
 
3.3.2 
 
15 Imitation of example is a key means for acquisition 
of behaviours.  
 3.3.3 
16 Explicit teaching and guidance as to right and 
wrong, are needed. 
 3.3.6 
17 Affection facilitates learning particularly in the 
family environment. 
 3.3.6 
 
The aim in Chapter 5 will be to propose for these characteristics, on the basis of 
current neuroscientific knowledge, neural part-constituents, biological elements 
that are integral to the exercise of virtue in the state of embodied soul. 
 
Bearing in mind, as seen in Chapter 2, that neural processing in the brain is 
extremely complex, it would be simplistic to suggest that virtuous activity is 
localized and restricted to specific pathways and regions. Virtuous action, by 
definition, potentially embraces the whole range of human activity, and so it is 
clearly beyond the scope of any study to catalogue all the pathways and regions 
with some involvement in virtuous activity. We must seek to distil the essential 
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neural components of virtuous action. In Chapter 5 I will seek to identify the 
neural basis for these essential material components of virtuous activity.  
 
Notwithstanding the caution with which one should nominate particular brain 
pathways and regions as implicated in activity of any moral type, to do so is 
consistent with a vast and expanding literature that implicates involvement of 
brain pathways and regions in the full range of human activities.   
 
Although experimental verification of the neural substrates of virtue proposed in 
this study is beyond the scope of the work, it should be noted that the various 
sub-components of a neural “solution”, have already been verified experimentally 
in the many studies to which I refer. The approach of this study is to align these 
established jig saw pieces into a coherent and highly plausible view consistent 
with the proposed notion of virtue.  
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Chapter 5 
 
The neural bases of virtue. 
 
“A mind of moderate capacity which closely pursues one study 
must infallibly arrive at great proficiency in that study.” 
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus 
Mary Shelley 
 
 
5.1 Reflections on the task being attempted. 
 
There is scant literature referring explicitly to the role of neural structures in 
virtue. The most noteworthy attempt is by William Casebeer in an article 
published in Nature Reviews Neuroscience in 2003. Casebeer’s paper provides a 
most valuable, broad brush endorsement of the task of identifying the neural 
bases of virtue. He considers the various approaches to ethics and in the broadest 
of terms suggests neuroscientific implications. He finds that because virtue is 
experience-based it is not only more suited to scientific investigation but also the 
ethical theory most likely to find correspondence in reality:   
The current evidence allows us to draw a tentative conclusion: 
the moral psychology required by virtue theory is the most 
neurobiologically plausible.1247 
 
He suggests that the neural “solution” will involve rich 
interconnectivity between the cognitive and affective resources of the 
brain, and recruiting aspects of the brain implicated in memory and 
TOM.  
Empirically successful moral cognition on the part of an 
organism requires the appropriate coordination of multi-modal 
signals conjoined with appropriately cued executive systems 
that share rich connections with affective and conative brain 
                                                          
1247
 Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 840-847.  
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structures that draw on conditioned memories and insight into 
the minds of others, so as to think about and actually behave in 
a maximally functional manner. There is clear consilience 
between contemporary neuroethics and Aristotelian moral 
psychology.1248 
 
Despite an ostensibly Aristotelian view of virtue, his focus is limited to “moral 
reasoning”, and the role of virtue in supporting rationality remains implicit 
without either elaboration or explanation. “Virtue” remains undefined, and 
effectively there appears to be no appreciation of “habitus” nor of how good 
habits may be acquired or in what they might consist, nor is any any 
differentiation of the roles of virtue with respect to reasoning and sensitive 
appetites. Casebeer makes no reference to brain plasticity; and there are only 
single passing references to basal contribution and to “habit” itself.1249 In short he 
demonstrates an impoverished understanding of virtue and consequently his 
speculation about the neural bases of virtue is unable to account for the actions 
and operations of virtue.  
 
In addition there is a small but increasing number of studies which consider the 
neural substrate of isolated behaviours such as honesty, compassion, empathy 
and contemplation. Of these studies there appears to be none based on the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic notions of virtue and ensouled body, and therefore offering 
an articulated position with respect to human personality, autonomous 
behaviour, and for the capacity of persons to modify behaviours in response to 
environment, experience and their own choices. 
 
In this chapter, I will argue for the existence of specific neural processes, brain 
areas, and pathways, constituting a complex of systems that are implicated in the 
development of virtue. My aim is to present a strong, inductive, empirical case for 
                                                          
1248
 Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 843, suggests that the study of moral 
cognition can be divided into “three branches:  the moral emotions, theory of mind and abstract 
moral reasoning.”  
1249
 He refers to “habits of character as informed by conditioned emotion and affect” (844). 
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the neural bases of virtue; a highly plausible mapping of current knowledge of 
neurobiology onto the characteristics of virtue identified in Table 4.1. Weight of 
evidence will argue that substantially differing neural bases are incompatible both 
with the neuroscience and with the Aristotelian and Thomistic notion of virtue. 
This study stands to make a timely contribution to the field and to give direction 
to research of an experimental nature.  
 
This task, to my knowledge, has not been previously attempted. 
 
5.1.1   Overview of this chapter. 
 
First I draw insights from contemporary efforts to bridge the disciplines of 
neuroscience and moral anthropology, with respect to the neural bases of 
emotion and of morality. I discuss cross-current understandings of the neural 
bases of emotion in recent explorations of the relationship between emotion and 
reason by neuroscientists, Joseph LeDoux and Antonio Damasio, and 
philosophers, Nancy Sherman and Martha Nussbaum. These neuroscientific and 
philosophical approaches converge in the view that emotion and cognition are 
interacting, complementary and highly integrated systems. 
 
Second I offer a compact overview of the neural bases of morality, and draw on 
the contemporary work in the discipline of psychopathology, by celebrated 
neuroscientist, Michael Gazzaniga. In Table 5.1 I offer a summary of the neural 
sites activated in moral activity as many of these must also subserve virtuous 
activity. I note the increasing quantity of literature on the neural bases of moral 
behaviour, and tabulate a representative sample of findings which emphasise 
complexity of processing, and highly predictable centres of activation, results 
which are consistent with observations about cognitive function offered in 2.7.   
 
In 5.3 I propose neural bases for virtue.  
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As a starting point, I propose that the neural bases of virtue must be considered as 
a complex of interacting systems. I suggest that the neural complexity of the 
human act, and of virtue itself, is a reflection of the psychological complexity of 
the human act (as we have seen in 3.1.3), moving from appetency and motivation 
at sense level, through evaluative reasoning to choice. I argue that, although 
particular brain areas are shown to be active in certain tasks, we must describe 
the neural dispositions of virtue in terms of neural interconnectivity and the 
activation of multiple brain areas and systems, predisposed by specific plastic 
development and thus able to work in highly elaborate concert. Only thus can we 
approach an understanding of the neural bases of the dispositions of virtue.  I 
draw together in Table 5.2 an outline of the interconnected systems at work in 
virtuous activity and then, drawing on the content of Chapter 2, I discuss the 
neural bases for the characteristics of virtue offered at the end of Chapter 4 in 
Table 4.1. 
 
In conclusion in 5.4, as a model of the neural activity underpinning a specific act of 
virtue, I offer a neural analysis of Nagai’s actions described Scenario 3. By analysis 
of a real life scenario, I demonstrate that the neural schema is highly plausible and 
readily applicable. 
 
5.2  Insights from contemporary cross-disciplinary studies in emotion and 
morality. 
 
5.2.1  Understanding emotion. 
 
Neuroscientists and philosophers have focused in recent years on the relationship 
between emotion and reason/rationality. For the past twenty years, Joseph 
LeDoux has been at the forefront of research into the neural bases of emotion, 
most particularly of the emotion of fear.1250 He shows that emotional reactions 
may be either regulated by higher cortical function or be direct and impulsive. 
                                                          
1250
 Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, (London: Phoenix, 1998). 
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Antonio Damasio argues that emotional somatic manifestations assist us in our 
cognitive response to the world, and that it is a mistake to separate mind and 
body. In common with philosophers, Nancy Sherman and Martha Nussbaum, 
these neuroscientists are in agreement that emotion can and should enrich 
decision making and that both emotion and reason possess biophysical correlates.     
 
5.2.1.1 Joseph LeDoux  
 
The work of Joseph LeDoux has provided some key lines of investigation for this 
study. He adopts a non-reductive approach, described by Nussbaum as “explicitly 
cognitive”.1251 LeDoux argues for emotion and cognition as separate but 
interacting mental functions mediated by separate but interacting brain 
systems.1252 His interest is very much as a neuroscientist, and his focus is on the 
neural bases of emotion and regulation of emotion.  
 
Of particular relevance for this study are these conclusions by LeDoux.  
 
He suggests that reason and emotion should be harmonised; human biology, he 
argues, supports the view that emotion be moderated but not negated by 
reason.1253 Because brain systems generating emotion are highly conserved, he 
argues that animal studies are valid indicators of the human brain systems 
associated with emotion:1254 for example, by means of rat studies, LeDoux had 
highlighted the central role of the amygdala in fear conditioning and the role of 
the reciprocal cortico-amygdalic pathway in emotional regulation. 1255   
 
LeDoux observes that connections from emotion to the cognitive are denser and 
richer than connections from cognitive to emotional, allowing, he argues, for 
                                                          
1251
 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 105. 
1252
 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 69. 
1253
 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 21. 
1254
 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 17. 
1255
 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 287. 
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emotions to flood consciousness.1256 He found that areas of the amygdala project 
back to a wide variety of cortical areas (all cortical sensory areas, PFC, 
hippocampus) allowing the amygdala to influence higher order thought process, 
working and long term memories, ongoing perceptions, attention, mental imagery 
etc.1257 
 
He identifies a “high road” of emotional response whereby the amygdala is 
informed of emotional content via the cortex, in preference to a “low road” of 
direct input to the amygdala via the thalamus, 1258 and concludes that cortical 
emotional regulation of fearful reactions requires reinforcement of this “high 
road” by means of use dependent plasticities. 
 
He notes that the hippocampus plays a key role when there is cortical regulation 
of emotion and suggests that these hippocampal pathways require consolidation 
and reinforcement by means of use-dependent plasiticities. He also notes that the 
“high road” of cortical afferent to amygdala is informed by hippocampal 
memory,1259 consistent with the view that the hippocampus is associated with 
conscious declarative memory and the implicit emotional memory associated with 
the amygdala (cf Chapter 2).1260  
 
While LeDoux discusses pathways of emotional control, he does not directly 
address habits of emotional control. He does not discuss the interplay of reward 
pathways and emotion, but he does observe that emotions are powerful 
motivators of future behaviours.1261  
 
5.2.1.2 Antonio Damasio 
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 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 19. 
1257
 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 287. 
1258
 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 170. 
1259
 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 199. 
1260
 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 203. 
1261
 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 19. 
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Another major figure in the contemporary dialogue between emotion and 
neuroscience is Antonio Damasio. In Descartes’ Error (1994) he develops his 
somatic marker hypothesis by which he argues that emotional somatic reactions 
and consequent qualia assist reason. 1262 Most significantly he argues that emotion 
enriches cognition, and writes broadly of an integration of “brain systems that are 
jointly engaged in emotion and decision making” allowing management of social 
cognition and behaviour.1263 Descartes’ error, he says, was to divide body and 
mind.1264 
 
In his 1999 text, The Feeling of What Happens, Damasio pursues this theme of 
integration of awareness and emotional response. He argues that consciousness 
and emotion are intimately related: consciousness as the conception that there is 
both a self and an external object; and emotion as the internal experience of 
change as a result of interaction with the external object, the “feeling of what 
happens”. 1265   
 
In a more recent book, Looking for Spinoza (2003), Damasio further develops the 
theme of the unity of the organism. With Spinoza (and, as we have seen, in 
keeping with Aristotle’s metaphysics) he argues that mind and body are 
manifestations of the same substance.1266 “The body and the brain form an 
integrated organism and interact fully and mutually via chemical and neural 
pathways.” 1267 Accordingly Nussbaum states that Damasio presents a non-
reductionist, physiological account.1268  Lacking explicit acknowledgement of the 
concept of person (for example, he writes only of “organism”) his philosophy of 
mind is arguably impoverished. Damasio relies on assertions such as “(it is) 
unnecessarily incomplete and humanly unsatisfactory to reduce the mind to brain 
                                                          
1262
 Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error (London: Vintage, 1994), 174. Damasio writes, “Somatic 
markers are a special instance of feelings generated from secondary emotions. Those emotions 
and feelings have been connected by learning, to predicted future outcomes of certain scenarios.” 
1263
 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, xix. 
1264
 Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error (London: Vintage, 1994) 249. 
1265
 Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens. 
1266
 Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza (Orlando: Harvest, 2003) 12. 
1267
 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 194. 
1268
 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 114. 
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events.” 1269 He attempts a non-reductive understanding of the unity of the 
organism, arguing,  
The truly embodied mind … does not relinquish its most refined 
levels of operation, those constituting its soul and spirit. … soul 
and spirit, with all their dignity and human scale, are now 
complex and unique states of an organism.1270  
Yet ultimately, these statements are observations without metaphysical 
justification. “Person” is much richer a concept than “organism”, capturing as it 
does the specific qualities of rationality and of a unifying principle beneath 
appearances.  
 
Damasio’s attempts, therefore, demonstrate the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, 
of defending specific metaphysiological conclusions about human nature in the 
absence of a concept of person. They demonstrate the need that mind-body 
speculation must be supported by a metaphysically rich anthropology. 
 
Nevertheless, the work of Antonio Damasio positively provides assistance to, or 
verification for, this study in several important ways.  
 
Like Aristotle (see 3.2.1.1) he argues that all human motivations reduce to pain 
and pleasure in some form or other. “Pain and pleasure are the levers the 
organism requires for instinctual and acquired strategies to operate 
efficiently.”1271 Significantly, within his anthropology he includes the development 
of habits by which we manage our reactions to pain and pleasure: “our reactions 
                                                          
1269
 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 251. 
1270
 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 252. 
1271
 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 262. Damasio appears to draw much from Aristotle, albeit 
indirectly. For example, he quotes another aphorism from Spinoza: we are always moved by love 
(understood as appetite for what is pleasurable) in some form or other. “An affect cannot be 
restrained or neutralised except by a contrary affect that is stronger than the affect to be 
restrained.” 
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to pain and pleasure can be modified by education”.1272 He offers neural 
substrates for sadness,1273 and happiness1274.  
 
He is drawn to a series of insights of Spinoza in an exploration of human 
motivation and feelings.1275 Importantly for this study he links pleasure with 
perfection of function, providing a rich avenue for eudaimonistic exploration.  He 
argues that organisms strive to achieve “a greater perfection” of function and that 
Spinoza equated that perfection with joy. 1276  1277 (See 6.2.1.) 
 
He describes emotion triggering sites as amygdala and VMPFC, and a further 
“frontal region in the supplementary motor area and cingulate”.1278 He writes of 
the basal forebrain, hypothalamus and nuclei of the brainstem as execution sites 
for emotion. He presents a number of significant clinical and research based 
observations about VMPFC.1279 1280 1281 1282 1283 1284 And he notes that the ACC 
                                                          
1272
 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 262. 
1273
 Damasio quotes a case of a slightly misplaced electrode in the midbrain, possibly in the SN or 
the periaqueductal gray region PAG, evoking profound sadness. 
1274
 Representative studies: Richard Davidson et al., “Reciprocal limbic-cortical function and 
negative mood: converging PET findings in depression and normal sadness,” American Journal of 
Psychiatry 156, (1999): 675-82; Richard Lane et al., “Neuroanatomical correlates of happiness, 
sadness and disgust,” American Journal of Psychiatry 154, (1997): 926-33. Damasio  also notes that 
stimulation in SMA (eg in mPFC and dorsal PFC and Anterior cingulate) was shown to evoke 
“genuine” laughter: Itzhak Fried, et al., “Electric current stimulates laughter,” Nature 391, (1998): 
650. 
1275
 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 12. 
1276
 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 12. 
1277
 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 11. His focus on Spinoza’s comment “Love is nothing but a 
pleasurable state, joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause” has the potential to connect 
motivation and pleasure with a role for justice.  
1278
 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 54. 
1279
 Hiroto Kawasaki, et al., “Single-unit responses to emotional visual stimuli recorded in human 
ventral prefrontal cortex,” Nature Neuroscience 4, (2001): 15-16. Damasio notes the asymmetry is 
in keeping with Davidson’s conclusion that right frontal cortices have a greater association with 
negative emotions. He points out that single cell studies show how specific different neurons in the 
right VMPFC in human subjects respond to pleasant and unpleasant visual stimuli. 
1280
 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 152. Damasio argues that the VMPFC and amygdala are critical 
areas of the PFC for reasoning/decision making and emotion/feeling. 
1281
 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 61. 
1282
 R.W. Sperry et al., “Interhemispheric relationships: the neocortical commissures; syndromes of 
their disconnection” in Handbook of Clinical Neurology Vol4, ed. P. J. Vinken and G. W. Bruyn 
(Amsterdam: North Holland, 1969), 273-90. Damasio’s work confirms the right hemispheric 
dominance in emotion,  and that damage to somatosensory cortices in the right hemisphere 
compromises reasoning/decision making and emotion/feeling as well as basic body signalling; 
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provides the location for intimate interaction between systems of 
reasoning/decision making and emotion/feeling leading to external action 
(movement) and thought animation and reasoning. 1285  
 
5.2.1.3  Nancy Sherman and Martha Nussbaum 
 
Aristotle explains in the Rhetoric that anger will be towards somebody whom we 
think has caused us harm. Emotions are directed towards some object, according 
to the Aristotelian notion.  Accordingly Nancy Sherman discusses emotions as 
“forms of intentional awareness”.1286 
 
Martha Nussbaum appears to build on this notion in her explorations of emotion 
in Upheavals of Thought which contains insights of significance to this study. She 
rejects any simplistic or negative view and defines emotions in a positive manner 
as:  
… appraisals or value judgements which ascribe to things and 
persons outside the person’s own control great importance for 
that person’s own flourishing.1287  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1283
 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 71. Damasio confirms that DLPFC damage compromises 
reasoning/decision making on a broader scale and that DA driven reward systems are associated 
with pleasure and with motivation for emotion regulation. 
1284
 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 180. He links VMPFC to autonomic nervous system effectors, able to 
trigger chemical responses from brain stem and hypothalamus.
 
 
1285
 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 72. 
1286
 In Making a Necessity of Virtue, Nussbaum writes, “Emotions are about something that we 
represent in thought. Emotions are intentional states. As such they have cognitive content. They 
are identified by that content, by what we dwell on, whether it be fleeting or with concentrated 
attention… Such an account need not exclude other features of emotion, such as awareness of 
physiological and behavioural response or felt sensations. The claim is that these, when present, 
are dependent on cognitive (i.e. descriptive and evaluative content), and are directed toward that 
content.” Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue, 55. Insight from Ana 
C. Santiago, “A Study of Aristotelian Demands for Some Psychological Views of the Emotions” (PhD 
thesis, Duke University, 2009).  
1287
 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 4. Nussbaum writes: “Emotions, I shall argue, involve 
judgements about important things, judgements in which, appraising an external object as salient 
for our own well being, we acknowledge our own neediness and incompleteness before parts of 
the world that we do not fully control.” 
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She presents a eudaimonistic vision in which “Emotions appear to be 
eudaimonistic, that is, concerned with a person’s flourishing”.1288 In further 
extension of this idea, she notes that Aristotle regards pleasure not as a feeling 
but as unimpeded action. 1289 Flourishing includes, therefore, the concept of 
mature biological development facilitating ease of action.   
 
Of great value to this study also are a number of additional insights.1290 She insists 
that “emotions are, like other mental processes, bodily.”1291 She also suggests that 
this vision of emotion offers clarity on the specific roles of the cardinal virtues; if 
emotion is essentially “thought of an object combined with thought of the object’s 
salience or importance” this arguably lends a greater role to justice. Secondly, it 
accords perfectly with an initial presentation of desires and aversions (understood 
broadly as apprehensions evoking responses disposed by temperance and 
fortitude or their contrary habits).1292 
 
She argues that it was Aristotle himself who integrated emotion into the cognitive 
world of the person, that Aristotle viewed pain as “pain at”, “as an intentional 
state with cognitive content”. 1293 
 
Discussing how particular representations in the mind make possible abstract 
eudaimonistic conclusions, she notes the significance of “rich particularising 
detail”, the connection to the imagination that differentiates specific evaluations 
from abstract judgments. She writes that the imagining is “a vehicle for making a 
eudaimonistic connection with the object” allowing for example compassion, and 
downstream the exercise of justice.1294 
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 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought,  22, 31 
1289
 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought,  63 
1290
 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought,  103 Of note also is her evaluation of Seligman’s work as a 
non-reductionist account where internal mental representations construct intentionality. 
1291
 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought,  25. 
1292
 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought,  61. 
1293
 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought,  63. 
1294
 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought,  65. 
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Also of note in this study of virtue, considered as voluntary habit motivated less by 
external reward and more by intrinsic considerations, are her comments about 
the need to modify the S-R model to one of “S-Organism-R” 1295 consistent very 
much with the view raised in Chapter 2 that voluntary habits can consist of A-O 
motivations replaced by S-R paradigms that are compatible with voluntary 
behaviour.1296  
 
5.2.2 Research into the neural bases of morality. 
 
5.2.2.1 Gillett’s psychopathology. 
 
a) The field of psychopathology. 
 
Research into psychopathology can assist here, as it is a burgeoning field where 
neurobiology and consolidated moral behaviours, albeit negative behaviours, 
intersect. If one accepts the premise that through illness, environment or choice 
such people have underdeveloped dispositions of virtue, insights are possible into 
the neurobiology of virtue. For example, I have referred above (4.2.1.d) to studies 
that suggest an excessive dominance of fear in psychopathic individuals. 
 
Studies emphasise time and again the functional and structural abnormalities of 
the the OFC, VMPFC and amygdala in psychopathic individuals.1297 A Nature article 
in 2001 suggested that early imaging studies in this area suggested either that the 
dysfunctional OFC or dysfunctional amygdala are at the basis of psychopathic 
behaviour; the views may not be mutually exclusive.1298 Yang et al. have now 
identified, by means of structural magnetic resonance imaging, marked 
deformations, including lower volumes, of the amygdala in individuals with 
psychopathy. They link these structural data to poor fear conditioning and poor 
                                                          
1295
 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought,  94. 
1296
 Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 465. 
1297
 Walter Glannon, “Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath,” Neuroethics 1, (2008): 158; Kiehl, 
et al., “Limbic abnormalities in affective processing by criminal psychopaths as revealed by fMRI”. 
1298
 Alison Abbott, “Into the mind of a killer,” Nature 410 (2001): 296-298. 
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facial emotion recognition that are also present.1299 Note the potential link 
between poor fear conditioning, and an inability, in developmental years, to 
develop normal emotional responses from the faces of parents.1300 1301 
 
“Empathetic dysfunction is one of the major features of psychopathology.”1302 
James and Blair find that the empathetic dysfunction of psychopaths is associated 
with impaired processing of emotions of fear, sadness and possibly disgust, and 
manifest multiple signs of amygdala dysfunction. 1303 Most interestingly they argue 
that the lack of emotional empathy appears linked to dysfunction in “cortical and 
sub-cortical face processing routes” involving amygdala, insula and OFC and 
VMPFC. 1304 Potential for learning refined dispositions to pain and pleasure from 
the face of one’s parents.  
 
Another common thread of discussion in the literature is that of the apparent 
“rationality” of psychopaths. However Maibom finds that her studies affirm 
Damasio’s argument for the essential role of emotion in practical rationality.1305 
She argues that the practical reason of psychopaths is impaired and that the basis 
of this appears two fold: an emotional impairment, with abnormal responses to 
fear, pain, guilt and empathy; and that are incapable of choosing means 
appropriate to ends. They are “constitutionally incapable of adopting and carrying 
out plans that affect the course of their lives in a pervasive and profound 
                                                          
1299
 Y.Yang, et al. “Localization of deformations within the amygdala in individuals with 
psychopathy,” Archives of General Psychiatry 66, 9 (2009), 986-994.  
1300
 This is consistent with my argument that children learn and embody refined attitudes to pain 
and pleasure from the example of parents first of all. Psychopathic deficits possibly heightened by 
environmental factors, appear to impair this process in early years.  
1301
 Other studies identify abnormalities in the corpus callosum: Adrian Raine et al. “Corpus 
Callosum Abnormalities in Psychopathic Antisocial Individuals,” Archives of General Psychiatry 60, 
(2003): 1134-42. 
1302
 R. James and R. Blair, “Empathic dysfunction in psychopathic individuals,” in Empathy in 
Mental Illness, ed. Tom F. D. Farrow, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 12. 
1303
 James and Blair “Empathic dysfunction in psychopathic individuals,” 12. 
1304
 “If we could find means to increase the empathic reaction of children with psychopathic 
tendencies, we might be able to considerably improve the prognosis of this disorder.” James and 
Blair “Empathic dysfunction in psychopathic individuals,” 15.  
1305
 Heidi Maibom, “Moral unreason: the case of psychopathy,” Mind and Language 20, 2  (2005): 
251. 
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manner.”1306  She suggests that psychopaths flout moral and social norms, but 
“experience no guilt or remorse, feel no empathy, and appear to be perfectly 
rational.”1307  
 
Lack of behavioural and emotional regulation also enters as an area of study. Corr 
suggests that deficits of behavioural inhibition are the basis of these aberrant 
behaviours. These deficits are associated with a consequent inflexibility with 
respect to cognitive activity, associated also with inattentiveness.1308 Significantly 
he argues that there are multiple systems, an “amalgam of processes”, that 
underpin normal behaviour, and that dysfunction in specific processes may 
account for the wide variations on psychopathology. He highlights for example 
failure of systems for appetitive anticipation. 
 
An important study utilizing diffusion tensor magnetic resonance imaging (DT-
MRI) shows neural underdevelopment in the limbic-cortical pathway connecting 
the OFC and amygdala.1309 The authors found significantly reduced fractional 
anisotropy (suggesting reductions in fibre density, axonal diameter and 
myelination) in the right uncinate fasciculus (the major neural limbic-cortical 
neural pathway) of psychopaths in relation to matched controls. 1310 
 
In summary, studies into psychopathology appear to confirm dysfunction in 
several of the principal candidate systems and regions appearing to be at the basis 
of virtue. They draw attention to the role of attention, of regulation of emotion 
and appetency, of imitation, and in particular of the high level of mutual 
interaction required between limbic and cortical areas. Furthermore studies 
highlight the necessity of a multi-systemic approach in order to describe the 
neurobiological contribution to moral behaviour.      
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 Maibom, “Moral unreason: the case of psychopathy,” 243. 
1307
 Maibom, “Moral unreason: the case of psychopathy,” 237. 
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 Philip J. Corr, “The The psychoticism–psychopathy continuum: A neuropsychological model 
of core deficits,” Personality and Individual Differences 48, (2010): 695–703. 
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 M. C. Craig, et al. “Altered connections on the road to psychopathy,” Molecular Psychiatry 
(2009), 1–8. 
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b) Gillett’s work. 
 
Grant Gillett’s work builds on the clinical studies of psychopathology. In one 
recent paper, he introduces neo-Aristotelian notions of character, agency, and 
moral responsibility (in a consideration of Aristotle’s account of practical reason in 
the light of Kant and Wittgenstein) and concludes “the will of the psychopath is 
pathological (in Kant’s sense) because it is dominated by appetite and not 
truth...”.1311 This is a fascinating insight drawing on the internal features of the 
human act (Table 3.1) and emphasizing the importance of the virtues of prudence 
and justice. By the neurobiological features characterising the absence of the 
virtues, Gillett provides important insights about their neural bases.  
 
Gillett presents a theory of action for psychopaths accounting for manifestly 
intentional behaviour that is disconnected from prudence and moral 
consideration.1312  Ultimately, he finds that the psychopath is moved by self-
oriented goals, and, lacking responsivity to others, lacks also responsibility. Often 
seeing others as less clever than himself, he suffers from a “pathologically 
restricted horizon of motivations” and “lacks the co-feeling and human 
connectivity that lie at the heart of moral voice and moral orientation.”  
 
Gillett suggests that moral responsibility according to a neo-Aristotelian 
understanding involves the subject choosing, using his rational powers, to obey or 
not to obey moral rules, and he sees these rules as pertaining not only to one’s 
actions in the world in isolation from others, but also according to the demands 
                                                          
1311
 Grant Gillett, “Intentional action, moral responsibility and psychopaths,” (2012 publication 
pending), 10. Gillett’s work on criminal psychopathology adopts a classic approach of 
neuroscience, that of learning about the brain by linking deficits of behaviour with anatomical 
observation. 
1312
 A theory of action links psychology of the individual with an understanding of individual human 
beings as moral agents. The author suggests that action may be explained either by a Millean 
tradition, relying on prior causal events, or in the Nietzschean (neo-Aristotelian) vision of the 
individual acting on the world to enact his life story. The latter he combines with the identity-
structure view of intention and action that sees action as the outward manifestation of the 
conception of the agent. 
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that arise from relationships with others. Within this framework, the role of pain 
in the form of disapproval, punishment, correction and discipline, is reviewed. 
Gillett notes that, during the acquisition phase of virtue, virtuous acts are not 
typically pleasant. Further he distinguishes between the cleverness of acting to 
achieve one’s desired end, from the motivational sensitivity towards others that 
normally accompanies ethical formation.1313 
 
His findings, drawing on various physiological and fMRI studies typified in the 
section above, highlight brain function in relation to poor choices, impulsivity, and 
lack of regard for others:  
 Defective psychopathic response to fear based and aversive conditioning 
is situated (in the “limbic prefrontal circuit - amygdala, orbito-frontal 
cortex, insula, and anterior cingulate” areas of the brain. 
 Severe social deprivation and abuse are consistent with unimpaired 
executive function and emotional intelligence.1314 (His thesis is that 
deprivation and abuse impact most of all on practical reason.)  
 Psychopathic activity appears unimpaired by secondary emotions of 
embarrassment and guilt.1315 
 Certain amygdala dysfunction appears in studies of criminal psychopathic 
individuals.1316 
 Defective responses in sensorimotor cortices as well as limbic and para-
limbic structures appear implicated in pathologically diminished 
empathy.1317 1318 
 
                                                          
1313
 Both are forms of rationality, but only the second contains a moral incentive. He argues that 
the psychopath acts with self-directed interest as opposed to “the natural human propensity for 
empathy and sensitivity to the suffering or negative emotions of others”. 
1314
 A. Raine, “Biosocial Studies of Antissocial and Violent Behaviour in Children and Adults: A 
Review,” Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology 30, 4 (2002): 311-326. 
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 A. Damasio, “A neural basis for sociopathy,” Archives of General Psychiatry 57, (2000): 128-9. 
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 K. A. Kiehl, et al., “Limbic abnormalities in affective processing by criminal psychopaths as 
revealed by fMRI” Neuroimage 11, 5 (2000), 677-684. 
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 T. Singer, “The neuronal basis and ontogeny of empathy and mind reading: Review of literature 
and implications for future research’ Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews 30, (2006) 855-863. 
1318
 Deely Q et al., “Facial emotion processing in criminal psychopathy,” British Journal of 
Psychiatry 18 9, (2006): 533-539. Gillett also discusses psychopathic insensitivity to distress and 
negative emotion shown in other’s faces. 
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Gillett concludes that “the physiological and fMRI studies show the findings that 
might be expected from the analysis of virtue and moral development found in 
Aristotle and Kant...”,1319 that “our natural tendencies are transformed by 
socialisation in which we learn to moderate our tendencies by instruction and 
correction”.1320 
 
Moreover he suggests that the advantageous pain, normally signalling 
undesirability of actions is somehow deficient in the psychopath. He suggests that 
“learned patterns of moral behaviour” can compensate for this deficiency.1321 
Moral education consists in this. “Necessarily, then, the character must be good or 
bad by its pursuit or avoidance of certain pleasures and pains.” 1322  
 
Gillett’s work is a cross disciplinary study reconciling aspects of Aristotelian 
psychology with neuroscience, and as such, serves as a useful precedent for this 
study. Furthermore, his identification of the involvement of specific neural 
structures in moral behaviour/psychopathology provides a valuable point of 
reference. 
 
5.2.2.2  Gazzaniga and the neural bases of free will.  
 
In the 2009 Gifford Lectures, neuroscientist Michael S. Gazzaniga explores the 
notion of free will. This topic is of importance to this study because a degree of 
freedom of agency is a necessity for the development of virtue, and for the 
operation of a rational being. Gazzaniga adopts a non-reductionist “strong 
emergent” paradigm in which the emergent “is more than the sum of its 
parts”.1323  A number of aspects of his analysis of free agency are particularly 
useful for this study.  
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 Gillett, “Intentional action, moral responsibility and psychopaths,” 13. 
1320
 Gillett, “Intentional action, moral responsibility and psychopaths,” 14. 
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 Gillett, “Intentional action, moral responsibility and psychopaths,” 14. 
1322
 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1121b33. 
1323
 Michael S. Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain (NY: Harper 
Collins, 2011), 124. See my response to “emergent rationality” in Appendix 1. A Response to the 
Claims of Emergent Rationality by Non-reductive Materialism. However, because both 
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He argues that the integration of multiple brain systems underpins complex 
aspects of personality. “It is becoming increasingly clear that consciousness 
involves a multitude of widely distributed specialised systems and disunited 
processes.” 1324 I argue and summarise in Table 5.2 that virtue may be seen as a 
type of macro system, a complex of systems, requiring multiple integrated brain 
systems for activation. Gazzaniga, by applying the concept to consciousness, 
provides a useful, highly credentialed precedent for such a view. It is the view of 
this study that such a “systems view”’ of virtue is appropriate to the extent that 
virtue is understood as a biological facilitation for rationality.1325 
 
Secondly he offers an alternative model for brain activity, springing from his own 
research. He argues that “rampant” lateralisation of circuits is a mark of the 
human brain, and that within the left brain is the “interpreter module” that makes 
sense out of the literal view of reality presented by the right hemisphere. 1326   
 
He writes of studies that demonstrate that suppression of the right DLPFC 
increases self interest and self centred responses, and that VMPFC lesions impair 
moral judgement. This is consistent with views of the role of the DLPFC that have 
already been presented in Chapter 2 and in Table 5.1.1327 
 
5.2.2.3 Neural subdivisions implicated in moral behaviour. 
 
In this section I note commonly identified neural bases activated in situations 
demanding a moral response, and complete the section with some comments also 
about the neural bases of immoral, psychopathic behaviour, as well as of spiritual 
                                                                                                                                                                 
hylomorphic and emergent rationalist approaches propose a single agent with rational and 
biophysical qualities, the conclusions of Gazzaniga, LeDoux, Damasio and others (with respect to 
neural bases, but not to anthropology nor metaphysics) transfer most readily to this study. 
1324
 Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain, 102. 
1325
 That such a view should be applied also to consciousness is not so evident but discussion of 
this issue is well beyond the scope of this study. 
1326
 Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain, 35 and 86. This appears 
consistent with the notions in 2.3.4.1 and 2.5.3.1 that affect arousal is preferentially in areas of the 
right cortex, while emotional regulation pertains more to left VMPFC. 
1327
 Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain, 170 and 177. 
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and mystical experiences. These moral bases will further inform discussion in 
5.3.3.2. 
 
Green and Haidt in a major review paper note that moral judgement appears to 
be based both on affect and reasoning, and that many brain areas contribute to 
moral judgement.1328 Moll et al. find a “remarkably consistent network of brain 
regions … involved in moral cognition”,1329 far more consistent than the variability 
of activations for basic emotions of happiness, sadness, disgust, fear, and anger.  
He finds that complex emotions (compassion, embarrassment, indignation, guilt) 
show consistently to activate the same areas:  ACC, aPFC, aTL, OFC , and STS.1330 
1331  
 
A great number of studies have sought neural bases for social behaviour. A typical 
study, by Rilling et al., focused on altruistic cooperation. By means of fMRI 
scanning of 36 women playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game a neural network 
associated with reciprocal altruism was identified.  
Mutual cooperation was associated with consistent activation 
in brain areas that have been linked with reward processing: 
nucleus accumbens, the caudate nucleus, ventromedial 
frontal/orbitofrontal cortex, and rostral anterior cingulate 
cortex. 1332   
 
Other studies have identified the key role of the medial PFC (MPFC) in studies 
concerning empathy, understanding for others, and the self-knowledge seen as a 
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 Joshua Green and Jonathan Haidt, “How (and where) does moral judgement work?” Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences 6, 12 (2002): 517-123. 
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 Jorge Moll, et al., “The neural basis of human moral cognition,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience  
6, (2005): 799. Moll looked at the various models for moral cognitive neuroscience, and proposed 
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 James K. Rilling et al., “A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation,” Neuron 35, (2002): 395–405. 
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prerequisite to moral responsibility. Furthermore, empathetic response to the 
pain of others appears to be mediated by the mPFC.1333 1334 1335 Other studies 
consider the roles of memory and imagination in moral activity. It appears our 
judgements to trust others are processed on two different pathways, one 
bypassing memory and simply assessing the face, and the other accessing memory 
of behaviour of that person in the past.1336 Some people draw on the personality 
trait information when judging trustworthiness others prefer to use facial 
information. 
 
Self-control disorder studies in children using electroencephalogram (EEG) as well 
as fMRI of normal subjects, are consistent in linking the VMPFC and moral 
behaviour, in finding that the OFC cues for moral behaviour and also the 
acquisition of moral knowledge. ACC is linked to regulation of attention and 
emotion, and (with the NAc, caudate, and OFC) for cooperation respecting the 
rights of others.1337  Moral cognition systems appear modulated by DA, 5-HT, NA 
and ACh.  But “the proper operation of the system as a whole is crucial for 
effective moral judgement.” 1338 
 
Persistent antisocial behaviours have long been a subject of interest. Forensic 
psychiatry like psychopathology is a large field offering insights into the neural 
bases of moral behaviour. Studies of violent offenders have demonstrated that 
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Insight from the neural bases of pain empathy,” Pain 125, (2006): 5–9. 
1334
 Arnaud D’Argembeau and Eric Salmon, “The neural basis of semantic and episodic forms of self 
knowledge. Insights from Functional Neuroimaging,” in Sensing Systems in Nature, ed. Carlos 
López-Larrea (Landes Bioscience and Springer Science+Business Media, 2011). The mPFC has been 
identified as playing “a key role in creating the mental model of the self that is displayed in our 
mind at a given moment.” 
1335
 Ruby P., Collette F., D’Argembeau A. et al., “Persons with Alzheimer disease did not recruit the 
mPFC when making judgments about themselves in perspective taking to assess self‑personality: 
what’s modified in Alzheimer’s disease?” Neurobiology of Aging 30, (2009): 1637‑1651. In persons 
with Alzheimer disease the mPFC appears inactive in judgements about self. 
1336
 J. D. Rudoy and K. A. Paller, “Who can you trust? Behavioral and neural differences between 
perceptual and memory-based influences,” Frontiers of Human Neuroscience 3, (2009): 1-6. 
1337
 Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 844. 
1338
 Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 843.  
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subjects have reduced grey matter in the PFC and patterns of abnormal limbic, 
prefrontal and temporal brain activation.1339 (See also above, 5.2.2.1.)  
 
It is demonstrated that emotions play a role in moral judgement.1340 A 2007 study 
by Michael Koenigs of six patients with VMPFC bilateral damage indicated that the 
subjects were more prone to utilitarian judgements on a certain type of moral 
dilemma, but that in other types their responses were normal. “The findings are 
consistent with a model in which a combination of intuitive/affective and 
conscious/rational mechanisms operate to produce moral judgements.” 1341 1342 
 
We must bear in mind the observation of Eric Kandel, Nobel laureate, that there is 
no single neural locus of command and coordination. He writes,  
“There is no single cortical area to which all other cortical areas 
report exclusively, either in the visual or in any other system. In 
sum, the cortex must be using a different strategy for 
generating the integrated visual image.”1343 1344 
If the brain requires complex coordination strategies to present an “integrated 
visual image”, how much more, then, will complex coordination of systems be 
needed for an integrated response to the world, for recognition of truth and 
moral action.  Yet, universal human experience is that in moral matters, as in 
behaviours of moral insignificance, human responses can be unified and 
                                                          
1339
 H. Soderstrom, et al., “Reduced frontotemporal perfusion in psychopathic personality” 
Psychiatry Res 114, (2002): 81–94. 
1340
 Michael Koenigs et al., “Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral 
judgements,” Nature 446, (2007): 908-911. 
1341
 Koenigs et al., “Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements,” 910. 
1342
 Darcia Narvaez, “Triune ethics: the neurobiological roots of our multiple moralities,” New Ideas 
in Psychology 26 (2008): 95-119. Narvaez provides a useful summary of the neural bases of moral 
behaviour within her “triune ethics theory”. She draws together neuroscientific evidence in 
support of the three stages: security, engagement and imagination. Rather than a top down, 
cognitively initiative view, she adopts a bottom up approach based on motivational orientations, 
and so her work is complementary to this study; she understands appetitive systems in the body as 
fundamental, a view consistent, as we shall see with the Aristotelian understanding of motivation. 
The article also provides an excellent overview of key literature on the role of affection in gene 
transcription.  
1343
 Eric R. Kandel and Robert H. Wurtz, “Constructing the visual image” in Eric R. Kandel et al. 
Principles of Neural Science, 4
th
 ed. (NY: McGraw, 2000), 340.  
1344
 Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 731.  
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purposeful despite the varied systems involved. Again, let us remind ourselves 
that neural excitation cannot make moral decisions, persons do.  
 
Table 5.1 draws together findings from some dozen authors whose work involves 
the neural bases of moral responsibility. The listing of areas and roles is by no 
means exhaustive, but it is representative of the complex integration of neural 
areas in moral action. 
 
5.3 Neural bases.  
 
5.3.1 A complex of systems. 
 
The complexity of the brain is inescapable: the sheer extension of the neural 
network, the intricate cooperation of mechanisms at the molecular, genetic and 
cellular levels underpinning a grand collaboration of systems, and the possibilities 
for connectivity blessed with the potential for a virtual infinitude of subtle 
variations of synaptic strengths and neuromodulation. Indeed in 1949 Donald 
Hebb had suggested that thoughts and memories were dependent on “cell 
assemblies”, networks of neurons. He postulated that changes in cell connections 
were the basis of learning, and that memory is both localised and distributed. 
Commonly in the current literature we meet terms such as “vast neuronal 
array”1345, and “neural pools”1346 to discuss the means by which networking 
complexity of the brain contributes to mental processes. Susan Greenfield 
proposes that “subsecond assemblies of 10s or 100s of millions of neurons lasting 
a fraction of a second determine depth of consciousness.”1347 One need not fully 
accord with the conclusion to appreciate the complexity of neural operations.  
 
                                                          
1345
 Susan Greenfield, I.D. The Quest for identity in the 21
st
 Century (London: Sceptre, 2008). 
1346
 Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 5
th
 ed., 471. 
1347
 Susan Greenfield, I.D. The Quest for identity in the 21
st
 Century, 127. “Determine” however is a 
word that carries unwanted connotations; use of “contribute to” or “subserve” would avoid the 
suggestion that materiality could be the ultimate cause of free action. (See 6.4.2.2.) 
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There is recognition that individual systems in the brain operate with astonishing 
breadth and complexity. Note for example this recent description of the 
motivational system:  
All of this being said, what should a neural mechanism of 
motivation look like? According to the account pieced-together 
in this dissertation, motivational mechanisms should look like 
pulsating synaptic cascades across vast breadths of neural 
tissue. From a seed of rhythmic activity, perhaps in 
orbitofrontal cortex and the hypothalamus, motivation would 
reach through planning mechanisms in dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, posterior parietal cortex, the cerebellum and motor 
cortex, and all of the loops connecting these areas through the 
basal ganglia and thalamus. Basically a motivation mechanism 
should extend through most of the brain.1348  
Other brain systems offer similar complexity.  
 
Neuroscientist Mario Beauregard in The Spiritual Brain argues that various brain 
systems are integrated in the performance of the highest rational functions, an 
intricate cooperation of neural systems, areas and mechanisms facilitating actions 
of the person. He says that transcendent experiences are  
…implemented via a spatially extended neural circuit 
encompassing brain regions involved in attention, body 
representation, visual imagery, emotion (physiological and 
subjective aspects) and self consciousness.1349  
 
LeDoux makes an important point that the contribution of components in a 
system is derived from the fact that the system exists. Individual components are 
of this conditional value. Hence he writes of the system of emotional 
                                                          
1348
 Anthony Landreth, “Far Beyond Driven: On the Neural Mechanisms of Motivation” (PhD thesis, 
University of Cincinnati, 2007), 186. 
1349
 Mario Beauregard and Denyse O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain. A Neuroscientist’s Case for the 
Existence of the Soul (New York: Harper One, 2007), 37. Beauregard writes, “The brain has a 
neurological substrate that enables it to experience a spiritual state”. (39) 
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management, “The amygdala is certainly crucial, but we must not lose sight of the 
fact that its functions exist only by virtue of the system to which it belongs.”1350  
 
Something analogous happens with respect to virtue. By applying this principle to 
the systems underpinning virtue, we gain a greater appreciation of the whole. 
There is no doubt that the PFC and the BG, and numerous other individual brain 
regions are intimately involved in the expression of virtue, but the whole is 
greater than the parts. It is the soul that is the principle of unity and the principle 
of virtuous action; when the soul departs the orchestra falls silent. The performers 
go their separate ways. The music ends. Virtue may be understood as a complex 
integration and orchestration of organic elements. 
 
George Orwell said that good prose is like a window… you see straight through it 
to the ideas it communicates; it does not draw attention to itself. Analogously, for 
all the complexity of the underlying neural orchestration, it is the beauty of virtue 
that is seen. We have seen that it is in his actions that the greatness of soul of 
Takashi Nagai shines out.  
 
The state of virtue will be underpinned at the neurobiological level by 
mechanisms and pathways within the multiple systems of the brain that integrate 
neural function under the agency of the person. These neurobiological bases 
dispose for rational virtuous activity. 
 
5.3.2 The principal brain systems contributing to the development and exercise 
of virtue.  
 
Our focus is not only on systems operating in isolation, but on “multiple neural 
systems” which  in turn are integrated in a highly coordinated manner. Grossberg 
and Versace offer an fascinating integrative view of brain function accounting for 
                                                          
1350
 J. LeDoux, “Emotion, Memory and the Brain,” Scientific American 270, (1994): 50-57. 56 
409 
 
cortico-thalamic learning.1351 Furthermore parallel systems operate and 
compete.1352 Pollak develops the idea of grand neural systems made up of 
contributory systems; he writes,1353 
Attachment, attention, emotion regulation, are likely to be 
constellations of processes that emerge as output from 
multiple neural systems… (and so it is necessary to seek) 
biologically plausible models of the mental processes in 
question. 1354  
 
Such a level of integration and coordinated complexity suggests that the state of 
virtue itself may be understood as complex of other systems, or several complexes 
of interlinked systems (pertaining to the different virtues), operating across the 
whole organism. It is the position of this study that the state of virtue may be 
classified as a system because numerous somatic areas and subsystems 
contribute, the process may be described scientifically, and results are replicable. 
Ultimately it is a system that is ordained to the flourishing of the human person, 
not only at the personal level, but at the biological level as well. This macro 
system however, does not operate beyond personal control (such as autonomic 
systems); rather it is a system over which the individual exercises considerable 
                                                          
1351
 Stephen Grossberg and Massimiliano Versace, “Spikes, synchrony, and attentive learning by 
laminar thalamocortical circuits,” Brain Research 1218 (2008): 278-312. In their Synchronous 
Matching Adaptive Resonance Theory (SMART) model they argue that there is high level of 
coordination between brain regions, dependent upon arousal, attention, memory, learning, and 
expectation brain systems, and mediated by plasticities generated by resonance and synchrony. 
1352
 A. J. Gruber and R. J. McDonald, “Context, emotion, and the strategic pursuit of goals: 
interactions among multiple brain systems controlling motivated behavior,” Frontiers in 
Behavioural Neuroscience 6, (2012): 50. “Multiple brain systems acquire information in parallel and 
either cooperate or compete for behavioral control. We propose a conceptual model of systems 
interaction wherein a ventral emotional memory network involving ventral striatum (VS), 
amygdala, ventral hippocampus, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex triages behavioral responding 
to stimuli according to their associated affective outcomes.”  
1353
 Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with 
developmental approaches to psychopathology,” 735. 
1354
 Cf. Gruber and McDonald, “Context, emotion, and the strategic pursuit of goals: interactions 
among multiple brain systems controlling motivated behavior,” 50. Adding a new degree of 
complexity, Gruber and McDonald (2012) comment on their finding that multiple brain systems 
appear to compete in pursuit of goals. They discuss a ventral emotional memory network that is 
constituted by ventral striatum (VS), amygdala, ventral hippocampus, and VMPFC. 
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autonomous control (directly, and through participatory systems such as the 
attentional systems and systems for learning).  
 
It is reasonable to suggest that neural systems operate in support of moral 
actions. Casebeer notes multiple cognitive sub-processes involved in moral 
cognition, “a highly distributed, whole brain affair”.1355 Greene and Haidt also 
draw attention to the distributed nature of the neural bases of moral 
cognition.1356 In a perceptive analysis of self reports of loss of will power by EL 
patients Paul Foley argues that it is necessary to view the brain as “an integrated 
whole” rather than separating out the psychic and the neurological elements. 
Within that view he finds that the biological basis of the loss of willpower in EL 
patients appeared to derive from dysfunction in the affective and motor centres 
of the BG, with interference to connection between thalamus and pallidum.1357 
 
Notably there is evidence that developmental maturation is associated with the 
phenomenon of increased connectivity and coordinated systems in the brain. 
Converging evidence suggests that, during development to adulthood, there is a 
lessening of immediate functional connections to adjacent regions, and an 
increase of connection between regions distant in the brain. “These novel 
network-level findings bolster the claim that cognitive maturation occurs not in 
unitary structures but in the connectivity and interactions between 
structures.”1358  
 
                                                          
1355
 Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 841 and 846. “Socio-moral behaviour 
is rooted in the brainstem/limbic axis and PFC, with input and recurrent connections to and from 
sensory and multimodal cortices and frontal lobe areas: so it involves more-or-less the entire 
brain.”  
1356
 Greene and Haidt, “How (and where) does moral judgment work?” 517–523. 
1357
 Foley, “The Encephalitis Lethargica Patient as a Window on the Soul,” 184-214. 
1358
 Somerville and Casey, “Developmental neurobiology of cognitive control and motivational 
systems,” 236-241; see also M. C. Stevens, et al., “Age-related cognitive gains are mediated by the 
effects of white matter development on brain network integration,” in Neuroimage 48, (2009): 
738–746; Beatriz Luna et al., “What has fMRI told us about the Development of Cognitive Control 
through Adolescence?” Brain and Cognition 72, 1 (2010): 101. The authors write: “The transition 
from adolescence to adulthood therefore can be seen as a change in mode of operation from 
initially relying on more regionalized processing, such as in the PFC, earlier in development to 
relying on a broader network of regions that share processing in an efficient and flexible manner at 
the systems level.” 
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And what are the neural systems that subserve the state of virtue? At the most 
elemental level we find the systems and mechanisms of plasticity and learning. 
Learning may be understood as our capacity to change in response to experience. 
We can be conscious of some of these changes, and even direct them by our 
choices; others will be at a subconscious level. The state of virtue denotes the 
conscious possession of learned moral habits. Plasticity and learning, then, are the 
two foundational systems for the construction of virtue. We have seen that 
mechanisms of plasticity are virtually ubiquitous across all areas of the brain.1359 
Plasticity is triggered by a wide array of developmental, environmental and 
experiential factors, and these mechanisms of plasticity are acknowledged to be 
decisive in all learning and memory. We have seen that plasticities associated with 
intracellular calcium and gene expression underpin structural changes resulting in 
long term memory, consolidated learning of new behaviours, etc. The brain’s 
capacity for plastic change is at the core of a neural explanation for the 
phenomenon of habit, 1360 and, this study suggests, of virtue itself. 
 
Higher “component” systems of the state of virtue utilise the mechanisms of 
plasticity and learning. These are the systems of memory, attention, reward and 
motivation, emotion regulation, habit formation, goal election, executive 
execution of motor commands and cognition, consideration of consequences, 
planning, and executive direction. In addition there are various subsystems 
assisting specifically in the development of virtue: systems for empathy and 
imitation, and systems disposing to sensitive periods of development.  
 
Table 5.2 summarises the principal brain systems and mechanisms contributing to 
the state and exercise of virtue, referring to summary tables associated with 
neuroscientific systems discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
5.3.3 The neural substrates of virtue. The state of virtue reflects a state of 
neural and systemic maturity. 
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 Butz, et al.,“Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 287-305. 
1360
 Typical of the literature: Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain,” 359-87. 
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Having proposed that the state of virtue may be understood, at the neural level, 
to operate as a system perfecting the various associated systems of the brain (in 
5.3.1 and 5.3.2), and having identified the principal brain systems contributing to 
the development and exercise of virtue (in summary form in Table 4.2, and in 
more detail throughout Chapter 2) it now remains to set out the neural substrates 
of virtue in some detail.  
 
I do this in two stages.  In 5.3.3.1 I lay out systematically the argument for what I 
call the “neural excellence” view of virtue in the brain noting in summary form the 
neural bases; in 5.3.3.2 I draw on neuroscientific understanding to account for the 
17 characteristics of virtue identified in Table 4.1.  
 
5.3.3.1 A “neural excellence” understanding of the neural bases of virtue. 
 
a) A successful identification of the neural substrate of virtue and of the 
individual cardinal virtues requires clarification of the terms virtue, 
prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. The virtues of prudence and 
justice are materially manifested as perfections of certain neural structures 
that are necessarily associated with rationality and choice in the embodied 
life. The virtues of fortitude and temperance are perfections of certain 
biological structures constituting dispositions of the irascible and sensitive 
appetites to endure appropriate difficulties and to seek appropriate 
pleasure; thus we can say they are predispositions for rationality and 
choice. In simple terms, the practical reason is understood, as the human 
capacity to elect appropriate means and ends for action; the rational 
appetite chooses what is good for oneself taking into account the good of 
others; the irascible appetite chooses goods that are difficult to pursue; 
the sensitive appetite chooses what is pleasurable. ‘Appropriate’ and 
‘good’ refer to choices that are in keeping with the needs of human 
nature. The view of this study, in line with Aristotelian and Thomistic 
notions, is that all mental activity in the embodied life has a biophysical 
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correlate, and therefore the dispositions of these four capacities have 
neural substrates. These substrates may be identified. (For detailed 
argumentation see Chapters 1, 3 and 4.) Furthermore the notion of the 
unity of the virtues has been argued: in all virtuous human actions the 
dispositions corresponding to all four virtues will be active. The fact that 
acts disposed by fortitude and temperance require rational guidance 
disposed by prudence and justice serves to clarify the distinctive neural 
tasks of each of these virtues. (For detailed argumentation see Chapters 1, 
3 and 4.) 
b) Virtue is a state of neural and systemic maturity. (See Chapter 5.3.1 and 
5.3.2) It is evident that this maturity corresponds to the biological 
flourishing of the organism.  (See Chapter 6.) The state of virtue is revealed 
as a macro system: the result of a highly complex interplay of systems, 
brain areas, mechanisms and pathways (neural, neurotransmitter and 
neuromodulatory, etc). The flourishing of the organism as a consequence 
of virtuous dispositions is seen in the mature development and integration 
of organic “components”. The high levels of specific interconnectivity and 
cooperation between systems, and fine tuning of mechanisms make 
possible, as material causes, the rational operations of knowing reality and 
loving other persons. In fact every experience leaves a trace of neural 
changes in our brain; it will only be neural modifications serving these 
deepest goods of our nature, of knowing and loving, that are associated 
with virtue. 
c) Virtue consists, structurally, in the constellation of neural modifications 
reflecting maturity, at the genetic, synaptic, and cellular levels, in areas 
of the brain and in its pathways, across all neural systems serving 
rational action. These neural modifications facilitate, at a material level, 
conscious and intentional action carried out for reasons of intrinsic 
motivation, and include receptivity for neuromodulation associated with 
reward pathways associated with pleasure inherent in virtuous action. 
d) We have seen in Chapter 2 and Tables 5.1, and 5.2 that a great range of 
brain areas and structures are involved in the formation of virtue.  
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Developmentally-dependent (initially) and use-dependent plastic changes 
in these areas and structures bring into being a material facilitation for 
rational activity; they are the neural signature of the state of virtue. 
Knowledge of the brain, while still advancing rapidly, has reached the point 
that it is possible to discuss with some clarity the contribution of discrete 
brain areas and how discrete areas contribute to the functioning of the 
whole.1361 Principal areas of the brain in which will be found the mature 
modifications of virtue include most areas of the PFC, areas of the other 
cortical lobes associated with memory, deliberation, goal election, 
consideration of consequences of action, moral judgement, attention, 
imitation, response and delivery of affectivity, and for motor execution. 
The BG, limbic and paralimbic structures, the neural pathways between 
interconnecting these areas with the cortex, and the pathways for 
neuromodulation reaching cortical and subcortical areas are also 
intimately involved. In particular the pathways of emotional regulation, of 
reward, motivation and goal election, and of habit formation are of great 
significance.  
e) Analysis of the exercise of virtue, or more properly of the various virtues, is 
additionally complex because of its integration into the steps of the human 
act itself. (See Chapter 3.1.3.) The analysis of the human act assists in 
identifying the distinctive roles of fortitude and temperance (disposing 
rationally appropriate appetitive representations prior to the 
commencement of the act) and the roles of prudence and justice 
(disposing the deliberations between intellect and rational appetite that 
constitute the act itself). 
f) Virtue is acquired by experience. “The human brain is inscribed (or carries 
traces) that make its microprocessing structure the record of an unfolding 
reality” writes Gillett.1362 (See Chapter 3.1.3.)  The various mechanisms of 
                                                          
1361
 Owing to advances in imaging techniques, the last two decades have brought a great increase 
in knowledge of the functioning brain.  Furthermore, as many neural mechanisms and systems are 
highly conserved across species, animal studies add greatly to knowledge of the human organism. 
1362
 Quoted in: Stephen Lyng, “Brain, body, and society: bioethical reflections on socio-historical 
neuroscience and neuro-corporeal social science,” American Journal of Bioethics 9, 9 (2009):  25-6. 
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plasticity, making possible learning from sensory experience: explicit 
tuition, environment, experience (guided and otherwise), and 
repetition,1363 bring about the requisite neural changes. Plasticity explains 
the capacity for the human neural system to modify structurally, and 
functionally, disposing to new behaviours in a stable way. (Chapter 2 and 
5.3.)  
g) The material manifestion of the state of virtue may be described as the 
sum of the perfections of neural structures necessarily associated with 
rationality and choice in the embodied life. 
h) We have seen that human motivation may reduce to seeking pleasure and 
avoiding pain. The practice of virtue then is closely supported by a healthy 
reward system, assisting motivation and goal election; a system that is 
balanced with rationally cued, aversive responses when appropriate: 
“Much of our behaviour is shaped by learned associations between stimuli, 
our responses to them, and the rewards and punishments that result.”1364 
Virtuous action is motivated by pleasures appropriate to our rational 
nature, and by the forbearance of difficulties for the sake of a noble 
reason. (See Chapters 1, 3 and 4.) In fact, the virtues of fortitude and 
temperance dispose the human reward systems, and closely associated 
systems of emotional regulation, to good health. It is patently not 
healthful for the organism to pursue rewards and exercise emotional 
responses which are detrimental to the wellbeing of the whole organism; 
therefore it is necessary that reward choices and emotional regulation are 
subject to cognitive processing. Fortitude and temperance dispose, at the 
neural level, the reward and emotion systems towards cognitive 
processing. Reward systems in the brain commence with sensory and 
somatosensory feedback to the OFC and limbic areas which are 
interconnected. Centres for both gratification and aversion are present in 
most limbic system structures. Aversional stimulation, for example in the 
                                                          
1363
 D. Narvaez and J. L. Vaydich, “Moral development and behaviour under the spotlight of the 
neurobiological sciences,”  Journal of Moral Education 37, 3 (2008): 289-312. 
1364
 Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 6
th
 ed., 540. 
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amygdala, produces unpleasant sensations such as fear and sorrow, 
consciously registered through the amygdalic pathways via medial 
thalamus to the cortex, and by somatosensory cortices registering bodily 
reactions triggered by amygdalic output to the hypothalamus; 1365 in 
contrast a sense of pleasure or reward is associated with gratification, 
notably mediated by the NAc,1366 pallidum and amygdala, and associated 
with -opioid and phasic DA signalling. 1367 Furthermore, limbic structures 
and the OFC inform the ventral striatum and the hypothalamus as well as 
the VTA and SN which reciprocally deliver DA to the OFC, amygdala, 
ventral striatum and hypothalamus.1368 Directly, and in a second pathway 
through the ventral pallidum, the ventral striatum also inputs the medial 
thalamus via a pathway returning to the OFC.1369 (See 2.6 for more detail.) 
This reward system is triggered in the OFC and amygdala by sense input. 
Arguably the due calibration of these areas is a major focus of the virtues 
of fortitude and temperance; but, as a system is only as strong as its 
weakest link, a healthy reward system requires all components and 
linkages to be calibrated to respond to pleasures with moderation and 
maintain a degree of equanimity in the face of dangers of one form or 
another.  
i) Maturity in virtue is evidenced by implicit motivation as opposed to 
extrinsic rewards. In the development phase of virtue, neural reward 
systems (mediated principally by DA) are implicated as goals for A-O 
paradigms. This shift from A-O to S-deliberation-R paradigms involves 
increased activity in the dorsal BG, a transition to intrinsic motivation and 
ease of action, and decreased cortical activity. 1370   
Some types of instrumental learning result in a strong 
association between a stimulus and an action that 
becomes resistant to reward devaluation. This kind of 
                                                          
1365
 Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 6
th
 ed., 540. 
1366
 Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 6
th
 ed., 534. 
1367
 Leknes and Tracey, “A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure,” 317-8. 
1368
 The ventral striatum is reciprocally connected also to the VTA and SN.   
1369
 Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 6
th
 ed., 428. 
1370
 Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 472. 
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associative memory, in which the stimulus becomes 
stronger than the outcome to trigger the response, is 
called habit….The more this associative memory 
becomes represented by a larger number of associative 
units, the more difficult it will be to erase them when 
the reward outcome or the novelty decreases. 1371 
Note that outcome devaluation affects neither habit nor virtue. 1372 (See 
2.6.4) 
j) The exercise of virtue requires cortical emotional regulation. Emotional 
regulation is closely associated with the conscious perception of reward 
expectations. Training in temperance and fortitude (see below p. and q.) 
consists in what could be described as the “plastic calibration” of the 
amygdala, and other limbic, basal and cortical structures associated with 
aversion and reward, in line with Aristotle’s insistence that children be 
trained to seek appropriate pleasures.  A further aspect of emotional 
regulation is the reinforcement of pathways from amygdala to the PFC.1373 
1374 Cortical processing alone, however, is insufficient for virtue. Cortical 
processing, in turn, must be disposed by prudence and justice. (See below 
n. and o. and also Table 5.2) 
k) The practice of virtue requires explicit involvement of systems for goal 
election, a consequence of effective presentation and processing of 
rewards, and of emotion regulation. Goal election, in its final phases, is a 
cognitive process disposed by prudence and justice. (See Table 5.2) 
Neural modifications during the acquisition of virtue will be dependent 
upon goals that are self-elected, or goals, as in the case of a young child for 
example, that are elected by another. In both cases, virtuous goal election 
                                                          
1371
 Da Cunha, et al. “Learning processing in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,” 166. 
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 Da Cunha, et al. “Learning processing in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,” 166. 
1373
 Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 6
th
 ed., 540. 
1374
 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 170. Sense input received in the amygdala is infused with 
emotional content. Thence, output will be either to hypothalamus (for bodily reactions to 
emotional stimulus), which is “the low road” identified by LeDoux, or areas of PFC implicated in 
conscious control and emotional expression, aspects of “the high road”. 
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is a task of rationality, therefore disposed either by one’s own prudence 
and justice, or by the prudence and justice of the guide whom one obeys. 
l) Virtue is a form of learning characterised by the acquisition of habits. The 
development of habitual behaviours is attributable to mechanisms of 
plasticity in brain areas and in brain pathways. Certain habits associated 
with virtue initially appear cognitively based (eg a habit of deliberation 
before acting), while others appear more procedural in the strict sense, 
with a striatal basis (eg the habit of courteously smiling to each new 
person one meets). Cognitive habits however will not simply be mediated 
by cortical plasticity. Striatally mediated habits are not restricted to 
subconscious procedural activities; automaticity may develop in formerly 
goal directed actions mediated by striatal changes. 1375 Cortically elicited 
DA release (from VTA and SN), in both PFC and striatum, reinforces goal 
election and mediates, by repetition, striatally based habit learning: “Habit 
learning is achieved after overtraining in the striatum.”1376 Graybiel 
suggests that oscillatory activity in the cortico-basal loops is involved in 
establishing the habit, and that that chunking of behaviours, of action 
repertoires, is evidence for a neuronal shift from limbic to regions of motor 
and cognitive output. “Thus the relation between habits and the evaluative 
brain is that habits are an endpoint in the evaluation process.”1377 (See 
2.4.5) Note that as habits are acquired, reward mediation in the ventral 
striatum gives way to dorsal automatisation.  (See above i.) 
m) Systems responsive to sensitive periods and to affection, and systems of 
imitation play significant roles in acquiring behaviours particularly during 
developmental periods. (See Table 5.2) 
n) Prudence is characterised by rich and reciprocal connectivity primarily 
between the DLPFC and other with cortical areas serving memory and 
somatic and sensory input, with the OFC, DMPFC, BG, and amygdala 
                                                          
1375 
Wickens, “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,” 125. 
1376
 Da Cunha, et al. “Learning processing in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,” 166. 
1377
 Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain,” 378. 
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serving emotion regulation, with the ventral striatum assisting in goal 
setting and motivation. (For more detail see Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and 5.3.2) 
o) Justice is characterised by habitual understanding for others, consideration 
of the impact of one’s actions on others, empathy, and considerations of 
fairness, capacities mediated primarily by the aPFC, mPFC, VMPFC, OFC 
(especially medial OFC), ACC (especially rostal ACC), insula, limbic and 
paralimbic areas, and the BG. (For more detail see Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and 
5.3.2) 
p) Fortitude is mediated first of all by the BG-thalamo-cortical loop and 
enriched connectivity between the OFC and the amygdala. At its most 
elementary level, the expression of fortitude may be understood as a 
capacity for rational, habitual suppression of debilitating responses to fear 
or pain.  The various pathways of emotional regulation are also implicated. 
Various brain regions are shown to be active including OFC, DLPFC, VMPFC, 
areas of the amygdala and of the BG. The close association of pain and 
pleasure systems in the brain allowing balanced cognitive judgements has 
also been noted. (For more detail see Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and 5.3.2).  
q) Temperance is mediated primarily by the DLPFC and ACC, and by the 
various pathways of emotional regulation associated with the OFC, 
DMPFC, BG, with the ventral striatum assisting in goal setting and 
motivation. (For more detail see Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and 5.3.2) 
r) Exercise of these four virtues will also be subserved by ready access to 
memory. Many forms of plasticity dependent learning and memory are 
implicated in the development of virtue. Deliberations implicit to 
cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, and goal election 
require activation of both long and short term declarative memory, as 
well as procedural memory and emotional memory. (See Table 5.2.) 
Consolidation and plasticity in memory pathways is a necessity for virtuous 
judgement.  Activation of declarative memory is necessary in evaluating 
the value of actions. 
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s) Acquisition of the four virtues will be served particularly by mechanisms 
of imitation priming responses in accord with the exemplar. (For more 
detail see Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and 5.3.2) 
t) The state of virtue should be seen as the endpoint of neural development, 
of a developmental sequence of behaviours associated with the ordered 
biological dispositions of fortitude and temperance informing right 
judgement. It involves an ongoing interplay between biological 
development, practical reason, experience, consideration for others, and 
the repetition of positive goal directed behaviours. The state of virtue 
makes use of the constellation of mechanisms and processes operating in 
across the various brain regions and pathways between them. Habit 
provides a mechanism for the organism to act more efficiently at the 
neuronal level, allowing the diversion of attention elsewhere and 
absorbing fewer cerebral resources. During the period of acquisition, both 
implicit procedural memories and virtue, move from the explicit to the 
automatised. 1378  Both are acquired by a process initially involving 
attentive, voluntary and repetitive action and explicit knowledge. During 
the human act and therefore the process of acquisition of virtue, concrete 
representations are present in mind.  
u) Finally, happiness as ‘the reward of virtue’1379 can be identified on 
various levels.  
i. Choices associated with appetite are rewarded indiscriminately by the 
body’s hedonic reward systems. As we have seen this is a normal 
concommitant to human acts. In biological terms this will be reflected 
in mechanisms of -opioid and phasic DA signalling and 5-HT uptake 
inhibition. 
ii. Pleasure enjoyed with self control is more enjoyable because it is 
longer lasting, and because it is enriched by the joy of knowledge of 
benefits to others, and is free of any bitter aftertaste  of self interest.  
                                                          
1378
 See Chapter 2 for referencing. 
1379
 NE, 1099b16. 
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Such reward satisfaction following upon intrinsic motivations has been 
discussed. This will also be reflected in DA and opioid signaling. 
iii. Via thalamic pathways from the striatum to the OFC that allow 
cognitive modification of PFC  to upregulate DA release, rewards are 
modified to reflect the conviction to that proposed virtuous actions are 
rationally desirable; a source of reward reserved for what is perceived 
as a rational choice.  
iv. Virtue empowers the functional flourishing of the organism. (See b. 
immediately above.) This state requires the efficient interconnection of 
the cortical, sub cortical, limbic, and brain stem regions, and the 
mature development of the full array of biophysiological attributes of 
the human being. 
v. Virtue empowers the functional flourishing of the person, facilitating 
openness to reality and the capacity to love other persons.1380 (See b. 
immediately above.) This is facilitated not only by rich connectivity 
between sensory cortices and the PFC but enriched brain activity 
supporting just action (see p. above), and prudent action (see o. 
above), supported by effective emotional regulation at the service of 
rationality. 
vi. Virtue empowers the teleological flourishing of the person. The 
endpoint is eudaimonia, a state of general flourishing marked by 
effective self-management mediated by the neurophysiological 
dispositions of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. It satisfies 
two conditions for the presence of virtue – on the one hand mature 
neurobiological development, integration of systems, efficiency and an 
emotionally enriched life; and on the other a rationality that is 
disposed to seek and recognise truth and to love others.  The wellbeing 
of the human person requires effective integration of the rational and 
physiological, the complete harmonisation of body and soul. This is the 
                                                          
1380
 Affective experience in turn feeds back into the paradigm of virtue development, facilitating 
peace of heart and motivating further positive behaviours.  
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ultimate meaning of eudaimonia.  (There will be further discussion of 
flourishing in Chapter 6.) 
 
5.3.3.2 The neural bases of virtue  
 
I will now map the neural substrates of virtue to the characteristics of virtue 
established in Chapters 3 and 4. The state of virtue is understood as a state of 
excellence at the neural biophysical level for each of the characteristics.  
 
This section proposes neural features for the 17 characteristics of virtue identified 
in Table 4.1. These 17 characteristics are divided, as per the original table, into 
three categories according to their association with the acquisition of virtue.  For 
each point I offer brief philosophical clarifications of the characteristic under 
discussion (relating findings of Chapters 3 and 4 to the neurological domain) and 
then I summarise the proposed neural signature for the characteristic under 
discussion. Finally, for each characteristic, I list the neural systems (see Table 5.2) 
associated, thus emphasizing the underpinning systemic integration. Tables 
summarizing discrete neural systems and their prima facie linkage to virtue are 
included in the endnotes.  
 
…. 
 
A. CHARACTERISTICS PERTAINING TO THE STATE OF VIRTUE 
 
1. The virtues of prudence and justice dispose the practical reason and the 
intellectual appetite facilitating rationality and appropriate choices. 
 
Philosophical clarifications. 
 The different virtues exhibit distinctive biological features. In the 
Aristotelian/ Thomistic understanding, the human person is the 
animated body. Rational activity is conducted by a body animated by 
a human soul. As has been reviewed in Chapter 4, four cardinal 
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virtues are necessary to account for operations and activities of an 
embodied soul.  On this basis it is necessary for the four cardinal 
virtues to have distinctive neural signatures. Hence, the virtues of 
prudence and justice are materially manifested as perfections of 
certain neural structures that are necessarily associated with 
rationality and choice in the embodied life. 
 Prudence1381 and justice1382 contribute habits perfecting the rational 
faculties,1383 and therefore directing choices consequent upon the 
presentation of arduous goods and pleasurable goods to the intellect 
and will by the habits of the sensitive appetites.1384  
 Rationality and rational choice as we have seen in Chapters 1, 3 and 
4, while not reducible to the biological, possess and are manifested 
by means of sensible, neurobiological concomitants. 
 Furthermore, (as has been argued in Chapter 4) in a state of virtue 
the unity of the virtues holds: all virtues are present and their action 
is fully integrated. Not only will the virtues of prudence and justice, 
here described, be enlisted in the direction of actions disposed by 
fortitude and temperance, but the self-dominion accompanying 
fortitude and temperance (described in the section immediately 
                                                          
1381
 The virtue disposing the practical intellect is prudence.  As we have seen in Chapter 4, 
prudence may be understood as the habitual disposition of the practical intellect to be of right 
counsel, to judge well and to command well. Aquinas argues that prudence is needed “to perfect 
the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end”. (ST, Ia-IIae, Q.57, 
Art.5.) It is “right reason about things to be done,” (ST, Ia-IIae, Q.58, Art.3.1) the habitual 
disposition of the practical intellect to be of right counsel, to judgement well and to command 
well. The starting point of prudence is knowledge of reality. Furthermore, “memory, experience, 
tact, good judgement, and sagacity” all either arise from prudence or accompany it.
 
(Aristotle De 
Virtutibus et Vitiis, 1250a30-37) It is “well trained reason, capable of working out the particulars of 
a problem, of foreseeing the probable consequences of an act, of using powers of circumspection, 
of weighing the individual circumstances of a situation, of exercising caution lest good intentions 
ultimately do more harm than good. Reasoning, foresight, watchfulness, precaution are all 
essential elements of prudence, and there is no real prudence without them.” (Gilson, The 
Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 288.) 
1382
 As we have seen in Chapter 4, Justice is the virtue which disposes the rational will to act with 
due respect to the rights of others.  Aquinas argues that justice is the state of character that makes 
people disposed to do what is just, and makes them act justly and wish for what is just. (NE, 
1129a7ff. ) Strict reciprocity of duty but also extending to duties of religion and of filial gratitude.  
1383
 Aquinas writes of virtue as the “perfection of reason” in ST, II-II, 51,1. 
1384
 The intellectual appetite is understood as the attraction to abstract pleasurable goals brought 
about by reward mechanisms in the brain responding to particular representations of goods 
associated with those abstract goals. 
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below) make prudent and just action possible. Hence, the neural 
signature of the virtues disposing a single human act will reflect the 
presence not only of the virtues disposing the intellect and rational 
appetite, but also those disposing the irascible and sensitive 
appetites. 
 We must keep present that it is the person who is rational, not 
particular brain cells. Although it is the case that the PFC, and higher 
cortical areas in general, are more active in supporting the 
dispositions of prudence and justice, it would be an unwarranted 
conclusion that man’s intellectual life, his capacities to grasp the 
truth of things or to love rationally, have their bases solely in activity 
in the higher cortical areas. This position would have no philosophical 
justification in keeping with the views of Aristotle and Aquinas. 
Beyond the highly complex integration of all brain areas, including 
limbic and basal structures, accompanying all activity in the cortex, 
activity in the brain itself is supported by the organic life of the 
organism, respiration, nutrition and circulation. Our microfocus on 
neural structures and pathways and mechanisms must be balanced 
by acknowledgement of the functional, existential, and objective 
unity of the person. 
  
Neural bases 
At the neurobiological level, prudence and justice are perfections of 
specific biological structures that are necessarily associated with 
rationality in the embodied life. They are established by plasticity-
elicited changes to neural structures, which optimise neural and 
biological efficiency and are essentially mechanisms for use-induced 
establishment and reinforcement of neural pathways. 
 
These perfections of bodily structures are essentially neuronal 
facilitations of the following biophysical tasks. These tasks together 
account for the roles of counsel, judgement, command, and the 
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disposition to accommodate the good of others, as required by the 
virtues of prudence and justice.1385  
 
 A facilitation for (hereafter described as “capacity for”) processing of 
sensory data as a prerequisite for grasping the reality of the context 
for decision making. This processing will be directed by the lateral 
PFC informed by the accurate cortical somatosensory feedback via 
PNS and lower brain areas that is required for effective cortical 
processing. 
 Capacity for planning and foresight, and for consideration of 
consequences of impact on others. This latter role is primarily a task 
of the VMPFC, 1386 1387 the ACC and the OFC. Areas of the PFC are 
active in consideration of possible future outcomes.1388 1389 1390  
Contribution of the right DLPFC has been noted. It is believed that the 
PFC, and in particular the OFC, is the site of appreciation of moral 
consequences of behaviour.1391 
 Capacity for cognitive processing of emotional content, and 
particular reward representations reaching PFC via OFC (input from 
cortico-striatal, and cortico-limbic pathways).  Clinical studies show 
time and again that frontal cortical inhibitory zones suppress lower 
                                                          
1385
 Counsel may be understood as a having a sound grasp of reality and duty in both physical and 
ethical dimensions. Judgement implies the capacity to evaluate the intrinsic and extrinsic benefits 
of an action taking into account the good of others. Command implies the executive capacity to 
carry decisions into action.    
1386
 Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,” 
1196-1214. It was the medial PFC that suffered damage in the case of Phineas Gage.  
1387
 Lee, et al., “Regulation of human behaviours,” 190. 
1388
 J. M. Fuster, The prefrontal cortex, (New York: Raven Press, 1989). 
1389
 J. Grafman,“Alternative frameworks for the conceptualisation of prefrontal functions” in 
Handbook of Neuropsychology, ed. F. Boller and J. Grafman (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1994), 187. 
1390
 R. Passingham, The frontal lobes and voluntary action, (Oxford: OUP, 1993). Passingham is 
recognised as a decisive pioneer of an understanding of PFC function and its role in support of 
decision making. 
1391
 Note that damage to the medial PFC and frontal cortex leads to socially inappropriate 
behaviour, disinhibition, emotional impairment, difficulty in planning, and impaired working 
memory, as noted above in the celebrated case in 1848 of Phineas Gage but borne out by many 
animal studies and human case studies. Cf Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of 
the brain. 
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order behaviours. 1392  1393 Emotional and reward representations are 
generated in the medial PFC in conjunction with the BG via reciprocal 
pathways. BG are also active in concert with the PFC, enlisting limbic 
structures for processing emotional content and memory. 1394 
Cognitive processing of emotional representations channeled 
through the OFC via limbic-cortical pathways is primarily in DLPFC, 
VMPFC, and OFC itself. 1395 1396 1397 This will be assisted by generation 
of representations in the memory (primarily distributed in cortex and 
in amygdala), as required for the representation of the anticipated 
goods. Note that, via striatal pathways, the medial PFC is capable of 
upstream modification on ACh and DA release, further modifying 
reward and emotional representations. 1398 1399 Plasticity in spindle 
cells understood to facilitate goal directed behaviour and self 
control.1400 There is evidence that emotional and reward election 
management requires the PFC areas to be in rich reciprocal 
communication with the amygdala and striatum. 1401   
 Capacity for associated deliberation about abstract goods (again 
primarily in the PFC)   represented by the above particular reward 
representations. This cognitive activity directed by the lateral PFC will 
be facilitated by recruitment of memory (principally cortical-
declarative, emotional memory via the limbic pathways, and 
hippocampal memory) which “supports the capacity to make 
                                                          
1392
 M. R. Bennett, “The prefrontal-limbic network in depression: Modulation by hypothalamus, 
basal ganglia and midbrain,” 483. 
1393
 Zotev et al., “Self-Regulation of Amygdala Activation Using Real-Time fMRI Neurofeedback”. 
1394
 Koch, “Consciousness,” 1220. 
1395
 Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,” 
1196-1214.  
1396
  Barbas and Zikopoulos, “Sequential and parallel circuits for emotional processing in primate 
orbitofrontal cortex,” 57. 
1397
 Balbernie, “Circuits and circumstances. The neurobiological consequences of early relationship 
experiences and how they shape later behavior,” 237-255. 
1398 Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with 
developmental approaches to psychopathology,”747. 
1399
 Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 470. 
1400
 Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 104-105. 
1401
 Ray and Zald, “Anatomical insights into the interaction of emotion and cognition in the PFC,” 
479-501. 
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generalisations and inferences from memory”.1402 1403 Recruitment of 
various forms of short and long term memory at cortical, limbic, and 
striatal sites in particular, facilitate recall of contextual particular 
information, emotional cues, and also abstract rules of right and 
wrong. The BG also play a direct role in the task of deliberation: areas 
of BG interconnected with PFC are implicated in intentional 
behaviour, learning and decision making. 1404   
 Capacity for consequent generation of an intention is supported by 
mechanisms of reward and goal election. As we have seen, goal 
election and cognition of reward representations appear to be 
closely associated functions. Rational intention will be informed by 
medial PFC emotional processing balanced by laterally directed 
deliberation.1405 1406 Input from the BG, modifying the PFC via 
thalamic pathways, is also considered a key regulator of voluntary 
behaviour.1407 Capacity for deliberation is an integrating cognitive 
task directed by the lateral cortex. 1408 1409 Active brain areas are 
diverse but feature strong connectivity. 1410 Memory in the striatum 
not only appears to instruct the PFC with respect to procedural 
patterns of behaviour,1411 but the striatum contributes to an 
                                                          
1402
 Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 1165. 
1403
 Marieb, Elaine N. and Katja Hoehn. Human anatomy and physiology. 8
th
 ed. San Francisco: 
Pearson, 2010, 459. Declarative memory pathways involve sensory input carried to the association 
cortex; information is then sent to the medial temporal lobe, including the hippocampus and 
proximate temporal cortical areas that link to the PFC and the thalamus. ACh from the basal 
forebrain released into the PFC and the medial temporal lobe is believed to trigger memory 
formation. 
1404
 Wickens, (2009) “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,”119. 
1405
 Markowitsch, et al., “Brain circuits for the retrieval of sad and happy autobiographic episodes,” 
643-665. 
1406
 Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 104-105. 
1407
 Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 464. 
1408
 Miller and Wallis, “The prefrontal cortex and executive brain functions,” 1201. 
1409
 Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 88. 
1410
 Lee, et al., “Regulation of human behaviours,” 189-199. 
1411
 Pasupathy and Miller, “Different time courses of learning related activity in the prefrontal 
cortex and striatum,” 873-876. 
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emphasis on intentional behaviour, learning and decision making. 1412 
1413   
 Executive command is a task of the lateral cortex enlisting motor 
cortices, the cortico-BG-thalamocortical loop, the BG, and the 
cerebellum. 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418  (See No. 7 in this section.) This will 
be complemented by the capacity to carry through executive 
commands to appropriate execution. 
 Capacity to utilise language as a vehicle for thought. For this the PFC 
links extensively to Broca’s Area also in the frontal cortex. 
 See also n. – q. in 5.3.3.1 outlining the particular neural features of 
each of the four cardinal virtues considered individually. 
 
Note that in the performance of a single human act, these tasks are 
seamlessly integrated.1419 
 
Prudence consists in appropriately formed neural structures that assist 
the intellect in reaching correct conclusions about ends and means. The 
lateral PFC is the principal site active in deliberation about 
consequences and means, planning and foresight. Lateral and medial 
PFC are densely interconnected and facilitate human volitional 
activity,1420 and cognitive deliberation about emotional content.1421   
                                                          
1412
 Wickens, (2009) “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,”119. 
1413
 Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 465. 
1414
 Doyon, et al., “Contributions of the basal ganglia and functionally related brain structures to 
motor learning,” 62. 
1415
 Kaas and Stepniewska, “Motor cortex,” 159. 
1416
  Barbas and Zikopoulos, “Sequential and parallel circuits for emotional processing in primate 
orbitofrontal cortex,” 73. 
1417
 Wickens, (2009) “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,”119. 
1418
 Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy, 5
th
 ed., 473. 
1419
 The analysis of the constituent parts of the human act (3.1.3) provides essential knowledge for 
the correct sequencing of activities at a somatosensory level and at the rational level. It provides a 
clear understanding of the distinctions between counsel, judgment and command, and of the roles 
of prudence and justice in informing these actions. Importantly also, it provides an understanding 
of the reciprocating deliberation between the intellect and the rational appetite prior to 
command. For example, an appreciation that particular reward representations precede to-and-fro 
deliberations between parts of the cortex prior to a single completed human act is essential the  if 
the neural signature of the virtues disposing that human act are to correctly be identified.   
1420
 Lee, et al., “Regulation of human behaviours,” 189-199. 
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Justice consists in appropriately formed neural structures that assist the 
rational will in choosing correctly. Neural structures include aspects of 
those aspects of b-e which are related to affective appreciation and 
evaluation, and emotion-cued reward representations.  In particular, 
areas of medial and orbital PFC are centrally implicated. These are the 
principal cortical sites for emotional processing, reward evaluation, 
deliberation about positive and negative affective consequences and 
means, and planning and foresight, most particularly with respect to the 
impact proposed actions will have on others. Recruitment of systems 
for empathy (including mirror neurons) to assist in understanding 
consequences of actions on others is also required. Areas of BG also, 
interconnected with amygdala, and PFC assist in deliberation about 
rewards with emotional content. Furthermore, a habit of expectations 
of cortical (ie conscious) DA reward in response to appropriate 
consideration for the impact of actions on others will be a further 
indicator of possession of the virtue.  
 
In summary, the PFC should be considered the most significant brain 
area associated with the virtues of prudence and justice, although 
various other brain areas are directly implicated, most significantly 
other cortical areas, the BG, the limbic system, and the pathways 
connecting these. The neural activity associated with prudence and 
justice takes place in a highly integrated and coordinated manner across 
multiple areas of the brain.  
 
Associated systems 
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of 
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1421
 Source for information in this section on the frontal cortex is, unless otherwise specified: Lee, 
et al., “Regulation of human behaviours,” 190. 
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formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and 
executive direction. 
2. The virtues of fortitude and temperance dispose the irascible and sensitive 
appetites to endure appropriate difficulties and to seek appropriate 
pleasure.1422 
 
Philosophical clarifications. 
 Virtue consists in appropriate (ie rational) response in respect to 
pleasure and pain. Regulation of emotion is at the heart of virtue. 
Fortitude and temperance dispose for the effective management of 
emotion. Rational guidance systems, disposed by prudence and 
justice, then are able to act.  
 Fortitude1423 and temperance1424 are essentially perfections of 
biological structures of the body, directly associated with 
management of emotional life,  which facilitate the presentation of 
appropriate arduous goods and pleasurable goods to the intellect 
and will. It has been argued that fortitude and temperance are, in 
total, ordered biophysical qualities of the human person; they 
facilitate rational action in the same way that a well-trained animal 
obeys the rationality of its master, eg by eating only when permitted, 
defending the master’s interests by fighting, etc.  
                                                          
1422
 The irascible and sensitive appetites, are understood as the attraction to concrete pleasurable 
goals brought about by reward mechanisms in the brain responding to particular representations 
or sensory input. Fortitude disposes the irascible appetite to endure difficulties in pursuit of 
difficult goods. Temperance disposes the sensitive appetite to obey reason in moderating pursuit 
of pleasures.  
1423
 Fortitude is a particular quality of self management; the right management of one’s fear and its 
concomitant sorrow is at the heart of the virtue. The essence of the virtue of courage is mastery 
over one’s emotions of fear with readiness in necessity to put one’s life knowingly and calmly on 
the line. “The man of fortitude relinquishes, in self forgetfulness, his own possessions and his life.” 
Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance, 54. 
1424
 Temperance is “the virtue whose particular function is to restrain and check passion”
 
(Gilson, 
The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 263). It is 
“
a virtue of the appetitive part, by which 
men cease to desire bad sensual pleasures” (Aristotle De Virtutibus et Vitiis 1250a30-37). In the 
strict sense it is “a mean with regard to the bodily pleasures of touch”
 
(NE, 1117b24ff). “To 
temperance belongs absence of admiration for the enjoyment of bodily pleasures, absence of 
desire for all base sensual enjoyment, fear of just ill repute, an ordered course of life, alike in small 
things and in great. And temperance is accompanied by discipline, orderliness, shame, caution.” 
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 We have seen that with respect to temperance Aristotle understood 
that virtue consists in finding pleasure in the right things for the right 
reason to the right degree. Thus we should look for the temperance 
in the changes and dispositions in the pathways triggering pleasure 
as well as in the cognitive reassessment and adjustment of sense 
pleasure, a reassessment of fitting sources of pleasure. 
 We have seen that with respect to fortitude Aristotle understood 
that virtue consists in enduring difficulties in the right things for the 
right reason and to the right degree. Thus we should look for the 
fortitude in the changes and dispositions in the pathways triggering 
fear as well as in the cognitive reassessment and adjustment of fear, 
a “recalibration” of what makes us fearful.    
 Note that, the points which follow should be read most particularly 
in conjunction with the No. 1 in this section outlining the common 
neural bases of prudence and justice, and n. – q. in 5.3.3.1 outlining 
the particular neural features of each of the four cardinal virtues 
considered individually. This is discussed in No. 1, immediately 
above, according to the understanding of the unity of the virtues.1425  
 
Neural bases 
At the neurobiological level, the virtues of fortitude and temperance 
consist in plasticity elicited changes to neural structures. These changes 
are brought about by mechanisms for use-induced establishment and 
reinforcement of neural pathways and they serve to optimise neural 
and biological efficiency. These perfections of bodily structures are 
essentially neuronal facilitations, plasticity elicited predispositions for 
rationally consistent responses to pain and to pleasure. They serve to 
enable rational action. In the restricted sense they consist of habitual 
responses, which when acquired, allow a person more easily to manage 
                                                          
1425
 Note that an understanding of the unity of the virtues leads to the conclusion that the work of 
the virtues is highly integrated, and points to the difficulty of precisely delineating at what point 
the work of fortitude and temperance is completed, and where the work of prudence, most 
particularly, commences. 
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fear of bodily danger and inappropriate attraction to sense pleasures of 
touch. In a broader sense they refer to habitual responses of patience 
and determination in the face of difficulties, and to habitual responses 
of appropriate moderation of pleasurable activities.  
 
They are constituted by integrated activity in neural bases below. 
Activity is primarily in interconnected areas of the PFC, limbic system, 
and BG, dedicated to emotional regulation, bearing in mind that the 
various emotions are represented, as would be expected, at differing 
locations in the brain.  
 
Fortitude and temperance, as we have seen, are brought about by 
“training” according to Aristotle, in a way analogous to training an 
animal. As such they may be viewed as varieties of “conditioned 
response”, itself a broad term denoting learning brought about by some 
form of incentive. These conditioned responses are compatible with, 
and facilitate, conscious rational goal election.  
 
The points below must be read in conjunction with No.1 above. In the 
light of the above proviso, the common neural bases for fortitude and 
temperance follow. 
 
 Areas of the PFC (OFC, medial PFC, and lateral PFC) and areas of the 
amygdala and of the BG are the key structures in management of 
fear and pleasure. The capacity of the PFC to elicit conscious 
representations of emotion, and to assess affective consequences of 
actions is at the heart of this emotional regulation.1426 The PFC has 
projections to and from the forebrain systems associated with 
sensory data, with voluntary motor movement, with long term 
memory, and with systems processing affect and motivational state. 
                                                          
1426
 Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,” 
1196-1214. 
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It is also interconnected to brain areas processing external 
information (linked to sensory systems/cortical and subcortical 
motor systems), as well as internal information (limbic and midbrain 
involving affect, memory and reward).  
 Cognitive processing of emotional representations reaching the OFC 
via limbically modified thalamocortical pathways is primarily in 
DLPFC, VMPFC and OFC, those areas of the cortex adjacent to the 
limbic areas, and are believed to regulate emotional response.1427 
1428 1429  1430 Conscious regulation of emotion utilizes both the DLPFC 
and VMPFC. It is believed that the DLPFC recruits input from the 
VMPFC (which includes the OFC) when there are conflicting 
emotional situations.1431  
 The OFC is regarded as the limbic gateway to the cortex. OFC 
inhibition of subcortical areas such as the amygdala is a key to affect 
regulation.1432 Neuroplastic remodelling of the frontal lobes is at the 
core of improved affect regulation in the PFC, allowing the OFC to 
effectively inhibit activation of subcortical areas such as the 
amygdala.1433 
 The ACC, within the medial PFC, has been called the “major outflow 
of the limbic system” and is active in the experience of pain and 
distress. 1434 With the OFC it plays a central role in cortical regulation 
of emotion.1435 The ACC appears to play a role in inhibiting impulsive 
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behaviours and in generating goal-directed behaviours.1436 There is 
evidence that it plays a role in analysing conflicting options.1437 
 The BG informs the limbic loop of emotional management and plays 
a significant role in regulation of emotional responses.1438 1439 1440 
This finding supported by clinical observation that dysfunction of 
basal ganglia-limbic circuitry leads to schizophrenia and severe 
anxiety.1441 
 The amygdala projects back to virtually all areas of the cortex 
influencing not only responses to fear, but higher order thought 
process, working and long term memories, ongoing perceptions, 
attention, mental imagery, principally in assistance to emotional 
regulation. 1442 1443 
 Pathways for emotional regulation are found in the BG-thalamo-
cortical loop importantly already associated with habit formation, 
and in the limbic-OFC-ACC loop. 1444  Limbic modulation requires rich 
reciprocal connections with the OFC. 1445 1446 Significantly, the NAc in 
the BG is adjacent to the OFC and rich interconnections exist 
between them. Limbic modulation also requires interconnectivity to 
memory centres. OFC links to other cortical memory centres and to 
subcortical memory centres including amygdala and hippocampus. 
The lateral OFC, the OFC, and medial PFC are interconnected and 
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play a critical role in cognitive and emotional processing and in the 
formation of motivation for the selection of behaviours.1447 DA 
modulation of reward pathways is well established. 1448  1449 1450 
 Various forms of memory are recruited in support of emotional 
regulation. Consideration of the perceived good of emotional 
regulation is associated with recruitment of memory (principally by 
hippocampal-cortical memory systems informed by the amygdala) 
the generation of reward representations associated with a 
pleasurable good, and associated DA and opioid signaling.  
 
Fortitude consists in appropriately formed neural structures that assist 
the irascible appetite to obey rationality. These are essentially learned 
dispositions at the neural level regulating fear responses and aversive 
responses to pain.  
 
As fortitude involves the rational management of fear, it is necessary to 
describe the neural bases of the experience of fear in order to better 
understand the neural bases of fortitude. To describe the neural bases 
of the experience of fear I draw, among others, from the work of 
Joseph LeDoux:  
 The PFC is active in conscious representations of emotion, and in 
assessing affective consequences of actions.1451  The presence of 
fear, the capacity to experience fear, indicates the maturation of 
working memory and in particular the OFC, linking temporal lobe 
limbic areas (amygdala and temporal pole cortex), the subcortical 
drive centres (in hypothalamus), and the DA neurons in reward 
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centres of VTA.1452 ACh is responsible for the mediation of vivid 
fearful memories. 1453 
 The amygdala is active in the experience of fear, mediates emotional 
influences on attention and perception, and regulates emotional 
responses. Mechanisms of synaptic enhancement are linked to 
emotional memory in studies of amygdala circuits that mediate fear. 
1454 Emotional memory seems associated with the BLA which 
includes the lateral, basolateral, and basomedial nuclei, and the 
CEA.1455 The lateral nucleus area tags memories with emotional 
“markers”.1456 Recall of these memories is mediated by 
hippocampus.1457  
 The BLA seems key in development of an aversion, of fear 
conditioning. BLA draws input from widespread cortical areas, and 
from the sensory nuclei of the thalamus, with reciprocal connections 
to hippocampal and striatal memory systems. Outputs also extend 
from BLA to CEA and thence to subcortical areas controlling fear 
related responses such as heart rate, blood pressure, sweating, 
hormone release, etc. 1458 
 Emotional arousal appears to promote synaptic plasticity (for 
memory and learning) by various mechanisms including release of 
NE.1459 The emotional circuitry is also modulated in an excitatory way 
by ACh from the gigantocellular neurons of the reticular excitatory 
area.1460  1461  
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 Cortisol, adrenaline, and noradrenaline are triggered from the 
adrenal glands in times of stress that may or may not accompany 
fear.1462 
Neural regions associated with the apprehension of pain are 
widespread and include the lateral PFC, anterior and posteria insula, the 
OFC, the MPFC, the anterior cingulate gyrus, areas of the BG, the 
thalamus, amygdala, hippocampus and various other subcortical 
regions. 1463  
 
It is proposed that the specific neural bases of fortitude are essentially to be 
found in neural modifications in the above pathways, most particularly in the 
following ways:  
 Cortical processing of pain and fear responses is facilitated by the 
cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical loop which permits complex 
cognitive-emotional interaction, and offer insights into processes of 
planning, goal selection, self-regulation, attention and motivation. 
There are dense interconnections between the OFC and the 
amygdala, and between the amygdala, the hippocampus, and the 
ventral striatum.1464 Furthermore, it is shown that motivation and 
meaning are analgesic factors. 1465 Therefore plastic modification of 
reward and goal setting pathways can effect changes in the pain 
threshold. 
 The VMPFC and the amygdala are the key brain areas implicated in 
fear and its management. The VMPFC, the DLPFC, the hippocampus, 
and amygdala constitute the core elements of the neural circuit (the 
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cortico-amygdalic pathways) critical for deactivating conditioned 
fears. 1466     
 Neurotransmitters modulate the individual’s emotional 
responses,1467  We have seen, for example, 5-HT released into the 
hypothalamus and limbic structures inhibits aggression. 1468 1469  
 Emotional inhibition makes use of inhibitory pathways in the brain. 
GABA is the major inhibitory transmitter in the mammalian brain 
further modified by the presence of steroids (denoting stress) and 
testosterone. 1470 1471 GABA and GABAergic genes are seen as key 
mediators of learning and memory in anxiety, and in specific in the 
amygdala and hippocampus, regions of the brain involved in memory 
and anxiety. 1472 
 Consciousness of wellbeing and inner peacefulness as a consequence 
of release of opioids from the hypothalamus,1473 and release of 
cortical (ie conscious) DA reward in response to appropriate 
endurance of difficulties will be further possible indicators of virtue.  
 
Temperance consists in appropriately formed neural structures that 
condition the sensitive appetite to obey rationality. These are 
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essentially learned dispositions at the neural level regulating formation 
of pleasure representations, and response to these representations. 
 
The neural bases for the experience of sense pleasure consist in:  
 Basic sexual drives associated the hypothalamus in association with 
somatosensory feedback pathways trigger neurochemical and 
hormonal release. DA, originating in the VTN and SN, is sent via 
reward pathways, to the striatum, medial PFC and some twenty 
other locations.  
 Equivalent pathways associated with sense pleasures with respect to 
food and drink. 
 Emotional memories are laid down in the BLA, reward and 
procedural memories in the striatum, and associated declarative 
memories distributed through the cortex.  
 
It is proposed that the specific neural bases of temperance are 
essentially to be found in certain neural dispositions. Hence the neural 
bases for temperance consist in the following:  
 The facilitation of cortically moderated responses to basic sexual 
drives associated the hypothalamus, and reward representations in 
the medial PFC and the striatum, following pleasurable stimuli. 
Reinforcement of appropriate emotional memory, procedural 
memory and declarative memories will be take place in association 
with this.   
 Facilitation for conscious management of lustful feelings in DLPFC 
and ACC, which have been shown to be activated in suppression of 
sexual response.1474 The DLPFC, interacting with VLPFC and ACC, 
becomes active in choosing to resist feelings deemed 
inappropriate.1475   
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 Established pathways of habituated responses to pleasure in keeping 
with rational choice, in association with cognitive pathways 
regulating reward responses, assessing impact on others, and 
assessing proposed behaviours against moral learning.  
 DA modulation of appropriate reward representations in the 
striatum exerts in turn a major modulatory effect on cortical output 
via the cortico-striatal connection and the via the thalamolimbic 
pathway. 1476  Cortico-basal-thalamic loops lead to further 
modulation and reinforcement of appropriate pathways.    
 Consciousness of wellbeing and inner peacefulness as a consequence 
of release of opioids from the hypothalamus,1477 and release of 
cortical (ie conscious) DA reward in response to appropriate sense 
pleasure, will be further possible indicators of virtue.  
 
In 4.2.6 I asked why fear has the capacity to obliterate reason more easily than 
sense pleasure.  The neural bases for these two responses are distinct, and it 
would appear possible that the central role of the amygdala, and direct 
interconnectivity with the hypothalamus, offer an explanation for this enhanced 
function.1478 The studies of LeDoux demonstrate that fear responses are highly 
phylogenetically conserved; for evolutionary reasons, the sympathetic, fight or 
flight responses triggered by the amygdala, have an override capacity.1479 Cortical 
processing comes second. It would seem too that pathways for the experience of 
sense pleasure to some extent are more cortically driven, a result of choice rather 
than of chance encounter in the environment requiring split second response. For 
this evolutionary reason too, it would seem that response to fear is more 
dominating and subrational. 
 
Associated systems 
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Plasticity. Systems for learning. A-O paradigms giving way to S-R paradigms. 
Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of emotional management. 
Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit formation. Cognition, 
consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and executive direction. 
Systems for imitation and empathy. 
 
3. A capacity for rational goal election is evident. 
 
Philosophical clarifications. 
In this section we look more closely at the neural basis for cognitive 
management of goal election. Cognitive management of goal election is 
a necessary but insufficient condition for the presence of virtue. 
Cognitive choices must not only be present but also disposed by 
prudence and justice (as discussed in No.1 above). Vice is none other 
than the deliberate choice of harmful behaviours.  
 
We have seen in No.2 that fortitude and temperance may be developed 
by incentive learning. In such a paradigm will be found rational goal 
election, supported by reward incentives for appropriate behaviours. 
 
In addition what can be called an intellectual or spiritual joy is effected 
by harmonious rational activity. This may be understood as the peace, 
comprehended rationally, and further rewarded by the body’s reward 
systems, derived from due order in one’s emotional and passionate life, 
and from an appreciation of the good accruing to others because of 
one’s virtuous activity.  
 
The pleasure associated with virtuous action is first of all a 
consequence of the reward systems and pathways. These reward 
systems operate at two levels: as a motivation to act, and as a further 
reward for virtuous action.  
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Neural bases 
Our focus in this section is on the reward systems of the human 
organism, associated with goal election and motivation; our focus is on 
how these, in themselves, are subject to the neural facilitation of virtue.  
Reward systems may either be subject to cognitive direction, or (in the 
case of impulsive behaviour) over-ride effective cognitive direction. It is 
shown for example, that subcortical sensory inputs to the amygdala can 
drive emotional responses that precede cortical awareness, thereby 
circumventing executive direction. 1480 
 
Neural modifications associated with virtue will dispose reward systems 
to cognitive deliberations thereby offering the satisfaction of greater 
self management attuned to the integrated flourishing of the entire 
organism. 
 
The neural bases for the human reward systems involve:  
 The exciting DA driven, and the blissful endorphin driven systems. DA 
release is the principal mechanism of reward activation and, as we 
have seen, is interdependent on opioid signalling. The hormone 
oxytocin manufactured in hypothalamus provides specialised reward 
incentive, upregulating mood. A further type of reward activation 
involves 5-HT release into the limbic area and hypothalamus. 1481 
14825-HT receptors are found in nerve endings throughout brain. 1483   
 Areas of the amygdala, BG, and OFC are major reward “centres” of 
the brain. 1484  1485 They are richly interconnected. Cue-reward 
learning and synaptic plasticity in the amygdala, more particularly, 
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the LA appears to be a decisive mechanism underpinning goal 
directed behaviour. Note that goal directed behaviour does not 
necessarily imply consciously elected action.  
 Hedonic reward has been long believed to be mediated by DA 
projections from the VTA of the basal forebrain.1486 Midbrain DA 
systems appear to provide reward signals to the PFC strengthening 
specific connections for particular behaviours.1487 1488  
 We have seen that there are two major DA systems in the brain: one 
projecting from the SNpc to the caudate and the putamen in the 
striatum and in a minor way to the NAc;1489 another, the 
mesocorticolimbic DA system originating in the VTA and innervating 
the NAc, the amygdala and the various parts of the cortex, 
particularly the PFC. 1490 This second system is regarded as central to 
the brain’s reward circuit,1491 1492 and critical in facilitation of 
incentive motivation.1493  
 These DA systems, triggered by cortico-limbic afferents,1494 in 
response to novel reward stimuli are the principal reward signals 
acting on the PFC to strengthen specific connections for particular 
behaviours.1495 1496   
                                                          
1486
 Di Filippo et al., “Short term and long-term plasticity at corticostriatal synapses: implications 
for learning and memory,”116. 
1487
 Miller, E. K., and Cohen, J. D. “An integrative theory of prefrontal function” Annual Review of 
Neuroscience. 24 (2001): 167-202.  
1488
 Wagner and Silber, Physiological Psychology, 213. 
1489
 Linked to laying down of procedural memory, and possibly to higher order personality traits 
1490
 McCormick, David A. “Membrane potential and action potential” Chapter 6 in Squire, Larry et 
al. Fundamental Neuroscience. 3
rd
 ed. Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008. DA is diffused in cortex with 
80% of the DA concentrated in the corpus striatum.  DA release is the condition for synaptic 
plasticity in the BG synapses between corticostriatal neurons and MSNs, possibly involving 
reverberation in the cortico-striatal loop. 
1491
 Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 3
rd
 ed., 390. 
1492
 Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 526. 
1493
 Depue andCollins, “Neurobiology of the structure of personality: Dopamine, facilitation of 
incentive motivation, and extraversion,” 500. 
1494
 Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with 
developmental approaches to psychopathology,”747. 
1495
 Miller, E. K., and Cohen, J. D. “An integrative theory of prefrontal function” Annual Review of 
Neuroscience. 24 (2001): 167-202.  
1496
 Da Cunha, “Learning processing in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,” 166.  
444 
 
 The BG play a major role in learning owing to their plasticity, 
presence in the reward and emotional regulation pathways, and 
efferent neuronal pathways to sensory cortices allowing somatic and 
sensory feedback. 1497  Closed cortical (lateral PFC, OFC, and the 
premotor cortex) - striatal loops appear to enable PFC to link 
complex anticipated behaviours with rewards, relying on rapid 
plasticities of the striatum. 1498 
  The NAc is topographically linked to basolateral amygdala and is a 
major terminal area for DA release in the reward pathways. The role 
of the striatum is essential in reward and motivation, organising 
somatosensory representations in a topographic manner. It draws 
cortical inputs from many areas of cerebral cortex.1499 
 
The neural bases facilitating virtuous activity in association with the 
human reward systems will facilitate activity in the following structures 
and pathways. 
 Plasticity in the OFC enables cortical processing of reward 
representations. The OFC is the key area for volitional goal election. 
Reward representations in the OFC are associated with goal-directed, 
conscious choices of action.1500  The OFC permits association 
information to access representational memory promoting 
“voluntary, cognitive, and goal directed (not stimulus driven) 
behaviour and facilitating new learning.” 1501 It is activated by tasks 
where processing of rewarding or emotional information is 
required,1502 1503 1504and where information about rewards and 
punishments is integrated with their predictors to select goals for 
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action. 1505 1506 Medial OFC appears implicated in reward and the 
lateral OFC in punishment. 1507  
 The OFC through its rich reciprocal connections to the limbic system 
and to the striatum plays a major integrating role. 1508 The OFC 
(particularly area MOC13) integrates both stimuli and responses with 
complex associations of reinforcement.1509  MOC 13 is believed to 
integrate appetitive and aversive factors that are environmentally 
dependent."1510 
 Plasticity in the DA pathways and uptake in the PFC facilitates 
cortical processing of reward representations. A large proportion of 
PFC neurons assisted by DA release, encode rewards linking 
behaviours to goal directed consequences. 1511  It is postulated that 
DA neurons in the midbrain respond when a reward seems 
imminent. 1512 
 Plasticity in areas of the BG facilitates conscious reward processing. 
1513  Like the OFC, the striatum is activated in association with 
movement for an expected reward. 1514  1515   The BG contain 
inhibitory GABAergic neurons, 1516 requiring strong and coherent 
excitatory cortical inputs from almost all cortical areas to become 
                                                          
1505
 Roesch and Schoenbaum, “OFC as gateway,” 201. 
1506
  O'Doherty and Dolan “The role of the human orbitofrontal cortex,”266. 
1507
  O'Doherty and Dolan “The role of the human orbitofrontal cortex,”269. 
1508
  Price, “Connections of the orbitofrontal cortex,”39 and 52. 
1509
 Depue andCollins, “Neurobiology of the structure of personality: Dopamine, facilitation of 
incentive motivation, and extraversion,” 501. 
1510
 Depue andCollins, “Neurobiology of the structure of personality: Dopamine, facilitation of 
incentive motivation, and extraversion,” 491-517. 
1511
 Miller and Wallis, “The prefrontal cortex and executive brain functions,” 1217. 
1512
 Miller and Wallis, “The prefrontal cortex and executive brain functions,” 1217. 
1513
 Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 465. Animal studies have 
offered much light about the role of the BG in reward systems. Lesions of the BG affected the 
instrumentality of actions so that tested animals have been no longer able act for reward to avert 
adverse outcome. 
1514
  Barbas and Zikopoulos, “Sequential and parallel circuits for emotional processing in primate 
orbitofrontal cortex,”  64. 
1515
 Wickens, “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,” 120. 
1516
 95% of neurons in striatum are GABAergic MSNs  according to Da Cunha, “Learning processing 
in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,” 159. 
446 
 
active. 1517  Over time A-O behaviours activating the ventral striatum 
give way to S-R behaviours.1518  1519  As has been discussed, S-R 
behaviours can also be volitional.1520      
 Plasticity in connectivity between the BG and the OFC is crucial to 
the body’s reward system, and hence to systems for goal election. 
Cells of the striatum become active in anticipation of reward, 
mirroring reward coding in the OFC.1521 1522 DA is released into the 
striatum leading to further limbic modification of neural 
transmission. DA modulation in the BG in turn brings about a decisive 
modulatory effect back on the cortex via the cortical-BG-cortical 
pathways. Striatal DA depletion is shown to lead to severe disruption 
of learned movement sequences.1523 This further supports the view 
that there is an interconnection, at the level of the BG, between 
reward pathways and learned sequential behaviours. The DA system 
acts as a learning signal for behavioural reinforcement but also may 
well be involved in attention and motivation before all important 
events, both positive and negative. Its action is facilitated by neural 
loops. 1524   
                                                          
1517
 Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation, ” 464. 
1518 
Wickens, “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,” 125. 
1519
 Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain,” 364. Ventrally based limbic reward 
becomes less significant; the dorsal striatum characterised by habit formation and addictions 
becomes associated with management pathways of actions. 
1520
 Beretta et al., “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia: A similar code for physiological and 
pathological conditions,” 349. Activities carried out with the ease of habit, either of a purely motor 
variety such as a tennis forehand, or with an ethical dimension such as habitual courteous 
greetings to strangers, may of course be fully intended and free, despite their intrinsic motivation.   
1521
 Horvitz, “Stimulus-response and response outcome learning mechanisms in the striatum,” 133. 
1522
 Horvitz, “Stimulus-response and response outcome learning mechanisms in the striatum,” 133. 
There is a close association between the striatum and the OFC by observation of differences 
between the sustained activity in striatal cells in comparison with the hundreds of millisecond 
activations of DA cells of the midbrain.
 
The striatal-cortical reciprocal pathways connect reward 
centres in the BG and PFC and play a major role in goal election. DA, a principal mediator of 
plasticity, is decisive in development of habits of goal directed action. 
1523
 Horvitz, “Stimulus-response and response outcome learning mechanisms in the striatum,” 135. 
1524
 Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with 
developmental approaches to psychopathology,” 747. In relation to this point, Pollak cites Schultz 
(1998), and Pruessner et al. (2004). 
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 Consciousness of wellbeing and inner peacefulness as a consequence 
of release of opioids from the hypothalamus,1525 and release of 
cortical (ie conscious) DA reward will be further possible indicators of 
virtue.  
 
Associated systems 
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Reward 
and motivational systems. Systems for habit formation. Cognition, consideration 
of consequences, planning, goal election, and executive direction. 
 
4. “Virtues change us.” The acquisition of virtue creates a state of character, a 
way of being that tends to be permanent.. 
 
Philosophical clarifications. 
At a secondary level, it is universally recognised that the habits we 
develop change us as people: good habits, virtues, change us for the 
better; bad habits, vices, for worse. Habit formation may be seen to 
consist in, at the neural level, of plasticities that facilitate certain ways 
of acting and thinking. 
 
Here I look at character, understood as a stable way of being that is 
associated with and denoted by qualities that have been acquired or 
developed. My focus is on habits that are acquired, the stable 
behaviours that define character. 
 
Neural bases 
 Explanation for the quasi permanent nature of character changes in 
the virtuous state is found at its foundation in the brain’s capacity to 
incorporate use-induced structural plasticities which elicit 
                                                          
1525
 Sunderland, The Science of Parenting, 87.  
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permanent structural changes at the neural level, predisposing 
thereby to changed behaviours.1526  
 Cortical and BG plasticities appear central to the stable, 
characteristic ways of acting and thinking that constitute personality 
and that are evident in emotional management systems, reward 
evaluation, systems for cognition and deliberation, and in the facility 
to act.   
 The cumulative effect of genetically transcripted changes on 
personality is profound.1527  In fact structural plasticities may have 
more permanent and lasting forms. For example, hippocampal 
plasticity is supplanted by cortical plasticity over time that is 
mediated by the striatum. 1528 1529  
 There is a compelling case supporting the view that the BG are a key 
component in the development of stable voluntary habits.1530 1531 In 
conjunction with the PFC, the BG are now increasingly regarded as a 
key brain area for reward and emotion processing, cognition and 
voluntary goal election, and for behaviour changing modulatory 
input to the cortex. BG are now seen as a centre, not only for 
subconscious facilitation of habits, but also mediating deliberate 
attention, and limbic modulation of cognition and action.1532 (see 
2.6) 
 The BG are now recognised as an area critical for learning, cognition 
and behavioural control. 1533 1534 Furthermore, the role of the BG, 
                                                          
1526
 Butz, et al., “Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 287-305. As we have seen, plasticity is 
now known to be virtually ubiquitous in the human brain. 
1527
 Malenka and Bear, “LTP and LTD: an embarrassment of riches,” 5-12. This is despite the fact 
that LTD is the mechanism whereby LTP can be reversed in the neocortex. 
1528
 Pasupathy and Miller, “Different time courses of learning related activity in the prefrontal 
cortex and striatum,” 873-876. 
1529
 For distinct forms of memory systems and the story of their discovery, the principal source of 
material that follows: Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 488. 
1530
 Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 1165. The role of the BG in 
modifying cortical motor representations is well documented. 
1531
 Floyer-Lea and  Matthews, “Distinguishable Brain Activation Networks for Short- and Long-
Term Motor Skill Learning,” 517. 
1532
 Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 3
rd
 ed., 327. 
1533
 Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 3
rd
 ed., 327. 
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and of the cortico-striatal pathways, in conscious goal election is 
increasingly well understood. 1535  
 It has become clear in recent years that the PFC-basal pathways 
sustain voluntary movement, whereas the motor cortex-basal 
ganglionic modules underlie more automatic movements.1536 The 
role of the BG in instructing the cortex in S-R situations is well 
understood.1537 Now it is becoming clear that S-R habituation need 
not necessarily be subconscious nor, per se, non-volitional. BG 
pathways appear integral to the pursuit of complex, purposeful, 
behaviour patterns,1538 It may be argued that individual goal directed 
behaviours on repetition become automated and less reward 
dependent, but nevertheless they remain purposeful, thereby 
fulfilling requirements for virtuous action.1539   
 
Associated systems 
Plasticity. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of emotional 
management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit formation. 
Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and executive 
direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems for 
imitation and empathy. 
 
5. The virtuous state is in keeping with our human nature. 
 
Philosophical clarifications. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1534
 Beretta et al., “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia: A similar code for physiological and 
pathological conditions,” 349. “It is well known that the cortico-striatal network controls 
functionally heterogeneous decision making processes, including goal directed actions, susceptible 
to reward feedback, and stimulus linked actions, largely automatic or habitual.” 
1535
 Beretta et al., “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia: A similar code for physiological and 
pathological conditions,” 349. 
1536
 Wise and Shadmehr, “Motor control,” 153.  
1537
 See for example:  Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation”; Da 
Cunha, “Learning processing in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors”. 
1538
 Beretta, Nicola et al. “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia: A similar code for physiological 
and pathological conditions” in Progress in Neurobiology 84 (2008): 345-346. 
1539
 Beretta et al., “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia: A similar code for physiological and 
pathological conditions,” 349. 
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Virtue assists human beings to flourish by disposing us to rational 
action.1540 The virtuous state, in keeping with our human nature, 
facilitates the fulfilment of our needs as human beings, understood by 
some as the goods of human flourishing (6.2), and promotes the 
complete realisation of personal potential (ie both at the biological level 
and at the level of the transcendental fulfilment by truth and love). 
Virtue offers us the capacity to be open both to the truth of experience 
and to transcendent truth, to elect reasonable goals for pursuit without 
interior hindrance, and to respond with love in interpersonal 
relationships.  
 
Neural bases 
 Virtue fosters the complete realisation of personal potential at the 
biological level. The development of virtue is manifestly a state of 
integration of brain systems, and a realisation of the capacity to learn 
most effectively from experience. The integration of the brain 
systems harnessed for the possession and expression of virtue is 
suggested by Table 5.1 and is central to this proposal for the neural 
bases of virtue. The capacity to learn from experience is a 
consequence of mechanisms of plasticity in conjunction with the 
somatosensory system, and systems for imitative learning.  
 
 Biological flourishing of the organism may be understood as the 
maturity of neural development. It implies the highest degree of 
development and specialization of individual neural components, 
mechanisms and systems, together with the development of 
interconnectivities (of all cortical, sub cortical, limbic, brain stem 
regions and PNS, together with the full development of 
                                                          
1540
 NE, 1106a15. “That which makes its possessor good and his work good likewise”. The good 
may be understood that which is most fulfilling according to one’s nature; rationality is ordered to 
choice of what is good. 
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neuromodulatory pathways). Thus is enabled the most complete 
integration and contribution of all elements at the service of 
emotional direction and enrichment, and which, in turn, is at the 
service of efficient, rationally directed action that takes the rights of 
others into full account.  
 Virtue offers the complete realisation of personal potential at the 
transcendental level by fostering an integration of emotional and 
rational life. Through a disposition to rational action, one is 
empowered to know and to love in an habitual way.  
 See No. 1 above for an overview of the neural manifestations of 
rational action.  
 Note also that the development of neuronal maturity in the support 
of rational operations is a gradual process. Neonates manifest little 
activity in the cerebral cortex and this accords with the Aristotelian 
view that infants and children, because they do not possess full 
rationality, are incapable of perfect virtue.1541 
 See also 6.2.1. 
 
Associated systems 
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of 
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit 
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and 
executive direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems 
for imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development. 
 
6. In the exercise of virtue intrinsic motivation takes priority over extrinsic 
motivation. Virtue is motivated by that which is worthy of man’s nature. 
 
Neural bases 
                                                          
1541
 Byrne, “Learning and memory: basic mechanisms,” 1142. 
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Intrinsic motivation leading to virtuous activity is present in several 
ways:  
 As has been discussed, once a disposition is acquired, A-O paradigms 
give way to S-R paradigms (possibly operating below the threshold of 
consciousness), leading to intrinsic reward associated with -opioid 
and phasic DA signalling in the BG, NAc, pallidum and PFC.1542 (It is 
argued that S-R paradigms are compatible with rational action.1543) 
 Actions disposed by virtue will be intrinsically rewarding, a trigger in 
themselves for the contentment mediated by reward systems. 
 By the exercise of the virtue of justice (see No. 1 above) which is 
always present in virtuous action, actions are disposed to take into 
account the good of others. This may be understood as a form of 
intrinsic motivation because there is no conscious hedonic benefit 
sought by the protagonist in interpersonal relationships. Persons may 
never be instrumentalised for personal gain or reward. 
 
Associated systems 
Plasticity.  Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of 
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit 
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and 
executive direction. Systems for imitation and empathy. 
 
7. Virtue facilitates effective action. 
 
Philosophical clarifications. 
While not all virtuous action need manifest in external activity, external 
activity that does result is rationally directed, taking the needs of others 
into account, addressing one’s own needs, having both sound intention 
and prudent selection of means.  
                                                          
1542
 Leknes and Tracey, “A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure,” 314-320. 
1543
 Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 465. The speed of 
development however is striking. In the first four years of life, cerebral neuronal metabolic activity 
increases to twice adult levels, thereafter declining to adult levels by age 15.  
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 See No. 1 for actions originating in the intellectual appetite. 
 See No. 2 above for actions originating in the sensitive appetite. 
 The virtue of prudence will underpin selection of ends and means. 
(See 5.3.3.1.n.) 
 The virtue of justice takes account of the impact of actions on others. 
(See 5.3.3.1.o.)  
 
Effective direction of habitual external behaviours is effected by 
complex pathways involving primarily the PFC, the motor cortices and 
the BG. 
 
Neural bases. 
We have seen in No.1 above, the role of executive command in the 
virtue of prudence. This was described as a task of the lateral cortex 
enlisting motor cortices, subserved by systems for action selection or 
goal election, and motor pathways utilizing the BG-thalamo-cortical 
loop, the BG, and the cerebellum, complemented by the capacity to 
carry through executive commands to appropriate execution. 1544 1545 
1546 1547 1548  Here I focus on the facilitation specifically of these tasks.  
This is a further characteristic that is necessary, but in isolation 
insufficient, for the presence of virtue.  
 
The facilitation of execution of intended action requires integration of 
the various sectors of the frontal lobe (most specifically the lateral PFC, 
an area oriented to action1549, and the motor cortices), enlistment of the 
                                                          
1544
 Doyon, et al., “Contributions of the basal ganglia and functionally related brain structures to 
motor learning,” 62. 
1545
 Kaas and Stepniewska, “Motor cortex,” 159. 
1546
 Barbas and Zikopoulos, “Sequential and parallel circuits for emotional processing in primate 
orbitofrontal cortex,” 73. 
1547
 Wickens, (2009) “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,”119. 
1548
 Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy, 5
th
 ed., 473. 
1549
 Barbas and Zikopoulos, “Sequential and parallel circuits for emotional processing in primate 
orbitofrontal cortex,” 73. 
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BG and cerebellum (for procedural facilitation), and directed neural 
activity in subsequent pathways via brain stem to execution in the PNS .  
 
Plasticity in these motor pathways is well documented. ACh is the 
principal excitatory mediating agent at the neuromuscular synapse, 
opening ion channels and triggering the phenomenon of muscular 
memory. Epi also plays a role.1550 AMPA trafficking is the mechanism 
appearing to underlie the formation of neuronal pathways, and 
behaviour modification itself.1551 Activity at the motor synapse can be 
self reinforcing with synapse pruning serving to optimise the 
connection,1552 1553 causing the synapse to be responsive to the specific 
environment of the individual. 1554 
 
The neural facilitation for effective action will consist in the following 
aspects: 
 The PFC itself is richly endowed with connections for conscious 
motor management to motor cortices, the primary motor cortex, the 
premotor and supplementary motor areas and Broca’s area. In 
addition to “anatomical loops” between the PFC and the BG , there is 
rich interconnectivity between the functional sectors of the frontal 
lobe, the cerebellum, the BG, and lower brain structures enabling 
execution of cortical commands.  The medial PFC “provides goal 
directed motor plans selected within the NAc on the basis of 
contextual and emotional associations from both the hippocampus 
and the amygdala”.1555 
                                                          
1550
 Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 707. 
1551
 Kessels and  Malinow, “Synaptic AMPA Receptor Plasticity and Behaviour,” 340. 
1552
 Tapia, Juan C and Lichtman, Jeff W. “Synapse Elimination” Chapter 20 in Squire, Larry et al. 
Fundamental Neuroscience. 3
rd
 ed. Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008. p470 
1553
 Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy, 5
th
 ed., 610. 
1554
 Tapia, Juan C and Lichtman, Jeff W. “Synapse Elimination” Chapter 20 in Squire, Larry et al. 
Fundamental Neuroscience. 3
rd
 ed. Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008. p475 
1555
 Quoted in Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective 
neuroscience with developmental approaches to psychopathology,”738. 
455 
 
 Multiple memory systems are associated with execution of goal 
directed motor plans.1556 The premotor cortex holds motor activity 
in memory. 1557 Motor memories and learning are triggered in the 
premotor cortex by ACh released from the basal forebrain. 1558 The 
dorsal striatum lays down memory for the long-term storage of well-
learned movement sequences and motor habits. 1559 The cerebellum 
holds movement programming.1560  Hippocampal plasticity and 
memory are evident in the development phase of habits in the 
striatum, and in the formulation of goal directed motor plans.1561. 
 Long term storage of explicit motor knowledge is in the PFC and 
associated parts of the BG, while storage of intermediate term 
explicit motor knowledge is in the MTL. 1562  
 The BG are most involved not only in cortical management of 
emotion, and habit formation, but also in motor management. The 
dorsal striatum lays down memory for motor habits and instructs the 
PFC in S-R situations.1563 The putamen receives input from motor and 
somatosensory cortical areas. 1564 Processing of motor commands 
takes place here and in the GP.1565 BG outputs directly affect activity 
of motor areas in the cortex,1566 operating “mainly to modify cortical 
motor representations rather than control behaviour through direct 
motor inputs”.1567 The GP and the SN of the BG also play a major role 
                                                          
1556
 Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 1174. 
1557
 Marieb and Hoehn, Human anatomy and physiology, 8
th
 ed., 437.  
1558
 Siegal and Sapru, Essential neuroscience, 124. 
1559
 Floyer-Lea and  Matthews, “Distinguishable Brain Activation Networks for Short- and Long-
Term Motor Skill Learning,” 517. 
1560
 Marieb and Hoehn, Human anatomy and physiology, 8
th
 ed., 458-459. 
1561
 Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with 
developmental approaches to psychopathology,” 747. 
1562
 Wise and Shadmehr, “Motor control,” 137-157. 
1563
 Squire et al., Fundamental Neuroscience. 3
rd
 ed.   
1564 
Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy, 5
th
 ed., 469. 
1565
 Martini, Fundamentals of Anatomy and Physiology, 6
th
 ed., 486. 
1566
 Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy, 5
th
 ed., 469. 
1567
 Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 1165. 
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in motor control, 1568  selecting patterns of cortical activity, and 
ultimately selecting and reinforcing chosen motor programs.1569 
 The BG-thalamo-cortical loop processes subsequent motor 
commands. Motor learning involves a “functional interplay... 
between cortico-striatal, cortico-cerebellar, and limbic systems.” 1570  
 The cerebellum assists in movement and motor habits and is now 
recognised to have a likely role in formation of cognitive habits.1571  
1572 1573  Furthermore, there is now evidence that the cerebellum and 
the BG are far more interconnected ,via a cerebello-thalamo-striatal 
pathway, and are therefore interactive, than has been long 
thought.1574  
 Axonal myelination facilitates speed of sensory and motor 
messaging through much of the PNS and CNS. 
 See also 6.2.1.2. 
 
Associated systems. 
Plasticity.  Systems for learning. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for 
habit formation. Memory systems. Cognition, consideration of consequences, 
planning, goal election, and executive direction. Systems for effective execution of 
motor commands. 
 
8. Virtue brings about ease of action. 
 
Philosophical clarifications. 
                                                          
1568
 Kaas and Stepniewska, “Motor cortex,” 159. 
1569
 Petersen, Human physiology, 205. 
1570
 Doyon, et al., “Contributions of the basal ganglia and functionally related brain structures to 
motor learning,” 62. 
1571 
James W. Kalat, Biological Psychology, 7th ed. (Belmont CA: Wadsworth, 2001), 238. 
1572
 Ito, M. “Cerebellar long term depression: Characterisation, signal transduction, and functional 
roles” 1143-1195. There is strong evidence that LTD is the mechanism by which learning is 
encoded in cerebellum.   
1573
 Patrick R. Hof, et al., “Cellular components of nervous tissue,” in Larry Squire, et al., 
Fundamental Neuroscience, 3
rd
 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008), Chapter 3. NE is distributed to 
the cerebellum and other areas from noradrenergic nucleus, the locus coeruleus, within the pons.
 
 
1574
 E. Hoshi, et al., “The cerebellum communicates with the basal ganglia,” Nature Neuroscience 8, 
(2005): 1491–93. 
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The easy repeatability of behaviours associated with virtue is 
immediately seen, for example in habitual courtesies,  habits of getting 
up when the alarm goes off, habits of reacting to difficulties with 
patience, etc. 
 
Neural bases. 
Here we focus on the development of habit, automaticity, in good 
behaviours. Ease of action is primarily a result of a number of neuronal 
mechanisms and loci of facilitation:  
 Preferential pathways are established by mechanisms of plasticity: in 
the pathways of the CNS and PNS, in motor, emotional and 
deliberative areas and pathways, in the various seats of memory, etc. 
 Mechanisms of habit learning, of automatisation, offer an 
explanation for the phenomenon of behaviours that appear to 
remain robust in the absence of immediate rewards. A-O paradigms 
give way to S-R paradigms with lower cortical demand: action 
becomes more efficient as action moves from high levels of cortical 
activation to simpler patterns of activation that are associated with 
automaticity. 
 The BG mediate subconscious facilitation of habits, cognition and 
action.1575 Hence they are now recognised as areas contributing to 
conscious control of established behaviours. The putamen, an area of 
the sensorimotor striatum, 1576 involved in learning and movement 
initiation and neuromodulated by DA from the SNpc, is also enriched 
by reward pathways.1577  
 See 6.2.1.2.  
                                                          
1575
 Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 3
rd
 ed., 327. 
1576
 Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 468. 
1577
 The BG become increasingly, or at least more efficiently, involved in the process of learning as 
actions become more automatic. Complex striatal habit formation involves cortical management 
via the striatal-cortical pathway. The striatum is functionally linked to SN which is richly 
interconnected to midbrain, STN, and VTA. In the dorsal striatum, which as we have seen is most 
active once actions are automatized, the caudate nucleus receives inputs from association cortices 
(and appears more implicated in A-O learning); the putamen has primarily sensorimotor 
connections (associated more with S-R learning). 
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Associated systems. 
Plasticity.  Systems for learning.  Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems 
for habit formation. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. 
 
9. Virtue facilitates the flourishing of the person. Virtue brings about a state of 
excellence: an excellence of the person, inclusive necessarily of both 
neurobiological flourishing and the exercise of rationality. It is a state 
whereby reason and rationality are empowered to manage activity. Capacity 
for rationality that is reflective and emotionally enriched and able to be 
carried through into noble humane behaviours. 
 
Philosophical clarifications. 
 Flourishing, those habits “by which a person acts well”,1578 is in effect 
the “reward of virtue”.1579 It denotes a state in which autonomy and 
agency, mastery over one’s operations and activities, are enhanced. 
Autonomy is a consequence of enhanced rationality and an 
enhanced capacity to bring one’s plans to fruition. See also No.5. 
 See also 6.2.1.2 where I argue that flourishing may be understood on 
at least three levels: affective, functional and teleological (directly 
facilitating of the final end of the person).  
 
Neural bases. 
 Nos. 1 and 2 above, focused on the capacity for the person to act in a 
truly rational and emotionally enriched way are the heart of 
eudaimonia. The high degree of integration of systems required, in 
support of emotional regulation and cognitive goal selection directed 
                                                          
1578
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.55, Art.3. 
1579
 NE, 1099b16. 
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towards moral behaviour,  is well established and increasingly 
acknowleged.1580 
 Nos. 7 and 8 above, focused on ease and efficiency of action, 
enhancing further to the autonomy of the person, contribute further 
to his functional flourishing. Functional flourishing requires structural 
maturity at the cellular and systemic levels, as well as functional 
integration. Essentially these processes are driven by developmental 
gene transcription triggered by internal processes and appropriate 
sense inputs. As the person matures after infancy, the subject’s own 
goal choices increasingly direct experiential inputs that consolidate 
pathways facilitating future behaviours. Development becomes 
increasingly self regulated, or at least offers the potential for this to 
be so.1581  
 Learning pathways need to be both efficient and cognitively directed: 
a result of plasticity and well developed mechanisms supported by 
habitual management of attentional systems.   
 
Associated systems. 
Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of emotional 
management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit formation. 
Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and executive 
direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems for 
imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development. 
                                                          
1580
 A representative sample of supporting papers: Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural 
constituents,” 841-849; Grossberg and Versace, “Spikes, synchrony, and attentive learning by 
laminar thalamocortical circuits,” 278-312; Greene and Haidt, “How (and where) does moral 
judgment work?”  517–523; Somerville and Casey, “Developmental neurobiology of cognitive 
control and motivational systems,” 236-241. Also see Stevens, et al., “Age-related cognitive gains 
are mediated by the effects of white matter development on brain network integration,” 738–746; 
Luna, et al., “What has fMRI told us about the Development of Cognitive Control through 
Adolescence?” 101. 
1581
 The work of Wolf Singer is of relevance. His work focuses on how the brain is modified by 
experience, and on the synaptic modifications underpinning the neurobiological basis of learning 
and memory. At the Pontifical Academy of the Sciences gathering of experts in Human 
Neuroplasticity and Education in October 2010, he spoke of the “massive rearrangement of 
functional networks” in adolescence, and of the “second chance” to reconstitute one’s neural 
structures in a way more conducive to personal fulfilment. Note reference to Singer in Table 1.1. A 
hylomorphic critique of 20th century currents in philosophy of mind.  
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B. CHARACTERISTICS OF  VIRTUE IN ITS ACQUISITION 
Essential features pertaining to virtue in its acquisition. 
 
10. The virtuous state results from habituation and education. 
 
Philosophical clarifications.  
Habituation in the Aristotelian sense consists of training from one’s 
earliest years, primarily in the behaviours appropriate to fortitude and 
temperance. Education, in Aristotelian sense, consists both in the 
learning of appropriate information (for example, of right and wrong in 
accord with nature) and the acquisition of appropriate experiences. In 
both, guided experience, imitation of good example, aspiration to what 
is good, true, and beautiful, and appropriate correction of erring 
behaviours are essential. Education also requires explicit ethical and 
behavioural instruction, carried out in a practical and contextual 
manner. 
 
Neural bases. 
 The neural bases for mechanisms of habituation are a result 
primarily of the plasticities, primarily use-induced, present in 
mechanisms of learning associated with the virtues of fortitude and 
temperance (see No. 2 above). These are complemented by the 
explicit development of habits and automaticity in specific 
behaviours (see No. 8 above.). 
 The neural bases for mechanisms of education are a result primarily 
of the plasticities, primarily use-induced, present in mechanisms of 
learning associated with the virtues of prudence and justice (see No. 
1 above.) These will be complemented by mechanisms of imitation 
inspired by exposure to what is good, true and beautiful (see No. 12 
below), and explicit ethical instruction (see No. 16 below). 
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Mechanisms of attention need to be engaged in order to facilitate 
learning (see No. 13 below). 
 
Associated systems. 
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of 
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit 
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and 
executive direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems 
for imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development. 
 
11. Repetition, understood as critical practice, plays an essential role in the 
acquisition of virtue: repetition in appetitive responses, in responses 
manifesting noble sentiment and attentiveness to others, and in 
reasoning, deliberation and sound decision making. 
 
Neural bases.  
 Use-induced plasticities and pathways operate across most brain 
areas and pathways, established by Hebbian laws, underpin the 
synaptic strengthening that results from repetition of neural firing. 
(See 2.2 and Tables 2.3 and 2.15) 
 Other forms of learning also contribute. The possibility of self 
induced and parentally guided conditioning has been discussed.  
 DA reinforcement of goal directed activity underpins a broad 
spectrum voluntary plastic reinforcement of behaviours. 
 
Associated systems.  
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Systems of emotional 
management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit formation. 
Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and executive 
direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems for 
imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development. 
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12. Education specifically in wisdom and beauty is necessary in the formation 
of virtue. 
 
Neural bases.  
All experience leaves neural changes. Education in wisdom and beauty 
is acquired, in the Aristotelian view, by exposure to appropriately true 
and beautiful experience. Experiences where there is effortful attention, 
positive emotional association, repetition, or novelty are shown to have 
greater potential to effect neural change. Mechanisms of cognitive 
learning and memory, as well as use-induced plasticities, will be 
implicated. 
 
Neural facilitation of these pathways of learning consists in plastic 
modification of neural structures associated with: 
 Attentional control. (See No. 13 below, and Tables 2.9 and 4.2 
Attentional Systems.) 
 Mechanisms for learning. (See No. 16 below, and Tables 2.4 and 4.2 
Systems for learning.) 
 Pathways for empathy. (See No. 15 below, and Tables 2.6 and 4.2 
Systems for imitation and empathy.) This will be most relevant in 
ease of adoption of behavioural example of parents, siblings, 
mentors and friends.   
 Pathways responsive to positive emotional context and affection. 
(See No. 17 below, and Tables 2.2 and 4.2 Sensitive periods of 
development.) 
 
Associated systems.  
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of 
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit 
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and 
executive direction. Systems for imitation and empathy. 
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13. Effortful attention plays a significant role. 
 
Philosophical clarifications.  
Human beings have some capacity to reflect on the direction and level 
of attention operating in their sensory systems (most significantly the 
visual system). They have some capacity to redirect or focus that 
attention if they so choose. If the activity pursued is virtuous, the choice 
to focus one’s attention must also be virtuous as it is integral and 
necessary for the intended act. The relationship between willpower 
(which, if rational and effective, will with due regard to the unity of the 
virtues involve the spectrum of established virtues) and attention has 
been noted.  
 
Neural bases. 
 
Effortful attention appears to be a prerequisite for much of the learning 
associated with the development of virtue. This is so for at least two 
major reasons: 
 The attentional system is a key to self-directed brain plasticity, and as 
such is a key to free and volitional behaviour.   
 Effortful attention would appear to be present in all learning from 
sensory input (consider for example a small child learning by 
observing). The nucleus basalis, and the attention system in which it 
plays a critical part, have the capacity to guide plastic 
development.1582  
 
In the learning stages of habit development there are much higher 
levels of attention evident in the cortex, than when the behaviour has 
                                                          
1582
 Doidge, The brain that changes itself, 84-88. 
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been incorporated as habit, at which time procedural mechanisms 
dominate.  
 
Neural facilitation in attentional systems will consist in the following: 
 Plasticity in the fronto-parietal attentional control system is the core 
mechanism for attention. 1583 1584  
 Learning related and use-dependent plasticities in the nucleus 
basalis, the parietal lobes, the ACC, and the BG. Each plays a key role 
in attentional learning. In these cases the actions will be constituted 
at the neural level by an integrated constellation of neural activities, 
similar to those outlined in Nos. 1 and 2 above.  
 The BG play an integral role in attention regulation, 1585 1586 1587 1588 
and in attentional loops.1589 
 ACC involvement in attentional systems, appears necessary for 
learning, and a prerequisite for goal election and executive 
command. 1590 
 Note that No. 13 refers to the attention required for learning to take 
place.  
 
Associated systems.  
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. 
 
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF  VIRTUE IN ITS ACQUISITION 
Features that may not necessarily be present in every case. 
 
                                                          
1583
 Froemke, et al., “A synaptic memory trace for cortical receptive field plasticity,” 425-429. 
1584
 Doidge, The brain that changes itself, 84-88. 
1585
 Hole Jnr., Human Anatomy and Physiology. 2
nd
 ed.  
1586
 Markowitsch, et al.,“Brain circuits for the retrieval of sad and happy autobiographic episodes,” 
643-665. 
1587
 Doidge, The brain that changes itself, 84-88. 
1588
 Kaas and Stepniewska, “Motor cortex,” 167. 
1589
 Doidge, The brain that changes itself, 84-88. 
1590
 Markowitsch, et al.,“Brain circuits for the retrieval of sad and happy autobiographic episodes,” 
643-665. 
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14. Advantage must be taken of the early years both for training and 
provision of appropriate example. 
 
Philosophical clarifications.  
Considerations under this heading will account for the effectiveness of 
early experience noting Aristotle’s dictum: “We like best what we first 
experience,” and his imperative to form habits while children are very 
young. 1591  
 
Neural bases. 
Mechanisms for enhanced learning in early years take advantage of 
periods of greater sensitivity, constituted at the neural level by 
enhanced developmental and activity induced plasticities. Learning in 
critical periods is comparatively effortless because of activity in the 
nucleus basalis.1592  
 
The relationship between sensitive periods and cortical development is 
now shown.1593 1594 1595  (See also No.17.)   
 Attentive mothering leads to gene transcripted cellular changes in 
the hippocampus reducing basal levels of glucocorticoids, abolishing 
thereby anxiety and fearfulness, and facilitating learning.1596  
 Emotional arousal, for example in the positive affect produced by 
sound mothering, appears to promote synaptic plasticity. This 
                                                          
1591
 Aristotle, 1103b. 
1592
 Doidge, The brain that changes itself, 84-88. 
1593
 In the case of imprinting, neurons in intermediate and medial mesopalium (IMM) become 
responsive and selective for the stimulus; there are local increases in NMDA receptors, an 
increased size in certain synapses, and a transitory surge in inhibitory activity. While imprinting is 
not directly a mechanism of virtue development, in a sense it may be regarded as a prerequisite 
mechanism laying necessary foundations for affection facilitated plasticity, etc. Systems associated 
with responsiveness to affection are directly implicated in sensitive periods 
1594
 Coon, Essentials of psychology, 7
th
 ed, 115. 
1595
 Laura E. Berk, Development through the lifespan, 4
th
 ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2007), 126. 
1596
 Core content here derived from Knudson, “Early experience and sensitive periods,” 525. 
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promotes learning by various mechanisms including release of 
NE.1597  
 The end of sensitive period is triggered sensory input and possibly by 
myelination.  
 
A wide range of mechanisms are directly involved in the plasticities of 
sensitive periods and developmental periods. Some of the more 
significant include:  
 As with other occasions when plasticity is at work, NMDA receptors 
triggering gene transcription associated with LTP and LTD are integral 
to the mechanisms of the sensitive periods and developmental 
learning. 
 Attentional mechanisms operate in conjunction with the great range 
of mechanisms of plasticity are associated with sensitive periods of 
development. Hence attentional learning plays a significant role here 
also. (See also No.13) 
 Guidance mechanisms are particularly active during this time: 
astrocyte, and associated molecular guidance cues of migrating 
neurons and production of growth (trophic) factors.1598  
 The amygdala is particularly active in mediating early attachment 
relationships, and reaction to stress and nonconscious emotional 
memories.1599  
 Hypothalamic oxytocin is also implicated; the oxytocin bonding 
pathways are active in periods of attentive mothering. 
 DA plays a key role in cortical information processing around 
puberty. 1600  
                                                          
1597
 Kessels and Malinow, “Synaptic AMPA Receptor Plasticity and Behaviour,” 344. 
1598
 Stevens, “Neuron-astrocyte signalling in the development and plasticity of neural circuits,” 
278-288. Neurotrophins such as BDNF can also play an essential role in anatomical remodelling.  
1599
 Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 3, 36. 
1600
 Rapp and Bachevalier, “Cognitive development and aging,” Chapter 45.  
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 Up to the age of 20, there is a gradual decline in synaptic density, a 
refinement and clarification of pathways; cortical myelination 
appears to continue to the fourth decade of life. 1601 1602 
 It appears that changes in dendritic architecture, and abnormalities 
in the myelination of axons are at the basis of aging in the prefrontal 
cortex, rather than neuron death and a simple decline in PFC 
synapses.1603 
 
Associated systems. 
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of 
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit 
formation. Systems for imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development. 
 
15. Imitation of example is a key means for acquisition of behaviours. 
 
Neural bases.  
 Imitative learning is effective because plastic changes in neuronal 
structures are triggered, allowing the adoption of new behaviours. 
Mechanisms for learning behaviours, for learning moral behaviours 
and attitudes, and for learning empathy, through imitation consist in 
the activation of mirror neurons present in areas of the cortex, most 
particularly in the left frontal operculum area (Broca’s area), the right 
anterior parietal cortex,1604 Imitative mechanisms involve activity in 
the fronto-parietal and the superior temporal cortex, the amygdala, 
and insula.1605  
 An important aspect of imitation is the capacity to empathise, to 
read the feelings of others. There is widespread association of mirror 
                                                          
1601
 Rapp and Bachevalier, “Cognitive development and aging,” Chapter 45. 
1602
 Principal source for this section: Knudson, “Early experience and sensitive periods,” 525. 
1603
 A. Peters, et al., “Are neurons lost from the primate cerebral cortex during normal aging?” in 
Cerebral Cortex  8, (1998): 295-300. 
1604
 Iacoboni, et al. “Cortical Mechanisms of Human Imitation,” 2526-2528. 
1605
 Carr, et al.,“Neural mechanisms of empathy in humans: a relay from neural systems for 
imitation to limbic areas,” 5497-5502. 
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neurons with the development of empathy. In addition, the OFC is 
regarded as having a major role in processing the “interpersonal 
signals necessary for the initiation of social interactions between 
individuals”. The OFC operates in a limbic circuit comprising OFC,1606 
1607 AC gyrus, amygdala and temporal pole. It would appear too that 
right orbitofrontal and right anterior insula cortices are components 
of a pathway that integrating bodily responses with attentional and 
emotional states. 1608   
 VMPFC and OFC are needed for associating incoming information 
with existing response contingencies, linking information to 
motivational importance, and for working memory... plasticity in 
these areas is necessary for object reward association memory, and 
contextual fear conditioning. The medial PFC, especially the ACC, has 
abundant links to limbic system via the hippocampus, the shell region 
of the NAc and the amygdala. There is a likely contribution of this 
pathway to DA and 5-HT modulation of cortical socioemotional 
areas.1609  
 The PFC and the complex integration of brain areas, including lateral 
and medial PFC, are associated with deliberation about emotional 
content is also involved. Effective emotional modulation of 
deliberation is essential for sound reasoning particularly in areas 
requiring empathy with others, understanding of others’ viewpoints 
etc.1610  
 The BG are known to play a role in anticipating movement.1611 1612 
                                                          
1606
 Nitschke et al., “Orbitofrontal cortex tracks positive mood in mothers’ viewing pictures of their 
newborn infants,” 583-592.  
1607
 Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 103.  
1608
 Schore, “Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain development, affect 
regulation and infant mental health,” 7-66.  
1609
 Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with 
developmental approaches to psychopathology,” 747. In primate studies, the amygdala has been 
shown to project directly to medial thalamic nucleus and thence to VMPFC, facilitating 
involvement in processing social information requiring plasticity dependent learning and memory. 
1610
 This is a very strong take home message from Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought. 
1611
 Tortora and Derrickson, Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, 11th ed., 493-494. 
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Associated systems.  
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of 
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit 
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and 
executive direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems 
for imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development. 
 
16. Explicit teaching and guidance as to right and wrong, are needed. 
 
Philosophical clarifications.  
Guidance as to right and wrong will include, when appropriate, 
appropriate correction to assist in reforming behaviour.1613  
 
Neural bases.  
Neural facilitation in pathways of cognitive learning consists in plastic 
modification of neural structures associated with: 
 Attentional control. (See No. 13 above, and Table 2.9 Attentional 
Systems, and Table 5.2.) 
 Imitation of example is a powerful means of inculcating ethical 
values. (See No. 15 above.) 
 Correction communicating affection and empathy is shown to be 
more effective in bringing about neural restructuring than methods 
motivated by fear. A moderate degree of stress promotes neural 
restructuring; excessive stress paralyses.1614   
 Cognitive learning requires particularly intense activation of learning 
mechanisms (See Table 2.4 Systems for learning, and Table 5.2.) 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1612
 Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain,” 379. In this way the BG are acknowledged 
to have a key role in control and modulation of social behaviours and may be integral to a 
progressive evaluation process of behaviours. 
1613
 Correction will normally take the form of admonition that enlightens. Aquinas insists that even 
punishment must be medicinal – restoring justice, and bringing a wrong doer to the point of 
recognising his or her error.  
1614
 cf Sunderland, The Science of Parenting, 38. 
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Learning usually involves strengthening and consolidation at the 
synapse, and associated changes in the dendritic tree. Learning 
associated with LTP and LTD is mediated by NMDA receptors, 
coexisting with AMPA receptors, activated by L-Glutamate.1615 
 Memory in the cortex is plastically responsive to experience.1616 (See 
Tables 2.5 and 5.2 Memory systems.)  
 DA, 5-HT, NA and ACh appear to modulate the moral cognition 
systems. OFC cues for moral behaviour and also moral knowledge 
acquisition. 1617  Activation of stored memories depends on 
hippocampus and the PFC – temporal cortex connection.1618 
 Declarative memory features the explicit recall required in cognitive 
learning. Hippocampus initially acts as retrieval system for 
information in widespread areas of neocortex. Over time, the 
hippocampus reactivates the neocortical representations (by 
repetition and rehearsal, etc), bringing about plasticity in cortico-
cortical connections. 1619  
 The PFC (focusing on acquisition of new rules) and the BG (focusing 
selection of rules appropriate to the situation) play complementary 
roles in rule learning.1620 
 
Associated systems. 
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Reward 
and motivational systems. Systems of emotional management. Systems for habit 
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and 
executive direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems 
for imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development. 
                                                          
1615
 See discussion in Waxham,“Neurotransmitter receptors, ” Chapter 9.  
1616
 Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 1174. 
1617
 Casebeer,“Moral cognition and its neural constituents,”843.  
1618
 Tomita, et al. “Top down signal from prefrontal cortex in executive control of memory 
retrieval,” 699-703. 
1619
 For distinct forms of memory systems and the story of their discovery, the principal source of 
material that follows: Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 488. 
1620
 Wise, et al.,“The frontal-basal ganglia system in primates,” 317-356. 
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17. Affection facilitates learning particularly in the family environment. 
 
Philosophical clarifications. 
Family and social culture, as well as appropriate laws and rules are 
needed. 
 
Neural bases.  
The capacity to respond to affection is shown to be developmentally 
sensitive, and is centred in the emotion responsive areas of the PFC: the 
VMPFC and the OFC. 1621   Furthermore affectionate mothering and 
affectionate teaching style facilitates learning and associated 
plasticities.  
 Cortical development is shown to positively correlate to the presence 
of affection, and consequent perfusion of hypothalamic oxytocin.1622 
1623  
 Attachment and positive maternal affect are linked to DA mediated 
reward arousal in the right brain of the infant1624.  
 Emotion laden events cause release of Epi and glucocorticoids by 
adrenal glands leading onto release of NE in amygdala, increasing its 
activity and thereby consolidating memory in other parts of the brain 
(direct by connections to striatum, hippocampus or cortex; and 
indirect by connections with nucleus basalis which innervates much 
of cortex). 1625   
                                                          
1621
 Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 103. 
1622
 Core content here derived from Knudson, “Early experience and sensitive periods,”  525. 
1623
 Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 8. 
1624
 Schore, “Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain development, affect 
regulation and infant mental health,” 24 
1625
 For distinct forms of memory systems and the story of their discovery, the principal source of 
material that follows: Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 488. 
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 Unless intense arousal is involved, emotional arousal appears to 
promote synaptic plasticity in memory promoting learning. 1626 
Mechanisms include release of NE.1627  
 Left side PFC has been shown to play a role in maintaining positive 
affect. Medial insula and the anterior cingulated cortex also mediate 
affective feelings. 1628 
 Reduced affect leads to underactive OFC. OFC function is relative to 
the individual’s reaction to emotional laden events in the 
environment.1629 1630 
 
Associated systems. 
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of 
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit 
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and 
executive direction. Systems for imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of 
development. 
 
5.4 A case study: a simplified neural analysis of a virtuous action performed by 
Takashi Nagai  
 
In conclusion to this chapter the analyses of 5.3.3.2 are applied to one of the case 
studies from Chapter 3, the moment when Nagai reads and rereads an American 
leaflet claiming that Japan’s defeat is inevitable. (See Scenario 3)  
 
                                                          
1626
 Bechara, et al.,“Emotion, Decision Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex,” 295-307. See Cahill et 
al., “The amygdala and emotional memory,” 295-296. 
1627
 Kessels and Malinow, “Synaptic AMPA Receptor Plasticity and Behaviour,” 344. 
1628
 Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,” 
1196-1214; Sunderland, The Science of Parenting. Identification with family or culture heightens 
positive affect and desire to learn, and neural restructuring. Clarity of expectation and 
communication, with explicit input and positive affection promotes effective cognitive learning.  
1629
 Roesch and Schoenbaum, “OFC as gateway,” 202. 
1630
 Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 8. We have seen that imaging 
studies of orphans (See 2.4.4 Early Experience and Sensitive Periods) reveal abnormalities that are 
consistent with the behaviours that appear to follow upon being raised in environments of social 
deprivation, in particular, the manifestation of an underactive OFC in comparison with normal 
children. 
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This exercise serves as illustration but also as a form of validation for the results 
presented in this chapter. It is a demonstration that the proposed model of virtue 
and neuroscience accommodates a real life case study of a virtuous act, as 
described in precise psychological observations by the subject himself.  
 
 
 
Table 5.3 
A simplified neural analysis of Scenario 3. 
For complete description of scenario see Chapter 3.1.2 Scenario 3. 
 
Action 
(3.1.2 Scenario 
3) 
Virtue commentary 
(3.1.2 Scenario 3 
Commentary; 3.1.3 Virtue 
and the human act.) 
Neural analysis 
Note that it can be only the person as the 
subject of the action when we are 
considering a human act. However when we 
are not referring to a human act, but to 
unconscious responses by parts of the body 
(eg ACh heightens attentiveness) or to the 
action of part of the body (eg my eye 
blinked, my amygdala responded to 
emotional input) there is no problem 
specifying non personal subject. 
“The chief 
nurse came 
running up and 
handed me a 
sheet of paper” 
Nagai has already 
demonstrated that he has 
finely attuned 
responsibilities to those he 
leads, and habitual 
courtesy. He takes the 
leaflet from the nurse, 
conscious of his duties 
towards her. It is 
reasonable to surmise that 
this sense of responsibility 
as well as his training in 
scientific objectivity 
assisted him in applying 
sufficient deliberation 
before committing himself 
to judgement.  
 
Justice will dispose Nagai 
to take his duties to the 
nurse and to the survivors 
into account, giving 
appropriate example and 
reaching a final 
deliberation in the best 
interests of the entire 
community he finds 
himself leading.  An 
unspoken principle he 
clearly follows is that 
Prior learning of duty and courtesy, both 
disposed by justice, lead Nagai to respond 
to the nurse’s implicit request to read the 
leaflet. 
 
Nagai is extremely drained and exhausted 
as it is the day after the bomb has exploded. 
He has suffered much blood loss and has 
lost consciousness at least on one occasion. 
The need to care for the wounded has given 
him little rest. He is also fatigued from the 
responsibility of leading the growing group 
of survivors. Exhaustion will be manifested 
in lower levels of attention, a heightened 
capacity for emotionally initiated 
representations (an overactive 
imagination), and difficulty in suppressing 
goal irrelevant sensory inputs.  
 
When Nagai is approached by the nurse and 
becomes aware of the American leaflet, his 
fronto-parietal attentional system is 
triggered. ACh from the nucleus basalis is 
released into the thalamus and into areas of 
the parietal, frontal and cingulated cortices, 
heightening attentiveness. Attentional loops 
between the BG and the cortex are 
established. DA, a facilitator of attention, is 
also activated for emotional and reward 
responses.  
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truth, no matter how 
unpalatable, must be 
faced… and for a leader to 
do so is necessary. 
Nagais’ initial 
glance at the 
leaflet revealed 
the cause of the 
catastrophe as 
an atomic blast. 
Nagai writes, 
“In the depth of 
my being I felt a 
tremendous 
shock. The 
atom bomb has 
been 
perfected! 
Japan is 
defeated!” 
Nagai’s description of how 
his passionate reaction 
subsides on successive 
readings of the leaflet 
gives us a remarkable 
insight into how 
deliberation can enable 
mastery of passion. What 
is initially less obvious is 
the interior battle that 
Nagai has fights in order to 
respond rationally to the 
news. 
 
There is an initial 
movement of 
complacency towards the 
truth. He comprehends 
the American claim and 
reacts initially 
dispassionately.  
As Nagai glances at the leaflet initial visual 
input is channelled to the BLA from the 
sensory nuclei of the thalamus which has 
filtered out other inputs allowing his full 
attention on the leaflet.  A degree of fear 
conditioning will be evident in the BLA given 
the suffering that Nagai has endured. 
 
There is an initial numbness, a lack of 
cortical response associated with a welling 
sadness (perhaps reflecting a left VMPFC 
that is underactive in managing right side 
negative affect), but Nagai falls back, 
perhaps heightened through his training as 
a scientist, on an established habit of 
seeking knowledge. He reads in the text a 
confirmation of his suspicions of a nuclear 
blast. His scientific knowledge gives him 
virtually an intuitive grasp of the potential 
of the bomb. Cortical representations of 
sadness for his country and people, and 
disgust at the Americans, flood his cortical 
memory and a negative emotional state 
overwhelms reason.  
 
Even in a state of physical and psychological 
exhaustion, Nagai’s learned self mastery is 
sufficient for him to utilise cognitive 
pathways to gain some management of 
passionate predisposition, reacting with 
deliberation, and consideration of 
consequences. 
“… Conflicting 
emotions 
churned in my 
mind and heart 
as I surveyed 
the appalling 
atomic 
wasteland 
around me. … A 
bamboo spear 
lay on the 
ground. I kicked 
it fiercely and it 
made a dull, 
hollow sound. 
Grasping it in 
my hand, I 
raised it to the 
sky, as tears 
rolled down my 
cheeks. The 
Conflicting emotions well 
up within him, of 
frustration, sadness, 
anger, patriotism and 
shame at defeat.   
 
He deliberates briefly 
about the prospects of 
victory for Japan in the 
face of a nuclear power 
and concludes there is no 
hope of victory.  
 
At some point there is a 
rejection of blind 
passionate assertion. 
Prudence disposes his 
readiness to apply himself 
diligently to assess the 
truth of the American 
claims. Justice ensures 
We are witnessing a “low road” emotional 
response unmediated by the cortex. 
Although there is consciousness in the PFC 
of the response, there is little cortical 
processing. A further surge of emotional 
memory inputs flood into the BLA via 
reciprocal connections to the hippocampal 
and striatal memory systems. There are 
neural activations of fear, sadness, anger 
and disgust (in the anterior insula). Outputs 
from the BLA trigger a rage response in the 
dorsomedial nucleus of the hypothalamus. 
This hypothalamic response directs rage 
related motor patterns.  
 
The various limbic aversion centres also 
activate. Limbic afferents to the PFC via the 
OFC trigger consciousness of the emotional 
response and provide an initial justification 
based hippocampal call up of DA mediated 
conscious short term memories of the 
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bamboo spear 
against the 
atomic bomb! 
What a tragic 
comedy this 
war was! This 
was no longer a 
war. Would we 
Japanese be 
forced to stand 
on our shores 
and be 
annihilated 
without a word 
of protest?” 
that does not dismiss the 
American claims out of 
hand. 
 
suffering witnessed in association with the 
bomb. These representations are in the PFC.  
 
The reward system is activated and Nagai 
seeks gratification in the pointless action of 
kicking the bamboo spear. DA floods the 
NAc in anticipation. GP and the SN select 
patterns of cortical activity
 
and motor 
programs for action drawing on movement 
sequencers in the dorsal striatum. 
Hippocampus is enlisted for goal direction. 
The BG instruct the motor areas of the PFC 
via the BG-thalamo-cortical loop. PFC and 
motor cortices deliver executive command. 
The bamboo is kicked. 
 
The BLA is now drawing input from 
widespread cortical areas, and from, and 
from cortical, hippocampal and striatal 
memory systems. Nagai shows a greater 
awareness of his current state, looking 
around and reflecting on his situation.  
 
Attempts to articulate the situation serve to 
mitigate his passionate reaction. Nagai 
indulges in a flight of imagination calling up 
a succession of cortical representations of 
future scenarios, and this diverts his 
attention away from sensory input and into 
deliberation. Effectively is buying time for 
cortical processing of the overwhelming 
emotion. The initial surge of passion, 
corresponding to a neuromodulating flood 
of ACh and DA, dissipates somewhat and he 
is able to adopt a more cognitive response. 
His training in self-discipline can now take 
effect.  
 
Also he is conscious that he has an 
audience. His desires to give good example, 
despite an absence of evident reward, are 
mediated by overlearned S-R responses in 
the ventral striatum. His prior training has 
brought about this mechanism.  
“I read the 
leaflet once and 
was stunned.” 
By learned pathways of 
reflection
 
Nagai sets about 
the task of reaching the 
truth of the situation.  
Quickly Nagai refocusses 
on reaching the truth or 
falsehood of the American 
claim. Very swiftly has 
Nagai moved through 
steps of the human act 
concerning ends and 
means (Table 3.1. Steps 1-
7.). His end is to reach the 
Nagai’s self mastery is characterised by 
habitual obedience of the emotional realm 
to rational command. Goals and rewards 
are not needed as incentives. S-
deliberation-R pathways have taken over. 
Input to the PFC via the BG-thalamo-cortical 
loop reestablishes higher cortical, as 
opposed to emotion driven, management. 
Emotional thalamic and limbic centres are 
now redisposed to cortical override. Prior 
learning of fortitude and temperance have 
established pathways moderating 
emotional responses so they are obedient 
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truth. The means is to 
weigh the message of the 
leaflet with his own 
assessment.  Prior to the 
commencement of his 
deliberative reading there 
is a moment of “election” 
towards the means to 
reach the chosen good: by 
reading and calm 
consideration he decides 
he will reach the truth. 
(Table 3.1. Step 8 of the 
human act. See also 3.1.3 
Virtue and the human 
act.) 
 
 Despite his impeding 
emotion he shows 
determination to face 
truth no matter how 
unpalatable it may be.  
(Table 3.1. Steps 9 to 11.) 
He makes a judgement 
that the truth can be 
reached by suppressing 
immoderate emotion and 
then applies himself 
rereading the leaflet 
weighing its assertions 
against his own knowledge 
and estimations.  
 
to rational direction. The habit of fortitude 
will be present in preferential pathways in 
the BG-thalamo-cortical loop, and 
strengthened top-down connections 
between the OFC and the amygdala. The 
prior habituation of temperance will be 
present in mediation primarily by the DLPFC 
and ACC. In the past it is likely that this 
habituation was associated with DA rewards 
that consolidated the pathways of self 
control. In this current scenario, with the 
habit established, it is unnecessary for DA 
perfusion to take place. Various brain 
regions now coordinate to regulate 
emotional reaction: OFC, DLPFC, VMPFC, 
further areas of the amygdala and of the 
BG.  
 
Emotional regulation leads to cortical 
direction of reward expectations. Emotional 
representations are consciously suppressed. 
Cortical management is consolidated via 
action plans involving rereading. Even 
though it is unlikely that this is a conscious 
strategy, nevertheless it is likely to be a 
learned strategy… to divert oneself into a 
cognitive task in order to take the heat out 
of emotion. 
“I read it a 
second time 
and felt they 
were making 
fools of us.” 
Nagai’s established 
dispositions to moderate 
and divert excessive 
emotional representations 
and expressions are the 
result of prior learning. 
The actions of these 
dispositions permit 
cortical deliberation to 
occupy his attention. 
Nagai’s response in this 
situation, and his 
character in general, is 
built on previously 
established behaviours 
and convictions upon 
which he can draw.  
 
Nagai’s habit of application at the task until 
the desired outcome is achieved is a 
consequence of prior training. His election 
of the goal to read and reread involves 
deliberative evaluation utilising numerous 
cortical areas, drawing particularly on 
episodic memory, self knowledge, scientific 
knowledge and skills of critical assessment.  
 
Intrinsic motivations have come to the fore: 
of commitment to the truth, and that one’s 
duty to others must be fulfilled. These 
appear to be the result of cortical neuronal 
pathways established and consolidated by 
prior experience and DA reinforcement, 
originating in the VTA and SN and mediated 
by the ventral striatum, by childhood and 
military training and in happier times. The 
prior habituation of prudence will be 
present in this rich and reciprocal 
connectivity, primarily to and from the 
DLPFC, with other cortical areas serving 
memory and somatic and sensory input, 
with the OFC, DMPFC, BG, and amygdala 
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serving emotion regulation, with the ventral 
striatum assisting in goal setting and 
motivation. Similarly the prior habituation 
of justice consists of consolidated pathways 
in the aPFC, mPFC, VMPFC, OFC (especially 
medial OFC), ACC (especially rostal ACC), 
insula, limbic and paralimbic areas, and the 
BG. These rich connections serve to give 
preferential traffic to deliberations about 
understanding of others, consideration of 
the impact of one’s actions on others, 
empathy, and considerations of fairness, 
etc.  
 
It is possible to detect in this change of 
behaviour the classic pattern noted by 
Graybiel:
1631
 a passing from reward 
mediation in the ventral striatum (Nagai’s 
kicking fruitlessly against the goad), 
associated with the emotional gratification, 
to a dorsal automatisation, carrying out 
duty as he has trained himself to do (Nagai’s 
determination to grapple with the truth and 
face it). Such an automatisation is 
consistent with our knowledge of the 
character of this wonderful man. 
“I read it a third 
time and was 
enraged at their 
impudence.” 
In the analysis of the 
human act (3.1.3) it was 
noted that sense appetite 
acts upon the will 
particularly at Steps 2,4,6, 
and 8; that “undue sense 
appetition can negate 
effective use of the 
intellect”. 
 
In neural terms this means that the person 
is aware of cortical representations of 
attractive or aversive sense objects, and 
that reward systems provide 
neuromodulatory incentive for preferential 
attention to, and pursuit of these goals via 
appropriate action plans. 
 
Cognition and the capacity to reach the 
truth can be overwhelmed by the 
presentation of attractive or aversive 
cortical representations. This is the battle 
that Nagai fights in the first, second and 
third reading.  
 
However by holding to his action plan of 
rereading he is able to regulate the emotion 
sufficiently to allow deliberation and a final 
judgement as to the truth of the American 
message. 
 
As we are discussing aversional content, 
direct involvement of reward systems is 
minimal. However, during prior learning the 
habits of prudence, justice, fortitude and 
temperance were established; during this 
time the reward systems were greatly 
active, leading to DA mediated 
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 Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain,” 378. 
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reinforcement of regulatory pathways 
triggered in the OFC and amygdala by sense 
representations. These pathways are 
available now for Nagai’s use in coping with 
this particularly difficult situation.   
“But when I 
read it a fourth 
time I changed 
my mind and 
began to think 
it was 
reasonable.” 
Nagai has reached the 
point a judgement about 
the trustworthiness of the 
American leaflet. 
In the course of moral evaluations and 
judgements there is a complex integration 
of numerous neural subdivisions which 
show significantly consistent activation 
across numerous studies. (See Table 5.1 and 
Table 5.2.)  Therefore it is possible to 
predict that, in this case, Nagai’s neural 
activity is likely to include heightened 
activation in numerous areas: 
 DLPFC, ACC, the ventral striatum, 
and amygdala will reveal principal 
activation.  
 Above baseline activation will also 
be evident in mPFC, VMPFC, OFC, 
the posterior 
cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, 
superior temporal cortex, STS, the 
temporo-parietal junction, medial 
hypothalamus, and insula. 
 LPFC and Right OFC will be active in 
the suppression of sadness. 
 Considerations of the social norms 
of patriotism and of cultural 
expectations of a leader will 
involve further integration of areas 
such as the VMPFC, lateral OFC, 
and aTL, assisted by storage of 
social perceptual representations 
in the temporal lobes,  
 In addition, reflecting Nagai’s 
frustration at the shame of defeat 
and empathy with the pain of 
others, the rostral ACC, and the 
anterior insula will show activity.  
 Posterior cingulate, and inferior 
parietal lobe will show activity 
during the Nagai’s brief 
catastrophising. 
“But when I 
read it a fourth 
time I changed 
my mind and 
began to think 
it was 
reasonable. 
After reading it 
a fifth time I 
knew that this 
was not a 
propaganda 
stunt but the 
He gives his assent to the 
assertion of the leaflet. 
The word “sober” 
indicates his attainment of 
“quies”. (Table 3.1. Step 
12 of the human act. See 
3.1.3 Virtue and the 
human act.) This 
achievement of quies 
contrasts with Nagai’s 
fierce kick to the bamboo 
spear: destructive, 
impulsive, futile, and 
In Nagai’s reading of the flyer, in this single 
human act seeking the truth of the issue, 
we have witnessed a highly complex 
interplay of systems (memory, emotional 
management, deliberation, goal election, 
consideration of consequences of action, 
moral judgement, attention, reward to 
some extent, and motor execution), of brain 
areas, of mechanisms and of pathways. 
 
The end result has been the harmonisation 
of the emotional life with the rational life. 
The disorder of actions carried out without 
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sober 
truth.”
1632
 
pointless.   
 
Acquiescence to the truth 
implies also a degree of 
self mastery. 
 
cognitive approval and direction, is replaced 
by an admission of the truth and a quieting 
of wayward passion.  
 
 
This exercise has also served to clarify certain understandings of virtue in action.  
 
Reason and judgement, and the virtues of prudence and justice, are exercised in 
what we could call a “biophysical dimension” that incorporates duration. As Nagai 
explores the truth of the American claims his deliberations are protracted in time.  
 
Examples drawn from actual life argue strongly for the unity of the virtues. Nagai’s 
struggle against his emotional reaction is quietened only when he admits that the 
American leaflet reflects truth. Emotional management is a necessary though 
insufficient condition for virtue. Management of passionate responses and the 
disposition to acquire and accept the truth pertain to different virtues.  Virtues 
that directly dispose rational operations as well as virtues that enable emotions to 
correctly inform, or respond to, rational command are both needed. 
 
The contributory work of the virtues of fortitude and temperance is prior to the 
deliberations of the human act. In this case, the contributory involvement is 
manifested in the rereadings and evaluations of the leaflet’s content. The action 
of these virtues is ongoing during the reading in response to the tenacity of the 
emotional reactions he experiences.  It is fascinating to note that, at the point 
where Nagai admits the truth, the violent emotional responses subside. (They are 
replaced by a sadness and lethargy which will require a further virtuous response 
from Nagai.)  
 
Automatised habituated dispositions for positive action are able to come to the 
fore once the flood of passion passes. Of course, should there be no habituated 
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 Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, 52-3. 
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positive habits, or should there be vices, the flood of passion will not be diverted 
but may stand in even greater relief.  
 
5.5 Conclusion.   
 
A highly probable model for the neural bases of virtue has now been described on 
the basis of an hylomorphic anthropology.  I have presented arguments 
supporting the view that virtue, as understood by Aristotle and Aquinas, is 
embodied, I have described the distinctive nature of that embodiment as it 
pertains to the cardinal virtues, and I have identified 17 characteristics that 
capture the nature of virtue. For each one of these characteristics I have identified 
processes that account for, at the neurobiological level, the specific contributory 
task that I have identified. I have noted the capacity of the brain to operate 
multiple processes, concurrently and in concert, in support of goals of the 
person’s own choosing, and that this view of virtue, as a complex of systems, is 
highly consistent with that view.  
 
This approach respects the soul as principle of being, unity and function; it 
accounts for rationality of the person and human freedom; it supports the view 
that neural bases are necessary for, but alone cannot account for, human 
operations.   
 
In mapping the discrete characteristics of virtue against the neuroscience, I have 
identified supporting neural structures, pathways and mechanisms. In summary: 
i. Human motivation and goal election are supported by the reward 
structures of the brain that are in reciprocal communication with cortical 
structures.  
ii. Emotional regulation is supported by limbic-cortical connectivity 
permitting bottom up modification of cortical “decision making”, and top-
down direction and regulation. I have argued that neuroscience and 
philosophy converge in describing the complementary roles of emotion 
and reason in a balanced happy life. The very presence of reciprocal 
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substantial neural pathways is firm evidence of both cortical direction and 
subcortical modification of regulation and decision making. A neural 
reality, consistently presented in this study, is that neuronal pathways 
develop when used, but atrophy in disuse. I have distinguished between 
the relative roles of the OFC, the DLPFC and the VMPFC in emotional 
regulation, with implications for motivation.  
iii. It has been shown that the established cognitive activity of the PFC 
requires the complement of subcortical structures of the limbic system and 
the BG for these activities of emotion regulation and goal election. I have 
further argued that the involvement of the BG is crucial, not only by its 
implication in emotion and reward pathways but also because the BG are 
the principal seat of automaticity of actions. It has been shown that such 
automaticity is not necessarily opposed to conscious, voluntary goal 
election.  
iv. The “second nature”, the ease of use that characterises virtue, is 
attributable primarily to mechanisms of structural plasticity in both cortical 
and subcortical regions and in the relevant communicating neural 
pathways. Plasticity in the structures of the BG underpinning automaticity 
is a further source of the facility for ready action that we find in actions 
disposed by virtue.     
v. The notion of a complex of systems is supported by a weight of current 
neuroscientific opinion. I have argued that the systems of reward 
evaluation, of goal setting, of motivation, and of emotional regulation are 
supported by “upstream” systems of plasticity, learning and memory, and 
capacities for attention, critical learning, and imitation and empathy.  
vi. In support for the notion of the unity of the virtues and of the distinctive 
neural “signatures” for each of the cardinal virtues I have reviewed the 
complexity of the human act and noted the necessary and consequent 
neural complexity of any virtuous act.  In particular, I have noted the 
activity of the sensitive appetites prior to every rational choice and noted 
the distinctive pathways involved in each of the cardinal virtues.  
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vii. Cognition centres in the PFC (assisted by other cortical and lower areas 
primarily implicated in reward and emotional assessment, sense 
apprehension, memory, attention, and motor planning and command) 
support the integrating capacity of rationality and the reflection and 
reasoning that are manifestations of prudence. 
viii. Cortical pathways and brain areas are demonstrably implicated in cortical 
assessment of the consequences of actions on others. These too are in 
reciprocal connection both by DA pathways, and BG-thalamo-cortical 
loops, with the reward systems and centres, providing further incentive for 
action. I have argued that the virtue of justice resides most typically in the 
habitual activation of these areas.  
ix. I have argued that human actions commence with sensitive appetitive 
responses to perceptions or imaginative representations in the memory 
(but not necessarily of specific past events) of pleasure and aversion, and 
that the essence of virtue is to find pleasure in what is in keeping with our 
nature, along with a readiness to endure difficulties to obtain those things 
that we know to be good for us. In essence, neural dispositions in our 
reward processing and in our responses to fear support temperance and 
fortitude.   
 
In Chapter 6 I will turn my focus to a eudaimonic analysis of what we have seen at 
the neural level. At the beginning of this current chapter, I noted Casebeer’s 
observation that the virtuous life will be characterized by neural elements 
operating in a “maximally functional manner”.1633 I will focus on this notion of 
functional fulfilment along with affective and teleological fulfilment. In conclusion, 
Chapter 6 will also offer neuroscientific, philosophical and pedagogical 
conclusions relevant to this study.  
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 Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 843. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Flourishing 
 
“A human being in perfection ought always to preserve a calm 
and peaceful mind and never to allow passion or a transitory 
desire to disturb his tranquility.”  
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus 
Mary Shelley 
 
 
6.1 This study proposes a necessary role for virtue in human flourishing. 
 
Elizabeth Anscombe proclaimed the need to get the psychology right if we are to 
do moral philosophy (see 1.6.1). 1634 This study insists that we must get the biology 
right too. Psychology and neurobiology must be in sync. It is appropriate to 
investigate whether virtues are all that Aristotle, Aquinas, and their followers 
claim them to be; if they are truly the key to human fulfilment and wellbeing, and 
if hylomorphic anthropology reflects reality, then it is appropriate to expect this to 
be evident at the biological level.  
 
So, in Table 4.1, a major characteristic of virtue was identified as follows:  
Virtue facilitates the functional flourishing of the person. Virtue 
brings about a state of excellence: an excellence of the person, 
inclusive necessarily of both neurobiological flourishing and the 
exercise of rationality. It is a state whereby reason and 
rationality are empowered to manage activity well. It is a 
capacity for rationality that is reflective and emotionally 
enriched and able to be carried through into noble, humane 
behaviours. 
Evidence presented in Chapter 5 has supported the view that virtue has a material 
foundation in the neural structures of the brain and that this material structure 
can be identified. I argue that these neural structures manifest, in their maturity 
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 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, 26-44. 
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of expression and integration across the entire brain, the role that virtue plays in 
human fulfilment itself, and that there is a biological aptitude and predisposition 
in human beings for the development of virtue.   
 
That the neurobiology of virtue may be described, and more importantly, that it 
constitutes a state of a neurobiological perfection must carry far reaching 
implications for the study of ethics. Aristotle proclaimed, “Happiness is the reward 
of virtue”,1635 with happiness understood as human fulfilment, flourishing, 
eudaimonia. In this concluding chapter we examine the evidence to support the 
view that happiness, understood as flourishing, is indeed a consequence of the 
neurobiological presence of virtue.  
 
The identification of the neural structures of virtue and of a biological aptitude for 
the development of virtue, for the necessary role of virtue in flourishing, must 
serve to strengthen the recognition of virtue ethics as superior to consequentialist 
and deontological approaches in offering a model for human wellbeing.  
 
It will be noted below that the work of Martin Seligman supports the view, as 
predicted by rational psychology, that virtues are demonstrably conducive of 
human wellbeing at the clinical level. That these clinical phenomena may be 
shown to be supported by a neurobiology of virtue necessarily constitutes a far 
reaching ratification not only of Seligman’s position but of hylomorphic 
anthropology, as a true model of the human being and human flourishing. This 
necessarily carries profound critical consequences both for the evaluation of 
current theories of philosophy of mind and of moral development, and for 
practical approaches to pedagogy and parenting.  
 
6.1.1. Reflecting on the structure of this study. 
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 NE, 1099b16. 
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After offering a prima facie case for the profound integration of the rational and 
the physical in the human person, Chapter 1 situated the philosophical 
dimensions of this study within contemporary approaches to philosophy of mind 
and ethics and within ethical theory. The significance of the hylomorphic 
foundation for this study has been discussed - the profound unity of material and 
non-material aspects in the human person, to the extent that human 
neurobiology participates in rationality and in every rational action.1636  
 
Chapters 2 presented a representative overview of current research into six lines 
of investigation that it is reasonable to associate with the acquisition and exercise 
of virtue: plasticity, learning and memory, habit formation, emotional regulation, 
goal election and reward, and cognition and executive function. 
 
The principal task of Chapter 3 and 4 was to identify key characteristics of virtue. 
Against a panorama of differing and opposing definitions of virtue, it is necessary 
to adopt a robust understanding of positive, dispositions of character acquired by 
repetition and practice. A broad Aristotelian understanding of virtue has been 
proposed, founded on Aristotelian and Thomistic rational psychology and an 
understanding of the hylomorphic view of substance, and attuned to eudaimonia, 
a notion derived from Aristotle and found in the work of prominent virtue 
ethicists. 
 
My essential methodology was, in the light of clear examples of virtuous action 
present in real life case studies and with the aid of insights from contemporary 
virtue ethicists, to distil from seminal Aristotelian/Thomistic texts the 
characteristics of virtue. Controversial questions were largely avoided, as outside 
the scope of this study, except that a restricted reading was offered for the notion 
of rationality “by participation” of the moral virtues of the sensitive appetites: 
fortitude and temperance were proposed as ordered biophysical qualities of the 
human person. In turn this led to greater clarification about the characteristics of 
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 As we have seen, Aquinas however distinguishes between powers “common to the soul and 
body”, and other powers “exceeding the entire power of the body” (ST, Ia, Q.76, Art.8.4). 
486 
 
the specific cardinal virtues and their distinctive contributions within the broad 
notion of virtue. Arguments were presented for the unity of the virtues. An 
analysis was offered of the distinct functions of the four cardinal virtues in 
disposing a virtuous human act as described by Aquinas. I argued that such a 
coherent understanding of the contribution of each of the four virtues to the one 
human act is a prerequisite to any proposal for the neural bases of virtues. In 
conclusion, Table 4.1 was presented, listing key characteristics of virtue.  
 
Chapter 5 married the characteristics of virtue with the neuroscience against a 
backdrop of recent cross-disciplinary work in regulation of emotion and moral 
action. The model offered suggests that, in the acting person, virtuous dispositions 
of thought and action are constituted at the neural level by highly integrated 
contributory brain systems (emotional regulation, reward, attention, memory and 
learning, habit formation, cognition and command)  supported by a range of 
mechanisms of plasticity allowing a certain permanence and durability. These 
established ways of thinking and behaving thus become characteristics of the 
personality of the subject.  
 
Ultimately I have sought to capture the complexity of the exercise of virtue and its 
reflection in neurobiology. I have wished to apply the real knowledge we have of 
the brain into the formation of a coherent picture for the development, exercise 
and state of virtue. I have proposed, by means of an integrative analysis of current 
research into brain function, a highly plausible model for the neural bases of 
virtue understood in the Aristotelian and Thomistic sense. 
 
It is highly conceivable that the accuracy of this model could, in time, be 
experimentally tested. By highlighting, at the biological level, the integrative 
nature of rationality, and by drawing cross disciplinary insights from rational 
psychology, I hope to stimulate interest in what presents as an important field for 
further exploration.  
 
6.1.2 The task of Chapter 6. 
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On the first page of this study I proposed four central questions for investigation:  
 
 To develop a methodology by which I can identify the core characteristics 
of the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of moral virtue. 
 To identify, on the basis of current neuroscientific knowledge, the neural 
substrates that may be reasonably demonstrated to play a substantial role 
in the acquisition and exercise of virtue.  
 In the light of neurobiological evidence, to draw conclusions about the role 
of virtue in human flourishing.  
 To consider wider implications of these findings, with particular respect to 
philosophy of mind, ethics and parenting. 
 
The first and second of these questions have been addressed in detail in preceding 
chapters; brief concluding reflections are offered below in 6.3. The primary task of 
this chapter is to present conclusions with respect to the third and fourth of these 
questions. Eudaimonic conclusions will be discussed in 6.2 with brief critical 
reflections also offered in reference to Flourish, a 2011 text by Martin Seligman 
which draws the notion of eudaimonia into the domain of clinical psychology;1637 
neuroscientific conclusions will be summarised in 6.3; philosophical conclusions in 
6.4 will include brief reflections on philosophy of mind; and pedagogical 
conclusions bring both the chapter and the study to a close.  
 
6.2 Eudaimonic conclusions  
 
This study proposes that man has a biological aptitude or predisposition for virtue, 
and that virtue is required for human flourishing. I argue that the brain is 
biologically disposed to the development of virtue. As it were, the conduits for 
virtue are already laid in the brain by way of genetic predisposition and 
participation in rationality; however the wiring will need to be installed by the 
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 Martin Seligman Flourish: a new understanding of happiness and well-being and how to 
achieve them. (London: Nicholas Brealey, 2011). 
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user himself through experience and repetition of actions, guided by rational goal 
setting. 
 
Human flourishing necessarily includes flourishing of the brain... the full and 
integrated development of the brain and its capacity to mediate a self-determined 
life. The argument of this study is that this biological aptitude for flourishing 
extends to the neurological domain: that the concept of human flourishing should 
properly include brain development along those lines of development to which 
the organism is biologically predisposed.  
 
I argue that man’s biological aptitude for flourishing is found in his ability to 
develop to the full his natural powers along the predisposed lines for the 
development of the human organism. This is also consistent with the view of 
Aquinas that virtue disposes man to perfection according to his nature.1638 
 
These lines of predisposed development incorporate the constellation of 
pathways and mechanisms that underpin virtue development. Further, I argue 
that, as virtue develops there is an extensive integration of the neural resources of 
the person (cognitive, executive, emotional and sensorimotor systems, and 
pathways facilitating habitual action); an integration that empowers man for 
rational self-management and necessarily implicit to human flourishing.   
 
My discussion of eudaimonic conclusions will focus first on this biological aspect – 
that the full development of the organism is indeed a form of flourishing, and then 
on the broader issue of fulfilment of the person, and in specific the eudaimonia of 
virtue.1639  
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 “Whatever is lacking for a thing’s natural perfection may be called a vice.” ST, Ia-IIae, Q.71, 
Art.1.quoting Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, iii. 
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 Note that the following sections contain material most relevant to this section:  1.6.4 (This 
study is situated under the umbrella of eudaimonist virtue ethics), 2.4 (Habit formation), 2.5 
(Neural bases for emotional control), 2.6 (Neural bases for goal directed behaviours and reward 
activation), 2.7 (Cognition and executive function), 3.2.5 (Virtues accord with the natural 
perfecting of the person), 3.2.5.3 (Virtue brings about human fulfilment), 3.3.7 (Development of 
virtue requires formation in what is appropriate in respect to pleasure and pain… emotional 
education.), 3.3.12 (Education specifically in wisdom and beauty is necessary in the formation of 
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6.2.1 Flourishing at the biological level. 
 
Nobel laureate Kandel noted above (5.2.2.3) what could be called a principle of 
decentralisation that operates in the brain, that there is no central command 
centre in the brain.1640 This reflects Hebb’s prophetic insight in 1949 that a cell 
assembly, all the activated cortical cells, provide the internal representation of a 
stimulus distributed through the brain.1641 Such a highly distributed model 
requires advanced interconnection for effective function. Facilitated 
interconnectivity is also required for effective cortical, or top down, governance of 
emotional and motivational life.  
 
In keeping with these observations I have suggested that the state of virtue 
presents as a highly developed facility for interconnection between brain regions 
and systems making use of the constellation of pathways, mechanisms and 
processes operating across the various brain regions and pathways between 
them. It is founded upon principles of use-induced plastic reinforcement of neural 
connections. Habit provides a further mechanism for the organism to act more 
efficiently at the neuronal level, allowing the diversion of attention elsewhere and 
absorbing fewer cerebral resources. During the period of acquisition, both implicit 
procedural memories and virtue, move from the explicit to the automatised.1642   
 
It is a state of systemic maturity. The state of virtue manifests as the endpoint of 
neural development, of a developmental sequence of behaviours associated with 
the ordered biological dispositions of fortitude and temperance informing right 
judgement. It involves an ongoing interplay between biological development, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
virtue), 3.3.9 (The development of virtue takes place over time and respects the development of 
the body), 4.1.2.7 (Rather than of “acts of isolated virtues” it appears more appropriate to think in 
terms of “moral operations performed with the integral involvement of multiple virtues”), 5.3 (The 
neural bases of virtue), 6.1 (This study proposes a necessary role for virtue in human flourishing), 
6.2 (Neuroscientific conclusions), 6.3 (Philosophical conclusions).  
1640
 Kandel and Wurtz,“Constructing the visual image,” 340. 
1641
 Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 731. 
1642
 See Chapter 2 for referencing. 
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practical reason, experience, consideration for others, and the repetition of 
positive goal directed behaviours.  
 
6.2.1.1 Rational operations in the present state of life are conducted with 
sensible knowledge and sensitive appetites as their “material 
cause”.1643 Therefore neural development that forms the biological 
basis of virtue is a “material cause” for eudaimonia of the person.  
 
Aquinas says that sensible knowledge is, in a way, “the material cause” of 
intellectual knowledge. “It cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and 
perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather it is in a way the material 
cause.”1644  
 
If, along the same lines, we can argue that the sensitive appetites (presenting 
aspects of pain and pleasure to the intellect and will)  are, in a way, the material 
cause of the human act (Step 2 Table 3.1), then we can also say that the sensitive 
appetites disposed by the virtues of fortitude and temperance are the material 
cause of good human acts.  
 
Therefore, the virtues of fortitude and temperance in their neural bases (see 
argument in 4.1), are the material cause of eudaimonia, if eudaimonia is to be 
understood as a state brought about by consistently good human actions. By 
extension we could also argue that the neural part constituents of prudence and 
justice should also be included as material causes of eudaimonia.  
 
Ultimately, it is this state of advanced interconnection and systemic integration 
underpinning virtue is the “material cause” of eudaimonia in the person.   
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 ST, Ia, Q.84, Art.6. 
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 ST, Ia, Q.84, Art.6. 
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Aristotle taught that “The soul in a certain way requires the body for its 
operation.”1645 He explained the key role of the material:  
No one can learn or understand anything in the absence of 
sense, and when the mind is actively aware of anything, it is 
necessarily aware of it along with an image.1646  
The word “necessarily” is important: in the state of body and soul united, all 
understanding not only starts in the senses but is dependent upon the 
presentation of the phantasm.  
 
He explains that suspension of the sensitive powers (eg during sleep) hinders the 
judgement of the intellect; 1647 1648that, “The corruptible body is a load upon the 
soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to 
man at all ages.”1649  
 
He says that cooperation of the body is necessary for acquisition of new 
knowledge and necessary for application of acquired knowledge, 1650and insists 
that the cooperation of the body as material cause for rational operations is 
according to human nature.  
It is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the 
phantasms as it is to be joined to the body; but to be separated 
from the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise 
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 ST, Ia, Q.75, Art.7.3. 
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 DA, 431b. In Book 3 of De Anima Aristotle affirms that the soul understands nothing without a 
phantasm. 
1647
 ST, Ia, Q.84, Art.8. 
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 ST, Ia, Q.101, Art.2. “... the state of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the 
sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tied and the interior sensitive powers 
hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. 
Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are 
hindered, the action of the former is necessarily hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use 
of reason.” 
1649
 ST, Ia, Q.101, Art.2.1. 
1650
 ST, Ia, Q.84, Art.7. “...not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies 
knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers. 
For when the act of the imagination is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance, in 
the case of a frenzy; or when the act of the memory is hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we see 
that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which he had previous knowledge.... 
when we wish to help someone understand something we lay before him examples from which he 
forms phantasms.” 
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to understand without turning to phantasms is not natural to it; 
and hence it is united to the body in order that it may have an 
existence and an operation suitable to its nature.1651 
The implication is, consequent on the theological principle that grace respects 
nature, that the embodied soul will only operate in a way suitable to its nature, ie. 
utilizing the neural structures of the body. 
 
Consonant with this view, Aquinas holds that, “(The human soul) reaches an 
understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and 
movement.”1652 Now elsewhere he explains, “The nerves,” we are told, “are 
instruments of movement.”1653 Hence it is compatible with these texts to 
conclude that Aquinas anticipated a neural part-constituent for the operations of 
the intellect.  
 
6.2.1.2 Rational operations in the present state of life are conducted with the 
body as their final cause. 
 
In 3.2.5.3 above, it has been argued that virtue perfects not only the soul but also 
the body.  
 
Aquinas writes,  
...the function of virtue (is)... to make (the sensitive appetite) 
execute the commands of reason, by exercising (its) proper 
acts. Whereby just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due 
external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its 
proper regulated movement.1654  
In other words, through rationality, manifested as virtue, the person flourishes.  
In keeping with the view that the soul united to the body 
“perfects the soul”, it is further argued also that virtue realises 
                                                          
1651
 ST, Ia, Q.89, Art.1. 
1652
 ST, Ia, Q.79, Art.4. 
1653
 ST, Ia, Q.99, Art.1. 
1654
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.59, Art.5. 
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the perfected structure of the body. Hence there is an aspect of 
final causality also present. 1655  
 
This final causality derives from the fact that the body is integral to the person and 
the development of virtue, with all the bodily ramifications is according, as 
Aquinas says, to the “due disposition” of the person. We read, “Virtue implies not 
only a perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of 
its subject.”1656 Note that this concept of “due disposition” is consistent with the 
view that virtue is not any arbitrary ordering, but a “right ordering”, of neural 
connections.  
 
Note that this notion is relevant also with respect to the unity of virtues. Precisely 
because the various virtues act in integrated concert, each with its requisite 
disposition of the materiality of the body, that the flourishing of the person is 
achieved. Virtue not only disposes the organism to rationality (because there is no 
virtue without rationality in the first place), but also rationality we can say 
disposes the human organism to fulfilment. 
 
6.2.2 The neurobiology of eudaimonia. 
 
The notion of eudaimonia in this study 
In 1.6.3 mention was made of the variety of positions adopted by virtue ethicists 
with respect to eudaimonia.  Not only do Aristotle and Aquinas have differing 
concepts of eudaimonia, but how eudaimonia is to be understood in Aristotle has 
been the subject of various schools of thought.  Hence, prior to drawing 
eudaimonic conclusions, it is necessary to offer further brief clarifications about 
the position adopted in this study.  
 
                                                          
1655
 Aquinas, Questions on the Soul, trans. James Robb (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University 
Press, 1984), 59,62. Cited in Ramsay, Beyond Virtue Integrity and Morality, 137. 
1656
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.71, Art.1. 
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Nagel identifies two accounts of eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics: the 
intellectualist (ie a state of contemplation) and the comprehensive account in 
which fulfilment is to be found in the “full range of human life and action”.1657 
Nagel proceeds to argue, “This (second) view connects eudaimonia with the 
conception of human nature as composite, that is, as involving the interaction of 
reason, emotion, perception, and action in an ensouled body.” 1658 This study 
considers eudaimonia in this second, arguably richer, category. It is a view that 
perfectly accommodates considerations about the neural bases of virtue and 
evidence for flourishing at the biological level.  
 
Rorty also addresses this issue and appears to accord with this second view. She 
proposes an integrated account: that the contemplative life (the fruit of the 
intellectual virtues) and the active life (fruit of the moral virtues) are compatible in 
the fulfilled life.1659 She argues, “For a human being, Aristotle says, to live well is 
to perceive well and to think well. These are natural energeiai:1660 their exercise is 
paradigmatically pleasurable (1170a16-20).” 
 
Other commentators also argue for this integrative account that embraces both 
intellectual and moral realms. In 1.6.3 we saw that the positions of Hursthouse 
and Swanton are broadly aligned with the view that the fulfilment of the person is 
integrated with the development of virtue.  
 
Hursthouse draws attention to the importance of phronesis (wisdom) in the 
development and exercise of virtue. She argues that Aristotle saw virtue and 
phronesis as two aspects of the same thing; and that it is impossible to have one 
                                                          
1657
 Thomas Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. 
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 7. McDowell too reflects 
this view, suggesting that Aristotle proposes two possible views on the meaning of eudaimonia: an 
intellectualist view, and the view that accommodates moral virtue. John McDowell, “The role of 
eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 373, note ii. 
1658
 Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics,” 7. 
1659
 Amelie O. Rorty, “The place of contemplation in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics” in Essays on 
Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 378. 
1660
 energeiai: a unified self contained whole. 
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without the other.1661  For example, Aristotle explains that both wise and 
villainous people can be called clever. “Wisdom is not the same as (cleverness) 
though it does involve it. ... A wise person is able to deliberate well about the sorts 
of things that conduce to the good life in general, ie eudaimonia.”1662 Hursthouse 
highlights the role that phronesis plays in virtue and in human flourishing. She 
says, “Like arête … phronesis was an almost unrecognised concept in modern 
moral philosophy until the virtue ethicists brought it back.”1663 
 
These contrasting positions of Hursthouse and Swanton with respect to 
eudaimonism are enlightening. Hursthouse develops a moderate position, closely 
reflecting Aristotle’s own thought and bridging the teleological and the non 
teleological accounts. Swanton on the other hand highlights deficiencies, or 
perhaps gaps, in Aristotle’s treatment of eudaimonia, and articulates the essential 
nature of virtue as a responsiveness to being, thus defending the primacy of virtue 
ethics over other ethical systems.1664  
 
In contrast with Aristotle, Aquinas utilises the word beatitudo in place of 
eudaimonia.  Aquinas considers the happiness of beatitudo to be “complete 
fulfilment to which nothing can be added by way of improvement or 
                                                          
1661
 Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory,” 51. 
1662
 NE, 1140a24-29. 
1663
 Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory”; and Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, 51. Swanton takes 
issue with “monistic” approaches found in proponents of relationship ethics and some versions of 
Aristotelian eudaimonistic ethics “according to which, the rationale of all the virtues is their being 
needed for the flourishing (good) of the agent”.  She argues for a “pluralistic” approach, “moral 
responsiveness” requiring a variety of modes: love, respect, creativity, promotion etc. “What I call 
the profile of a virtue is that constellation of modes of moral responsiveness or acknowledgement 
which comprise the virtuous disposition.”
 
 Swanton (in Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, 48) argues 
against what she regards as a “monoculture of consequentialist thought”. Swanton insists that 
virtue cannot be instrumental in pursuit of goods such as love, friendship and pleasure as these 
goods are not independent of virtue and that it is misleading to consider goods as having an 
absolute value. For example, the value of particular goods may be derived from the relationship to 
the agent himself. She seeks to “combine eudaimonism and naturalism through the unifying idea 
of the perfection of our rational nature”(54). The point, as for Aristotle, is that the notion of virtue 
derives from the very nature of the person.   
1664
 Swanton’s debt to Aristotle is evident, though she advocates a somewhat more eclectic 
approach to virtue ethics and moral psychology, drawing even on notions derived from Nietzsche’s 
theory of self love, in order to emphasise that she regards virtue as integral to the natural 
wellbeing of the subject. 
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variation”,1665 and contrasts it with felicitas, earthly experiences of happiness. He 
regarded man’s ultimate good as the perfection of the intellect by means of what 
he calls beatitudo, which is often translated as happiness. To live the good life 
knowledge however is insufficient; he argued that the acquisition of virtues is 
necessary. These qualities enable us to make effective use of moral 
knowledge.1666 Implicit to beatitudo is the notion, far beyond Aristotelian 
understandings, of blissful union with God. Nevertheless, beatitudo as ‘the 
perfection of the totality of a well lived human life’1667 bears much in common 
with the comprehensive account offered by Aristotle. Both are the outcome of a 
fully realised life according to nature, as each distinctively defines it.  Both argued 
for the necessity of rationality for life directing choices and happiness, and that it 
is virtues that perfect rationality and human action. They see the development of 
virtue as a response to being, a requirement for happiness. 
 
In conclusion this study adopts a moderate eudaimonistic approach that considers 
virtue, following Aristotle and Aquinas, to be constitutive of and enabling of 
human flourishing understood as the development of our natural faculties. 
 
A notional distribution of the neural bases of eudaimonia. 
The explicit reference to eudaimonia in No.9 in Table 4.1 leaves much still to be 
elaborated about the relationship between part-constituents of the characteristics 
of virtue and eudaimonia. To some extent the immediate affective outcomes will 
be reflected in the intrinsic reward outcomes associated with Nos.2 and 6, and 
functional aspects certainly enter into Nos. 7 and 8. While functional flourishing 
may include everything from efficiencies of transmission of neural commands, to 
facilitated emotional regulation, there are also major objective positive outcomes 
such as enhanced freedom of action, augmented capacity to love others, which 
deserve acknowledgement as functional advantages. No. 9 focuses very much on 
                                                          
1665
 Brian Davies, “Happiness” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. B. Davies and E. Stump 
(Oxford: OUP 2012), 232. 227-237 
1666
 For a useful useful primer on Aquinas’ thought: Peter S. Eardley and Carl N. Still, Aquinas:  A 
guide for the perplexed (London: Continuum, 2010). 
1667
 Brian Davies “Happiness,” 227-237.  
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teleological flourishing: that the rational operations of the organism are directly 
facilitated. In fact, it appears that the notion of eudaimonia is associated with all 
the characteristics in some way or other. 
 
In Table 6.1 I consider the neural bases of the characteristics of virtue in the light 
of affective, functional, and teleological categories of fulfilment. Detail concerning 
the relevant neural bases is found in 5.3. This division follows upon simple analysis 
of the nature of these characteristics: some are more associated with feelings of 
pleasure and contentment, others reflect the nature of virtue as a facilitation of 
action, and the third category most reflects the rationality of virtuous action, that 
it is performed for an evident end. 
 
 
Table 6.1 
A notional distribution of neural bases of eudaimonia.  
Characteristics of the state of virtue having 
neural bases. 
For description of the neural bases of 
characteristics refer to 5.3. 
 
Indicative categories of fulfilment 
Affective Functional Teleological 
Conducive to 
subjective 
feelings of 
contentment. 
Directly 
associated 
with 
satisfaction 
derived from 
this neural 
and 
cognitive 
efficiency. 
Directly 
facilitating 
rationality 
and 
therefore 
directly 
enabling 
virtuous 
moral 
choices. 
1. The virtues of prudence and justice 
dispose the practical reason and the 
intellectual appetite facilitating 
rationality and appropriate choices. 
   
2. The virtues of fortitude and 
temperance dispose the irascible 
and sensitive appetites to endure 
appropriate difficulties and to seek 
appropriate pleasure. 
   
3. A capacity for rational goal election 
is evident. 
   
4. “Virtues change us.” The acquisition 
of virtue creates a state of 
character, a way of being that tends 
to be permanent. 
   
5. The virtuous state is in keeping with    
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our human nature. 
6. In the exercise of virtue intrinsic 
motivation takes priority over 
extrinsic motivation. Virtue is 
motivated by that which is worthy to 
man’s nature. 
   
7. Virtue facilitates effective action.    
8. Virtue brings about ease of action.    
9. Virtue facilitates the flourishing of 
the person. Virtue brings about a 
state of excellence: an excellence of 
the person, inclusive necessarily of 
both neurobiological flourishing and 
the exercise of rationality.  It is a 
state whereby reason and rationality 
are empowered to manage activity. 
It is a capacity for rationality that is 
reflective and emotionally enriched 
and able to be carried through into 
noble humane behaviours.  
   
Characteristics of  virtue in its acquisition  
For description of the neural bases of 
characteristics refer to 5.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. The virtuous state results from 
habituation and education. 
   
11. Repetition, understood as critical 
practice, plays an essential role in 
the acquisition of virtue: repetition 
in appetitive responses, in responses 
manifesting noble sentiment and 
attentiveness to others, and in 
reasoning, deliberation and sound 
decision making. 
   
12. Education specifically in wisdom and 
beauty is necessary in the formation 
of virtue. 
   
13. Effortful attention plays a significant 
role.  
   
Characteristics of  virtue in its acquisition  
For description of the neural bases of 
characteristics refer to 5.3. 
   
14. Advantage must be taken of the 
early years both for training and 
provision of appropriate example. 
   
15. Imitation of example is a key means 
for acquisition of behaviours.  
   
16. Explicit teaching and guidance as to 
right and wrong, are needed. 
   
17. Affection facilitates learning 
particularly in the family 
environment. 
   
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Note that all three aspects of fulfilment should be present in an enriched 
understanding of embodied eudaimonia. Affective pertains to those 
characteristics directly conducive to subjective feelings of contentment. 
Functional pertains to aspects of neural efficiency at the behavioural level. 
Teleological includes those characteristics more directly facilitating rationality and 
therefore directly enabling virtuous moral choices. 
 
We should be mindful that these characteristics all pertain to differing facts of 
virtue itself. A definitive categorization is not possible; rather, the notional 
distribution of characteristics of virtue across indicative categories serves to 
highlight the complexity of the neural bases of eudaimonia.   
 
The sections immediately following comment on the neural bases for the 
affective, functional and teleological aspects of eudaimonia.   
 
6.2.2.1 Affective fulfilment. Discussion of the neural bases for the feelings of 
contentment associated with virtue.  
 
Our focus here is not on arbitrary feelings of wellbeing, but on wellbeing directly 
associated with the state, exercise or acquisition of virtue.  
 
A convincing case may be presented that the dispositions of virtue lead to 
heightened positive affect. While choices associated with appetite are rewarded 
indiscriminately by the body’s hedonic reward systems and this is a normal 
precursor to human acts, it is reasonable to suggest that pleasure enjoyed with 
self-control is more enjoyable because it is longer lasting, and because it is 
enriched by the joy of knowledge of benefits to others, and is free of any bitter 
aftertaste of self-interest.  
 
So, feelings of contentment will manifest at the neural level first of all in 
mechanisms of DA regulation, -opioid messaging and 5-HT uptake inhibition, but 
also via thalamic pathways from the striatum to the OFC (allowing cognitive 
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modification of PFC to upregulate DA from the VTA and SN). Thus reward 
signalling is modified to reflect the conviction that proposed virtuous actions are 
rationally desirable; a source of reward reserved for what is perceived as a 
rational choice.  
 
Cognitive memory in association with emotional memory facilitates recall of 
positive experiences in a manner exemplified in Wordsworth’s “Daffodils”. In this 
way, in addition to intrinsic functional benefits towards facility for preferred 
actions, we find that ease of action, clarity of deliberation, and so on, engender 
the experience of rational joy.  
 
Peace and wellbeing, appreciated at the emotional level as a freedom from fear 
and a feeling of contentment, should also be included at this point. The capacity 
for self-management, and ultimately of happiness, is intrinsically dependent upon 
the successful management of one’s emotional life (see 5.3.3.2 No 2 for neural 
bases). It is said of Alexander the Great that he had in his power all things except 
his passions, unaware that the greatest of empires is to possess dominion over 
oneself.  
 
6.2.2.2 Functional fulfilment. Discussion of neural and cognitive efficiencies. The 
intrinsic functional benefits of virtue.  
 
Autonomy and ease of action are directly a result of virtue. Virtue requires 
enriched neural connectivity and well developed neural pathways, a neural 
perfection in some way analogous to physical fitness, empowering a person to act 
more freely.   
 
Neural and cognitive efficiencies, offered by the neural characteristics of virtue, 
may be identified at various levels.  Flourishing of the organism is a state denoted 
by mature development of neural systems and mature integration of brain 
systems; freedom to live an emotionally enriched life constitutes a further 
important dimension of organic functionality.  
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Neural bases for the intrinsic functional benefits of virtue appear to consist in the 
following: 
 
i. Systemic integration that characterises the state and operations of virtue. This 
integration exhibits the benefits that result from integrative processes: 
efficiencies, and an end result beyond the reach of individual contributions (in 
this case the various contributing systems, brain regions and pathways.) 
ii. This systemic integration facilitates a self-regulation that is characterised by 
intrinsic motivation, a rich emotional life, and effective motor command. 
Emotional life is passionately felt, and passionately appreciated at the 
cognitive level, with a heightened aesthetic sense. Nevertheless, in a state of 
virtue, internal emotional expression does not eclipse cognitive deliberation. 
Such a situation would directly result in internal neural inefficiencies of loss of 
objectivity in interpreting sense data leading to poor decision making, and 
confusion or a loss of internal peace as a consequence of anxiety at not being 
in control, or as a result of not acting in one’s best rational interests. This rich 
emotional life complemented by an inner peace has been noted in the life of 
Takashi Nagai in 3.1.1 and demonstrated in Table 5.3.   
iii. As virtue develops cortical activity is enriched by duly moderated, emotional 
responses.  Reward representations and emotional responses have been 
calibrated by training in that which is most apt for human nature in pleasure 
and pain.  Emotional regulation must not be understood as a circumventing of 
emotion leaving redundant “circuitry” and superfluous systems. As virtuous 
behaviours are acquired, direct limbic routes remain for fast response if 
needed. As virtue is acquired, pathways between limbic centres and cortical 
processing areas are established and consolidated, allowing both cortical 
regulation to some extent of emotional responses, and also permitting 
emotional enrichment of cortical understanding.  
iv. Loops and oscillatory messaging appear to offer the neural efficiencies of 
amplification of transmission, distillation of the core messages by filtering out 
of noise. Emotional processing via loops offers such efficiencies of circuitry.  
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Well calibrated perfusion of neuromodulation, in coordination with such 
reverberation and oscilliatory messaging appears to offer insights into the 
neural bases supporting a constant state of mind, and possibly even playing a 
role in peace of mind. 1668   
v. Neural efficiencies as a result of mechanisms of habit formation are present. 
Neural resources are optimised. As habits are consolidated, and fewer cortical 
resources are enlisted in the performance of actions,1669 attention can be 
focused elsewhere. “The brain is constantly trying to automate processes, 
thereby dispelling them from consciousness; in this way, its work will be 
completed faster, more effectively and at a lower metabolic level. 
Consciousness, on the other hand, is slow, subject to error and 
‘expensive’.”1670 
vi. Neural resources dedicated to emotional self regulation are reduced as virtue 
is acquired. There are natural developmental analogies for this.  
Voluntary suppression of a primary emotion, such as sadness, 
requires more prefrontal work in children than in adults. 
Conscious and voluntary self regulation of emotion is more 
challenging (cognitively and affectively) in children than in 
adults because the maturation of the connections linking the 
prefrontal cortex and the limbic structures is not yet 
completed. 1671  
Similarly, the effort to be cheerful in children exhibited increased PFC 
activation. 1672  
                                                          
1668
 The basal-thalamo-cortical loop appears most relevant here. Da Cunha, “Learning processing in 
the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,” 163. 
1669
 For example, Solso finds that experts use less energy in their brains responding to stimuli in 
their domain. R. L. Solso and D. W. Massaro, The science of the mind: 2001 and beyond, (Oxford: 
OUP, 1995). 
1670
 Gerhard Roth, “The Quest to Find Consciousness,” Scientific American Mind, January-February, 
2004. 
1671
 Beauregard and O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain. A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the 
Soul, 136. 
1672
 Beauregard and O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain. A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the 
Soul, 136. Increased activation is noted in lateral PFC, OFC (just above the optic nerve input), mPFC 
and rostral ACC. 
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vii. Stable intrinsic motivations replace the unreliability of extrinsic reward. As 
habits are formed behaviours become increasingly resilient against reward 
devaluation and efficiencies of intrinsic reward take dominance. Motivation 
becomes independent of extrinsic reward. This accelerates further use-
induced synaptic stabilisation: reinforcing behaviours are repeated more 
readily once motivation is internalised.  
viii. The proximity of brain regions with key involvement adds further efficiencies 
of interconnectivity. PFC, BG and limbic structures, with their interconnections 
and loops, have been identified as key brain areas associated with the state of 
virtue. These systems are adjacent in the architecture of the brain offering a 
considerable neural efficiency for interconnectivity. This efficiency is further 
enhanced by the fact that the BG and the limbic systems, enjoying rich 
neuromodulator infusion, are adjacent to temporal lobes which are 
themselves richly interconnected to the PFC and active in cortical memory, 
and are situated between the autonomic systems linked to the brainstem and 
cortical regulation.   
ix. Structural neuronal plasticity is a major cause of functional efficiency. 
Structural changes facilitate pathways for preferred reward and emotional 
responses, for deliberation, and for preferred motor outcomes. The stability of 
virtue and of associated personality is accounted for, at the neurobiological 
level, by structural plastic change as a consequence of gene expression 
mediated by processes such as LTP and LTD. For example: preferred reward 
outcomes could include intrinsic rewards for helping another; preferred 
emotional responses could include remaining calm in a crisis; preferred motor 
outcomes could include ready courtesies of smiling, etc. Mechanisms of 
neuroplasticity offer greater speed, accuracy and efficiency in replicating 
behaviours, by means of established pathways of motivation, processing, 
command, and execution. Experience-based, Hebbian learning associated with 
forms of LTP and LTD appears to play a major role in these mechanisms, 
accounting for enhanced interconnectivity upon which procedural sequences 
involved in virtuous actions are founded. 
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x. Sensitive periods and affection induced plasticities offer further efficiencies. 
Guided by the reason of parent or caregiver, a child’s sound early 
development of likes and dislikes, the precursor behaviours to fortitude and 
temperance, are assisted by sensitive periods of responsiveness and by care-
giver affection. 
xi. Mechanisms of imitation lead to direct incorporation of emotional responses. 
This is manifested most particularly, though not exclusively, in younger 
children. This facilitates parental and caregiver guidance in what, according to 
reason, should be sought as pleasurable and what should be avoided.    
xii. The experience based paradigm of learning which underpins virtue 
development brings a grand efficiency. Every experience carries potential for 
learning not only at the cognitive level, but by inducing direct biological 
modifications below the threshold of consciousness.  
xiii. In the development of the neural bases of virtue, a law of increasing returns 
operates. Arden and Linford explain, “On the macro level: the more often we 
do something, the more likely we are to do it again.”1673 Choices to act 
virtuously serve to encourage future choices along the same lines. The neural 
basis for this is found in use-induced plastic reinforcement of pathways of 
preferred behaviours; simultaneously, unused and little used pathways are 
pruned away. 
 
6.2.2.3 Teleological fulfilment. The neurobiology of eudaimonia at the 
teleological level.  
 
In 5.3.3.1 u. teleologically oriented eudaimonia was described as:  
A state of general flourishing marked by effective self-
management mediated by the neurophysiological dispositions 
of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. 
…(underpinning) a rationality that is disposed to seek and 
recognise truth and to love others.   
                                                          
1673
 Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 21. 
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In this section I consider eudaimonia, at the teleological level, under this aspect.  
We saw (1.4.1.a) that flourishing, fullness of potentiality, is necessarily associated 
with final causality; here we discuss flourishing of the person with respect to his 
proper ends: truth and love.  
 
Man is empowered for truth and love by the integrated action of the virtues 
disposing his acts for perfection. Virtue facilitates inhibition of impulsivity towards 
inappropriate and harmful pleasures, assists in mastery of timidity and 
moderation of rashness (see 3.4.3.5-7 and 5.3.3.2 No.2), inclines towards a spirit 
of relationship and respect for others, and assists in the dominion of reason. 
There is compelling inductive argument that the state of virtue is a state of natural 
happiness, and that therefore that the neural part-constituents of virtue are 
aspects of the natural developmental trajectory of the human being, although this 
natural development can be frustrated by the individual.   
 
As we have seen (4.2.2) man’s capacity to grasp truth is perfected by prudence. 
His capacity to moderate his own goods in relation to the goods of others is 
perfected by the dispositions of justice (4.2.3, and 5.3.3.2. No.1 for neural bases 
of both virtues). Virtue empowers the person for openness to reality, accuracy in 
evaluating reality, planning, sincerity about reality; it empowers man for right 
deliberation about means and goals, and about abstract goods. 
 
On the basis of truths grasped and knowledge of one’s own end, it is possible to 
make rational choices to choose rightly, to be in “good shape for self 
determination”.1674 
  
Furthermore, life is “relational” starting even at the synapse itself. Our capacity to 
move ourselves towards the goals we understand to be good for ourselves 
                                                          
1674
 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 86. Finnis argues 
that human flourishing is dependent on the possession of various goods, among them the basic 
good of life is characterised by the capacity for self determination. Other goods such as practical 
reasonableness necessitate the presence of virtue.  
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necessarily requires the capacity to grasp the truth of things or people: I will love 
another whom I understand to be a good for me. Hence, flourishing at the 
personal level includes an openness to another in a personal relationship to the 
degree that that person is understood as a good for oneself. It is common 
experience that happiness in life is dependent on the experience of these loving 
relationships.1675 In turn these positive experiences facilitate further positive 
behaviours, nourishing human maturity.  Reciprocally, it is shown that the quality 
of relationships experienced by a child will affect brain development.   
 
Biological processes facilitate a state disposed to knowing and loving. It seems 
natural to human beings to love with all their being, with full integration of the 
biological. Knowing too requires full integration of the biological. Without this 
vision, knowing and loving remain as ancilliary activities to man, failing to enlist 
one’s entire being, optional fulfilments for limited aspects only of human nature. 
It would in fact be self-contradictory to argue that human beings are fulfilled by 
knowing and loving were these operations not carried out with the integrated 
involvement of the body.1676 Virtue may be understood as the neurophysical 
disposition enabling rational operation, and is the key to our knowing and loving 
in a fully integrated way. The perfection of the body must be integral to the 
perfection of the person in a permanent way.1677 
 
                                                          
1675
 Cf John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis, (1979), 10. “Man cannot live without love.  He remains a 
being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he 
does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not 
participate intimately in it.” 
(http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_04031979_redemptor-hominis_en.html) 
1676
 Norman Doidge regards oxytocin as the neural substrate for love and commitment, creating a 
calm and warm mood and triggering trust between couples and between mothers and children. He 
christens it “the commitment neuromodulator”(119), and suggests that as a neuromodulator it is 
more able to “enhance or diminish the overall effectiveness of the synaptic connections and bring 
about enduring change” (118). Doidge is of the view that oxytocin assists imitation of another’s 
intentions and perceptions, and counters self-centredness. (119) He quotes Walter J Freemen of 
Berkeley who argues there to be two massive neuronal organisational times: falling in love and 
parenting. Doidge, The brain that changes itself, see discussion 116-121.   
1677
 The very perfection of the risen Christ reveals, to a Christian, that bodily perfectibility is 
permanent, and that how we are hereafter is proportionate to how we become now. 
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I am fulfilled by knowing and loving with all my being, without holding back, a 
complete giving in which all my senses, internal senses, memories, desires, 
planning and deliberations are enlisted and present. This understanding is in 
accord with a definition of love that embraces complete self-giving. (See also 
Woytyla’s enriched understanding of person, and fulfilment in loving relationships 
in 1.4.3.) To love with all my heart is to love not only the “movement” of love 
towards the good that is loved, but, in interpersonal love, the mutual possession 
of the beloved and complete self-giving of the beloved. This is true flourishing. 
Virtue is the only path. It is the biological key.1678  
 
Happiness normally also accompanies the capacity for autonomous action that is 
necessarily a feature of human maturity.  It is also common experience that 
happiness depends upon peace of heart, that quality of character reflecting the 
capacity to direct oneself to the goals one holds to be of greatest value in life. It 
may be argued that good habits, habits following upon choices of what we 
perceive as deeply good for us, bring this peace. A further case may be presented 
that habitual dispositions for meditation, reflection, and contemplation of beauty 
are also implicated in happiness.  
 
Note that while peace of heart may appear to be a subjective element, there is a 
manifestly objective basis in the due order in one’s life and in one’s 
neurobiology.1679 
 
6.2.3 Fulfilment through virtue. 
 
Links between virtue and fulfilment are found in two prominent contemporary 
professors of psychology whose work is largely consistent with the 
Aristotelian/Thomistic view of virtue as a source of fulfilment for man. Both 
venture into the neuroscience.  
                                                          
1678
 For this reason, for a Christian, Christ is the model of human activity; a man who knows and 
loves “in” his very being.  
1679 
“The peace of all things lies in the tranquility of order; and order is the disposition of equal and 
unequal things in such a way as to give to each its proper place” Augustine XIX.13, p. 938. 
508 
 
 
The work of Samuel Franklin openly attempts to demonstrate that a greater part 
of the anthropological wisdom, and biological accuracy, of current psychology may 
be traced back to Aristotle’s teachings about virtue. The other is the initiator of 
the Positive Psychology movement, Martin Seligman, who presents the view that 
at the clinical level (and therefore at the level of biological structures) that virtue 
perfects the nature of man. Seligman’s most recent text, Flourish, presents his 
current thought on the topic. 
 
6.2.3.1 Samuel Franklin 
 
With the intention of building a bridge between contemporary biopsychology and 
Aristotle, Samuel Franklin has published in 2010 The Psychology of Happiness. A 
good human life. He discusses “the physiological basis of virtue”.1680 
Aristotle suggested that virtue is the moderation of emotion by 
reason. Although it took 2,500 years, we now have neurological 
evidence that he was right. 1681  
 
Drawing on the work of LeDoux, he outlines a simple model for the implication of 
biological structures in the operation of virtue. At the core of his insight is the 
contrast between a longer cortical route for emotional processing, involving eye – 
thalamus – visual cortex – amygdala – PFC – emotional reaction, with a more 
direct route: eye – thalamus – amygdala – emotional reaction; 1682 he argues that 
the longer cortical route is integral to virtue.  He holds that the capacities for 
“executive control” lie in prefrontal areas.1683 He argues for the instrumentality of 
the PFC in executive control and self awareness and result in foresight, 
judgement, social graces, creativity, empathy, reasoning, and reliability,1684and 
                                                          
1680
 Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, Chapter 12. 
1681
 Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, 117. 
1682
 Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, 117. 
1683
 Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, 119. 
1684
 Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, 119. 
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suggests that both humans and primates suffering damage to the prefrontal areas 
(think of Phineas Gage) lose these capacities.  
Here lay the capacities for “executive control”, the ability to 
make reasonable decisions, to inhibit when appropriate, and to 
say and do the right thing. The prefrontal lobes appear to be 
the centres where visual images become meaningful and where 
reason and emotion join together.1685  
 
The absence of any discussion whatsoever touching on the hylomorphic makeup 
of the human person is a serious omission from the perspective of this study. He 
suggests, incorrectly from an Aristotelian perspective: “The prefrontal lobes ... 
may be the seat of our humanness, our ergon.”1686  
 
6.2.3.2 Martin Seligman 
 
Martin Seligman, Professor at University of Pennsylvania and a recent past 
President of the American Psychological Association, is a giant of contemporary 
psychology. Having won acclaim for his groundbreaking work on resilience for 
young people, in 2004 he coauthored with Christopher Peterson Character 
Strengths and Virtues, an analytical framework for discussion of character defined 
as a composite of positive traits or habits.  
 
Their avowed aim was to “reclaim the study of character and virtue as legitimate 
topics of psychological inquiry and societal discourse”, seeking to elevate 
discussion of virtues to a clinical basis through an evidence-based methodology. 
They stated, “We believe good character can be cultivated, but to do so we need 
conceptual and empirical tools to craft and evaluate interventions.” This 
confirmation of the role of virtue and particularly of its contribution to flourishing 
is timely. 
 
                                                          
1685
 Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, 119. 
1686
 Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, 120. 
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Seligman and Peterson through an exhaustive process identified six umbrella 
abstract virtues: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance, humanity and 
transcendence and a further list of character strengths subordinate to the virtues. 
Their list of virtues bears resemblance to core virtues of the various traditions of 
man.  
 
Under the six headings the authors drill down to twenty four character strengths, 
or stable traits of character; for example wisdom is the umbrella virtue for 
creativity, curiosity, open-mindedness, love of learning, and perspective. The 
authors suggest that one can further descend to what they call “situational 
themes”, habits manifesting the character strengths in specific circumstances. The 
whole process is thus from the abstract to the specific habits that manifest the 
virtues. Pleasingly Aristotelian.  
 
They are at pains to remind us that theirs is not the final word, but the work is 
most impressive nonetheless. Major sections in the book discuss aims and 
methodology of the project, the character strengths in detail, and assessment 
processes. Chapters on each character strength are the work of contributing 
experts in their own specific fields. Discussion of each strength follows a standard 
template: definitions, traditional approaches, measures, benefits, manifestations, 
cross-gender and cross-cultural variations, interventions for fostering, areas for 
future study, and bibliography.  
 
Early in the work, Seligman and Peterson review understandings of virtue through 
the great cultural traditions of the east and the west. It is most of all in the 
writings of the great Greek philosophers that Seligman and Peterson find their 
inspiration. The four cardinal virtues closely align with five of the six of Seligman 
and Peterson. Only transcendence at first sight is not easily categorized yet 
Socrates and his followers would no doubt have included a transcendence within 
the speculative virtue of wisdom. Not only does the actual articulation of the 
virtues essentially correspond, but the vision of a virtue as a good habit closely 
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aligns. Seligman has now built upon this work, taking it an overtly eudaimonistic 
direction… “strengths of character that make the good life possible.” 
 
Building on his earlier work, Seligman has now published Flourish. The new work 
broadens his definition of happiness. He proposes five indicators of flourishing: 
positive emotion, engagement, relationships, meaning and accomplishment. 
Relationships and accomplishment receive more emphasis than in his past 
works.1687 Nevertheless his analysis appears to have compatibility neither with 
that of Aristotle nor with the basic human goods as outlined by John Finnis and 
others.1688  
 
An attempt to align the three perspectives suggests that Seligman’s divisions are 
based on a subjective perspective: for example, Seligman overtly discusses 
positive emotion and the experience of meaning and accomplishment, whereas 
both Aristotle and Finnis prefer to limit their analysis to objective context. I 
suggest this reveals a significant difference in approach. Ultimately Seligman 
prefers to discuss the subjective experience of virtue and the subjective 
experience of happiness, rather than the existential reality of virtue. While this is 
understandable given his clinical emphasis it is perhaps inevitable given 
Seligman’s lack of a metaphysical anthropology. This does not, however, detract 
from the value of Seligman’s findings on the necessity of virtue for human 
flourishing. The power of clinical findings is in their objective basis in evidence; it is 
Seligman’s analysis that adds the note of subjectivity.  
 
6.3 Neuroscientific conclusions 
 
6.3.1 Reflections on the model that has been proposed. 
 
                                                          
1687
 Seligman Flourish: a new understanding of happiness and well-being and how to achieve them.  
1688
 In 3.2.8 we saw that Aristotle regarded virtue as necessary though not sufficient for happiness 
and he enumerated requirements for happiness. 
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During my investigations there have been moments of significant insight that have 
given shape to this study. An understanding of these stepping stones will provide 
an appropriate lead-in to a summary of neuroscientific conclusions, and may 
stand my key findings in greater clarity.  
 
The role of virtues as factors that promote wellbeing has been most evident to me 
in my professional life. I am still in close touch with a great number of students, 
some now in their late 30s, whom I knew very well through a decade of their 
school lives. Many are flourishing and some are struggling. It has become patently 
clear to me that that our habits will either pull us through or, if they are bad 
habits, come back to bite us.  
 
A Time article fifteen years ago about the developmental windows in a child’s 
brain got me thinking about a project describing the neural basis of virtue 
understood as good habits, and that it could be possible to demonstrate 
scientifically the benefit of virtues.1689  
 
Once I started on the project, it became very clear that the solution needed to 
embrace the unity of the virtues. When I dissected the actions of Nagai it became 
clear that good actions in real life consistently require the dispositions of most, if 
not all, of the cardinal virtues.  Rereading the Nicomachean Ethics in the light of 
the task I was undertaking, I was struck by Aristotle’s remarkable insights about 
pain and pleasure as human motivations, and of the virtues of temperance and 
fortitude disposing for appropriate pain and pleasure. The role of temperance and 
fortitude fell into place as necessary dispositions prior to every human act.  
 
When I was considering the possibility of neural bases for prudence and justice, it 
became apparent that, during the process of deliberation, reasoning requires the 
ongoing support of phantasms drawn from memory (and imagination, which is a 
form of composite memory). This fact and the description in Scenario 3 where 
                                                          
1689
 J. Madeleine Nash, “Fertile minds,” Time Magazine, 3 February, 1997. 
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Nagai reads and reads again the pamphlet dropped from the plane before he 
comes to a conclusion, made it clear to me that embodied rational deliberation 
has duration and is conducted with the ongoing assistance of, is disposed by, 
neural structures.  
 
The observation of trained dogs that obey their owners’s commands to sit at kerbs 
(even when, as in the suburb where I live, dogs receive instruction in a foreign 
language!), accorded remarkably with the observation of Aristotle that acts 
disposed by fortitude and temperance in a small child must follow the reason of 
the parent. This led me to the view that fortitude and temperance must essentially 
be neurobiological features.  
 
When the discovery of mirror neurons received publicity, initially I could see a 
possible role of this neural mechanism in assisting the uptake of parental example. 
I then read of Aristotle’s insistence that parents must teach refined attitudes to 
pleasure and pain, by example and body language in an ongoing emotional 
education, and thus teach emotional regulation. The mirror neuron thus offers a 
mechanism not only to assist in imitation of example and development of 
empathy but for the very core business of emotional education: children are able 
to embody their parent’s emotional reactions to pain and pleasure … again for 
better or for worse.  
 
At a comparatively early stage in this project, an integral role for the BG struck me 
as necessary. 
i. In my readings in neuroscience on habit formation in the brain, I was 
struck by the recent expanding understandings of the function of the BG 
(extending to involvement in reward and emotion processing, and 
cognitive support for decision making and goalsetting). I had come seeking 
a neural basis for good habits, and it was felicitously coincidental that the 
area most associated with automaticity enjoyed rich reciprocal 
interconnectivity with the PFC and with the limbic areas. It struck me that 
the Hebbian principle brings with it a corollary: connections are not only 
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built by activity, but the existence of connections indicates activity, and 
dense interconnection indicates a virtual information 
highway.Furthermore, the physical location of the BG also struck me as 
highly conducive to an integral role.  
ii. Addiction studies brought to my attention the pathways in the BG for the 
transformation of reward related behaviours to habitual behaviours, with 
corresponding reduction in reward significance. This struck me as a 
significant parallel to the reward independent intrinsically motivated 
behaviours of mature virtue, most especially given the presence once 
again of the BG in the equation. The reality of reward incentivation for 
small children (and puppy dogs) during stages of habit formation further 
suggested to me a role for the BG in mature virtue.  
iii. Furthermore, addiction studies note the coexistence of BG addiction 
pathways with clear-headed, calculating rationality in the addict. This 
suggested that positive BG habits could also have a rational dimension. 
That there are no motor pathways directly from the BG demonstrates that 
the role of the BG is to modify motor commands not to issue them. In 
principle, the abundant basal-cortical connectivity can support positive 
reflective habits, not only unconscious habit and addictive behaviours.     
 
My attendance at the Persons and their Brains conference at Oxford in July 2012 
and subsequent meetings and correspondence with several figures writing in 
philosophy of mind and neuroscience have given me greater clarity of 
understanding concerning the shortcomings of the notion of emergence and of 
the need to repackage the hylomorphic view in terms that can engage with 
neuroscience. A chance meeting with a professor of Thomistic philosophy helped 
me refine my view of the unitive and functional role of the soul.1690 1691  
                                                          
1690
 Discussions and correspondence with Professor Antonio Malo of the University of the Holy 
Cross, Rome. 
1691
 These insights are presented in Appendix 1. A Response to the Claims of Emergent Rationality 
by Non-reductive Materialism and in several articles I have penned in subsequent months. Several 
online pieces I have contributed to MercatorNet website, http://www.mercatornet.com/:“The 
battle to reclaim free will,” 6 July 2012; “Stephen Covey: reviving the forgotten notion of virtue,” 
22 August 2012; “What’s the matter with Analytic Philosophy,” 4 September 2012. 
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6.3.2. A summary of neuroscientific conclusions. 
 
I have argued that the neural bases of virtue (as have been presented in 5.3 and in 
Table 5.2) consist in the highly coordinated integration of higher neural systems at 
both the functional and structural levels, subserved by the lower neural structures 
and other bodily systems (sustaining life and supporting physical activity). These 
neural bases manifest the plasticity that is virtually ubiquitous across the neuronal 
pathways of the human brain; this plasticity, and the systems of learning, 
memory, habit formation, emotional regulation and goal election offer the 
primary mechanisms to assist in the stabilisation and reinforcement of behaviour 
by repetition and in response to environmental inputs.  
 
In the normal course of events consolidated neural pathways are a use-induced 
consequence of repeated choices disposed by the virtues of prudence and justice 
(and therefore with full respect for duties towards others), free from the negative 
consequences of emotion driven choices (through the dispositions of 
temperance), and from unreasonable fears of external obstacles (though the 
dispositions of courage). In other words, it is rational and virtuous choices 
themselves that further consolidate stable dispositions of virtue in a marvellously 
efficient paradigm of development; the very neural circuitry involved in individual 
virtuous acts becomes over time a flexible myriad of expressways and flyovers for 
ease of action (pathways facilitating attention to others, intrinsic reward, 
emotional management, consideration of consequences to others, critical 
judgement, prior planning, decisiveness, etc). In complement to each virtuous 
action, preferential recall in cortical memory systems and reward circuitry, is 
further consolidated by each virtuous action: preferential priority for subsequent 
behaviours is accorded to practised behaviours. This will be true for practised 
positive behaviours (eg sincerity, service to others, patience, a capacity to endure 
discomfort for a reasonable motive, etc) but also for negative behaviours (eg 
laziness, reactions of disrespect, surrender to anger, etc). 
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The state of virtue manifests at the neural level as a systemic harmonisation, a 
grand integration of the mental resources of the human being. An ongoing 
interplay is required between biological development, practical reason, 
experience, consideration for others, and the repetition of positive goal directed 
behaviours. Established interconnections facilitate, most importantly, higher 
cortical management of a person’s emotional life and of deepest motivations for 
action. For this reason as we have seen (See 5.2.2.2), the development of the 
neural dispositions for virtue may be seen as a flourishing of the human organism 
at the biological level. 
 
Furthermore this complex systemic integration is ordained to the fulfilment of the 
person at the holistic level, to eudaimonia in the most complete sense of the 
word. (See 5.2.2.3) The development of the neural structures supporting virtue is 
manifestly the end point of a developmental process that is, so fittingly given our 
yearning for rational self-determination, autonomous. Freely elected life 
experiences and free responses to environmental and experiential inputs are the 
raw material from which virtues are formed. The state of virtue is a state of neural 
and systemic maturity, but one which, in some way, one constructs oneself. 
 
6.3.3 Associated insights into brain structure and function. 
 
In Chapter 1 I suggested that this study has the potential to contribute to our 
understanding of the human brain. The following insights appear particularly 
noteworthy:  
i. In keeping with the evolutionary preference for increasing efficiency in 
organisms and organic systems, this study holds that increased 
integration and interconnectivity of brain areas and brain systems are 
manifestations of normal developmental processes. This is suggested, 
for example, in the clarification of interconnections between brain 
regions brought about by synaptic pruning (see 2.2.4, 2.2.5 and Table 
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2.15) with resulting greater efficiencies of connectivity, and found also 
in descriptors of the Templeton research grants (2.1.1.2). 1692  
ii. This study supports the view, gaining greater traction with improved 
imaging, that deep cortical structures play a more significant role in 
cortical and cognitive activity than had been previously understood.  
iii. The BG appear to play a most significant integrative role by facilitating 
cognitive processing of emotion, reward considerations and habit 
formation.  
iv. Note that plasticity denotes not only flexibility for change, but 
paradoxically the capacity to become and remain in a different 
configuration. This capacity, first to be responsive to remoulding, and 
then for the “concrete to set” is at the heart of the stabilized pathways 
that are manifested in virtue. It was noted in Chapter 2 that the 
capacity to lock in behaviours is “the forgotten … aspect of 
plasticity”.1693 The essence of this quality of plasticity appears to be 
found most of all in permanent changes associated with gene 
expression brought about by structural reconfigurations at the level of 
the dendrite. Hebbian paradigms of synaptic strengthening govern the 
development of brain structures that reflect procedures of behaviour 
and associations between environmental stimuli.  
v. The necessary integration in cognitive learning of systems of attention 
has particular significance in the development of the virtues of 
prudence and justice, which rely less on early training and more on 
explicit guidance. Attentional difficulties in adolescence must be a 
significant hindrance to moral development.     
vi. In the model of virtue proposed, neurotransmitter perfusion most 
particularly of DA in response to cognitive reward perception plays a 
                                                          
1692
 Note too, that in descriptors of the Templeton research grants, (2.1.1.2) accord with the view 
that virtue manifests in high levels of integration and interconnectivity between neural systems: 
most particularly in the integration of the brain’s emotion and reward/motivation/goal election 
systems, with systems of cognition, planning and executive management. Note, for example, that 
the rational moderation of pleasure and rational endurance of pain for a proportionate good, 
necessarily present in acts of temperance and fortitude, requires a high level of neural 
interconnectivity between reward, emotion, emotional memory, cognition and executive centres.   
1693
 N. Doidge, The brain that changes itself, 276. 
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most significant motivational role, most certainly in the early stages of 
acquisition of the virtue. But also, on the basis that the body possesses 
mechanisms to reward activities that are perceived as enjoyable with 
DA, 5-HT and opiates,1694  these pathways are also likely to constitute 
the basis of intrinsic reward associated with virtue.1695  
vii. In the model of virtue proposed, the lack of resilience, shown in the 
virtual epidemic of depression and anxiety present in young people, 
would appear to consist in a heightened sensitivity to conditioned 
fears, and a corresponding lack of development cortical management 
pathways.  
viii. The ready facility found in young people for the development of habits 
is also shown to be grounded in the neuroscience: it is proposed that 
structural plasticity at the neuronal level provides the mechanism 
underpinning the long-term changes which characterise virtue. It is 
also proposed that mechanisms of structural plasticity provide the 
neural substrate for the necessary rational elements that underpin true 
virtue. It is argued that structural plasticity is also implicated in the 
greater self management of emotional life that virtue affords... and in 
the experience of happiness and peace that self management provides.  
ix. I have presented neurobiological evidence that we human beings have 
the evident ability to bring about, by our own choices, the neural 
development of our brain systems that are necessarily conducive to 
the exercise of rationality and emotional regulation across the 
spectrum of virtuous behaviours. I suggest that this neural 
development may be understood, because of excellence of cognitive-
emotional integration and connectivity it entails, as the pathway par 
excellence for our maturity as human persons. 
x. Ultimately this study into the neural bases of virtues is a further 
witness that the material is integral to our humanity. A state of virtue is 
                                                          
1694
 Addiction studies of video gamers show this.  
1695
 The research into the bases of intrinsic reward under the Templeton research grants offers the 
possibility of early clarification of this model. 
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a stable disposition to know and to love, and is ordered to our deep 
fulfilment. To program ourselves for happiness we need to build up, by 
dint of constant choices and effort, a repertoire of positive behaviours; 
as we consolidate them, these experiences change us. Functional 
change leads to permanent change both neuronally and personally. 
Virtue based approaches remind us that rationality and matter are 
profoundly integrated.  
 
6.4 Philosophical conclusions. 
 
In 6.4 I draw together conclusions, in the light of the neuroscience and 
hylomorphic theory, with respect to: 
i. Anthropology – In addition to the points raised in 6.1 and 6.2 
concerning eudaimonia, I offer reflections arising from this marriage of 
neurobiology and hylomorphism. I consider the unity of the virtues and 
offer brief reflections on the distinction between virtue and vice.    
ii. Philosopy of mind – I consider the comparative advantages, in the light 
of an identification of the biophysical part-constituents, of the 
hylomorphic approach to philosophy of mind. I suggest that a notion of 
soul as principle of being, unity, and function of the person accords to 
hylomorphism the language to engage more successfully with 
contemporary currents in philosophy of mind and demonstrate a 
patently superior approach to materialist and dualist understandings. 
iii. Virtue ethics – This study suggests that virtue ethics, because of a 
demonstrated relationship to human biophysiology, is superior to 
consequentialist and deontological approaches.  
iv. Hylomorphism itself – I consider the insights that the hylomorphic 
account of human freedom and rationality stands to gain from a 
deeper understanding of neuroscience.  
 
6.4.1 Anthropology. Understanding of the human person. Advantages of an 
hylomorphic approach. 
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By describing the neurobiological basis for acquired character traits, this study 
offers a heightened appreciation of the effect that choices and behaviours, 
experiences and environment play in defining who we are.  
 
Plutarch wrote that character is inured habit.1696 For better or for worse this is 
true.  Our personality is sooner or later defined by our habitual behaviours. The 
traction obtained by repeated negative or positive behaviours is founded in the 
biological basis of virtue. Matter brings determination; in the case of virtue, a self-
elected determination. A comprehensive model has been offered, consistent with 
both the identified characteristics of virtue and with the neuroscientific data, 
describing how emotion and processes of goal election may either hijack 
rationality or reinforce decision making.   
 
6.4.1.1 Unity of the virtues reveals itself as a biological necessity.  
 
This study serves to considerably strengthen the case for the unity of the virtues.  
 
In 4.3 I argued for the complementary and integral activity of the cardinal virtues 
in every human act. My approach consisted of the following: I offered 
observations of the apparent complex integration of the various virtues in real 
scenarios; in concert, I argued that an analysis of the human act (Table 3.1) 
reveals composition by various elements each requiring the distinctive perfection 
of the various virtues; then, noting Aquinas’s argument that each virtue must play 
a distinctive role, and on the basis of a close reading of Thomistic texts, I offered a 
“restricted understanding of Aquinas’ “reason is the form of the virtues”. In 
summary I have argued that all four cardinal virtues are present in actions of 
perfect virtue because the four cardinal virtues each perform different roles, 
disposing the sensitive appetites, the intellectual appetite and the intellect. All are 
needed for the completion of the good action. 
                                                          
1696
 Plutarch, On the education of children. 
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When these arguments based on observation, dissection of the human act, and 
deduction from an understanding of the differing roles of the virtues based on 
analysis of Aristotelian and Thomistic texts, are complemented in 5.3.3 by 
identification of highly plausible neural bases of each of the cardinal virtues, a 
compelling argument crystallises: it would seem that the unity of the virtues be a 
biological necessity. 
 
6.4.1.2 Some thoughts on the nature of vice.  
 
Vice is understood popularly as the antonym of virtue. In 3.3.13 the nature of vice 
was discussed. Vice is a disposition to give free rein to a passion, following one’s 
sensitive nature “contrary to the order of reason”.1697 It stands in contrast to both 
virtue which, generally speaking, is the habitual rational choice of a good that is in 
keeping with one’s nature, and to incontinence in which the action against nature 
is contrary to the express will of the agent who lacks the mastery that would be 
accorded by possession of the virtues of justice, fortitude or temperance.  
 
The neural analysis of Chapter 2 serves to highlight that vice and virtue are not 
simple alternatives. Vice is a habit of complacent abrogation of rational 
deliberation and so is most harmful for the subject. Vices are best understood as 
an absence, accompanied by rational justification, of neural circuitry facilitating 
adequate evaluation of goals.   
 
Vice and virtue are not simple alternative trajectories of development; vice is a 
privation of neural development. A correctly formed understanding of vice leads 
us to understand that bad habits are not a simple alternative to good habits; there 
is a world of difference both in function – rationality informed by appropriate 
ends- and structure – vice must necessarily exhibit defective pathways of 
                                                          
1697
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.71, Art.2. 
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deliberation and/or evaluation of consequences of one’s actions, accompanied 
also possibly by impoverished emotional regulation.  
 
Vice is a self-imposed privation of rationality. Neurally it will be constituted by 
direct pathways between passion and behaviour, bypassing due deliberation. As it 
is a complacent attitude, it will be accompanied by higher cortical reward 
representations denoting awareness and enjoyment of one’s actions. There will 
be no consequent activity in brain centres for sadness and guilt.  The bottom line 
is that the person in the grip of vice is content to underutilise the human capacity 
to deliberate effectively about ends. Such underutilisation becomes neurally 
reinforced, through strengthening of direct, non reflective routes, the more the 
relevant behaviours are pursued.  
 
6.4.2 The benefits of a non-reductionist, hylomorphic approach to philosophy 
of mind.  
 
In Chapter 1 notions of anti-reductionism, rationality and person were introduced 
as essential to the Aristotelian view of virtue. In Section 1.5, I adopted Haldane’s 
advocacy of a “return to form”, and proposed the suitability of an hylomorphic 
solution to the mind-body problem. A convincing, non-reductionist position 
appears impossible without the concept of person as agent. Here I further 
conclude that the anti-reductionist position and notions of person, rationality, and 
virtue, are further supported by an enriched understanding of causality (6.4.2.1) 
and by an understanding of soul that is adequate to underpin human freedom 
(6.4.2.3, and Appendix 1). Thus, in the first case, I further distance hylomorphism 
from any taint of substance dualism, and in the second, I avoid a narrow and 
deterministic definition of causality that considers only material cause.  
 
We have seen that contemporary philosophy of mind, in seeking to account for 
human behaviour and material causality, is dominated either by reductionist-
materialist approaches on the one hand, essentially denying freedom, or anti-
reductionist approaches on the other. Within the latter, this study proposes that 
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only an approach founded on the Aristotelian-Thomistic vision of the human 
person succeeds in accounting for both causality and freedom. We have seen that 
the other principal non-reductionist approach to philosophy of mind has looked 
either to substance dualism in one form or another for a solution accounting for 
human freedom, or to a paradigm of emergent rationality. 
 
Ultimately, free human action is as inconceivable in a model of human nature that 
proposes a dual substance solution as in one that is purely material. The first, in 
affirming freedom disposes of a single human subject, and the second is incapable 
of offering a rationally satisfying accommodation for freedom within the 
determination of matter. The hylomorphic solution, is however, as we have seen, 
a “non dualist, dual aspect, ontological anti-reductionist” approach to the human 
person; an approach that reconciles human freedom with the notions of material 
causality essential to neuroscientific method.1698  
 
6.4.2.1 The importance of an hylomorphic understanding of brain function and 
structure.  
 
What if someone should ask whether there is any practical difference between a 
materialist (reductionist or non-reductionist) understanding of the brain and an 
hylomorphic understanding? In the first, matter is the agent; in the second 
animated matter operates. Does this difference have any real significance? Could 
it be that agency resides ultimately in neural structures and neurochemicals? 
Could it be that hylomorphism is simply an act of faith that preserves a realm of 
immateriality? 
 
On the contrary, this study argues that rationality is only possible if the 
hylomorphic understanding of matter holds. Rational understanding and rational 
choices to move ourselves towards what we know is suitable for ourselves seem 
only explicable within a paradigm of participation ungoverned by the 
                                                          
1698
 A classification suggested by Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind”. 
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determination of matter. A materialist explanation of human beings is not 
rationally satisfying. 
 
There is undeniable evidence of the human capacity to transcend the material. 
Human beings can transcend from the concrete and the immediately perceived; 
they can acquire wisdom, understanding about what things are and their purpose. 
Human beings can choose; they can elect to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of 
goods that they believe will enrich them even on a non-tangible level; also a 
human being can form interpersonal relationships whereby he or she dedicate 
themselves to carry out the will of another seeing this as for their own fulfilment 
in some way.1699  
 
Because this evidence of man’s capacity to operate at a transcendent level is 
undeniable, and because materialist accounts cannot explain non-material 
realities, material explanations for man’s nature are necessarily inadequate. And 
once the inadequacy of the material agency is established, the notion of “person” 
as moral agent is a necessary further conclusion on the basis of unity of being. 
Note that the conclusions first of the hylomorphic constitution of man, and of his 
personhood are both based on observation of the real nature of things. Take away 
the hylomorphic constitution of man and he is denied personhood. 
 
There are only five possible explanations for the presence of rationality of human 
beings.  
i. That human beings are puppets of a rational principle beyond 
themselves. This is manifest nonsense as it removes every skerrick of 
agency from mature human beings. 
ii. A reductive materialism that defines matter as the functioning agent, 
and argues that all human behaviour has its explanation in cells, 
currents, neurotransmitters, etc. This is a deterministic position and is 
                                                          
1699
 cf Ansombe’s observations abou the non materiality of man’s spiritual nature. 
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ultimately a denial of rationality; an assertion that rationality and 
human freedom are essentially illusory. 
iii. A substance dualism that defines the soul as the functioning agent, 
leading to insuperable contradictions in accounting for causation and 
for interaction between human beings and physical experience.  
iv. A non-reductive materialism arguing that rationality emerges from 
matter itself. Yet an emergent rationality must be tied to the 
determinism inherent in matter; it cannot explain the capacity to grasp 
universal truth, nor human freedom. As both of these are manifest 
realities, non-reductive materialism is ultimately a self-contradictory 
position. The term “emergent” appears to be an unscientific sleight of 
hand. Furthermore, to resort to “chaos” and “quantum”, as some do, 
to explain personhood and freedom either misunderstands rationality 
or takes refuge in a mysticism that is ultimately irrational.  
v. The hylomorphic solution which is more subtle and satisfying, arguing 
that there must be another principle for human activity beyond matter 
but intrinsic to the human being. This special quality cannot emerge 
from the matter itself nor be a separate substance to the body. It is a 
principle animating the body itself but must be received from beyond 
the body. This principle of activity is the rational soul. The hylomorphic 
solution is founded on the observation that an animated human body 
is essentially of a different order from a living animal or a non-living 
thing.  
 
The prevailing position in neuroscience is that of materialism, either reductive or 
non-reductive, but either way materialism.  It is my hope that this cross-
disciplinary study, in subjecting the assumptions of neuroscience to a rigorous 
philosophical critique, assists in bringing to this exciting field the depth of an 
hylomorphic understanding of man.   
 
Without a broader acceptance of hylomorphism in the community of 
neuroscience, it would appear that the neurobiology of abstraction, of human 
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freedom, of personal agency and interpersonal relationships must remain 
undervalued and possibly understudied. Without acknowledgement of rich 
complexity of the human person, and the role of truth and dedicated 
interpersonal love in human fulfilment these fields will remain uncultivated in 
neuroscience.  There are of course noteworthy exceptions of persons currently 
working in these fields. Because, in the hylomorphic scheme of things, virtue 
opens the door to truth and interpersonal commitments, it is my hope that neural 
studies of virtue, in the light of hylomorphism, open the door to neural studies of 
human flourishing at an even broader level.  
 
6.4.2.2 An enriched understanding of causality accords with the anti-reductionist 
view and permits dialogue between scientific and philosophical 
explorations. 
 
In this task of applying neuroscience to an anthropology that respects human 
freedom, an enriched, essentially Aristotelian, understanding of causality is 
necessary, that discriminates between material, formal and final causes at the 
neural level. Without such discrimination it would appear impossible to 
accommodate both biological materialism and the human freedom manifested in 
the rational development of virtue ordered to the flourishing of the person. 
Without such an enriched understanding it would various appear impossible to 
reconcile man’s freedom with the determinism inherent in matter.   
 
Therefore I propose that these investigations into the neural bases of virtue, 
indeed all neuroscientific endeavours attending to human subjects, must respect 
the following notions of causality: 
i. Experimental method understands an efficient causality operating at the 
material level. The cause of water turning to steam is the Bunsen burner. 
The cause of the accident is the drunk driver. A key mistake of reductive 
understandings of neuroscience is that causality is simplistically reduced to 
one category: efficient/material causality. This is an impoverished view of 
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causality; 1700 in the development of virtue, I suggest that appropriate 
experience is the efficient cause of the development of habit. There are 
clearly other factors in play, but no good habit can exist without 
appropriate experience. 
ii. Good habits in their neurobiological bases are the material cause of virtue. 
Good habits are truly embodied. The body is a necessary co-constituting 
factor of good habits in the embodied state. In our embodied state all 
human activity in the rational, moral, conscious order, not only has 
manifestations in man’s physical being, but is mediated through the 
physical.  
iii. Although rationality is mediated through the physical it is not reducible to 
the physical. It is the person who is rational, not his or her brain. 
Biochemical mechanisms alone are insufficient to account for free action. 
Human development and human behaviours cannot be reduced to actions 
subject to a material determination. Through our rationality we become 
masters of our own development. Hence, rationality, is the formal cause of 
all virtue.1701 An understanding of this concept has discussed at length in 
Chapter 3.  
iv. Good habits are characteristics, not merely of biology, but of the person. 
Indeed as was presented in 5.2.1.2, it is argued that the flourishing of the 
person is the final cause of virtue, that good habits, with all of the 
biological embodiment that this implies, are the means by which a state of 
human flourishing is achieved. 
 
Without this enriched appreciation of causality, I suggest it is not possible to 
reconcile neuroscientific understandings with human behaviour, nor to reach 
findings of significance both to philosophy and neuroscience.  
 
                                                          
1700 
Formal and final causality are neglected completely. 
1701
 Not only does Aquinas affirm this principle, but Haldane as we have seen, argues that a return 
to an understanding of formal cause is absolutely necessary if we are to find a way forward in 
philosophy of mind, if we are to reconcile man’s evident, albeit limited, freedom of action, with 
notions of causality in the physical world.  
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6.4.2.3 Functionalist approaches to hylomorphism.  
 
a) Rationality is functionally integrative. 
 
An enriched understanding of causality offers a solution satisfactory to both 
neuroscience and to an anthropology protective of rationality and freedom.  We 
have seen in particular that it is essential to embrace notions of formal and final 
causality if one is to reach an accommodation satisfying to both. 
 
I argue here for a “functional” understanding of rationality. By this I mean the 
view that rationality is the principle of being, unity and function for the person; it 
offers a path by which physicalist understandings of matter may be moderated by 
non physical factors. Without such an understanding of rationality there seems to 
be no possibility of a dialogue between physicalism and metaphysics. Once 
rationality is dismissed as a physically dependent element in the constitution of 
the person, there would appear to be no longer any room for human freedom. 
The notion of an emergent freedom ultimately appears self contradictory, 
grounded as it is in physical laws. 
 
We have seen that rationality, ultimately, is not simply something one does, nor a 
reflection of physically constitutive parts; it is something of one’s very being. 
Activity follows upon nature; function is a reflection of being. A functional 
approach therefore readily accommodates the Aristotelian notion of the rational 
soul as a principle of activity in the entire body. Consider Aristotle’s text: “As pupil 
and sight are the eye, so, in our case, soul and body are the animal”.1702 A 
profoundly functional understanding of the soul is proposed; sight for the eye is 
analogous to rationality for the body. Furthermore, Aquinas considers rationality 
to be an overarching operative power; an emphasis once again on function as a 
descriptor of what it means to be and act as a human being.1703 He noted also (see 
                                                          
1702
 DA, 413a. 
1703
 ST, Ia, Q.48, Art.5. 
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1.4.1.b) that the soul “perfects each part of the organism”1704 and that it is “whole 
in each part”.1705  
 
It follows that rationality is “functionally integrative”.  It is indeed helpful to 
identify functions of the mind in order to discuss structures of thought (see 3.1.3), 
but, in discussing, for example, the parts of the human act or notions such as 
“agent intellect”and “operations of the soul”,1706 we must not obscure the fact 
that the acting person is the agent, that emotional life intimately enriches 
personal judgements, and that rightly ordered appetitive responses to pain and 
pleasure are necessary for sound, embodied, rational choices. It is an affirmation 
that acquisition of accurate sense data, moderation of emotional response and of 
reward anticipation are as valuable to the act of thinking rationally as the 
conclusion itself.  A “functionally integrative” view of rationality assists in such 
synthesis. It is patently faithful to Aristotle and Aquinas but presented in language 
                                                          
1704
 ST, Ia-IIae, Q.22, Art.2, Art.76.8. 
1705
 SCG, II.72.1485. 
1706
 Although beyond the scope of this study, I suggest that it is not helpful from a Christian 
perspective either to talk of the soul as agent in preference to the embodied soul, or the ensouled 
body. It is completely compatible with the Christian understanding of the substantiality of the soul, 
to affirm that, in embodied life, rational expression could be said to be the very task of the 
animated body. The view that rationality is a fitting operation for neural part-constituents respects 
the theological principle that grace respects nature. Commentaries, as well as Aquinas himself, 
write of the soul as agent of various activities, but a close, cross-referenced reading of Thomas 
always clarifies the understanding that the person, the ensouled body, is the agent. Nevertheless 
such an emphasis on soul as agent can lead not only to dualist turns of phrase but to dualist ways 
of thinking. A failure to emphasize the “ensouled body” as agent, can lead to the conclusion that 
the operations of the soul are independent from the body at least as far as their “intellectual 
activities” go. Take for example this current metaphysics instructional text:  
It is at this highest point of animal life that intellectual knowledge comes into play in 
human knowledge. For, it is by the co-working of the imagination (as a cognitive 
instrument) and the intellectual (abstractive) power of the spiritual soul (as principal 
agent) that the essential character of the accidental forms expressed in the imagination, 
reaching to the substantial forms of the things so represented, are opened up, whereby 
they can be known and understood by the intellect.  This abstraction (and illumination) is 
not the activity of knowledge. It simply puts the forms (by a spiritual impression) into the 
understanding intellect, which is where the immanent activity of knowledge occurs. This 
is the beginning of human knowledge as it is intellectual or spiritual. There remains, as all 
are conscious of, a long and arduous process of intellectual work (reasoning) still to do 
before any degree of full human knowledge is achieved. This course is part of that work-in 
progress. (www.cts.org.au accessed 26/10/12). 
Note, that for the sake of “clarity” the author is making soul, intellect, and abstraction the subjects 
of actions. Yet in the process, an impression is created that activities at this level are conducted 
without the complicity and assistance of the ensouled body. One could almost conclude that 
association with the body bespeaks an unworthiness for these higher functions. 
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accessible to contemporary philosophy of mind, familiar with the various currents 
of functionalism.1707 (See: 6.4.2.3.c.)  
 
In confirmation of this, recent work on emotion suggests that emotion has a place 
in rational decision making.1708 In a paradigm where function pertains to the 
acting person such a view presents no problem. In the light of an hylomorphic 
understanding of animated flesh, an ensouled body, it is reasonable to suggest 
that the emotional responses and reward apprehensions initiating the human act, 
provided they are moderated by fortitude and temperance and provided they are 
in keeping with principles of justice, are themselves integral to rationality.   
 
In summary, a functional view of rationality appears better able to engage with 
contemporary intellectual currents, and it resists any narrowing of the concept of 
rationality in a way that would undervalue the integral contribution of the body.  
 
b) A response to prevailing physicalism. 
 
Yet materialist conceptions dominate the neuroscience.  Larry Squire, author of a 
standard neuroscience text asserts that all behaviour and all of mental life have 
their “origin in the structure and function of the nervous system”.1709 Stephen 
Lyng captures the determinism of contemporary neuroscience in acknowledging 
the work of Grant Gillett: “Countering the prevailing neurophilosophical view of 
human action as a product of largely unconscious brain events, Gillett employs his 
relational model to dispel the notion that free will is only an illusion”.1710  
 
These materialist conceptions dominate also in contemporary philosophy of mind, 
perhaps for want of a more closely considered philosophical position. For 
                                                          
1707
 Although well beyond the scope of this study, I would think also that such language is more 
accessible to the expectations of analytic philosophy. 
1708
 The work of Nussbaum and Damasio has been noted above. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought;  
Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error.  
1709
 Larry Squire, et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3
rd
 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008). 
Introduction to Section 1.  
1710
 Lyng “Brain, body, and society: bioethical reflections on socio-historical neuroscience and 
neuro-corporeal social science,” 25. 
531 
 
example, words from Kandel, dismissive of human freedom, were quoted in 1.3: 
“All biological phenomena are properties of matter”.1711 Tellingly he 
acknowledged only two possible approaches to philosophy of mind: physicalist or 
dualist. Hylomorphism was completely off his radar.  
 
Contemporary currents in neuroscience seek to account for human freedom 
either by emergentism, which is a form of non-reductive physicalism, or by 
dualism. Both appear logically flawed.  
 
Emergentism suggests that non-material realities can emerge from purely 
material origins. For example, Susan Greenfield argues that the brain is 
“personalized through a unique and ceaselessly changing configuration of 
neuronal connections”. Yet, ultimately, human freedom cannot exist in a being 
which is wholly material and therefore determined. Nor is it logical to take refuge 
in qualia, one’s “inner sanctum”,1712 as in some last bastion against materialism. 
How could qualia escape the determinism of their origins?  The emergent views of 
Joseph LeDoux (5.2.1.1), Antonio Damasio (5.2.1.2), and Michael Gazzaniga 
(5.2.2.2) seem similarly problematic. 1713  (See Table 1.1, and Appendix 1.)  
 
Various forms of contemporary dualism and epiphenomenalism deny causality 
between the real and mental worlds, leave it as unexplained, or resort to fanciful 
theories. Schwartz, for example, insists that mental events can precede biological 
events in the brain. 1714  Yet dualism is not a rational option: in its modern forms 
an immaterial mind controls the body (yet is paradoxically derived from and 
therefore ultimately dependent upon matter), or two orders of being are 
                                                          
1711
 Kandel et al., Principles of Neural Science, 4
th
 edition, 1317. 
1712 
Greenfield, I.D. The Quest for identity in the 21
st
 Century, 168 and 132.   
1713
 Gazzaniga Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain,  124. 
1714
 Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain, 319. “There are no rational grounds for denying 
that conscious mental effort plays a causal role in the cerebral changes observed in OCD patients.” 
On the one hand Schwartz denies causality as we know it by invoking Quantum theory as an 
explanation for non-material realities; on the other he enlists causality in asserting that mental 
events are distinct from physical events: “thinking creates pathways”.  
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proposed without any causal interaction from the mental to the physical. 1715  (See 
Table 1.1) 
 
Hylomorphism has been proposed as the “third way” (1.4). Openness to the 
hylomorphic solution can free neuroscientists from determinism and from 
dualism.  There are indications that both Schwartz and Greenfield would be open 
to such a resolution as they preserve person as agent, and this agent enjoys a 
freedom subject to certain physical limitations. In addition, Susan Greenfield 
(differing from Schwartz) affirms the hylomorphic principle that the mental and 
the physical are not separate events. Schwartz writes: “There are no rational 
grounds for denying that conscious mental effort plays a causal role in the 
cerebral changes observed in OCD patients”, 1716 but Susan Greenfield insists that 
for every thought there is “a physical correlate”.1717 It would appear that neither 
Schwartz nor Greenfield are, per se, committed materialists; simply that, perhaps 
like Eric Kandel, they had not conceived of a third way and had opted, one for an 
emergent approach and the other for  dualism, for the best theories on offer.1718 
(See further discussion in Appendix 1. e.) 
 
c) Bridges to contemporary philosophy of mind.  
 
Hylomorphism provides a pathway to reconcile human freedom with the 
determinism of physical laws. Martha Nussbaum and Grant Gillett are two 
philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition who have sought to marry hylomorphism 
with neuroscience. To do so they have emphasised variations on a functionalist 
approach.  These insights are of value to this study. 
 
                                                          
1715
 We have seen above (1.5) the criticisms that highlight the “crypto-cartesianism” of 
contemporary materialism that posits a matter which appears to be none other than the matter of 
dualism. Such crypto-cartesian thinking constitutes a further category of dualism. 
1716
 Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain, 319.  
1717
 Greenfield, I.D. The Quest for identity in the 21
st
 Century), 50. 
1718
 To take this observation a little further: Greenfield, from a background of neuropharmacology, 
emphasises the brain chemistry; psychiatrist Schwartz seeks a way to preserve the power of 
cognitive based therapies. Hylomorphism offers a bridge between the hard sciences and cognitive 
clinicians. 
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Nussbaum adopts a functionalist hylomorphic solution in order to answer the 
materialist philosophies of mind often associated with neuroscience and the 
substance dualism that is sometimes proposed as an unconvincing response to 
determinism. Nussbaum champions the work of the functionalist Hillary Putnam 
as compatible with hylomorphism,1719 and takes issue with Burnyeat’s suggestion 
that “Aristotle’s philosophy of mind is no longer credible because Aristotelian 
physics is no longer credible”.1720  
 
She argues that certain contemporary functionalist approaches are indeed 
Aristotelian. Burnyeat had sought to force a wedge between Aristotle and Putnam 
by arguing, “the whole point of functionalism is to free our mental life from any 
particular material setup”1721. Nussbaum responds, drawing on the 
Metaphysics:1722 
The soul is not an “it” housed in the body but a functional 
structure in and out of matter. Matter is, in its very nature, just 
the thing to constitute the functions of life (it is not a thing to 
which these functions of life can be reduced). 1723    
 
She concludes, “As Aristotelians we do not discover something behind something 
else, a hidden reality behind the complex unity that we see and are. We find what 
we are in the appearances.  And Aristotle tells us that if we attend properly to the 
appearances the dualists’ questions never get going.” 1724     
It is not appropriate to inquire whether the soul and the body 
are one – just as it is not appropriate in the case of wax and its 
shape, and in general the matter of each thing and that of 
                                                          
1719
 See especially Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind” in Essays on 
Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1992), 27-56. This compendium of essays contains further useful sources. 
1720
 M. F. Burnyeat, “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind still credible (A draft)” in Essays on 
Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1992), 15-26. Quotation from p16. 
1721
 M. F. Burnyeat, “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind still credible (A draft),” 16. 
1722
 “Some things are just are this or in this, or these parts ordered in such and such a way.’ M, 
1036b22ff. 
1723
 Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 56. 
1724
 Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 56. 
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which it is the matter.... If you attend in the appropriate way to 
the complex materiality of living things, if you understand the 
common conception of what it is to be a living thing, you will 
not ask that question.1725  
 
Whilst Nussbaum does not enter discussion about neural substrates, she (as also 
John Haldane, noted in Chapter 1) establishes an hylomorphic response to the 
mind-body problem, and reaffirms authoritatively that discussion of a biophysical 
substrate for mental activity is indeed valid within a Aristotelian-Thomistic 
approach. 
 
A recent paper by Grant Gillett also presents a modified hylomorphic 
understanding of human beings in which, he writes, “both matter and form (or 
body and subjectivity) are important”.1726 In assessing the ethics of psychosurgery, 
Gillett suggests that form is “not just a configuration of matter but a holistic, 
subjective, relational and embodied reality: the person who exists in our midst as 
a being-in-the-world-with-others”.1727  
 
He takes Aristotle’s dictum “If the eye were an animal, then the sight would be its 
soul” and develops a multifaceted view of the soul that “involves” relatedness 
with others, “an identity that evolves over time”, “a stream of conscious 
experience”, and a moral standing as a socially situated agent whose life story is 
lived out and elaborated among (others)”.1728 In particular, he rejects a focus on 
narrow cognitive functions, insisting that the human psyche (the soul) is shaped 
primarily by interaction with others. In seeking to summarise Aristotle’s view of 
the soul, he offers five principles, including: that the soul is shaped by life among 
others, that it is “the expression of patterns of activity laid down in the brain”, and 
                                                          
1725
 DA 412b6-9 
1726
 Grant Gillett, “The gold-plated leucotomy standard and deep brain stimulation,” Bioethical 
Inquiry  8, (2011): 35. 
1727
 Gillett, “The gold-plated leucotomy standard and deep brain stimulation,” 35. 
1728
 Gillett, “The gold-plated leucotomy standard and deep brain stimulation,” 35. 
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that it is a “unique, interactional configuration of brain function shaped by a 
segment of the human life world.” 1729 
 
While it is in keeping with Aristotle’s view of the embodied soul that the soul is, 
while not exclusively, “the expression of patterns of activity laid down in the 
brain”, it does seem open to misinterpretation to describe the soul as 
“interactional brain function”. Surely Aristotle, in discussing the soul, would have 
us focus on the functions of the embodied person rather on functions of the brain 
alone. For Aristotle, a human brain without a human soul is inconceivable. It is the 
soul which gives the brain its meaning, not vice versa. I think rationally because of 
my soul; the soul must not be reduced to intellectual activity let alone to brain 
function.  
 
However Gillett’s emphasis on the interactional, and therefore the functional, as 
essential to the definition of the human psyche, provides us with a rich line of 
eudaimonistic exploration, building the case for the essential distinction that 
necessitates the virtue of justice, and integrating that virtue into a vision for 
human flourishing.  
 
A functionalist approach is also found in Mario Beauregard who defines mind not 
as substance but as a collection of mental processes and events.1730 In effect this 
opens the door to the existence of an underlying substance or person, but without 
attempting any metaphysical explanation of the assertion. The merit of 
Nussbaum’s and Gillett’s functionalist paradigm stands out clearly when one 
compares their approach with that of Jeffrey Schwartz, the “non-materialist UCLA 
neuropsychiatrist”1731 who, as we have seen, argues that minds change brains. 
Without a functional, non-reductive emphasis, efforts to accommodate human 
                                                          
1729
 Gillett, “The gold-plated leucotomy standard and deep brain stimulation,” 36. 
1730
 Beauregard and O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain. A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the 
Soul, 315. 
1731
 Beauregard and O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain. A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the 
Soul, xiii 
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freedom by arguing that the non-material substance of the mind acts on the 
material substance of the brain, must drift towards the substance dualism.  
 
d) Conclusions. 
 
The hylomorphic solution provides the subtle philosophical conception of reality 
that is required for logical consistency. We have seen that the soul, rather than a 
substance in its own right,1732 must be the principle of being and function of the 
subject. Furthermore, as this principle of rationality may not be derived from 
matter it must in some way be received. There are no other options.  
 
This “principle-received”, neither derived from matter nor a substance in its own 
right, must be a sharing in some manner or other.  As Martha Nussbaum has said, 
we must attend carefully to the “complex materiality of things”. 1733  The answers 
are all there. In Thomistic terms, this sharing is a participation in the being of God; 
it is participation in perfect “act” (refer to 1.4.1.a), participation in the being of 
God himself. The evidence of human freedom leads inexorably to the conclusion 
that the soul is a gift of functional participation in the divine act of being. (See 
Appendix 1. A Response the Claims of Emergent Rationality.) 
 
Only a “received” rational principle can explain both rationality and the necessary 
unity of the subject. Only perfect “act” can offer the possibility of such 
“functional” participation. The conclusions extend beyond neuroscience, yet I 
suggest they provide the only possible path forward to provide a philosophy of 
mind that is rationally satisfying.   
 
Functionalist explanations therefore appear to demonstrate convincingly how the 
“return to form”1734 advocated by Haldane can marry with neuroscientific 
                                                          
1732
 Notwithstanding the term “substantial form” applied to the soul (1.4.1), I refer to the soul in 
the embodied life as not a “substance in its own right”. I suggest that the term “substantial form” 
offers a glimpse into the dignity of participated rationality, personhood. 
1733
 Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 56. 
1734
 Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind”. 
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evidence that would otherwise appear deterministic. Of course it is not only 
Nussbaum and Gillett who are focussed on function. It is Aristotle himself who 
argues for the necessity of four virtues on the basis of the four appetitive 
functions they perform.  Observation of function leads to metaphysical 
conclusions. Aristotle is the original functionalist. 1735  
 
6.4.3 Advantages of a virtue based approach to ethics over consequentialist 
and deontological approaches.  
 
I have argued that the understanding of virtue is more in keeping with the 
complexity of human nature itself. According to the Aristotelian-Thomistic notion 
of virtue, virtue possesses both sensitive (exclusively biological) and rational 
dimensions. Aristotle and Aquinas propose that sense memory, imagination and 
appetite, and processes such as imitation and habit development, are in complex 
interplay with the knowing and choosing which are inherent in all fully human 
action. I have argued that the contribution of these various processes in accord 
with what is for the good of the subject, are supported at the biophysical level. 
Virtue, so long regarded as essential component of human flourishing in the 
philosophical tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, is now demonstrably so by the 
findings of contemporary neuroscience.   
 
On this basis it is possible to argue for the superiority of a virtue based paradigm 
evaluating human behaviour. Virtue ethics stands in contrast with rule and duty 
based ethical systems and consequentialist approaches, all of which are theory 
based and give little significance to human experience and to an anthropology 
where rationality and matter are intrinsically integrated (see also 1.6). 1736  These 
approaches find less support in the neuroscience: as ethical systems they are 
learned and applied cognitively, whereas virtue development is acquired 
principally by profound experiential modification of the organism itself. In short, it 
                                                          
1735
 Dermot Moran ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2008), 977. “It is often said that Aristotle is the founder of functionalism because of his 
view that the function of an entity determines its form.” 
1736
 For this reason, Robert Louden writes of virtue ethics as “anti-theory”.  
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would appear that virtue based development best accords with a view of man 
where bodily development is integral to his very nature.1737  Along this line a 
strong inductive case may be mounted in support of a rich, virtue-based, moral 
development of the person, and such an inductive case is necessarily 
strengthened by the identification of physical bases for virtue.  
 
6.4.3.1 A contemporary validation of virtue ethics in the light of neuroscientific 
evidence. 
 
I noted in 1.7 that contemporary accounts of moral behaviour fall broadly into 
consequentialist, deontological or virtue based approaches. In 3.1.5 an analysis 
was offered demonstrating that virtue ethics appears superior to consequentialist 
and deontological paradigms in accounting for the behaviour of Takashi Nagai.  
 
A number of arguments were offered. There is an undeniable causality operating, 
present in Nagai’s own worldview and born out in his actions over a substantial 
period of his life, demonstrating that actions effectively flow from settled states of 
character. Furthermore, there is a striking correspondence between specific 
behaviours (eg the role of passion and deliberation, the presence of intrinsic 
motivation, and the evidence of happiness subsequent to virtuous action) 
predicted by virtue theory and Nagai’s own self description of moral actions. It is 
evident too that virtue theory offers the capacity to accommodate the human 
freedom and rationality that are apparent aspects of human nature. These 
qualities of the virtue based account contrast with the apparent inability for rule 
based and consequentialist paradigms to account for Nagai’s behaviour.  
 
It is hoped that a biological validation of virtue ethics will serve to focus moral 
education on virtue development, heightening the political, popular and clinical 
                                                          
1737
 Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 844. Casebeer notes the experience 
based nature of virtue development, “It is a practice affair”. He suggests that althought “moral 
reasoning and action are “whole psychology, whole brain’ affairs”, the neurobiology of a Kantian 
position would have a frontal emphasis in Kant, and a pre-frontal, limbic and sensory emphasis in 
Mill, but would be the “properly coordinated action of all” in Aristotelian approaches. 
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recognition of the role of virtues in moral development. It will also serve to 
publicise in neuroscientific circles the possibilities of an hylomorphic 
anthropology, focussing on the human person, and permitting an analysis of 
human action that embraces the rational.   
 
We have seen that the focus accorded by the Templeton Foundation, and the 
clinical work of Seligman and Peterson. (1.2.3.1 and 6.2.2.2) 1738 promise a 
contemporary neuroscientific validation of virtue based approaches. Also, a 
biological validation of virtue ethics would be a significant contribution to the 
burgeoning field of neuroethics, a field exhibiting a most diverse and at times 
contradictory range of views, from the physicalist perspectives typified by Neil 
Levy1739 to Darcia Narvaez’s defence of moral education.1740 Physical evidence for 
the neural bases underpinning the development and acquisition of virtue, based 
on an hylomorphic understanding of the human person, would be a significant 
challenge to purely physicalist approaches. It would offer a way forward for an 
enriched scientific view of the human being.1741 
 
6.4.3.2   Understandings of neurobiology assist the discipline of virtue ethics. 
 
                                                          
1738
 Seligman and Peterson, Character Strengths and Virtues. See also: Martin Seligman,  Authentic 
Happiness (NY: Free Press, 2002). 
1739
 Neil Levy, Neuroethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
1740
 Darcia Narvaez, “Human Flourishing and Moral Development: Cognitive and Neurobiological 
Perspectives of Virtue Development” in Handbook of Moral and Character Education, ed. L. P. 
Nucci and D. Narvaez  (NY: Routledge, 2008). 
1741
 If moral virtues are essentially neural structures established ultimately at the promptings of 
reason (one’s own or one’s parents’), what are “infused virtues”? This thought experiment is 
appropriate here and it sheds light on the nature of moral virtue and the importance of truth and 
moral conviction as prerequisites for  virtue. Infused virtue is a form of virtue that comes as a 
divine gift. (cf Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Virtue, Q.1, a.10.) It seems unlikely however that 
infused virtues have a neural signature: this would require a miraculous biophysical 
reconfiguration. Furthermore, the theological understanding of infused virtue is that without good 
will to exercise the infused virtue there can be no apparent effect; this would not be the case were 
there a neural presence which must deliver some degree of permanent impact on behaviour. 
Therefore it would appear that, just as moral virtue disposes for particular actions, infused virtues 
are graces that also dispose for particular actions. They appear to be the promise that stable, 
actual graces will be available to assist the person to act in specific positive ways and so build up 
the actual moral virtues. I propose that these graces consist essentially in an infused 
enlightenment; a clear perception of a truth. For example, infused justice may consist in such a 
conviction that all men and women are brothers and sisters to me. Antonio Malo accorded with 
my view of this in a personal discussion in July 2012.  
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This study has the potential to clarify apparent imprecisions in contemporary 
writing in virtue ethics.  
 
In much contemporary writing in virtue ethics itself, discussion of virtue as a form 
of habit seems largely unexplored. One finds virtue defined or described in 
terminology such as “dispositions of responsiveness” and “the expression of fine 
inner states”,1742 “being well endowed with respect to the agent’s actions, desires, 
and emotions”1743, “powerful and enduring concern”1744 “substantive dispositions 
to choose what is right”.1745 These approaches, while admittedly not seeking 
neurobiological precision, lack the benefit of insights that neurobiological studies 
can provide.   Outside of the discipline of virtue ethics, the range of 
understandings of the term virtue drifts further from a conception of virtue as the 
spectrum of positive habitual behaviours: Rawls, for example, defines virtues 
relatively narrowly as “strong and normally effective desires to act on the basic 
principles of right”.1746 A neurobiology of virtue will assist in standardising 
approaches by anchoring definitions in physical reality.  
 
A neurobiological lens on the notion of virtue offers the possibility of a deeper 
appreciation of: 
i. The processes and pathways for habitual management of emotion, 
demonstrating that they fall in the trajectory of human maturation, and 
are not a line of development merely parallel to impulse challenged 
personalities. 
ii. The distinction between habits, on the one hand, and on the other, less 
neurobiologically precise terms such as states, enduring concerns, and 
normally effective desires. These latter suggest phenomena rather than 
stable features of personality that are demonstrably established and 
                                                          
1742
 Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, 5. 
1743
 Rosalind Hursthouse as presented by Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, 94. 
1744
 Philippa Foote as presented by Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, 94. Cf Philippa Foote, 
Virtues and Vices, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
1745
 Statman, “Introduction to Virtue Ethics,” 49. Statman presents this a the moderately pluralistic 
view held by certain virtue ethicists. 
1746
 Rawls, A theory of justice, 436. 
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enduring, and are oriented towards action through the integration and 
consolidation of neural pathways for emotional and reward oriented 
responses, moderated by brain systems performing tasks of emotional 
management and goal election.  
iii. The neurobiological attentional processes which we utilise for directing our 
concentration which are arguably implicated in the neural systems for will 
and choice. An understanding of these systems can facilitate greater self 
awareness  and consequent greater self management, as well as more 
effective cognitive therapies.  
 
6.4.4 Fine tuning the hylomorphic approach. 
 
This study also presents an opportunity to refine explanations of Aristotelian-
Thomistic psychology, allowing it to engage more effectively with contemporary 
neuroscience. Just as the Copernican revolution changed understanding without 
changing the philosophical essentials of cosmology, so too, accommodating the 
new evidence, it is possible that there can be insights into traditional 
understandings of reason, virtue, vice, etc.  
 
Although the notion of person as an ensouled body is extremely well developed 
philosophically, there is little written from the Aristotelian perspective (we have 
looked at two notable exceptions in Nussbaum and Gillett) that considers how the 
lens of neuroscience can assist Aristotelian philosophy and illuminate aspects of 
rational psychology, embodied rationality, and the very notion of fulfilment itself. 
Reflections on the nature of, and fulfilment for, embodied rationality can provide 
a valuable contribute to this field. 
 
I have suggested that a study of neuroscience in the light of hylomorphism throws 
into relief several key principles: 
i. The importance of a view of the soul as principle of being and function. As 
we have seen, this is a view of rationality highlighted by Putnam and 
Nussbaum in the 1990s in response to physicalist theories.  
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ii. A view that the unity of the virtues is a biological necessity.  
iii. An understanding of vice, not as a parallel alternative to virtue, but as a 
privation of biophysical development.  
iv. The possibilities for a language, accessible to neuroscience and to 
contemporary philosophy of mind, better able to explain the tenets of 
hylomorphism. (cf discussion in 6.4.2.3.a.) 
 
There are further observations that can be made. 
 
An understanding of the human biophysical constitution leads to a deeper 
appreciation of the trajectory of human maturation, and of what is required for 
human beings to flourish. Modification of the biophysical that is implicit to the 
Thomistic account is “fleshed out” so to speak, and in so doing implications 
become evident. For example, the need for enriched Aristotelian notions of 
human flourishing becomes apparent: the interplay of neural structures and 
human freedom necessitates the Thomistic development of “participation in 
being”.1747 And in turn this leads to a further argument for the objective basis of 
human flourishing: we know ourselves as sharers, participants, in rational life, and 
know moreover that our greatest fulfilment is in accepting the invitation to seek 
truth, and to respond to that Loving One who invites us to share being. (See 
6.4.2.3.d and especially Appendix 1. A Response the Claims of Emergent 
Rationality.)  
 
An understanding of neural involvement in mind function must lead to a deeper 
appreciation, in accord with basic hylomorphic tenets, that knowing and loving 
can only take place in this embodied life with the biophysical as material cause. 
                                                          
1747
 "St. Thomas...grasped from the very beginning the theoretical significance of the opposition 
between Plato and Aristotle and the absolute need to overcome it by bringing their fundamental 
principles and conclusions into agreement.  This he did by elaborating his own notion of 
participation.  This notion, in contrast with the Neoplatonic concordism, presents an entirely new 
concept and principle: it is the concept of esse as actus essendi, not to be confused with the 
existentia of Augustinianism and of rationalism.  It is from the concept of esse as ground-laying first 
act that Thomas develops his own notion of participation and his entire metaphysics.” Cornelio 
Fabro, "The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation," Review 
of Metaphysics 27,  (1974): 451-457. 
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Every action and every choice dispose us either for, or away from, excellence in 
knowledge and love. The vision of man that has been proposed is complex. The 
human being is understood as a person, an embodied soul, an animated body, 
with rational powers, and therefore fulfilled not only by sense knowledge and 
pleasure, nutrition and security, and movement and emotional life, but also by 
activities in the rational order of knowing truth and choosing, and ultimately by 
the free gift of self in loving relationships.1748  
 
An understanding of neural involvement in mind function has the potential to 
clarify Aristotelian/Thomistic notions of the nature of intellectual life itself. For 
example, should we distinguish, on their biophysical characteristics, the 
deliberations that lead to rational outcomes from the rational insights and choices 
themselves?  Clearly deliberations of reason, underpinning what we could call the 
“process” of the human act, manifest a biological substrate. They have duration, 
they involve brain areas for attention, for reward apprehension, for cognitive and 
emotional memory, for assessment of consequences, for issuing commands, etc. 
Yet it is clear, too, that even the instantaneous events of grasping a truth, and 
making a choice, are biology dependent; at the most elementary level, for 
example, there can be no conviction of truth or choosing of goods in this life 
without consciousness. Yet even the very moment of flash of insight into the 
nature of things or the very moment of choice (and the inner life of the person 
cannot reduce to just these moments) will nevertheless be accompanied by neural 
correlates- not only accompanying emotional surges and heightened attention, 
but neural activity directly associated with the knowing and the choosing.  
                                                          
1748
 Scruton argues that unhappiness is driven by lack of truth and lack of relation to others; 
ultimately perhaps by a lack of virtues of sincerity, compassion, and generosity. Roger Scruton, 
“Connecting Catholic Anthropology to a Secular Culture,” Edification 3, 1 (2009): 80-82. Scuton 
writes:  “I think particularly of the need to persuade people that one of the principal causes of 
unhappiness in modern societies is the ‘self delusion’, about which Vitz (1994) has written in other 
terms: the delusion that what I truly am is this inner thing that is hidden from the world, and that 
my happiness consists in nurturing it and taking from others what is needed to supply it with its 
needs. That delusion is the opposite of the truth. Happiness comes from forgetting the self; from 
thinking of others; from seeking to give and not to take – and that idea, which is of course con-
tained in the doctrine of Christian charity, can be phrased in secular terms that make it 
immediately apparent to the ordinary agnostic that therapy based in the Christian faith might be 
exactly what people suffering from the self delusion require.” 
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Strictly speaking the operations of the embodied intellect are the capacity to 
grasp the true nature of things, and the choice to move oneself towards what one 
has grasped as a good. 
 
Within the flesh and blood human being it is absurd to suggest two acting 
substances. In a psychologically balanced human being there should be no wrestle 
for agency between the operations of rationality and the activities of the body, 
notwithstanding our excursion into psychopathologies which demonstrated that, 
when the body is not functioning as it should, the pathologies may drive 
behaviour rather than the agent himself. Operations of rationality are carried out 
in the ensouled body, on this count capax for intellectual activity; the soul is a 
principle of function and unity, not a separate functioning agent.    
 
And what then of the human capacity to abstract from the concrete to universals? 
Was this not Aristotle’s proof for the immateriality of the soul? Surely abstraction 
to universals takes place beyond the reach of matter? No again. The wrong 
question is being asked.  Rather we should ask: What is special about human 
beings empowering them to see the truth of things?  It is the person that acts: an 
animated body capable of abstracting to universals, of seeing the truth of things 
and of seeking unreservedly that which, or that whom, it perceives as good for 
itself. Hence we see that reflections on the biophysical constitution of human 
beings have the potential to clarify perhaps popular misconceptions about 
Aristotelian and Thomistic thought.  
 
6.5 Pedagogical conclusions 
 
In 1.7.1 it was suggested that virtue ethics is superior to other paradigms of ethics 
in its understanding of the principles of education. It offers three clear 
advantages.  
i. At the most fundamental level, the focus of virtue ethics is on the qualities 
of the agent rather than his actions; it offers a more incisive understanding 
545 
 
of education because it is empowering of the agent.   Ultimately, a virtue 
based view of education emphasises the primacy of formation of 
character, what we could call the “sacred” formation of character.  
ii. Virtue is a more effective model for moral and skills development because 
it is experience based and thus takes into account the anatomical realities 
of plastic change as a result of experience. All that we choose to do, all 
that we consent to experience, all that we enshrine as desires in our 
hearts, all that we elect as convictions in our minds – all these things sculpt 
our personalities. Every experience has the potential to change us, to 
consolidate ways of acting and thinking. This sacred and exquisite 
sensitivity to experience is well captured in a passage by Mitch Albom:  
All parents damage their children. It cannot be helped. 
Youth, like pristine glass absorbs the prints of its 
handlers. Some parents smudge, others crack, a few 
shatter childhoods completely into little jagged pieces, 
beyond repair.1749 
iii. There is a grand interplay between the emotional and cognitive realms; 
the underpinning educational psychology presents a harmony between 
emotion and reason. Emotions guide us in selecting the experiences that 
we know will change us. Sound emotional responses help us make sense of 
the environment, responding with appetency or rejection. Temperance 
and fortitude may be understood as acquired emotional responses to the 
environment; to be nurtured in a child through training, and when 
complemented by prudence and justice bestowing self management 
experiences and environment.    
 
6.5.1 Ineffective moral pedagogies.   
 
The report card for moral education initiatives, at least in the USA, is less than 
flattering. In 2010 the results of a major study of Social and Character 
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 Mitch Albom, The five people you meet in Heaven, (London: Little Brown Book Group, 2004). 
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Development (SACD) programs were released. The study found that SACD 
programs produced no improvement against control schools on measures of 
emotional and social competence, nor in behaviour or academic performance.1750  
 
This need for a coherent framework upon which to structure character education 
programs is also apparent from a 2011 Science review of intervention programs to 
improve executive function (designated as a range of personal qualities 
summarised by “creativity, flexibility, self control, and discipline”1751 and therefore 
including what we have discussed as emotion regulation). The authors assessed a 
range of current programs. In response, I make the following observations:  
i. The variation between the character education approaches was 
substantial: computerised and other games based training for working 
memory, speed and reasoning, aerobic exercises, martial arts, meditation, 
role play games, Montessori culture, heightened expectations and 
reinforcement for behaviour, and conscious training in self control 
strategies.  
ii. The variations however were the result of intuitive, rather than analytically 
argued, lines of investigation. The programs offered broad alignment with 
the view that emotional regulation and repeated practice must lie at the 
basis of effective approaches.  
iii. Interventions, except for the Montessori program and, to some extent, the 
PACT program which teaches self control strategies, did not place an 
explicit priority on respect for others, ie the virtue of justice.  
iv. Interventions generally did not seek to empower students in conscious self 
management, even though this is a sine qua non of adult self regulation 
and necessary for skills of personal assessment and refined goal setting. In 
general there was a lack of appreciation that the virtues disposing for 
                                                          
1750
 The Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education, "Efficacy of Schoolwide 
Programs to Promote Social and Character Development and Reduce Problem Behavior in 
Elementary School Children", October 2010, 
http://ies.ed.gov/ncer/pubs/20112001/pdf/20112001.pdf. 
1751
 A. Diamond and K. Lee, “Interventions shown to aid executive function development in 
children 4-12 years old,” Science 333, (2011): 959-964. 
547 
 
rationality would be crucial in personal goal setting, and therefore in 
ensuring transfer of skills.  
v. In the design of the programs, there appeared little appreciation of the 
neural bases for attention, personal goal setting for arduous tasks.  
vi. The ineffectiveness of the programs appears to reflect the lack of 
comprehensive rationale behind them. Gains were modest at best, and 
mostly manifested at the lower performance end of the scale. In most 
cases there was a low level of transfer of skills learned to tasks beyond the 
immediate exercise, “Executive function training appears to transfer, but 
the transfer is narrow.” 
 
Kevin Ryan, founder and Professor Emeritus of the Center for the Advancement of 
Ethics and Character at Boston University, ascribes this undeniable failure to the 
poor understanding, by designers of programs, of what constitutes human 
character and human flourishing, and a public policy that emphasises the role of 
the state over that of the family.1752  
 
These worrying conclusions suggest that important insights for moral and 
character education and intervention programs may be gleaned from this study 
into the neural bases of virtue. Design of improved programs, although beyond 
the scope of this study, should incorporate the systematic anthropology that has 
underpinned this study:   
i. Parental efforts require all support and facilitation. 
ii. The programs must be designed on the basis of a rich psychological 
understanding of the developing person, endowed with a range of specific 
powers (intellect, rational appetite, sensitive and irascible appetites) each 
requiring nurture.  
iii. Appreciation of the unity of the virtues must be an essential element. 
Programs must seek the integrated development of sound judgement, 
respect for others, resolution in the face of difficulties, and self control.  
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 Kevin Ryan, “The failure of modern character education,” prepublication draft in personal 
correspondence, 2 November, 2012. 
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iv. In particular considerations of justice and habits of cognitive assessment 
must be present in all human acts, if young persons are to be empowered 
to set goals effectively.  
 
6.5.2 Insights from the neuroscience.  
 
In the section that follows, I restrict discussion to insights that may be gained from 
a study of the neural bases of virtue, although these insights will have wider 
pedagogical application, for example, into the design of teaching programs or in 
guiding one’s own children.  
 
a) Principles of plasticity. 
i. We have noted the Hebbian principle. Neural electrical activity 
builds more permanent connections. Consequently it is clear that 
both our conscious and unconscious thoughts and behaviours are 
self reinforcing; they effectively change our brain by synaptic 
strengthening along specific neural pathways, facilitating like 
thoughts and behaviours that utilize these pathways. (See 
extensive references to use-induced plasticity, especially 2.2.) 
ii. Vivid experience is shown to be linked to learning. It is human 
experience that novel, sense laden and dramatic experiences (for 
example war, sex, drugs, loud music, first exposure to something 
truly surprising) are not only indelibly etched in memory, but also 
that this retention of vivid experience is more easily revisited, 
acquiring a certain addictive quality (for example studies show that 
pornography “changes our brains”,1753 or of the phenomenon of 
                                                          
1753 
Judith A. Reisman, “The psychopharmacology of pictorial pornography restructuring brain, 
mind and memory and subverting freedom of speech,” 
(http://www.drjudithreisman.com/archives/brain.pdf; accessed March 2009). 
G. J. Meerkerk,  et al., “Predicting compulsive Internet use: it's all about sex!” Cyberpsychology and 
Behaviour 9, 1 (2006): 95-103; Patrick F. Fagan, “The effects of pornography on individuals, 
marriage, family and community,” in Research Synthesis, Family Research Council, (December 
2009). In the last document note testimony about pornography addiction by Mary Anne Layden of 
Centre for Cognitive Therapy, University of Pennsylvania (Testimony for US Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 18 November, 2004).  
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soldiers seeking repeated tours of duty, or of the addictive 
behaviour of serial killers). 1754  
iii. Emotional engagement has been shown to be closely linked to 
learning, to the development of new pathways in the brain. (Table 
2.2) 
 
b) Habit formation as learning. 
i. Consolidation of learning normally requires repetition and takes 
place over time. Therefore it may be concluded that material 
processes are involved and that neural configurations and 
connections are facilitating the learning process. People who 
exhibit virtues (such as cheerfulness, self control, or courage), or 
vices (such as dishonesty, laziness, or insincerity) exhibit these 
behaviours repeatedly… character traits exhibit stability and are 
sound predictors of future behaviour. A neuroscientific 
understanding is that ease of repetition suggests established 
circuitry. Ease of repetition suggests an established pathway in the 
brain, and so too an inability to retain flexibility is a sign of an 
established pathway. (See 2.2, 2.4 and 3.3.4.) 
ii. The repetition required in learning and unlearning is arduous. This 
is found for example in the application of mental discipline to build 
up some desired capability – in the time it takes to build up 
intellectual habits such as planning ahead and problem solving, 
habits of emotional management of anger or appetite, or even 
intentionally performed motor skills such as a tennis forehand.  
That it is arduous to develop habits suggests also a material process 
where patience is required but eventually is rewarded.  
iii. There are windows for learning that correspond to developmental 
stages in the biological make up of the human being. Windows of 
opportunity that are age related, and the intractability of 
                                                          
1754
 See discussion: Difede and Cukor, “Evidence-Based Long-Term Treatment of Mental Health 
Consequences of Disaste among Adults,” 336-339.  
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behaviours outside of those windows, despite all good intentions to 
change them, bespeak a material physiological foundation for 
learning. There is a timeline of development for the human 
organism; there are windows of opportunity, sensitive periods, for 
the development of various capacities. These windows of 
development embrace not only the development of sensory 
powers (such as sight and hearing), but also mechanisms of 
emotional expression, and of emotional management, virtues. (See 
Table 2.2.) 
iv. It is recognized that first experiences are particularly powerful in 
the development of neural pathways. The neural basis for this 
appears associated with the principle that guides sensitive periods 
of development: reception of appropriate experience closes off the 
sensitive period. (See 2.2.4) The applicability of this phenomenon 
to parenting is immediately apparent.  
v. Concomitant physical activity has been shown to be associated with 
increased capacity to form new connections and to learn.  
 
c) Pathways of habit formation. 
i. Habits also short circuit the need for cognitive processing; take for 
example the action of a touch typist who has no need to reflect on 
each key stroke. (Table 2.7.) 
ii. At the moral level, habit formation may be positive (virtues) or 
negative (vices). Such habits can seem virtually “hardwired” and be 
very difficult to change, with simple intentions insufficient; we see 
people with such good intentions, but unable to put their desires 
into action. Emotion driven behaviours take up residence and 
become the default behaviours; another dynamic is at work 
suggesting a more permanent change has taken place in the 
organism. Repetition builds habits and dependency upon those 
habits; for example, established sleeping and eating patterns can 
be hard to break, just as pattern of poor self control can also be 
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resistant to efforts to change.(Table 2.7) But also, when good 
habits are embodied, these learned, emotionally attuned, positive 
behaviours will carry us through periods of tiredness, illness or 
stress.1755 
iii. The mechanisms of synaptic modification and modulation of 
transmission provide an excellent explanation not only for the 
construction of habits but for habits of varying intensity. (Tables 
2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.15.)  
iv. The popular adage reminds us, ‘The best predictor of future 
behaviour is past behaviour’.   Thought and behaviour are closely 
interconnected; past behaviours fuel our expectations, goal setting, 
and action plans. Habitual behaviours fuel our thoughts; behaviours 
very much make us who we are. (Table 2.14.) 
 
d) Principles of memory. 
i. Certain thinking and acting processes include a physical 
component: we see that some memories can be affected by time, 
either diminishing in intensity, or actually become more vivid as we 
obsessively “rewrite” them focusing on specific perceptions. Again, 
these phenomena are consistent with changes at the neural level. 
(Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.) 
ii. Dementia also gives us insight into the material mechanisms of 
memory. A person, suffering from the neural degeneration that 
characterises dementia, can lose memories or reaccess memories 
dormant for decades in the subconscious. This suggests that 
memories are tied very much to material mechanisms, mechanisms 
now increasingly well described. (Table 2.5.) 
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 An example: a friend explains that he returned exhausted from an overseas trip, and “failing to 
keep his mouth shut”, found himself in a destructive, domestic argument that led to a decision to 
leave the marriage. The same man, 30 minutes later, still tired but drawing on established humility 
and sincerity, found the strength and self control to make his apologies and turn around a 
potentially tragic situation.   
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e) Principles of imitation. 
i. The experience of imitation leads directly to learning without the 
necessity of cognitive involvement. It will be seen that imitation is a 
key factor in the acquisition of behaviours underpinning virtue. The 
relevance to parenting and the moral education of younger 
children is immediately apparent. (Table 2.6.) 
ii. An understanding of the function of mirror neurons offers 
heightened appreciation of the mechanisms whereby our own 
experience, including sense experience, profoundly dyes our 
behaviours. For example, one who has not experienced love, will be 
unable to put love into his actions. (Table 2.6.) 
 
f) Interplay between emotion and learning. 
i. Emotions are demonstrably bodily functions; yet the chemical 
messages at the heart of appetite, desire and passion, can initiate 
processes that conclude in more or less free choices.1756  (Tables 
2.8 and 2.11.) 
ii. It is shown that the emotional centres of the brain, in particular the 
amygdala, are richly connected via the limbic pathways both to the 
PFC and to the BG, and play a key role in the generation of habitual 
behaviours. This study proposes that these areas, among others, 
are substantially implicated in the acquisition of virtues. (Tables 2.8 
and 2.13.) 
 
g) Healthy body; healthy mind. 
i. Damage to the PFC leads to compromise of what are normally 
regarded as moral behaviours. This outcome is consistent with poor 
moral choices under analogous situations when the biology has 
been compromised, for example in moments of utter exhaustion, 
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 US pro-life activist, Terri Herring, cites scriptural references to Christ “moved by compassion”, 
and argues that human beings can draw the energy to act from attention to, and reflection on,   
appropriate emotional stimuli. (Oral presentation  at Redfield College, Sydney, 2004.) 
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under extreme stress, in dementia, etc. It would appear that 
learned, emotion-driven, negative behaviours can surface when 
inhibitory decision making is impeded. (See 2.7.)  
 
6.5.3 Parenting conclusions 
 
If neuroscientific knowledge confirms the role of virtue in human flourishing it is 
all the more imperative that we refocus on the necessity of positive input in the 
lives of impressionable children, that we help parents maximise their effectiveness 
by sound neuroscientific insights, that we shield children from negative inputs 
that have the potential to profoundly change them for life, and that we actively 
promote the development of personality underpinned by habitual strengths of 
character. 
 
A biological validation of virtue based moral education carries far reaching 
implications at theoretical and practical levels. Virtue ethics in the tradition of 
Aristotle and Aquinas itself receives validation as an ethical system most suited to 
human flourishing. The model of human flourishing that, prior to some decades 
ago, underpinned character education in the West for two and a half millennia, is 
revalidated.  
 
There is currently much confusion in educational circles about the importance 
that should be given to virtue development in moral education. Some would 
replace virtues with values, failing to understand that good intentions while 
important are far from being good habits. Others use the terminology of values 
and virtues, sometimes remarkably interchangeably,1757 yet because they fail to 
ground virtue in what befits man’s nature, they cannot escape a relativistic 
framework.1758 Others resort to fragmented suggestions of varied worth without a 
                                                          
1757
 This appears to be a fault in the much publicized The Book of Virtues by the former US 
Secretary for Education: William Bennett, The Book of Virtues (Melbourne: Bookman Press, 1994). 
1758
 The National Values Framework created by the Howard Government in 2004, seemingly 
founded on consequentialist and relativist approaches to virtue ethics, appears to be inspired by 
these approaches.  
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foundation in an adequate understanding of man.1759 A relatively small proportion 
of parenting authors do adopt a virtue building approach. Notable are Thomas 
Lickona1760, James Stenson1761, and Stephen Covey1762 in the USA, Donald De 
Marco1763 in Canada, and David Isaacs1764 in Europe. Parenting for Character also 
features a virtue-based rationale.1765 This current study offers a scientific 
justification for the practical strategies found in these works. It provides an 
evidence-based verification of the approach these authors take; and this is a 
necessity if virtue-based moral education is to gain traction in contemporary 
society.  
 
The neuroscientific evidence supports parenting approaches that foster the 
development of virtue. I argue that this study in fact confirms virtue development 
as a scientifically sound approach to moral development. It is an urgent task to 
identify neuroscientific insights that assist parenting. This is beyond the scope of 
this current study, however below I briefly identify parenting practices which, in 
the light of current neuroscience, would serve to facilitate children’s moral 
development.  
 
Furthermore, it is hoped that this project may contribute to a popular 
reassessment of the importance of virtue in moral education and parenting. 
Despite the fact that virtue ethics is a dynamic field of philosophical study with an 
enduring presence also in moral theology,1766 and despite the fact that for some 
two and a half thousand years the development of virtue has been regarded in the 
                                                          
1759
 For example, Steve Biddulph’s writing appears to lack an adequate underpinning psychology.  
1760
 Thomas Lickona, Character Matters: How to Help Our Children Develop Good Judgment, 
Integrity, and Other Essential Virtues (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004) is one of Dr Lickona’s 
more recent works. 
1761
 James B. Stenson, Upbringing: A Handbook for Parents of Young Children  (New York: Scepter, 
1992). 
1762
 Stephen Covey, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective Families (New York: Allen & Unwin, 1997). 
1763
 Donald DeMarco, The Heart of Virtue (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1996). 
1764
 David Isaacs, Character Building: A guide for parents and teachers, 2
nd
 ed. (Dublin: Four Courts 
Press, 2001). 
1765
 Andrew Mullins, Parenting for Character (Sydney: Finch Publishing, 2005). 
1766
 For example: Peter Kreeft, Back to Virtue; Traditional Moral Wisdom for Modern Moral 
Confusion  (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,1986); Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues ; Pius XI, On the 
Christian Education of Youth (Encyclical, 1929). 
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West as the foundation for moral education, virtue is now much misunderstood 
and marginalised in both public policy and in contemporary writing on parenting.  
 
6.5.3.1 Applications to parenting  
 
The goal of the morally educative dimension of parenting is to foster the sound 
capacity for reflection and action facilitated by the virtues. Maturity of character 
and the freedom to act autonomously result from the development of virtue. 
A parenting model consistent with the neuroscience presents strategies for 
fostering virtues, and for the management with meticulous care of inputs entering 
into the life of the child. It is so right that parents focus on habits, manifest 
behaviours, that help a child develop a healthy autonomy with inbuilt safeguards 
against physical and psychological compulsion by external forces, but also 
empowering them to avoid debilitating internal faults of laziness, self centredness, 
timidity, etc.  
 
Environment and experience are decisive in development of character.  The 
parent-child relationship, founded on mechanisms of bonding, fueled by parental 
care and affection, and conducted in an atmosphere where selfless service 
between family members is the norm, provides a natural venue for moral growth. 
 
Elements of a parenting model consistent with the neuroscience include: 
i. Acknowledgement that parental responsibility for the formation of moral 
character in an impressionable child includes decisive guidance in the early 
years in development of fortitude and temperance, and in the years when 
rationality becomes active in the child, of prudence and justice. 
Environment, critical practice, explicit advice and correction all contribute.  
ii. Acknowledgement of the role of early training in teaching moderation 
according to reason of what is pleasurable and what pains are worth 
enduring for a sound reason. Parental facial expressions and body 
language are beneficial or corrosive. As the child grows, obedience to 
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parental reason in these matters transfers to obedience to their own 
reason. Parental guidance gives way to self education and self-talk. 
iii. Attention to the quality of parent child habitual interaction and 
communication as a prerequisite for moral learning.  
iv. Acknowledgement that early exposure to what is good, true and beautiful 
is beneficial. A consequent appreciation of the urgency of proactive 
parenting.  
v. Expertise in identifying incipient patterns of behaviour, both positive and 
negative, in children, and readiness to intervene in the case of negative 
patterns that can lead to bad habits and, with complacency, to vices. 
vi. Management of non parental inputs coming into the life of the child such 
as technologies and peer group. Expertise in identifying, evaluating, and if 
necessary intervening in response to, character traits apparent in those 
with whom the child spends time. Parents are facing a great deal of 
competition in raising their children, competition from peer group, from 
media, from bad example of role models in society. If they do not manage 
those inputs and actively build good habits their children will suffer. 
vii. The role of high but realistic parental expectations allowing a child to strive 
for behaviours that are achievable and enriching. The importance of 
accountability for those expectations. 
viii. A conviction that human beings need to focus not only on their own needs, 
and that it is virtues that dispose us to good deeds. Good intentions are 
not enough. Children without virtue lack the wherewithal to do good in 
their lives. The end point of all parenting is that young people act well and 
freely from their own dearly cherished convictions. So, the essential 
challenge in teenage years is to help a young person internalize the values 
they have learned. Good values must lead to a good heart, to habitually 
good choices, and to self management. “It is no profit to have learnt well, 
if we neglect to do well,” wrote Publilius Syrus sometime during the 1st 
557 
 
century BC. Virtues give habits of acting1767. Furthermore, virtues enable a 
person to take responsibility in a democratic society. Virtues affirm the 
concept of personal responsibility... that in normal circumstances, I am 
responsible for what I do, or for what I have decided. A society which 
denies personal responsibility will be doomed to mediocrity and then to 
decline. 
ix. Strategies for the formation of good habits through consistent 
expectations, imitation and repetition, correction, guided practice, 
reflection, and  reinforcement of recent experiences given that the 
common experience of human beings is that they can more readily repeat 
recent actions than those further in the past. 1768    
x. Responsibility for a positive home environment. An understanding of the 
role of habitual parental affection, specific emotional reinforcement, 
praise, positive emotional associations, emotional engagement, etc, in 
learning and the development of virtue. An understanding that parental 
emotion is “contagious”.  
xi. An understanding that focused attention is required for cognitive learning.   
xii. An understanding that non cognitive learning leading to imitation of 
behaviours and emotional states can be sub cognitive.  
xiii. An understanding that strategies such as visualisations and rehearsal of 
physical actions  assist in building virtues; thought facilitates behaviour, 
and behaviour can facilitate intention.   
xiv. An understanding of virtues, brings an appreciation of the debilitating 
effects of bad habits, vices. “A young person’s character is like wax for the 
growth of bad habits,”1769 observed the old Roman soldier poet Horace.  
xv. Appreciation that the family is the natural environment par excellence for 
fostering virtue. Virtues are best learned in a family, where an overriding 
                                                          
1767
 The Dale Carnegie saying, “If you want to be enthusiastic, act enthusiastic” suggests a subtle 
dynamic between modeling actions and incorporating them fully into our personality. This is 
another version of the A.A. motto: “Fake it till you make it.” 
1768
 Joel Kupperman insists on the importance of “longitudinal close looks at the reality of human 
lives” through history, stories and biographical studies. His book Character contains a very useful 
appendix of strategies for moral education. J. Kupperman, Character (Oxford: OUP, 1995). 
1769
 Horace, Letters “To the Pisos”, 153. 
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motivation is the welfare of the other members. In such an environment 
the motive for action is love. In the family, love is unconditional; a failure 
to exercise virtue is corrected. Institutions can also assist in fostering 
virtue, provided the culture is right: respect for others; high but realistic 
expectations; a positive philosophy of education where mistakes are part 
of the process of learning and problems are not disasters because they 
bring the underlying cause into relief so that it can be addressed.   
xvi. Recognition for the virtually indelible nature of first experiences and their 
role in maximizing learning. Habits are most easily formed in childhood.1770 
First impressions can be virtually indelible: “We are by nature most 
tenacious of childish impressions...further it is the worst impressions that 
are most durable.”1771 Because, as Aristotle observed, “We (human beings) 
always like best whatever we first experience” parents do well to put great 
care into the early experiences of children and focus on habits built in the 
younger years. Experts talk of windows of opportunity for building 
particular virtues1772; a child who has not learned the importance of 
truthfulness by the middle of primary school, at the latest, is likely to have 
real difficulties in facing reality, etc.  
xvii. Acknowledgement of the need to pass on to children an understanding of 
rational anthropology, including an understanding of the integration of 
rationality and emotional life, what virtues are, how they are acquired, and 
the role of virtue in human flourishing. 
xviii. An understanding of virtues makes parenting much more effective. Parents 
become much more aware of the need to establish good habits, to provide 
consistent routines, to follow up misbehaviour before it becomes 
entrenched, to help a child work against temperamental weaknesses such 
as timidity, impulsivity, etc.  
                                                          
1770
 Bennett, The Book of Virtues. 
1771
 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, trans. HE Butler (Loeb Classical Library). (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1920), I, I, 1-7. 
1772
 Professor David Isaacs displays a chart in his Character Building which shows the most 
appropriate virtues to focus on in the various stages of childhood. 
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xix. Commitment to meticulous parental example. A necessary consequence of 
this priority is that parents themselves strive to develop virtues in their 
own character and to eliminate bad habits. Of the two forms of virtue 
formation – training and education in childhood, or free, conscious, self 
imposed, perhaps arduous, habit formation in adult life – the second 
applies to parents. When parents grasp also that their own parenting 
comes down to a collection of habits… good and bad, they can then 
improve their parenting practices more easily. It is important for parents to 
identify their own character defects and mistakes in order to minimize 
negative example. A parent’s poor relationship, a habit of over-
management, unresolved dependencies on drugs and alcohol, experience 
of abuse, etc, have the potential to wreak intergenerational havoc. Unless 
parents strive for virtue, they will not pass on a love for virtue as a source 
and prerequisite of fulfilment. Key parental virtues include: 
o Sincerity about the deepest values that underpin one’s behaviours.  
o Sound judgement. Consistent and clear headed prioritizing.  
o Generosity: loving dedication to one’s spouse and family, and a 
capacity to model solidarity and compassion for those in need. 
o Fortitude and self control: a demandingness on oneself.  John Paul 
II said of his own father, “He never had to be demanding on me, he 
was so demanding on himself.”  
o The virtues of humility, human warmth and approachability, and 
the capacity to show affection and understand others. 
xx. Understanding of strategies parents may employ to change their own 
behaviours may include: 
o The necessity of sincere acknowledgement of mistakes.  
o The necessity of reflective sorrow for impulsive or self centred 
behaviours – sorrow and shame will act subliminally as 
disincentives for the repetition of negative future behaviours.   
o The role of making realistic commitments in order to put changes in 
train (eg structured anger management programs, monitored 
action plans on paper). 
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o Readiness to accept the support of others, including one’s spouse, 
in order to change one’s behaviour. 
o Appreciation of constant performance of targeted concrete actions 
such as getting up on time, eating the right foods, carrying out acts 
of service to others, smiling when tired, etc, thereby overlaying old 
habits with new preferred behaviours.    
xxi. Appreciation of the ultimate goal of parenting for virtue, that children 
develop: 
o The capacity to manage themselves – “Children have the right to 
learn how to solve their own problems in life.”1773 This refers to the 
virtue of prudence.  
o Readiness to care for others – “Children grow up when they are 
able to care for others, and want to.”1774 Here I refer to the virtue of 
justice, underpinning charity. Augustine says that charity contains 
all the cardinal virtues.1775 The capacity to truly love others is a 
consequence of character with a well rounded development of 
virtues. Virtues make love possible.1776  
xxii. An appreciation of the following neurobiological insights: 
o A basic understanding of virtues (see 3.2) includes a taxonomy of 
moral virtue though an schema such as that of the cardinal virtues. 
o The priority of the cardinal virtues as essential character strengths. 
o We like best what we first experience. We can be easily attracted 
to what we have already experienced. We have a natural fondness 
for the familiar. 
o All our behaviours are essentially self reinforcing, for better or for 
worse according to the law of association. “Neurons that fire 
together wire together.” 
                                                          
1773
 This gem comes from the late Rafael Pich, father of sixteen, and driving force behind the 
Family Education movement in Catalonia.  
1774
 Jim Stenson. 
1775
 Augustine, Epistles  CLXVII PL33 738. 
1776
 DeMarco, The Heart of Virtue. 
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o Time can resolve many issues; passions can dissipate. Remove 
oneself from the situation; don’t raise the emotional stakes, take 
time to reflect, etc.  
o The law of attenuation, “Use it or lose it”, also sometimes applies 
to things we have learned, and to abilities and skills. If we do not 
practise them we lose the facility.   
o When we give our attention, we learn.  
o Where we provide emotional reinforcement we facilitate learning. 
o An appreciation of the relationship between virtue formation, 
autonomy and self management, and human flourishing. 
o An understanding of the processes of emotional control and of 
formation of habits (including habits of mind under the umbrella of 
prudence). 
o Mastery of the range of strategies for virtue formation (see 3.3). 
 
6.6 The last word. 
 
This study commenced with a quotation from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. 
Notwithstanding its ghoulish spawn over almost two centuries, the tale stands as 
a moral and metaphysical reflection on human existence. The creature asks: 
"Who was I? What was I? Whence did I come? What was 
my destination? These questions continually recurred,… 
but I was unable to solve them"1777 
Much more than a gothic thriller, Frankenstein is a warning that science must 
know its boundaries. It is also a reminder, from the youngest of women, that 
while knowledge may bestow power, power must be exercised responsibly within 
objective limits. Our rationality is grandly disproportionate to the nerves and 
sinews which compose us. She reminds us too, in the tragic denoument of the 
tale, of the stark contrast between human flourishing and its grim alternatives. 
 
                                                          
1777
 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus, The Pennsylvania Electronic Edition, 
ed. Stuaart Curran, (http://knarf.english.upenn.edu/index.html; accessed 28 November 2012) 128. 
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Einstein wrote, “Everything must be made as simple as possible. But not simpler.” 
It is the very stuff of a corporeal existence to appreciate that a whole is made of 
parts. I have explored the detail, not to get lost amongst the dendritic trees, but to 
better appreciate the wood as a whole. In describing the biophysical basis and 
developmental pathways for virtue, I have endeavoured to show that if we step 
back from the complexity of the pathways and processes and multiplicity of 
systems and brain areas that are involved, a grand picture emerges of a state of 
being that offers heightened autonomy, functional efficiency, and affective and 
contemplative peace of heart, true eudaimonia.  
 
After first identifying characteristics of virtue in a close reading of Aristotelian and 
Thomistic texts, supported by analysis of the human act and real life scenarios, I 
proposed specific and identifiable neural elements underpinning these 
characteristics. I suggested that they are integral to, and necessary conditions for, 
the formation of virtue in the embodied life. I have described them as the material 
causes of virtue. In the process, I proposed distinct biophysical part-constituents 
for each of the cardinal virtues arguing that each virtue plays a necessary role in 
every virtuous human action.    
 
I have proposed that the state of virtue is demonstrably a state of systemic and 
neural maturity, essentially an apogee of neurobiological development. It is a 
state of grand coordination and integration of neural systems, directed primarily 
to the harmonisation of the emotional and cognitive domains and thus, at the 
service of personal fulfilment.   
 
We must not miss the wood for the trees. Most importantly, not only is virtue a 
disposition for good action, but human beings have a disposition to virtue itself.   
There is an evident, genetic predisposition in human beings to the development of 
virtue. Aristotle touches on this when he writes:  
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There are three things which make a man good and virtuous: 
these are nature, habit, rational principle; these must be in 
harmony with one another. 1778 
To be virtuous is of our very “nature”. By “habit” Aristotle refers to dispositions of 
the sensitive appetites that we have developed, or allowed to develop, in our 
characters.1779 Aristotle links the harmony intrinsic to eudaimonia with the 
training of the appetites and free rational choices. Such elevated physical 
development of an organism is inconceivable without specific biological 
predispositions at the genetic level. Our characters are the outcome of nature 
(genes), nurture (upbringing) and our own choices.  
 
The virtuous person is thus endowed with a capacity for self-realisation, a key to 
his flourishing. The development of virtue, provided we do not frustrate the 
process by wayward appetitive habituation, consists in rational choices resulting 
in the development of certain stable neural structures to which we are 
predisposed. In turn these stable neural structures support ongoing rational 
behaviours. There is a grand efficiency operating; one’s progress is not thwarted 
by occasional mistakes.  This optimisation of past efforts contributes to a sense of 
fulfilment even during the acquisition stage of virtue.1780 Repeated good acts, over 
time, build up a stability of virtue. “To him who has, more will be given.”  
 
The dispositions of mature virtue guide us along the pathways of calm self-
management, bestowing peace in the face of difficulties and self-control in the 
face of temptation or provocation. Think of Nagai. Virtue directly facilitates 
rationality, by disposing us to accept reality and act well by freeing us from 
unreasonable attachments to pleasure and from unreasonable fears. Such an 
                                                          
1778
 Aristotle, Politics, 1332a39.  “The rational principle” refers to the principle of 
rationality and free choice;  
1779
 According to Sherman’s understanding of habit as “non-rational training of desires towards 
appropriate objects”, habit then refers to the trained sensible desires, biophysical pathways.  
Nancy Sherman, “The Habituation of Character” in Aristotle’s Ethics ed. Nancy Sherman (New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 231. 
1780
 Add to this the reality that habits acquired during the sensitive period of childhood may be 
reactivated after lying dormant for years more easily than if they had to be established from 
scratch. 
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outcome is dependent both on actual development of the biological pathways and 
on rational choices to act in ways disposed by those pathways.  
 
The ramifications of this study are significant. Most importantly science itself is 
now seen to validate the notion of virtue and fulfilment through virtue. Science 
demonstrates that eudaimonia is dependent upon the development of specific 
neurobiological qualities that are experience dependent in a dynamic process 
whereby positive behaviours predispose to increased facility for action and 
greater reward. The virtuous man is empowered to flourish: “In this life, nothing is 
more precious than the virtues.”1781 
 
And as a corollary, I argue that the alternative approaches to ethics, according to 
deontological and consequentialist notions, are manifestly inferior to the rich 
account of affective, functional and teleological fulfilment implicit in the 
eudaimonist virtue based paradigm. Embodied reality trumps theory every time. 
Our diligent response to the neural dispositions of our bodies makes for our 
happiness in the deepest sense. Robert Browning captured this:  
“All good things  
Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more  
Now, than flesh helps soul.”1782  
 
Philosophy of mind requires a return to the notions of form and being. I am 
convinced that it is realistically possible to articulate hylomorphic and Thomistic 
arguments able to better engage with contemporary philosophy of mind. Such 
arguments will be grounded in direct observation of reality, offering an 
appreciation of contingency and participation in being, an enriched understanding 
of causality, and avoid the unnecessary misunderstandings that can arise in 
response to the concept of subsistent soul. 
 
                                                          
1781
 St Thomas Aquinas, Meditations for Lent, trans. Philip Hughes (London: Sheed and Ward, 
1935), Passion Wednesday.  
1782
 Robert Browning, “Rabbi Ben Ezra” 
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Noting the current confusion in the field of moral pedagogy, I have touched but 
briefly on the potential for this study to offer clarity of methodology to pedagogy 
and parenting. Extensive repercussions for public policy, for research into further 
specification of the neural bases, and formulation of psychological applications in 
education and counselling remain largely implicit.  
 
It is my hope that this study assists in a rediscovery of virtue as an intrinsic 
necessity for moral development, happiness and abiding peace of heart. On this 
note of intrinsic fulfilment I finish.  I offer the final word to Antonio Damasio who 
for two decades has been at the forefront of neuroscientific explorations of 
cortical management of emotion, an articulate advocate for the importance of a 
rich human emotional life and an opponent of dualistic understandings that would 
deny a physical correlate to mental events or the possibility of an integration of 
rationality and human passion.  
Happiness is the power to be free of the tyranny of negative 
emotions. Happiness is not a reward for virtue: it is virtue 
itself.1783 
 
  
                                                          
1783
 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 175. 
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Appendix 1  
A Response to the Claims of Emergent Rationality by Non-reductive 
Materialism.1784 
 
a) Non reductive materialism asks the wrong question. 
 
The advocates of emergence pose the questions “What is a human being?” and 
“How did human beings become like this?” Both questions focus on the 
assumption that the central questions are essential rather than existential.   
 
The emergent approach adopts a scientific method and therefore takes existence 
as a given. But human existence is demonstrably contingent so we cannot dodge 
the existential question.  
 
Therefore these questions are mistakenly framed. They ought to ask “What is a 
human being?” and “In what way do human beings have existence?” The first 
question is essential; the second existential.  
 
b) “What is a human being?” 
 
The advocates of emergence presuppose that human rationality is on a continuum 
of development with the intelligence of animals. Yet the more evident the gap 
between human beings and the highest animals, the more difficult it is to accept 
the non-reductive materialist presupposition.1785  We do well to listen to Martha 
Nussbaum’s advice to attend carefully “to the complex materiality of living 
things.” 1786 Human rationality is of a patently different order to the intelligence of 
                                                          
1784
 This non reductive materialist position is compatible with a belief in a theistic creation. 
Theistic, non reductive, materialism asserts nevertheless that all that man is now, including his 
existing now, comes to him by an evolutionary pathway.   
1785
 In conversation with me in October 2012 Tim Chappell agreed with this. Chappell holds a 
theistic, non-reductive, materialist position. 
1786
 Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 56. 
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animals and it appears unscientific to support the view that human rationality 
emerges from matter. 
 
We human beings know ourselves and understand the world in which we find 
ourselves because of our capacity to know universal ideas and reason with them. 
We can both act in the world and stand above that world. Our agency is of a 
different order to the limited freedom that animals enjoy; our choices can be 
motivated by intangibles. We can respond to what is not immediate and sensible; 
no animal has this capacity. Moreover our capacity to find fulfilment in idealistic 
dedication to another is not instinctual but a choice. In a similar way, our capacity 
to fulfil the will of another is not the result of training alone but of training and 
choice. We are our own masters. This phenomenon is without parallel in the 
animal world. 
 
It is sometimes argued that our capacity for language is a sophisticated 
development of the language of animals, that our capacity for communication 
reached a tipping point and that human development from that point forwards 
accelerated. Yet the gulf between animals and humans remains, and even if the 
bridge were crossed, the apparent contingency of our being creates a further and 
insuperable challenge.  
 
 
c) “In what way do human beings have existence?” 
 
All that we see around us is contingent. Contingent things cannot be self 
explanatory so how is it that they exist? How is it that they come into existence 
and are sustained in existence?  
 
It is a very different thing to ask how a planet was made, from asking for an 
explanation of how a planet has existence. To focus just on how things became 
can miss the significance of the fact of current existence. Contingency requires an 
abiding existential causality. 
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Contingent living things seem to be a further category of existent, 1787 but human 
life appears to be of another order all together. Aristotle argued that the human 
capacity for knowledge and for love based on informed choice bespeaks a 
dimension in human nature of non-materiality.  
 
Rationality can neither be possessed by matter nor be bestowed by matter. Both 
would be dualistic solutions failing to explain the profound unity in human nature. 
Therefore the only alternative is that human nature participates in a principle of 
being. Aristotle called this the “rational principle”. There can be no other solution.  
Aquinas concluded that this non-materiality consists in a personal, abiding, 
participation in rational life. Human beings enjoy a personal, rational identity, 
something that matter cannot bestow.   
 
The inevitable conclusion is that human participation in being is of a different 
order to that of animals. Human beings have the capacity to understand their 
world, and at the same time, to stand above it, to seek fulfilment in elective, 
loving relationships with other rational beings. Rationality transcends the material 
world. It can neither be derived from it nor find fulfilment in the merely material. 
 
Our capacity for rational life, to make love-choices about what we know, 
characterises the very being in which we share. Again apply the Martha Nussbaum 
principle of close observation of reality. Because we share in this capacity to love, 
inescapably we must conclude that we have been created by a personal being 
who knows and loves us, and furthermore that, with our abiding participation in 
rational life, we are invited to respond to this Loving One.  
 
As our principle of rational identity is not derived from matter, it would appear 
that we transcend death although how this will happen is unclear. Aristotle 
suggested that the soul is immortal but that man loses his personal identity after 
                                                          
1787
 Nevertheless there seems to be no rational objection to the statement that vegetative and 
non-human animate life are emergent from matter. 
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death. Aquinas however concluded that this individuated, rational participation 
continues after decomposition of the body. 
 
The view that we participate in being should not be understand as an artificial 
construct, an inadequate model that raises more questions than it answers. It 
seems clear that neither an emergent solution nor a dual substance solution 
provide satisfactory answers. The big question of existence may be answered only 
by close attention to reality. 1788 (See also 5.4.2.3.) 
 
d) The question of fulfilment. 
 
There is a third question that must be asked: “What fulfils human beings?” 
 
The answer to this question must be utterly different depending on whether one 
just asks essential questions, or whether one asks also the existential question.  
 
Advocates of emergent rationality who ask the essential questions define human 
beings as free agents, able to know themselves, to know the world, and to choose 
whatever course is preferred. The emergent view bestows purpose on life. It is 
difficult, from this position, to demonstrate an objective purpose in life.  
 
But if we answer the existential question we discover the purpose in life by 
knowing ourselves to share in the life of one who knows and loves us. This is an 
acceptance of the truth of participated being, a recognition that one cannot be 
fulfilled in isolation, and that one is fulfilled by the use of rationality to know and 
love other persons, first of all in knowing and loving the Loving One in whose 
being one shares and to whom one owes one’s all.1789 
 
                                                          
1788
 Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 56. 
1789
 This view underpins the philosophical writing of Benedict XVI.”Our nature is constituted not 
only by matter but also by spirit and as such is endowed with transcendental meaning and 
aspiration.” Benedict XVI, Charity in Truth (original title: Caritas in Veritate), (San Francisco: 
Ignatius, 2005), 48. 
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In the Aristotelian and Thomistic understanding, virtue is a necessary means to 
objective wellbeing. The personal excellence of virtue is ordered to fulfilment in 
personal love. When fulfilment is framed in purely subjective terms, when 
relationships with other persons becomes an optional extra and unabashed self 
interest a viable alternative, there can be little room for virtue.  
 
e) Why has the existential question been neglected? 
 
I argue that the existential answer is the most important answer of all. If so much 
hinges on correctly framing and answering the existential question then the 
current debate in philosophy of mind must rediscover the existential question. It is 
essential to identify issues which cloud the discussion. I suggest causes for neglect 
of the existential question, and the seeds of its reemphasis, lie in the following: 
 Aquinas, writing for another age where the Pauline vision of participated 
existence “in him we live and move and have our being”1790 was not 
questioned, gave great emphasis to the soul even in the embodied state. 
Perhaps this was because primarily he was writing theology, and so gave 
importance to man’s transcendence of the material world, and to personal 
responsibility for one’s soul. Nevertheless, emphasis on soul as an entity in 
itself rather than as a principle of participation in rational life, has served 
to mask Aquinas’s doctrine of participation and has possibly contributed 
to a widespread misunderstanding of the notion of form. 
 Kant argued that existence is not a property: “Being is evidently not a real 
predicate, that is, a conception of something which is added to the 
conception of some other thing.”1791 This has dissuaded philosophers from 
engaging with the question of existence, yet Kant fails to consider 
contingence as such, as well as notions of being and participated being. 
                                                          
1790
 Acts 17:28. 
1791
 I. Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Chapter 12. He states, “All our knowledge of existence 
belongs entirely to the sphere of experience.” 
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1792  He appears to consider whether being can be considered a quality of 
a substance but is silent on being as the principle of existence.  
 In contemporary analytical circles there has been a Wittgensteinian bias 
against metaphysics. The simple logic that underpins the conclusion of 
participated being must be affirmed.  
 Certain teachings of Aquinas have been misinterpreted by his 
commentators. At times English translations have not helped either.1793 
Only in recent decades have modern commentators rediscovered the 
primacy of existence in Aquinas, emphasised his doctrine of participation, 
and given recognition to the Platonic sources of much of his thought. 1794  
 In major sectors of the fragmented, contemporary, Christian world there 
is a distrust of philosophy in the service of faith: Orthodox theology was 
bypassed by the insights of Aquinas, and the reformers in emphasising 
faith unintentionally contributed to a distrust of human reason. 
Philosophers have failed to recognise that participation in existence is a 
crucial underpinning for an anthropology accommodating Christian belief.  
 Modern philosophy has largely bypassed the existential question caught 
up with the pressing challenges of idealism, materialism, and dualism.  
 The growth of scientism has opened the door to a non critical acceptance 
of physicalist constraints of thought.1795  
 Physicalist solutions dominate in contemporary neuroscience and 
evolutionary biology.   
                                                          
1792
  Roger Scruton writes, “I always have trouble with the concept of being (being tempted by 
Kant's view that it is not a concept) and so these Thomistic arguments don't always spark off 
assent in me. However, I do agree that there is a problem about accounting for rationality and the 
general difference between man and the other animals, and that in the end we need some kind of 
teleological metaphysics to make sense of our condition.” Personal correspondence, 3 November 
2012. 
1793
 For example, esse was often translated in works of Jacques Maritain as “existence” rather than 
“act of existence”. 
1794
 Note for example, the rediscovery of The primacy of existence in Thomas Aquinas by Dominic 
Banez (1528-1604), and the work of Etienne Gilson in Being and some philosophers, (Toronto, 
1952), of Cornelio Fabro in La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d’Aquino 
(Milan, 1939), and A. Little in The Platonic Heritage of Thomism (Dublin, 1949). 
1795
 Scientism: a term used by John Paul II denoting the naïve confidence in the capacities of 
science.   
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 Some have accepted the emergent view as compatible with Christianity. 
For example, readings of the Christian scriptures can seem to support 
emergence. For example, Adam received the “breath of life”, but Eve 
received Adam’s rib. This suggests to some that God kickstarted a process 
that biology has now taken over. This line of thought misses the fact that 
all existence is by participation. Man’s participation in rational life is that 
principle whereby he exists in the here and now; wholly material 
substances also enjoy an abiding participation in existence. Man differs 
from rocks in that his form, his principle of existence, being rational, is 
therefore substantial in itself. But we don’t need to go there in this 
discussion. 
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Appendix 2  
A brief introduction to neuroscientific concepts and terminology.  
 
The nervous system is structurally comprised of the central nervous system (CNS) 
and the peripheral nervous system (PNS). 1796 Our focus is principally on the CNS 
although sensorimotor and autonomic communication utilises also the PNS.  
Afferent messaging is from sensory organs and receptors. Efferent information is 
outgoing from the CNS.  
 
An anatomic division of the brain: cerebrum, the limbic system, the diencephalon 
(thalamus and hypothalamus), cerebellum, brain stem, and reticular activating 
system.1797  
 
A functional division of the CNS into seven main parts:  
 The spinal cord. 
 The medulla oblongata (the area of the brain stem, the coordinating centre 
for vital autonomic functions such as digestion, breathing, and heart rate 
immediately at the top of the cord). 
 The pons (also in the brain stem and sitting above the medulla oblongata) 
involved in movement management. 
 The cerebellum involved in movement and motor skills. 
 The midbrain (third part of the brain stem) which manages many sensory 
and motor functions. 
 The diencephalon (containing thalamus, which links cerebral cortex to the 
CNS, and the hypothalamus). This area is the regulator for autonomic, 
endocrine and visceral function. 
                                                          
1796
 A highly readable introductory overview of the nervous system may be found in: Carter, The 
Brain Book. A concise overview for professionals may be found in: Crossman and Neary, 
Neuroanatomy. An illustrated colour text. For an introduction to the anatomy and physiology of 
the brain: Swanson, “Basic plan of the nervous system”. 
1797
 Anne M. R. Agur and Arthur S. Dalley II, Grant’s Atlas of Anatomy, 12
th
 ed. (Philadelphia: 
Wolters Kluwer, 2009) provides an excellent introduction to anatomy of the head (7.1 – 7.83) and 
of the brain (7.84-7.96). 
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 The cerebral hemispheres consists of an outer layer, the cortex, and three 
deeper structures, namely the basal ganglia (BG) which have a key role in 
motor activity, the hippocampus which is the centre for memory and the 
amygdaloid nuclei which have a key role in emotional response.1798 
 
Neurons are the basic structural and functional units, the cellular building blocks, 
of the nervous system. The human brain features some 100 billion neurons and an 
estimated 100 trillion axonal connections between neurons.  
 
Neurons are interconnected, bioelectrically active, highly polarised, 
communication cells; 1799  they are highly specialised conductors with an 
extremely high ratio of surface area to volume, most advantageous for receiving 
and transmitting stimuli. 1800 Typically they have highly developed and active 
secretory pathways that play a decisive role acting intra and extracellularly at the 
synapse, the zone of connection between pre- and postsynaptic neurons. The 
synaptic gap is the space between the neurons at this point of junction. 
 
Groups of neurons, or their processes, may be grouped together in the PNS into 
cordlike bundles commonly called nerves. Also clumps of neuronal cell bodies, 
ganglia, are found especially around the spinal cord and in the CNS, within the 
brain. 
 
Neurons have principal components:1801   
 
 Cell body including nucleus and various cytoplasmic organelles. The cell 
cytoskeleton features microtubules, microfilaments (short filaments some 
100x diameter in length). 1802 
                                                          
1798
 Marieb and Hoehn, Human anatomy and physiology, 8
th
 ed., 431. 
1799
 See Hof, et al., “Cellular components of nervous tissue,” Chapter 3.For detail concerning 
patterns of individual neuronal circuitry. 
1800
 Siegal and Sapru, Essential neuroscience, Section II, provides a well structured account of the 
neuron, its characteristics and function. 
1801
 For an introduction to cellular neuroscience: Hof, et al., “Cellular components of nervous 
tissue,” Chapter 3. 
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 Dendrites. For each neuron there are multiple dendrites (additional 
processes from nerve cell body) which receive synaptic contacts from 
other neurons. These have complex branching, the dendritic tree, and 
sometimes, on the branches, multiple short protrusions, spines. These 
neurite outgrowths have the effect of increasing dendritic surface area.  
Usually excitatory contacts are located on spines when they are present. 
They have a role in regulation of neurochemical events related to 
transmission, and are capable of local synthesis of proteins.  
 Axon. Normally each neuron has one axon although that axon may itself 
develop branches. The axon is the process of the neuron that connects 
with and facilitates transmission to the dendritic positioned synapses on 
target neurons. In comparison with the cell body proper, the axon can be 
of great length. The axon connects to cell body via axon hillock, where an 
action potential, or charge, is generated.  
 
Neurons are highly differentiated throughout the various regions of the brain. 
They are commonly classified by: 
 Function.  
 Location. 
 The type of chemical neurotransmitter that they synthesise and release. 
 Their shape. For example, according to a morphological description of the 
cell itself (chandelier, double bouquet, bipolar), or according to the shape 
of their dendritic tree.  
 
In addition to neurons, nervous tissue contains neuroglia, cells which, 
outnumbering neurons perhaps ten to one, support, functionally assist, and bind 
neurons together to other neurons. Neuroglial cells are grouped into microglia 
and microglia. Macroglia are most commonly astrocytes which provide metabolic 
support and remove excess neurotransmitter secretions, and oligodendrocytes (in 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1802
 Jenkins et al., Anatomy and Physiology, 2
nd
 ed, 72-73. 
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CNS), and Schwann Cells (in PNS), both of which synthesise myelin and wrap 
themselves around axons, in a process known as myelination. 1803 1804  
 
Messaging in the nervous system is via specialised nerve impulse conduction 
from neuron to neuron. Neural conduction requires both chemical and electrical 
messaging.  
 
 Communication between neural cells is most commonly by chemical 
messaging at the synapse. Each synapse consists of the presynaptic 
element (on the axon), a cleft or physical gap between cells, and the 
postsynaptic element (on dendrite). The active secretory pathways of the 
synapse, releasing quanta of neurotransmitter, are a key to the function of 
the neuron.  Synapses and junctions have localised gatherings of tiny 
organelles, synaptic vesicles, with roles in transmitter storage. Synaptic 
vesicles are typically refilled with locally produced neurotransmitter (eg 
small molecules of acetylcholine (ACh), amino acids such as glutamate) and 
reused locally to the synapse.   
 Chemical messaging received across the synapse opens ion channels into 
and out of the cell. Typically there are proteins for the takeup, recycling 
and restorage of previously released transmitter molecules.1805  
 After initial inflow of Na+, further voltage gated Na+ channels are triggered 
causing a massive influx of Na+ ions and local depolarisation. For a few 
thousandths of a second Na+ enters freely, and if a threshold is reached, an 
electrochemical pulse is generated known as an action potential. 
Depolarisation activates K+ channels and gradually the system resets.  The 
electrical impulse carries the length of the cell, and produces a further 
synaptic output via the axon, ie chemical messaging to dendrites of 
proximate cells.  Specifically, it is the rapid increase in Na+ followed by the 
slower efflux of K+ which generates action potentials. Currents of Na+ are 
                                                          
1803
 Hof, et al., “Cellular components of nervous tissue,” Chapter 3. 
1804
 Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 6
th
 ed., 448. 
1805
 Tortora and Derrickson, Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, 11th ed., 73-76. 
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pronounced and transient, whereas the K+ currents are sustained and 
gradual; this differential in time generates the action potential.1806 At 
Nodes of Ranvier, which occur at approximately every 1mm on peripheral 
nerves, there is a high density of Na+ channels causing saltatory 
conduction whereby the electrical impulses jump from node to node and 
are effectively generated almost simultaneously along length of neurons.  
 Coinciding with an action potential, Ca2+ second messenger mechanisms 
may be triggered within the cell, internally messaging to the nucleus and 
effecting genetic transcription and structural changes at the synapse itself. 
This is one mechanism by which use dependent pathways are established, 
and helping to explain at the neural level how experience and environment 
leave a lasting biological footprint.   
 
Neurons may be classified by their electrophysiological characteristics. These 
classes admit to rough groupings. There are regular firing cells, generating 
successive action potentials one spike at a time. This can be associated with the 
phenomenon of decreasing frequency over time, known as spike frequency 
adaptation. Also there are cells that generate rhythmic bursts of action potentials 
usually through activation of Ca2+ currents. There are cells characterised by short 
duration action potentials (<1ms) discharging at high frequencies (>300Hz), and 
there are cells that spontaneously generate action potentials at slower 
frequencies (1-10 Hz). These are especially associated with neurons releasing 
neuromodulatory transmitters such as ACh, norepinephrine, serotonin, 
histamine.1807 It will be seen that some of these variants are associated with 
effecting structural and functional changes at the synapse. 
 
There are some dozen classical neurotransmitters and dozens of neuropeptides 
that function as transmitters. In addition, there are other unconventional 
                                                          
1806
 This was first documented by Overton in 1902. 
1807
 McCormick, “Membrane potential and action potential,” Chapter 6.  
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transmitters, essentially any compound that permits messaging from one neuron 
to another at the synapse.1808  
 
Neurotransmitters may be classified according to molecular structure: classical, 
peptides, dissolved gases, and endocannabinoids (ECs) 1809  1810 or by function 
(excitatory or inhibitory).  
 
Neurotransmitters most commonly classified as classical are:  
 ACh which was the first neurotransmitter to be identified. It is a cholinergic 
neurotransmitter that is released at all neuromuscular junctions 
stimulating contraction of skeletal muscles. In addition, it is released at all 
pre- and post- ganglionic parasympathetic neurons as well as all 
preganglionic sympathetic neurons. Its action is excitatory if binding to a 
muscarinic receptor and inhibitory if to a nicotinic receptor (nAChR).1811  
 The biogenic amines made up of the three catecholamines: 
o norepinephrine (NE): NE also known as noradrenaline is an 
adrenergic hormone acting as a vasoconstrictor. Its main function 
appears to be linked to transmission through the sympathetic 
nervous system associated with fight and flight.  
o dopamine (DA): a precursor of NE. It is found concentrated in the 
basal nuclei, acting in an inhibitory manner on the extrapyramidal 
system.  Dopaminergic neurons project via the mesolimbic pathway 
to the limbic structures and the nucleus accumbens (NAc) in the BG, 
and via the mesocortical pathway to the cingulate cortex and 
especially the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex (omPFC).  DA is 
produced primarily in the substantia nigra (SN) and diffused in 
cortex with 80% of the DA concentrated in the corpus striatum 
                                                          
1808
 For an introduction to neurotransmitters and their action: Ariel Y. Deutch and Robert H. Roth, 
“Neurotransmitters” in Larry Squire, et al., Fundamental Neuroscience, 3
rd
 ed. (Burlington, MA: 
Elsevier, 2008), Chapter 7. 
1809
 Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 120-121. 
1810
 Deutch, Ariel Y, and Roth, Robert H. “Neurotransmitters” Chapter 7 in Squire, Larry et al. 
Fundamental Neuroscience. 3
rd
 ed. Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008.p152. 
1811
 P. Harris, et al. ed.  Mosby’s Dictionary of Medicine (Sydney: Elsevier, 2006). 
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(part of the BG). It plays a major role in mechanisms for emotion, 
motivation and reward. 
o epinephrine (Epi): Effects are not unlike NE and act upon the 
hypothalamus, the thalamus, the spinal cord, and the adrenal 
medulla.  
 Serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine, or 5-HT): 5-HT can act as a potent 
vasoconstrictor. In the CNS it acts as a neurotransmitter.   
 Histamine: A vasodilator. Release is from basophils of the blood, and mast 
cells of connective tissue. 
 Amino acid transmitters such as -Aminobutyric Acid (GABA): GABA is the 
major inhibitory transmitter in the body, present in 20%- 30% of all CNS 
synapses.  
 Glutamate and aspartate: These are the major excitatory 
neurotransmitter in the CNS and responsible for most of the fast synaptic 
transmission in the mammalian brain;  
 Glycine: It is the most common inhibitory neurotransmitter in the spinal 
cord. It is present in inhibitory neurons of the CNS and in retina. 
 The purines: adenosine triphosphate (ATP) and adenosine. ATP is the 
major energy transfer molecule. 1812  
 
Neurotransmitter speed of action is also relevant. ‘Fast’ neurotransmitters are 
excitatory amino acids (such as glutamate or aspartate) or inhibitory amino acids 
(such as GABA or glycine), whereas slower acting neurotransmitters (such as DA, 
NE, and 5-HT) produce longer lasting changes in excitability activating metabolic 
processes within the post synaptic cells. These longer lasting changes are of 
relevance to this study. DA, it will be seen, mediates permanent synaptic changes.  
 
In addition to neurotransmitters, there are neuromodulators, not necessarily 
released at the synapse, but affecting the strength of the synaptic transmission, 
                                                          
1812
 Siegal and Sapru, Essential neuroscience, Chapter 8, provides a well structured account of 
neurotransmitters, their characteristics and function.  
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acting either presynaptically on mechanisms of release, degradation and reuptake 
of neurotransmitter molecules, or postsynaptically affecting uptake.  
 
Neurotransmitter receptors at the synapse are of two types: ionotropic receptors 
containing an ion channel within their own structure; and metabolic or 
metabotropic. 
 
Ionotropic receptors are ligand gated (they open or close on receipt of the 
chemical message of the neurotransmitter molecule, the ligand) and mediate 
direct opening of the ion channel. Consequently these ion channels carry out very 
fast transmission of signals, passing from an activated to deactivated state in only 
10ms, and have been called “the underlying ‘hard wiring’ of the nervous 
system.”1813 This class of receptors includes:1814  
 the excitatory (depolarising) receptors 
o  nAChR, the nicotinic ACh receptor for ACh.  
o the receptors for glutamate, including the α-amino-3-hydroxyl-5-
methyl-4-isoxazole-propionate (AMPA), N-methyl-D-aspartate 
(NMDA) and kainite receptors. 
o for aspartate. 
o for ATP. 
 the inhibitory (hyperpolarising) receptors 
o GABAA, a receptor for GABA.  
o the receptor for glycine.  
o the 5HT3 receptor for serotonin. 
 
Metabotropic receptors are neurotransmitter binding sites but not containing an 
ion channel within their own structure. 1815 In contrast to the activation of 
ionotropic receptors these receptors allow slower onset, longer duration 
responses (from a fraction of a second to hours) with a series of enzymatic steps 
                                                          
1813
 Schulman and Roberts, “Intracellular signaling,” 205. 
1814
 Dale Purves, et al., Neuroscience,  4th ed.  (Sinauer Associates, 2008), 128–33. 
1815
 Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 157. 
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involved. Signalling also modulates transcription of genes. Essentially these 
receptors alter the concentration of intracellular metabolites thereby indirectly 
gating ion channels. They are of two types:  
 G-protein-coupled-receptors (GPCRs) which include the muscarinic ACh 
receptor, and receptors that bind the biogenic amines and neuropeptides. 
 receptor tyrosine kinases that modulate the activity of ion channels 
through the activation of protein phosphorylation (adding of a phosphate 
group to the compound) reactions and are responsive to growth and 
trophic factors affecting development and differentiation of neurons. We 
will see that trophic factors promote structural changes in the neuronal 
pathways.  
 
Information processing takes place within the neuron itself.1816 The neuron has 
been described as a “complex information processing system”.1817 A neuron may 
receive multiple excitatory and inhibitory dendritic inputs of modulated intensity. 
These inputs are altered in time and in intensity to form coded electrical outputs 
via the single axon. This electrical output is then normally converted at the 
synapse to chemical messaging pathways, both of an internal second messenger 
nature, and via the release of neurotransmitters and modulators. The response of 
the cell includes what could be called pathways for plasticity. These include 
genetically driven anatomical changes at the synapse that profoundly influence 
subsequent messaging downstream. 
  
                                                          
1816
 Saladin provides a useful introduction to this topic. Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 5
th
 ed., 
468-9. For more detail: Gordon M. Shepherd, “Electrotonic properties of axons and dendrites” in 
Larry Squire, et al.  Fundamental Neuroscience, 3
rd
 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008), 88. 
1817
 Shepherd, “Electrotonic properties of axons and dendrites,” 88 
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Appendix 3   
Neuroimaging Technologies 
 
Of great assistance to this current study have been the developments in imaging 
over recent decades. Better imaging has led to a growing appreciation of: 
 The potential for widespread plastic change in the central nervous 
system (CNS), both during development and in maturity.1818 Much 
research also has been undertaken into addiction, habits, a more 
refined understanding of the role of specific pathways and centres in 
the brain, as well as the genetic, biochemical and electrochemical 
bases processes.  
 The workings of living subcortical elements of the brain.  The improved 
imaging has greatly enriched our understanding not only of the roles of 
subcortical elements such as the amygdala, the hippocampus, the 
thalamus, the hypothalamus and the BG, but of their vital contribution 
to “higher cortical activity”.  
 The fact that brain processes often utilize numerous regions of the 
brain simultaneously. 
 The intricate interconnectivity of virtually all areas within the brain for 
complex processing. Sophisticated tracer technologies allow the highly 
complex neural pathways of the brain to be mapped.  
 The great complexity of both subtle and striking effects wrought by 
chemical and hormonal neuromodulation of brain activity. 
 The importance of timing patterns of electrical neural activity. 
 Reward, attentional, and emotion regulatory systems of the brain are 
understood with greater clarity. 
 
                                                          
1818
 Two popular books standout for the quality of their synthesis and analysis: neuropsychiatrist 
Jeffrey Schwartz documented his insights into cognitive treatments for patients with obsessive 
compulsive disorder in his The Brain and the Mind; and Norman Doidge, in The Brain that Changes 
Itself, focused almost exclusively on plasticity. His narrative distills amd popularises the insights of 
current research.  Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain. Norman Doidge, The brain that 
changes itself (Melbourne: Scribe, 2008), 95. 
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Neuroimaging Technologies 
Sources: Geake (2009)
1819
; Magristretti (2008)
1820
; Nitsche et al. (2008)
1821
; Sweeney 
(2009)
1822
; Ziemann et al. (2008)
1823
. 
 
Name Abbrev-
iation 
Process Strengths and 
applications as 
a research 
tool 
Limitations Comments 
Computer-
ised axial 
tomography 
CT or 
CAT scan 
Computerised 
analysis of 
multiple x-
rays. 
Great 
improvement 
over 
conventional 
x-ray imaging. 
Safety 
protocols 
required in 
use of x-rays. 
Shortcomings 
derive from 
limitations to 
resolution and 
opacity 
differentials 
inherent to x 
ray imaging. 
Capital costs. 
 
Positron 
emission 
tomography 
PET Measurement 
of emissions 
from 
radioactive 
trace in blood.  
A more direct 
insight into 
neural activity 
with many 
medical 
applications.    
Short 
radiation half 
life restricts 
design of 
experiments. 
Scans do not 
allow 
instantaneous 
study of brain 
response. 
Widely used 
from late 
1970s 
onwards. 
Radioactive 
glucose 
crosses blood-
brain barrier. 
On metabol-
isation emits 
positrons, 
which 
produce 
gamma rays 
on interaction 
with 
electrons.   
Magnetic 
resonance 
imaging 
MRI Use of strong 
magnetic field 
delineates 
contrasting 
brain tissue by 
collection and 
processing of 
echoes from 
High 
resolution 3D 
image. 
Non invasive. 
Provides 
precise 
structural 
imagery of the 
Unable to 
demonstrate 
short term 
brain activity. 
Capital costs 
(a factor in 
MRI 
applications in 
Originally 
known as 
NMR. Rabi 
awarded 
Nobel Prize in 
1944 for 
discovery. 
                                                          
1819
 Geake, The Brain at School, Chapter 2, “Neuroimaging technologies”: a useful discussion of the 
features and limitations of current technologies. Geake is both educator and neuroscientist by 
training. 
1820
 Pierre J. Magistretti,“Brain energy metabolism” in Larry Squire, et al. Fundamental 
Neuroscience, 3
rd
 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008), Chapter 13. 
1821
 Nitsche, et al., “Transcranial direct current stimulation: State of the art 2008,” 206-23. 
1822
 Michael S. Sweeney, Brain. The Complete Mind (Washington: NG, 2009). 
1823
 Ziemann, et al., “Consensus: Motor cortex plasticity protocols,” 164-182. 
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hydrogen 
atoms in 
water 
molecules in 
the brain.    
brain.  general).  
Functional 
magnetic 
resonance 
imaging 
fMRI Obtains a 
blood oxygen 
level 
dependent 
(BOLD) 
response 
through 
measurement 
of the 
paramagnetic 
qualities of 
deoxygenated 
haemoglobin.  
Allows 
mapping of 
brain activity 
and 
performance, 
and insights 
into function 
of specific 
brain areas.  
Current 
resolution 
1mm
3
. 
Non invasive. 
Owing to 
sluggish 
vasculature 
changes (3-9 
seconds 
typically) 
scans do not 
allow 
instantaneous 
study of brain 
response. 
Capital costs. 
Widely used 
from 1990s 
onwards.  
Voxel based 
morpho-
metry 
VBM Highly 
processed MRI 
data. 
Allows refined 
studies of 
tissue density. 
Capital costs.  
Diffusion 
tensor 
imaging 
DT-MRI Specialised 
MRI analysis 
of neural 
pathways. 
Allows 
imaging of 
connectivity 
maps in the 
brain. 
Capital costs 
as for other 
MRI 
technologies. 
Also known as 
diffusion 
weighted MRI.  
Magnetic 
resonance 
spectros-
copy 
MRS MRI used to 
identify 
neuro-
chemicals 
present.  
Aids in studies 
of both 
neurotransmit
ters and 
hormones. 
MRS has 
confirmed the 
role of DA in 
decision 
making.  
Not all neuro-
chemicals 
register.  
Only 
applicable to 
whole brain 
imaging. 
Capital costs. 
Developed by 
Ernst (Nobel 
Prize 1991) 
Electro-
encephal-
ography 
EEG Electrodes on 
scalp record 
electrical 
activity of 
cortex. 
Excellent 
temporal 
discrimination 
and non 
invasive.  
Signals can 
suffer from 
distortion. 
Used in 
conjunction 
with spatial 
data of fMRI 
and PET.  
Used for study 
of event 
related 
potentials 
(ERPs). 
Magneto-
electro-
encephalogr
aphy 
MEG Magnetic 
sensors placed 
on skull reveal 
currents 
created by 
neural 
discharges. 
Excellent 
temporal 
discrimination 
to 1/1000 
second. 
Allows greater 
clarity of 
reception than 
EEG, and 
allows analysis 
 Used in 
conjunction 
with spatial 
data of fMRI 
and PET.  
 
MEG has been 
used to 
analyse 
cortical 
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of cortical 
activity when 
there is no net 
signal 
increase.  
regions 
implicated in 
the first half 
second of 
visual word 
recognition. 
Used in 
location of 
tumors. 
Near optical 
infra red 
NOIR Detects 
oxygenation 
and 
bloodvolume 
changes on 
region specific 
basis during 
functional 
studies. 
Apparatus 
easy to handle 
and portable. 
Allows 
functional 
metabolic 
investigation.  
Optical field 
dependent. 
Under 
development.  
Nuclear 
magnetic 
resonance 
mobile 
universal 
surface 
explorer 
NMR-
MOUSE 
A unilateral 
NMR non 
invasive 
sensor.  
Non 
destructive; 
permitting 2D 
and 3D 
imaging.  
Portability and 
relatively low 
cost are 
strengths.  
Confined to 
near surface 
studies. Level 
of resolution 
is a deficiency.  
Under 
development. 
Transcranial 
magnetic 
stimulation 
TMS Localised 
magnetic field 
temporarily 
knocks out 
effective 
neuronal 
activity in 
localised brain 
areas. 
Used in 
testing 
implication of 
various brain 
areas in 
particular 
tasks. rTMS is 
shown to be 
useful in 
treatment of 
depression. 
rTMS has 
provoked 
epileptic 
seizure in 
individuals 
with prior 
history. 
Introduced in 
the 1980s. 
Used in 
conjunction 
with MRI.  
rTMS shown 
to induce 
plasticity in 
certain 
conditions.  
Transcranial 
direct 
current 
stimulation 
 
tDCS   Application of 
highly 
localised 
electrical 
current to 
cortex. 
Will not 
provoke 
action 
potentials and 
so is less 
invasive than 
TMS and 
rTMS. 
 Used in 
conjunction 
with MRI.  
Induces long 
term synaptic 
change by 
protein 
synthesis. 
Similarities to 
neuro-
modulation. 
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Table 1.1 
An hylomorphic critique of 20
th
 century currents in philosophy of mind 
 
Four categories are adopted from Kirk Ludwig “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview” in 
Stephen P Stich and Ted A Warfield (eds.) The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind 
(Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 2003). 
 
*Note that hylomorphic responses in one subcategory may be applicable in other 
subcategories. I have noted the more obvious of these. Responses within broad 
categorisations are in many cases applicable across subcategories within the same broad 
category. Responses are my own unless alternate source is cited.  
 
Broad category Definitions and 
subcategories 
Advocates
1824
 
and 
antecedents 
Tenets  Hylomorphic 
responses* 
1. Irrealism
1825
 
Eliminative 
materialism 
Eliminativism is 
the denial of the 
existence of 
mental 
properties: “the 
view that 
beliefs, desires, 
and other 
mental states do 
not exist, and 
that 
explanations in 
terms of such 
states will be 
replaced by 
neurobiological 
explanations.”
 
1826
   
 
P. Feyerabend 
(1963)
1827
 
R. Rorty 
(1965)
1828
 Paul 
Churchland 
(1981)
1829
  
S.Stich 
(1983)
1830
 
Patricia 
Churchland 
(1986)
1831
  
 
Antecedents of 
eliminativism 
are found in 
Feyerabend, 
Quine, and 
Nietzschean 
nihilism.
1832
 
“… a strategy 
which removes 
the (ontological) 
obstacles that 
higher level 
phenomena 
pose to 
naturalism…  by 
denying their 
existence.”
1833
  
 
Outspoken 
opposition to 
the mental 
categories of 
folk psychology, 
arguing that 
they fail to 
capture physical 
Eliminativism is 
a radical 
departure from 
realist 
epistemology. 
Truth is found 
not in being but 
in a relativist a 
priori denial of 
mental 
phenomena.  
 
Critique of 
physicalism: that 
it is based on an 
impoverished 
metaphysical 
conception of 
reality.
 1835
 
                                                          
1824
 As an introduction to the thought of the various figures mentioned in this table, I cite 
representative texts presenting the views of each. Texts not explored in detail are omitted from 
bioliography. 
1825
 Essentially the material eliminativist view, as proposed by Richard Rorty, that minds are not 
real.  
1826
 Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 973. 
1827
 P. Feyerabend,“Mental events and the brain,” Journal of Philosophy 60, (1963): 295-6. 
1828
 R. Rorty, “Mind body identity, privacy and cateogories,” Review of Metaphysics 19, (1965): 24-
54.  
1829
 P. M. Churchland, “Eliminative materialism and propositional attitudes,” Journal of Philosophy 
78, (1981): 67-90. 
1830
 S. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983).  
1831
 P. S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1986).  
1832
 Sarah Patterson, “Philosophy of Mind” in The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century 
Philosophy, Dermot Moran ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 555 Chapter 12. Feyerabend argued 
that should mental phenomena and brain processes be identified, then the brain processes would 
have the same obscurity as the phenomena. 
1833
 Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 973. 
589 
 
Eliminativist 
neuro-
philosophy. 
 
 
 
reality.
1834
 
 
 
“Ultimately 
unintelligible”
1836
: a reductive 
denial of 
substance. 
 
Connectionism  
 
Connectionism 
is also known as 
neural networks 
or parallel 
distributed 
processing. 
Connectionism 
is a model of 
cognitive 
processing 
taking into 
account neural 
structures.  
Paul Churchland 
(1988)
1837
  
Kim Sterelny 
(1990)
1838
 
Andy Clark 
(1989, 1993, 
2001)
1839
  
A synthesis of 
eliminativist and 
functionalist 
approaches.  
 
 
Reductionist 
functional 
approaches 
focus on outputs 
defined 
according to 
material criteria, 
and disregard 
ontological 
questions.  
 
Reality may not 
be reduced to 
actions or 
relationships. An 
effective 
understanding 
of outputs 
requires a prior 
understanding 
of nature.  
The search for 
the neural 
correlates of 
consciousness. 
“Self 
representation 
accounts of 
consciousness”
1840
 
D. Armstrong 
(1981)
1841
 
W. Lycan 
(1987)
1842
 
 
Consciousness 
defined as 
“when the brain 
perceives, or 
otherwise 
represents, 
Consciousness 
and subjective 
perception are 
not ontologically 
prior to being.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1835
 N. Chomsky, New horizons in the study of language and mind (Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 
2000). Chomsky’s critique of physicalism: it is a misapplication of methodologies of the 
experimental sciences to metaphysical questions and, as such, is a methodological error. 
1834
 Folk psychology argues that the everyday practice of explaining behaviour in terms of beliefs, 
desires and other mental states, the attribution of “propositional attitudes” to others, allows us to 
predict how they will behave. In short the theory that this is how we predict others’ states and 
intentions. 
1836
 Hylomorphism advocates that knowledge starts in being. As a consequence of their materialist 
stance, eliminative materialists also deny freedom in human action, even a freedom that is limited. 
John Haldane, “Incarnational Anthropology,” in ed. David Cockburn (ed.), Human Beings 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1991), 75-93. 
1837
 Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge MA: MIT, 1988) ; Paul M. 
Churchland, The Engine of the Reason, the Seat of the Soul (Cambridge MA: MIT, 1995) 
1838
 Kim Sterelny, Thought in a Hostile World: The evolution of human cognition (Malden MA: 
Blackwell, 2003). 
1839
 Andy Clarke, Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science and Parallel Distributed 
Processing (Cambridge MA: MIT, 1989); Andy Clarke, Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy 
of Cognitive Science (Cambridge MA: MIT, 2001). 
1840
 Terminology proposed by Paul M Churchland in “Consciousness” in Richard L Gregory (ed), 
Oxford Companion to the Mind. (2
nd
 ed) (Oxford: OUP, 2004 
1841
 Armstrong, D. (1981) The Nature of Mind.  
1842
 W. Lycan, Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). 
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some of its own 
cognitive states 
and activities. 
Consciousness is 
thus a form of 
metacognition.”
1843
 
 
 
Objective being 
cannot be 
verified through 
subjective 
experience.     
 
Consciousness 
itself may not be 
reduced to self 
awareness. 
1844
 
 Self control 
accounts of 
consciousness
1845
 
P. Churchland 
(1995)
1846
 
J.G.Taylor 
(2001)
1847
 
Consciousness 
characterises an 
agent that is 
“modulating, 
manipulating, 
and steering its 
own cognitive 
activities… 
partly 
autonomous in 
generating not 
just its own 
behaviour, but 
its own 
cognition as 
well.”
 1848
 
False premises: 
consciousness 
may not be 
reduced to self 
control; nor may 
self modulation 
require 
consciousness.
1849
 
 
Being is 
ontologically 
prior to activity.  
 
Reductive 
physicalism 
cannot account 
for rationality 
and freedom. 
 Special 
architecture and 
dynamics 
account.  
G. Edelman 
(1993)
1850
 
P. Churchland 
(1995)
 1851
 
R. Llinas 
(2001)
1852
 
Higher function 
derives from the 
complexity of 
neural pathways 
and reverbatory 
circuits. 
Neural 
complexity 
cannot explain 
or 
accommodate 
choice, freedom, 
judgement of 
conscience, and 
the capacity to 
abstract to 
universal 
principles. 
                                                          
1843
 Paul M. Churchland, “Consciousness” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2
nd
 ed. Richard L. 
Gregory ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
1844
 Churchland, “Consciousness”. 
1845
 Terminology proposed by Churchland, “Consciousness”.  
1846
 Churchland, The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. 
1847
 J.G. Taylor, “The central representation: the where, what and how of consciousness” in The 
Emergence of Mind: Proceedings of the international symposium, S. Colona ed. (Montedison, 
2001). 
1848
 Churchland, “Consciousness”. 
1849
 Churchland, “Consciousness”. 
1850
 G. Edelman, “Neural Darwinism: selection and re-entrant signalling in higher brain function,” 
Neuron 10, (1993). 
1851
 Churchland, The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. 
1852
 R. Llinas, I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self (Cambridge MA: MIT, 2001). 
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Reductive 
physicalism 
cannot account 
for rationality 
and freedom. 
 
Output may not 
only be defined 
in material 
terms. 
Fictionalism.
1853
 
 
 
“Fictionalism is 
the claim that, 
whilst mental 
states don’t, 
strictly speaking, 
exist, it is 
nevertheless 
useful to 
pretend that 
they do.”
 1854
  
 
Fictionalism is 
associated with 
projectivism.   
 
Daniel Dennett 
(1991)
1855 1856
 
W. Lycan 
(1987)
1857
  
 
Ryle’s logical 
behaviourism is 
a precursor to 
Dennett’s 
position.   
 
Associated with 
folk psychology, 
regarding it as 
indispensable.
1858
  
 
Fictionalism is 
an example of 
property 
dualism 
combined with 
“substance 
monism of a 
physicalist 
type”.
1859
  
 
Functional 
explanation of 
consciousness: 
 
“necessarily, 
anything that 
has physical 
behavioural 
dispositions of a 
certain kind and 
complexity has a 
mental life.”
1860
 
 
Belief and desire 
“are real inner-
causal states of 
people”.
1861
 
1862
  
A form of total 
conceptual 
relativism: 
humans are 
given 
characteristics 
they do not in 
fact have.
1863 
 
 
The view seems 
aligned with 
relativist views 
that meaning is 
determined by 
the receiver not 
the subject.
1864
 
 
Critique of 
eliminativist 
roots as above.  
 
The 
functionalism 
evident in 
Dennett’s work 
circumvents 
                                                          
1853
 Also known as “Instrumentalism”. 
1854
 Ian Ravenscroft, Philosophy of Mind. A beginner’s guide (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 193. 
1855
 Dennett, Consciousness Explained . 
1856
 Haldane, “Incarnational anthropology,” 76. Haldane suggests that Dennett holds to 
projectivism with respect to some classes of phenomena, and to realism in relation to others. 
1857
 W. G. Lycan, Consciousness Cambridge, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). 
1858
 Dennett’s view. 
1859
 Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 58. 
1860
 Samuel Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 
1994), 136. A “behaviour-as-sufficient” view.   
1861
 William G. Lycan, “The Mind-Body Problem” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, ed. 
Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 2003), 60. Dennett proposed this 
view in common with with identity theorists, functionalists and token physicalists. 
1862
 Ravenscroft, Philosophy of Mind. A beginner’s guide, 72. Ravenscroft classifies Dennett within 
eliminativism and argues that although Dennett is on record suggesting he is not a fictionalist, his 
writings suggest that he holds this position. He presents his thought in the section of his book 
dedicated to eliminativism. Lycan, on the other hand argues that Dennett regards mental 
ascriptions as real inner causal states. 
1863
 Haldane, “Incarnational anthropology,” 76. 
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 deeper 
ontological 
questions. (See 
above.) 
2. Conceptual reductionism
1865
 
Neutral Monism Neutral Monism 
holds that “...the 
mental (and the 
physical) are 
reducible to 
something more 
basic.”
1866
 It is 
“the view that 
mind and matter 
are complex 
constructions 
out of more 
basic elements 
which are 
neutral, neither 
mental nor 
material.” 
1867
  
 
 
Ernst Mach 
1886)
1868
 
William 
James(1904)
1869
 
Bertrand Russell 
(1921)
1870
  
A non dualist, 
non physicalist, 
approach. We 
are 
“constructed” 
by experience.
 
1871
  
1872
 
 
James argued 
that pure 
experience, not 
the subject of 
pure experience, 
should be the 
focus of study. 
 
Russell argued 
that matter is a 
“logical fiction 
(giving) us a 
convenient way 
of stating causal 
laws”.
 1873
 
 
“Mind is … 
exemplified in 
number and 
complexity of 
habits… mind 
and matter alike 
are seen to be 
constructed out 
Neutral monism 
reverses the 
fundamental 
tenet of 
hylomorphism, 
that activities of 
an organism 
follow upon its 
nature - do 
follows be. This 
leads to a 
consequent loss 
of the sense of 
substance.  
 
A failure to 
address richness 
of substance, 
and a 
substitution of 
idealism or 
phenomenalism.
1875
 
 
Neutral monism 
is incapable of 
making 
meaningful 
statements 
about the real 
nature of things 
because, as an a 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1864
 Haldane, “Incarnational anthropology,” 77. Dennett proposes a world in which “an event may 
be wholly determined in its causes (but) conceived of in a fashion which allows it to be a free 
action”. The view seems aligned to Hume’s relativistic argumentation. 
1865
 The view that whatever can be said about the whole can also be expressed in concepts 
pertaining to the parts. In philosophy of mind, this presents as two strands: that man and his 
mental life are reducible to the material, or to idealism. 
1866
 Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 21. 
1867
 Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 985. 
1868
 E. Mach, Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis des Physischen zum Psychischen 
(1886), available in translation as The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of Physical to the 
Psychical (New York: Dover, 1959). 
1869
 William James, “A World of Pure Experience,” Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific 
Methods 1, 20-21 (1904). 
1870
 Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind (1921), 308. 
1871
 Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 21. The view of Mach and Russell. 
1872
 C.D. Broad, The Mind and its Place in Nature (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925). 
Charles Broad classified Russell’s position as “mentalistic neutralism”. 
1873
 Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind, 308. Russell advocates a monist metaphysics. 
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of neutral stuff.”
 
1874
 
 
 
priori position, it 
holds that it is 
experience that 
creates reality. 
Logical 
Behaviourism 
 
 
Behaviourism 
sees behaviour 
as intelligible 
and rational.  
 
Having a mind 
“is constituted 
by nothing more 
than the 
engaging in 
especially 
sophisticated 
types of overt 
behaviour, or of 
being disposed 
to engage in 
such behaviour 
in suitable 
circumstances”.  
1876
 
R. Carnap (1931) 
G. Ryle 
(1949)
1877
 
J.L. Austin. Their 
followers: Peter 
Geach, Anthony 
Kenny, Normal 
Malcolm, AI 
Melden, and 
Peter Winch.
1878
  
 
The early 
articulation of 
behaviourism 
was by logical 
positivists, 
Carnap, Hempel, 
and Ayer. It 
developed from 
the 
verificationism 
of logical 
positivists prior 
to WWII, and 
was also 
influenced by 
British 
Empiricism.  
 
Wittgenstein 
and Russell used 
aspects of  
behaviourism. 
1879
 
Logical 
behaviourism 
stands in 
contrast to 
physicalism and 
in profound 
opposition to 
Cartesian 
dualism. 
 
“The 
behaviourist 
takes minds to 
be (at least to a 
significant 
extent) 
constituted by 
(evident) outer 
effects.”
1880
  
 
The link 
between mental 
states and 
behaviour is 
logical not 
causal.
 1881
   
 
 
Logical 
behaviourism 
fails to propose 
an ontological 
framework,
 1882
  
nor to consider 
the “non dualist, 
dual aspect, 
ontological anti-
reductionist”
 1883 
view.
 
 
 
The meaning of 
terms such as 
mind requires 
clarification by 
reference to 
Aristotelian 
terms such as 
intellect and 
rational 
nature.
1884
  
 
Where 
appropriate, an 
hylomorphic 
critique 
addresses 
behaviourist 
affinities to 
physicalism. 
(See above). 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1875
 Leopold Stubenberg, "Neutral Monism" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta ed., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/neutral-
monism/. 
1874
 Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind, 308. Russell advocates a monist metaphysics. 
1876
 Armstrong, “Mind body problem: philosophical theory”.  This “peripheralist” view  
stands in contrast to the “centralist” position admitting the possibility of “‘inner’ mental processes 
which interact causally with the rest of the body.” 
1877
 G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949). 
1878
 Adherents of logical behaviourism may or may not subscribe to a reductive materialism. Their 
approach however is arguably reductive in its behaviourist focus.  
1879
 Guttenplan, ed.,  A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 132. 
1880
 Minds are not “inner psychic mechanisms merely contingently connected with their outer 
behavioural effects.” Guttenplan, ed.,  A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 132. Logical 
behaviourism manifests little interest in the ontological questions, or in the inner world for that 
matter. There is a phenomenal approach to behaviour, with the assumption of a logical link 
between the mental and behaviour which follows. Logical behaviourism exhibits non engagement 
with the issue of mental causality.  
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Idealism
1885
  Idealism is the 
view that reality 
is composed of 
minds and 
collections of 
ideas.
1886
  
G. Berkeley 
(1710)
1887
 
R. Carnap 
(1928)
1888
 
In more recent 
forms see, for 
example, 
A.C. Grayling 
(1985)
1889
 
Idealism began 
as a refutation 
of dualism.  
 
Idealism gave 
rise to to 
phenomenalism.
1890
 
1891
  
 
 
Idealism, as a 
denial of the 
material, is a 
reductive and 
unsatisfying 
understanding 
of the 
complexity of 
substance.
1892
1893
 
Identity 
theory
1894
  
The 
identification of 
sensations with 
brain processes 
is a type 
physicalist 
theory.  
 
David Lewis’ 
psychophysical  
U. T. Place 
(1956)
1895
 
H. Feigl 
(1958)
1896
  
J. J. C. Smart 
(1959)
1897
  
David Lewis 
(1966)
1898
 
Mental states 
are identified 
with brain 
states.
1899
  
 
Identity theory 
bestows causal 
relevance on 
mental 
properties.
1900
 
The type-type 
causality 
attributed to 
mental 
properties by 
identity theory 
is unable to 
account for the 
non 
predictability of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1881
 Brian McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert 
Audi (Cambridge: CUP, 1995). The position of Ryle and Wittgenstein. 
1882
 Patterson “Philosophy of Mind,” Chapter 12. It has been pointed out that Ryle tends to argue 
as though dualism and behaviourism exhaust the philosophical alternatives.  
1883
 A classification suggested by Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind”. 
1884
 This approach is a response to the origin of behaviourism in semantics. Thus, the subjective 
meaning of mind in behaviourism could be displaced by one founded on essential properties of 
being. 
1885
 Also known as universal pure mental particle theory. 
1886
 Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 16. 
1887
 G. Berkeley, Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, (1710). 
1888
 Rudolf Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin: Bernary, 1928) trans. R.A. George: The 
Logical Structure of the World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). 
1889
 A. C. Grayling, The Refutation of Scepticism (London: Duckworth, 1985). 
1890
 Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 16 
1891
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. Phenomenalism (as, for example, advocated by Ayer) 
is a version of neutral monism or idealism: “all empirical statements are synonymous with 
statements solely about phenomenal appearances” 
1892
 Haldane avoids offering opinions on questions of qualia and consciousness, preferring to 
anchor his discussion on the primacy of existence.  
1893
 An hylomorphic metaphysics accounting for real existence and for substances having physical 
and rational properties overcomes the difficulties posed by idealism.Without such an hylomorphic 
response, the challenges raised by idealism with reference to consciousness are virtually 
insurmountable. 
1894
 Identity theory known also as psychophysical (or mind-brain) identity theory. R. W. Sperry, 
“Consciousness and Causality” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2
nd
 ed., ed.  Richard L Gregory 
(Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
1895
 U.T. Place, “Is consciousness a brain process?” British Journal of Psychology 47, (1956): 44-50. 
1896
 H. Feigl, “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2, 
H. Feigl, et al. ed. (Minneapolis: U Minnesota Press, 1958), 370-497. 
1897
 J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and brain processes,” Philosophical Review 68, (1959): 141-56. 
1898
 D. Lewis, “An argument for identity theory,” Journal of Philosophy 63, (1966): 17-25. 
1899
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. 
1900
 The view of Feigl. This is an understanding of causality limited to efficient material causality 
assuming , on an a priori basis, the identity of mental and physical. 
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theory.  
Mind and brain 
appear different 
things “because 
we have used 
different 
languages and 
perspectives”.
 
1901
  
 
Lewis makes use 
of “functionalist 
descriptions of 
states extracted 
from a ‘folk 
theory’ of 
psychology to 
identify mental 
states with 
physical states”.
 
1902
    
 
 
correspondence 
between the 
mental and the 
physical, and is 
ultimately a 
consequence of 
human freedom. 
Instead, 
however, of 
opening the way 
for hylomorphic 
solutions that 
uphold human 
freedom, the 
token 
physicalist, non-
reductive 
solutions of 
anomalous 
monism (see 
below) inherited 
the middle 
ground.  
Central state 
materialism. 
Central state 
materialism is a 
type physicalist 
theory, a further 
development of 
identity theory 
and a form of 
functionalism.
1903
 
 
 
David Armstrong 
(1968)
1904
 
 
 
“All mental 
states are 
contingently 
identical with 
states of the 
brain or CNS 
that are apt to 
produce a 
certain range of 
behaviour…. 
Mental states 
are actual 
internal states 
with causal 
effects”.
1905 
 
 
 “We can give a 
complete 
account of man 
in purely 
physico-
chemical 
terms… (by a) 
purely 
electrochemical 
Armstrong 
presented a 
reductionist 
view of the 
human being as 
“nothing but a 
physic-chemical 
mechanism”.
1907
 
Yet, since 
mental events 
and brain 
processes have 
different 
intrinsic 
properties, they 
cannot be 
identical.  
 
Functionalist 
stance is unable 
to avoid 
ontological 
issues because 
of its association 
with the 
                                                          
1901
 Sperry, “Consciousness and Causality”. 
1902
 Lewis, “An argument for identity theory,” 17-25. 
1903
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. 
1904
 David Armstrong, A Materialist theory of the mind (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968). 
1905
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. Some believed the mind is the brain, others subscribed 
to Ryle’s view that the mind is capacities and dispositions, a view that has gained widespread 
traction. 
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account of the 
workings of the 
brain.”
1906
 
physicalist 
conception of 
reality and a 
mechanistic 
view of human 
behaviour.
1908
  
Epiphenom-
enalism 
Mental 
phenomena are 
the result of 
physical 
processes in the 
brain, or else 
both enjoy a 
common cause.  
 
A form of 
interactive 
parallelism.
 1909
 
 
 
 
 
 
F. Jackson 
(1982)
1910
 
David Chalmers 
(1996)
1911 1912
  
 
Epiphenom-
enalism, began 
as a reaction to 
dualism, 
asserting a form 
of scientific 
behaviourism.  
 
Type 
epiphenom-
enalism: “that 
no state can 
cause anything 
in virtue of 
falling under a 
mental type”; 
mental states 
cannot be 
causes.  
Token 
epiphenomenali
sm: “that no 
mental state can 
cause anything”. 
1913
 
 
Essentially the 
mind is a 
spectator. 
Conscious 
experience is a 
side effect of 
brain activity.
 
1914
  
 
A denial that 
human beings 
can be 
intentional 
agents. “Mental 
states do not 
cause anything.”
 
1915 1916
 
 
Chalmers writes, 
“the hard 
problem of 
consciousness is 
that of 
explaining how 
it is that physical 
processes in a 
brain are 
associated with 
subjective 
experiences…. A 
science of 
consciousness 
needs to admit 
both first-
Hylomorphic 
response would 
address the 
inconsistencies 
in marrying a 
reductionist,
1918
emergent 
approach to the 
Cartesian notion 
of a mind 
independent of 
matter.
1919
 
 
See response to 
dualism below. 
 
Jackson (and 
Van Cleve), by 
arguing that 
consciousness is 
irreducible and 
emergent, fall 
into the 
deterministic 
camp.
 1920
 Their 
position is 
fundamentally 
materialistic. 
See refutation of 
reductive 
materialism 
above.  
 
Chalmers lacks 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1907
 Patterson, “Philosophy of Mind,” 547. 
1906
 David Armstrong quotation. Sperry, “Consciousness and Causality”. 
1908
 Overt materialism can be answered by an hylomorphic defence of non material properties in 
certain substances.  
1909
 Richard L. Gregory ed., “Epiphenomena” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford: 
OUP, 2004). Epiphenomenalism admits only one way psychophysical action. 
1910
 F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly 32, (1982): 127-36. 
1911
 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind.  
1912
 Paul M Churchland classifies Chalmers as an ephphenomenalist. Churchland, “Consciousness”. 
1913
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. 
1914
 A. Delbridge et al., Macquarie Dictionary, 3
rd
 ed. (Macquarie University: Macquarie Press, 
2001). “Conscious processes, though distinct from physical processes, have no distinct causal 
properties.” 
1915
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. 
1916
 Haldane, “Incarnational anthropology,” 78. 
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person data and 
third person 
data as real and 
mutually 
irreducible.”
1917
 
both an 
adequate 
rational 
psychology and 
notion of formal  
causality.
1921
  
3. Conceptual anti reductionism
1922
 
Emergentism 
 
Emergent 
theories may be 
classified as 
type-type 
(Category 2 
above) or as 
supervenient 
non type-type. 
 
 
“Emergent 
materialists hold 
that there are 
only material 
things, but that 
some complex 
material things... 
have mental 
properties and 
that those 
mental 
properties are 
not conceptually 
reducible to any 
of the physical 
complexes of 
the complexes 
that have them”
 
1923 
 
C.D.Broad(1925)
1924
 
 
Emergentism 
began as a 
materialist 
rejection of 
dualism, 
idealism, and of 
reductive 
materialism as 
empirically 
implausible.
 1925
 
It is associated 
with the 
nineteenth 
century rise of 
science and 
theory of 
evolution.
1926
 
1927
 
C.D. Broad 
following J.S.Mill 
distinguishes 
mechanism and 
emergentism.
1928
  
 
Emergentism is 
non reductive,
 
1929
 
1930 
and  
essentially 
materialistic.
1931
 
1932
 
 
 
Hylomorphism 
teaches that 
properties 
follow upon the 
essence: the 
nature of 
something limits 
its behaviour 
and activities. 
The emergence 
of rationality, a 
new class of 
property, does 
not correspond 
to an empirical 
understanding 
of the world.
1933
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1918
 Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 58. 
1919
 With some characteristics of a dualistic theory, epiphenomenalism asserts an unbridgeable gap 
between two orders of being.This must lead either to a deterministic universe, or to an 
incomprehensible universe unable to account for human freedom and causality.   
1920
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. 
1917
 David Chalmers, “Consciousness” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2
nd
 ed., Richard L Gregory 
ed.  (Oxford: OUP, 2004). Chalmers seeks to explain the connection of physical processes to 
conscious experience. He advocates the development of “simple, basic and universal” principles 
connecting physical processes and consciousness by means of correlating first-person data 
(subjective description) and third person data (neuroscience and psychology).  
1921
 Without these, Chalmers’ goal of developing “principles connecting physical processes and 
consciousness” appears impossible. His principles would simply reflect behavioural phenomena. 
1922
 That the mental activity of the human being and their minds, cannot be reduced constituent 
parts.  
1923
 Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 18. 
1924
 C.D. Broad, The Mind and its Place in Nature (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925). 
1925
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. 
1926
 Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 9. 
1927
 In recent decades emergentism has resurfaced in numerous forms. It is currently the broad 
materialist category into which many philosophers and neuroscientist classify themselves.  
1928
 He argues they are typified variously by mechanical and chemical combination... one the sum 
of its individual effects, the other only known “inductively”. 
1929
 Patterson, “Philosophy of Mind,” 525. “Mind (is) beyond belief of reductive explanation”. 
1930
 Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 973. It is “the view 
that wholes exhibit novel features which are emergent, or not explicable in terms of the properties 
of the parts of the whole”. 
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Anomalous 
monism.  
 
“A metaphysical 
view... according 
to which all 
mental events 
are physical 
events, but 
there are no 
strict laws 
linking mental 
and physical 
predicates.”
 1934
 
 
A form of dual 
aspect theory 
whereby events 
can have 
autonomous 
mental and 
physical aspects. 
 
A token 
physicalism.
1935
  
 
Donald 
Davidson 
(1963)
1936
  
 
Anomalous 
monism built 
upon the work 
of Kripke
1937
 
who argued that 
statements of 
strict identity 
between 
sensation and 
physical state 
are not 
possible.
1938
  
 
A form of 
emergentism;
1939
 a non 
reductive 
materialism. 
 
Davidson 
introduced 
notion of 
supervenience.
1940
 
1941
 Mental 
events can be 
causally related 
to physical 
events but 
mental events 
are physical 
events. 
 
Anomalous 
monism 
established the 
paradigm for 
non-reductive 
Anomalous 
monism 
circumvents 
ontological 
questions and 
relies on 
positivist 
principles.
1943
 
 
Foundation on a 
physicalism and 
causalism seeing 
the mind as the 
efficient cause 
of behavioural 
outputs.
 1944
 
 
Non reductive 
materialist, 
emergent, and 
functionalist 
understandings 
(without an 
explicit enriched 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1931
 Broad’s emergent materialism held that every substance is wholly made up of the physical. 
Later advocates of emergentism tend to adopt an a priori materialist position. Drawing on an 
evolutionary paradigm, emergentists assert that higher properties evolve according to mysterious 
inner processes as yet unknown. 
1932
 Broad, “Mind and its Place in Nature,” 647. Mentality is “an emergent characteristic of certain 
kinds of material complex”. Broad regards behaviourism as reductive materialism and opposes this 
to emergent materialism. 
1933
 Hylomorphism argues that there is a lack of scientific foundation for the fundamental 
emergentist presupposition, that higher properties (rationality) evolve. The more distinctive the 
qualities that are recognised in human nature, the more difficult for the emergent position to gain 
any traction. See Appendix 1 for detailed refutation of emergent rationality. 
1934
 Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 967. 
1935
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. “Every particular is physical... yet physical tokens can 
fall under non physical types. Not all token physicalism is type physicalism.” 
1936
 D. Davidson, “Actions, reasons and causes,” Journal of Philosophy 60, (1963): 685-700. 
“Interacting mental and physical events instantiate physical laws and hence are both physical”. He 
upheld the anomality of the mental but offered no concession to dualism.  
1937
 S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). 
1938
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. 
1939
 Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 9. 
1940
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. Supervenience: “An asymmetric relationship of 
determination between sets of properties or facts. If mental properties supervene on physical 
properties, then there is no variation in mental properties without a variation in physical 
properties. There is a special kind of dependence between “higher level” properties and “lower 
level properties that does not allow conceptual reductions”.... Davidson submits that the mental 
supervenes on the physical, such that no mental change can occur without a physical change. See 
Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 993. 
1941
 Davidson, “Actions, reasons and causes,” 214.“Mental characteristics are in some sense 
dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics.” 
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physicalism that 
has 
predominated in 
latter 20
th
 
century.
1942
  
 
ontology) must 
ultimately be 
physicalist and 
unable to 
account for 
human freedom. 
Biological 
naturalism 
Biological 
naturalism is the 
belief that 
mental and 
physical 
categories are 
mistaken. Searle 
argues that 
higher level 
features of the 
human organism 
are caused by 
lower level 
elements.
1945
  
 
John Searle 
(1984)
1946
 
M. Gazzaniga 
(2011)
1947
  
 
Biological 
naturalism is a 
rejection of 
functionalist and 
Computational 
Theory of Mind 
understandings.  
 
Searle moved 
from this 
position to  
“quantum 
indeterminism” 
(see below) to 
explain freedom 
through physical 
quantum 
processes. 
A subtle form of 
emergentism. 
 
Biological 
naturalism 
questions the 
distinctions 
between the 
mental and 
physical 
suggesting there 
is no basis in 
reality for the 
distinction.  
 
Searle argues 
consciousness is 
a result of 
neurobiological 
processes, an 
evolved brain 
process.
1948
 
1949
  
 
 
Hylomorphism 
mental and 
physical 
properties exist 
in reality.
1950
  
 
If mind is 
accorded 
executive status 
(in a dualist 
paradigm of 
substance) it will 
necessarily lead 
to a dualist, an 
epiphenom-
enalist position 
or a physicalist 
position.
1951
  
Competition for 
executive 
control 
accounts
1952
 
A further form 
of emergentism 
-  this account 
proposes that 
B.J.Baars 
(1988)
1953
 
F.Crick and C. 
Koch (1990)
1954
 
These are 
essentially 
emergent 
positions: 
The material 
determinism of 
these accounts 
lacks adequate 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1943
 Hylomorphism also holds to the fundamental intelligibility of reality. Anomalous monism, and 
the non reductive physicalisms in general, propose anomalous mental and physical properties on a 
physical foundation. Essentially this must be either self contradictory or at the very least 
paradoxical. 
1944
 Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 45. 
1942
 Patterson, “Philosophy of Mind,” 552. Davidson rejected psychophysical laws and focused on 
intention rather than sensation. He argued that what is mental are “attitudes such as believings, 
desirings, intendings, identified by their content: what is believed, desired, intended.” 
1945
 Searle outlines his position in Guttenplan. Guttenplan, ed.,  A Companion to the Philosophy of 
Mind, 544-557. 
1946
 John Searle, Minds, Brains and Science, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).  
1947
 Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain.  
1948
 Patterson, “Philosophy of Mind,” 569. 
1949
 Julian Baggini and Jeremy Stangroom, What Philosophers Think (London: Continuum, 2003), 
185. “One of the things we know... is that all of our mental processes are caused by processes in 
the brain. That’s the kind of starting point I can take when I work in the philosophy of mind.” 
1950
 This is so even if the distinction between mental and physical substances is misplaced at times. 
1951
 It is possible that a clarification of terminology is required: mental can be used synonymously 
with mind understood as the very source of human consciousness and autonomy. 
1952
 Terminology proposed by Churchland, “Consciousness”.   
1953
 B.J. Baars, A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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neural 
complexity leads 
to consciousness 
and executive 
control. 
 
D.A.Leopold and 
N.K.Logothetis 
(1999)
1955
  
W.Singer 
(2000)
1956
 
S.Greenfield 
(2008)
1957
 
 
consciousness 
arises from 
neuroscientific 
complexity 
Rationality and 
autonomous 
personhood 
arise from brain 
complexity. 
 
Accounts of 
mechanisms for 
executive 
control: the 
“global 
workspace 
account”, the 
“shifting 
coalitions” 
account, and the 
“synchrony” 
account .
1958
  
 
‘Compatibilism’ 
accounts for 
apparent 
freedom.
1959
 
understanding 
of the person 
endowed with 
both spiritual 
and material 
faculties.  
 
Haldane urges, 
“No 
epistemology 
without 
ontology”.
1960
  
 
Hylomorphism 
rejects the 
position that 
substances are 
either material 
or immaterial. 
Instead it posits 
the possibility of 
psycho-physical 
substances, with 
a nature capable 
of both physical 
and mental 
activity.
1961
 
Non reductive 
physiological 
accounts. 
These accounts 
take advantage 
of powerful 
recent imaging 
A.Damasio 
(1994)
 1962
 
(1999)
1963
  
(2003)
1964
 
Supported by 
quantities of 
neuroscientific 
research, 
Damasio’s 
attempts 
demonstrate the 
difficulty, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1954
 F. Crick and C. Koch, “Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness,” Seminars in the 
Neurosciences 2, (1990). 
1955
 D. A. Leopold and N. K. Logothetis, “Multistable phenomena: changing views in perception,” 
Trends in Cognitive Science 3, (1999). 
1956
 W. Singer, “Phenomenal awareness and consciousness from a neurobiological perspective,” in 
Neural Correlates of Consciousness, T. Metzinger ed. (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000).  
1957
 Susan Greenfield, I.D. The Quest for identity in the 21
st
 Century. 
1958
 The global workspace account posits a seat of consciousness in the brain. The shifting 
coalitions (Baars, 1988) suggests temporary networks underpinning consciousness. The synchrony 
account (Crick and Koch, 1990) which suggests synchronous firing of neurons is the key. This 
account lends itself to utilising brain imagery to localise higher function. For example, Crick in The 
Astonishing Hypothesis locates free will in the anterior cingulate region of the brain. 
1959
 This is the view, first proposed by Koch and Dennett, that free will and determinism are 
compatible, essentially free will is reduced to freedom to act. 
1960
 Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 57. This principle underpins the 
hylomorphic refutation of attempts to discuss executive control, qualia or consciousness without 
addressing the ontology of the substance. 
1961
 Haldane argues that an hylomorphic understanding of the person allows a richer model of 
human behaviour than the various alternative contemporary approaches to the philosophy of 
mind that are physicalist, or epiphenomenalist. He argues that these alternatives are both 
reductionist. He insists that form contributes order, that forms received play a decisive role in 
perception, and that intentional forms play a decisive role in action. 
1962
 Damasio, Descartes’ Error. 
1963
 Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens. Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.  
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techniques 
revealing the 
mechanisms of 
emotion and 
cognitive 
processing.     
J. LeDoux 
(1998)
1965
 
 
Damasio and 
LeDoux have 
developed 
arguments 
supporting the 
notion of a 
profound unity 
in the organism 
on materialistic 
assumptions.  
perhaps 
impossibility, of 
defending 
specific 
metaphysio-
logical 
conclusions 
about human 
nature in the 
absence of a 
concept of 
person. They 
demonstrate the 
need that mind-
body 
speculation 
must be 
supported by a 
metaphysically 
rich 
anthropology. 
1966
 
Functionalism. 
 
Functionalism It 
is “the view that 
mental states 
can be analysed 
in terms of their 
relationships to 
sensory inputs, 
behavioural 
inputs, and 
other mental 
states. Thus pain 
is not identical 
with a particular 
neuro-
physiological 
state, but with 
any state which 
is caused by 
injury and 
manifests itself 
in pain 
behaviour.”
 1967
   
 
Functionalism is 
more a family of 
Hilary Putnam 
(1968)
1970
  
J.Fodor 
(1968)
1971
 
N.Block 
(1978)
1972
 
 
Ryle seems to 
be a forerunner 
of functionalism 
which may be 
seen as a 
successor to 
behaviourism.  
Functionalism 
built on the 
insights of folk 
psychology. 
 
Functionalism is 
the orthodox 
view in 
contemporary 
philosophy of 
mind (going 
Functionalism 
allows mental 
states to be 
causes of 
behaviour.
1974
 
1975
 
 
Functionalism is 
a reassertion of 
the language of 
psychology. 
 
Mental states, 
while physically 
based, are not 
conceptually 
identified with 
the physical. The 
mental, while 
supervening on 
the physical, is 
not conceptually 
reducible to the 
physical.
1976
   
 
Critique of the  
functionalist 
approach 
observes that 
the focus is on 
the 
phenomenon of 
consciousness 
rather than on 
an articulation 
of its causes. 
Functionalism 
finds its origins 
in 
behaviourism.
1978
 (See above.) 
The focus is on 
black box inputs 
and outputs.   
 
Functionalism 
has much in 
common with 
hylomorphism.
1979 
  It grants  
                                                                                                                                                                 
1964
 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza. 
1965
 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain. 
1966
 See 5.2.1.1 and 5.2.1.2. 
1967
 Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 977. 
1970
 H. Putnam, “Brains and Behaviour” in Analytical Philosophy II,  R.J.Butler ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1968), 1-19. 
1971
 J. Fodor, Psychological Explanation (New York: Random House, 1968).  
1972
 Not all those who describe their approach as “functional” are necessarily materialist.  
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empirical 
models 
concerned with 
sensory inputs 
and behavioural 
outputs, rather 
than an 
understanding 
of mental 
activity.
1968
 
1969
 
back to Putnam 
and Fodor).
 1973
   
Functionalism 
comes in many 
forms. It 
developed 
primarily as a 
token physicalist 
theory.
 1977
   
the real 
existence of 
things, avoids 
treating mind as 
a substance and 
discusses 
causality in 
apparently non-
material terms.
 
1980
  
Computational 
functionalism.
1981
  
 
“According to 
this theory, 
mental states 
are complex 
symbols, and 
mental 
processes are 
computational 
processes. In 
short: the mind 
is a 
computer.”
1982
 
R.W. Sperry 
(1966)
1987
 
J. Fodor (1990) 
N. Block (1986 
and 1995)
1988
 
H.Putnam(1992)
1989
  
 
Computational 
Theory of Mind 
was the 
predominant 
This non 
reductive 
physicalist form 
of functionalism 
emphasises the 
reality of mental 
phenomena, 
consciousness 
and mental 
causation.
1991
 
1992
 An account 
that is 
An hylomorphic 
critique notes 
the lack of 
scientific 
foundation for 
emergentist 
presupposition. 
 
The hylomorphic 
responses to 
functionalism, 
above, also 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1974
 Putnam (1968) and Chihara and Fodor (1965). McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. Their 
position “appeals to the simplicity, plausibility, and predictive accuracy of an explanatory system as 
a whole”.
1974
 
1975
 Ned Block, “Consciousness” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2
nd
 ed., Richard L. Gregory ed. 
(Oxford: OUP, 2004).  Yet the adoption of an a priori materialist position by some functionalists, 
and a disregard for metaphysical considerations, lead to a deterministic reading of human action.  
In contrast with others of behaviourist lineage but on the basis of real world observations, 
functionalists do acknowledge the causal role that mental states play. Functionalism, in contrast to 
behaviourism, allows that mental states should be causes and effects.
 
       
1976
 Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 9. 
1978
 Block, “Consciousness”.   
1979
 “It is often said that Aristotle is the founder of functionalism because of his view that the 
function of an entity determines its form.” Cf Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth 
Century Philosophy, 977. Of course this is in the order of knowledge. Metaphysically, the reverse is 
true: the form of an entity determines its function. 
1968
 For example, functionalism seems unable to grapple with the notion of 1
st
 person experience.  
1969
 Functionalism shows little interest in the ontological questions.
 
 Cf Hilary Putnam in 
Guttenplan, ed.,  A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 513. It is telling that Putnam, after his 
repudiation of functionalism, has written that the “key elements of functionalism operate... within 
a seventeenth century perception of the mind”. 
1973
 Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 977. 
1977
 Patterson, “Philosophy of Mind”. In an early variant, the Australian Functionalists (Armstrong, 
Lewis and Smart) “used functionalist analyses to argue for the type identity theory. They regarded 
mental states as functionally specified physical states.” 
1980
 Nussbaum and Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 27-56. See Chapter 4. Prominent 
Aristotelian philosopher, Martha Nussbaum, and Putnam have jointly issued publications 
discussing what they describe as the functionalist aspect of hylomorphism. 
1981
 Roger Penrose, “Consciousness” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2
nd
 ed., Richard L. Gregory 
ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2004).  Roger Penrose classifies  the search for the neural correlates of 
consciousness (see above “Competition for executive control accounts”) under this category.  
1982
 Ravenscroft, Philosophy of Mind.  A beginner’s guide, 192. 
1987
 R.W. Sperry, “Mind, brain and humanist values,” Bulletin of Atomic Science 22, (1966). 
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“Brain 
physiology 
determines the 
mental effects” 
in this 
“interactionist” 
model “in which 
mental 
phenomena are 
described as 
…supervening, 
rather than 
intervening in 
the physiological 
process”. 
Consciousness is 
an “autonomous 
phenomena”.
1983
  
 
The mentalist 
view 
corresponds to 
the ascendency 
of cognitivism 
over materialist 
behaviourism in 
psychology in 
the 70s.
 1984
 
1985
 
1986
 
theory of mind 
from the mid 
70s to mid 80s.
 
1990
   
 
“emergentist, 
functionalist, 
interactionist 
and monistic.”
 
1993
     
 
Proponents 
contrast their 
position with 
both 
behaviourist 
materialism and 
dualism.  
 
In more recent 
years it has been 
influenced by 
computer 
development.
1994
 
Fodor and Block 
have 
investigated the 
challenge of 
qualia for 
functionalism. 
 
apply.  
 
References to 
neurobiology 
are 
characterised by 
non sequitur 
conclusions 
typically 
attributing 
consciousness to 
the complexities 
of neurobiology.
 
1995
 
1996
  
 
Computational 
functionalism is 
bereft of a 
metaphysical 
basis upon 
which to 
demonstrate 
freewill and 
causality. 
Ultimately, it 
appears open to 
reduction to 
determinism or 
dualism. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1988
 Ned Block, “On a confusion about the function of consciousness,” Behavioural and Brain 
Science 18, (1995): 227-47.  
1989
 Nussbaum and Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 27-56. See Chapter 4. 
1991
 Patterson,“Philosophy of Mind,” Chapter 12. Again, this is a most broad category. Not all those 
included would consider themselves materialist. 
1992 
Block, “Functionalism”. Putnam and Fodor “saw mental states in terms of an empirical 
computational theory of the mind” 
1983
 Sperry, “Consciousness and Causality”. 
1984
 Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 982. Mentalist 
understandings of consciousness are founded on neurobiological explanations.  “Mentalism treats 
meaning and concepts as psychic phenomena in the mind of individuals.” 
1985
 Armstrong, “Mind body problem: philosophical theory”. Mentalist theories emphasise the 
immediacy and certainty of the mind knowing itself in contrast with material things. 
1986
 Hilary Putnam in Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 513. Fodor’s work 
contributed to “The rehabilitation of mentalism, the conception of mental phenomena as inner 
causes, involved its detachment from the ‘Cartesian’ conception of mental phenomena as 
immaterial causes which were ‘inner’ in the sense of being private, of being subjective phenomena 
uniquely accessible to a single consciousness.”
 
Non reductive functionalism may include 
teleological approaches.  
1990
 Jerry Fodor The Language of Thought. New York: Thomas Crowell, 1975. 
1993
 Sperry, “Consciousness and Causality”. 
1994
 Ned Block, “Functionalism” in Guttenplan, ed.,  A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 
323.325. through Putnam (1967) who suggested mind to be analogous to software, and through 
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 Quantum 
indeterminism.  
 
This is an 
attempt to 
marry the 
physics of 
quantum theory 
to neural 
science in order 
to account for 
free will.  
 
H.P Stapp 
(1993)
1997
 
Roger Penrose 
(1994)
1998
 
J.Schwartz 
(2002)
1999
 
G.Vitiello 
(2002)
2000
  
J.Searle 
(2007)
2001
 
M.Gazzaniga 
(2011)
2002
 
 
Penrose 
proposes 
“Quantum 
gravitation 
coherence”.
2003
  
 
Other advocates 
adopt detailed 
analysis of 
neural 
structures to 
argue for laws of 
quantum 
mechanics and 
therefore of 
physical 
indeterminacy. 
 
Recently 
Penrose and 
Hameroff 
publicized their 
“quantum soul 
theory”.
2004
 
 
This position 
appears to be 
characterised by 
a misapplication 
of the principles 
of quantum 
physics to 
account for 
phenomena not 
reducible to the 
physical. The 
theory is based 
on imagination 
and assertion 
rather than 
weight of 
evidence.  
 
Physicalist 
emergent 
approaches 
must fail to 
demonstrate 
any physical and 
therefore 
determined 
basis for human 
freedom, the 
ability to know 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Block’s (1978) psychofunctionalism: “that the scientific nature of the mental consists not in 
anything biological, but in something organizational, analogous to computational structure.”  
1995
 Sperry, “Consciousness and Causality”. As for note above, this need not imply a position of 
determinism. For example “Thus the critical, multinested space time pattern properties of the 
neuronal infrastructure, as well as the mass-energy elements, must also be included in the causal 
account.” 
1996
 “A representation is conscious if it is broadcast on a global neuronal workspace.” Block, 
“Consciousness”. This position does not necessarily suggest physical determination but the exact 
meaning requires clarification. Note also: the underpinning emergent view is primarily based on an 
evolutionary development of the mind. Essentially it is materialist view, asserting that matter 
possesses undescribed mechanisms that account for the phenomena of consciousness.  
1997
 H.P. Stapp, “A quantum theory of the mind-brain interface,” in Mind, Matter, and Quantum 
Mechanics, (Berlin: Springer, 1993), 145–172. 
1998
 Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind (Oxford: OUP, 1994). 
1999
 Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain. 
2000
G. Vitiello, “Dissipative quantum brain dynamics,” in No Matter, Never Mind, ed. K. Yasue, et al. 
(Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2002), 43–61. 
2001
 J. Searle, Freedom and neurobiology. Reflections on free will, language and political power (NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2007). 
2002
 Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain.  
2003
 Churchland, “Consciousness”. “’Quantum gravitation coherence’ occurs within the 
microtubules of the brain’s axonal fibres  as the hallmark or essence of consciousness, on grounds 
that blocking such coherence may explain how anaesthetics work, while the achievement of such 
quantum-level coherences may explain the existence of sound but non algorithmic mathematical 
knowledge.” 
2004
 The hypothesis that quantum effects within neuronal microtubules constitute the soul. 
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reality and 
universals, and 
to form love- 
choices. The 
notion of 
participation in 
being remains 
an insuperable 
obstacle for 
materialist 
indeterminacy. 
 New mysterian 
account  
 
The term harks 
back to the “old 
mysterians”, 
supposedly the 
Cartesians, who 
proposed 
nonnatural 
solutions 
without 
adequate 
explanation. 
Colin McGinn 
(1989)
2005
 
“New 
mysterianism is 
a postmodern 
position 
designed to 
drive a railroad 
spike through 
the heart of 
scientism” 
2006
 
 
The position 
argues that the 
hard problem of 
consciousness 
cannot be 
resolved 
because we can 
never know 
another’s 
subjective 
experiences.
2007
   
As the New 
mysterian 
account is 
essentially an 
emergent view 
of 
consciousness, 
the hylomorphic 
responses to 
emergentism 
are applicable.   
 
Ultimately 
qualia, in a 
physicalist 
account, cannot 
escape the 
determinism of 
their origins.  
 
Haldane insists 
that 
preoccupation 
with the study 
of qualia must 
not take priority 
over the 
ontological 
questions. See 
above. 
Panpsychism  
 
 
 
"The view that 
the basic 
physical 
constituents of 
the universe 
have mental 
properties."
2008
   
 
William James 
(1900s)  
Thomas Nagel 
(1974)
2009
 
 
Panpsychism 
has ignited 
interest in 
A form 
of property 
dualism 
following four 
premises: 
materialism; 
non 
reductionism; 
Nagel’s concern 
has been to 
provide an 
effective 
refutation of 
physicalism.
 2012
   
 
Hylomorphic 
                                                          
2005
 C. McGinn, Mental Content (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). 
2006
 O.J. Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered  (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992), 10,131.   
2007
 Nevertheless, as there is no possibility of studying consciousness from outside the system, 
there is a certain common sense in these insights.    
2008
 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 181. 
2009
 T. Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?” Philosophical Review 83, (1974): 435-50. 
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consciousness 
and qualia. It 
was to some 
extent a 
reaction to the 
materialist 
identity theories 
that were 
dismissive of the 
significance of 
subjective 
experience. 
realism; and non 
emergence.
2010
 
It is a universal 
mental particle 
theory. 
 
Nagel 
postulated non-
mental, non-
physical 
properties, 
“proto mental 
properties” in 
response to the 
difficulty of 
understanding 
subjective 
experience 
2011
 
 
critique would 
question the 
possibility of 
discussion of 
rationality, as a 
prerequisite to 
certain mental 
experience, 
within a 
functionalist and 
essentially 
materialist 
paradigm.
2013
 
 
As a non 
reductive 
materialist 
position 
responses above 
apply.  
4. Ontological anti reductionism
2014
 
Dualism Dualism is “the 
philosophical 
theory that 
supposes that 
the mind is 
essentially 
independent of 
the brain, 
though mental 
events run 
parallel with 
physical brain 
events”.
2015
  
K.Popper and 
J.Eccles 
(1977)
2016
  
J.Foster 
(1996)
2017
  
 
Following 
Descartes other 
figures modified 
the theory. 
Malebranche 
developed 
“occasionalism”
Descartes 
proposed 
separate 
spiritual and 
material 
substances.  
“Mind and body 
interact and 
ideas represent 
material things 
without 
resembling 
them”; “God 
 “The error of 
the Cartesian is 
to suppose that 
non-physical 
attributes imply 
an exclusively 
incorporeal 
substance as 
bearer.”
2021
 
2022
 
 
Cartesian 
dualism 
represents an 
                                                                                                                                                                 
2012
 Cf Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?” 437. Nagel argued “If physicalism is to be defended, the 
phenomenological features (of experience) must themselves be given a physical account. But 
when we examine their subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible” His approach 
respects the hylomorphic principle that only like properties may be compared. 
2010
 The view of Thomas Nagel.  
2011
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. 
2013
 Nagel is preoccupied with demonstrating the reality of experience rather than the reality of 
being itself. He chooses not to discuss key metaphysical questions.  Strawson’s argument that 
person is more fundamental than a person’s mind or body is relevant here.   
2014
 “Ontological antireductionism holds… that certain higher-order phenomena cannot even in 
principle be fully explained by physics, but require additional principles that are not entailed by the 
laws governing the basic constituents. With respect to biology, the question is whether the 
existence and operation of highly complex functionally organized systems, and the appearance of 
self-replicating systems in the universe, can be accounted for in terms of particle physics alone, or 
whether they require independent principles of order.” T Nagel, “Reductionism and 
Antireductionism” Novartis Foundation Symposium 213, (1998):3-10. 
2015
 “Dualism” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2
nd
 ed., Richard L. Gregory ed.  (Oxford: OUP, 
2004), 271. 
2016
 K. Popper and J.Eccles, The Self and its Brain (Springer, New York, 1977). 
2017
 J. Foster, “A defence of dualism” in The Case for Dualism, J. Smythies and J. Beloff 
ed.(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1989). 
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2018
; Leibnitz 
developed a 
theory of 
harmony among 
non interacting 
monads; 
Spinoza within a 
one substance 
view proposed  
a paradigm of 
property.
 2019
 
 
makes these 
things 
happen”.
2020
 
 
Cartesian 
dualism has 
difficulty in 
accounting for 
sensation, 
knowledge and 
causality.   
 
 
essentially anti-
Aristotelian view 
of the material 
world.
2023
   
 
Descartes’ view 
of the mind as a 
substance, an 
object, was a 
category 
mistake.
2024 
“There is no a 
priori reason to 
think that the 
mind is 
intimately 
related to the 
brain and 
Aristotle did not 
associate them.”
 
2025
 
2026
   
Attribute 
Dualism  
 
 
Essentially 
attribute 
dualism 
proposes we 
comprehend the 
same reality 
whether under 
mental or 
Spinoza 
(1677)
2028
 
Strawson 
(1959)
2029
 
Thomas Nagel 
(1986)
2030
 
David Chalmers 
(1996)
2031
 
The higher 
region of the 
brain is a 
physical 
substance “with 
some non 
physical 
properties”.
2032
  
The “neo 
dualist” 
approach may 
cite the “body or 
some part of it, 
ie the brain, as 
being that with 
which this 
                                                                                                                                                                 
2021
 Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 58 Haldane argues that “a proper 
understanding of substantiality should lead one to reject the idea that a wholly physical particular 
could be the bearer of intrinsic attributes that are non-physical.` 
2022
 Anscombe insisted philosophy must once and for all discard Cartesian ways of thinking about 
matter. “The divide between matter and mind was drawn differently by the ancients and 
medievals from the way it is drawn in modern times. So far as I know, the source of the new way 
of drawing the line is Descartes….” She nominated the very passage where Descartes made the 
mistake of identifying brain and mind in his Second Meditation. G. E. M. Anscombe, Collected 
papers of GEM Anscombe, Vol 2, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind. Republished as Human 
Life, Action and Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), Chapter 1. 
2018
 Occasionalism: in which the mind and body do not interact but God makes them appear to. 
2019
 Richard A. Watson, “Dualism” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Robert Audi ed. 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1995). 
2020
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. Descartes held that extension is the essence of the 
physical and so minds are not physical. He held that two way causation without any physical basis 
connects our minds to our brains. 
2023
 Armstrong, “Mind body problem: philosophical theory”. This involves rejection of teleological 
considerations, with bodies operating as machines according to physical principles. Ironically 
Descartes opens the door to a materialist account of the mind. 
2024
 Ryle and Anscombe both argued this. Furthermore an hylomorphic critique points out the 
mistake of attributing efficient causality to representations in the intellect and guards against a 
materialisation of the process. 
2025
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. 
2026
 McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597.Ryle argued that mind, while a noun, is not an object, 
and so Descartes was confusing discourse about body with that of mind, which is to have 
capacities and dispositions. 
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physical 
attributes. 
 
There are many 
forms of dual 
aspect theory.
 
Double aspect 
theory is in fact 
a family of 
theories: 
universal or 
restricted, 
mixed mental 
particle 
theories.
2027
  
 
 
 
Attribute 
dualism traces 
back to Spinoza 
who proposed a 
single eternal 
substance with 
attributes 
including 
extension and 
thought; 
ordinary things 
are modes of 
this substance. 
Spinoza’s theory 
may also be 
seen as a form 
of panpsychism. 
 
Attribute 
dualism adopts 
a “special 
particle theory” 
that 
incorporates a 
restricted mixed 
mental particle 
theory: “that 
some basic 
constituents of 
things, which 
are at least 
spatially located, 
have mental 
properties, but 
not all”.
 2033
 
2034
  
 
  
subject is 
associated”
 
thus 
permitting “a 
psychophysical 
subject of 
thought and 
action”.
 2035
  
 
In contemporary 
philosophy of 
mind, the 
attribute dualist 
appears to 
underestimate 
the notion of 
participation 
and so struggles 
to offer a 
plausible 
explanation for 
rationality.
 2036
   
Non dualist, 
dual aspect, 
social being 
A non reductive 
account holding 
that human 
beings are truly 
free and that 
they operate in 
a social context.  
Gillett (2001)
 2037
 There are 
aspects of an 
analytic 
approach that 
avoids the 
metaphysical.  
 
Gillett holds that 
the explanation 
Malo’s critique 
of this position 
centres on free 
action as not to 
be conceived as 
external. It is 
not a “freedom 
from without”, 
but rather “from 
                                                                                                                                                                 
2028
 B. Spinoza, Ethics (1677).  
2029
 P. Strawson, Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959). 
2030
 T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
2031
 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory. 
2032
 Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 58. 
2027
 Leopold Stubenberg, "Neutral Monism".  “Its relationship to neutral monism is therefore 
difficult to discern. All versions of the theory appear to be committed to the view that there are 
certain substances—god or nature (Spinoza), persons (Strawson), body or brain (Thomas Nagel), 
information (a view explored by David Chalmers)—that are intrinsically neither material nor 
mental.” 
2033
 Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 17. 
2034
 Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 17. While this position is not among the 
traditional responses to mind body problem it appears to hold currency in certain neuroscientific 
circles 
2035
 Haldane, “Incarnational anthropology,” 78. 
2036
 This challenge was unanswered also by Spinoza whose one substance view was ultimately an 
unsatisfying understanding of rationality. Cf David Papineau, “Consciousness” in Oxford 
Companion to the Mind, 2
nd
 ed., Richard L. Gregory ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2004), who notes that 
attribute dualism requires us to make a false choice of either denying dualism or identifying 
conscious experiences with the neural causes of behaviour.  
2037
 G. R. Gillett, “Free will and events in the brain,” Journal of Mind and Behaviour 22, 3 (2001): 
287-310. (Available at www.btinternet.com/~Negativecharisma/freewill/gillet1.pdf.) Gillett’s 
approach is to link freedom with the ability to accord one’s behaviour with socal rules: in a sense 
this is another perspective on freedom shown in one’s capacity to carry out the will of another, or 
the beloved.  
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of human action 
lies in the the 
person’s mental 
acts. He argues 
that there are 
two kinds of 
reality: physical 
and psychic. 
Psychic is 
constituted not 
by mental 
processes but by 
the form of the 
human action in 
a social context. 
within”, 
depending 
“ontologically 
on the 
person”.
2038
  
Non dualist, 
dual aspect, 
hylomorphism. 
A non reductive 
account holding 
that, in the 
person, the 
material is 
animated by a 
non-material 
principle, and 
that operations 
and activity, 
both mental and 
physical, are 
carried out by 
this ensouled 
body. 
Aristotelian-
Thomistic 
philosophers of 
mind. In recent 
years, Haldane 
and Nussbaum 
among others.  
See extended 
discussion in 
1.5.  
 
 
Hylomorphism 
provides a “third 
way”, a most 
attractive 
solution that 
allows for a non 
dualist, dual 
aspect, 
alternative, 
while allowing 
for the non-
material 
dimension of 
human nature. 
 
  
                                                          
2038
 Antonio Malo, “Three theories about freedom” pre publication manuscript, 145. 
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Table 2.1 
Search Process 
 
Search 
number 
Date Database Key words 
 
Numerous other searches 
were conducted in 
preparation, identifying 
words that were most 
effective in the searches.
2039
  
Number 
of 
studies  
Number 
of 
relevant  
results 
1 21.8.08 Medline Learning. Plasticity. Synaptic 
strengthening.   
18 9 
2 10.2.09 Scopus Neuroscience. Plasticity. 
Habitual behaviour. 
20 12 
3 10.2.09 Scopus Neuroplasticity. Learning. 
Emotion. 
23 1 
4 10.02.09 Medline Neuroscience. Neuronal 
plasticity. Behaviour. 
27 3 
5 10.02.09 Medline Neuronal plasticity. 
Learning. Habits.  
11 2 
6 22.04.09 Scopus Neuroplasticity OR Plasticity 
AND Moral development.  
82 12 
7 22.04.09 Scopus Neuroplasticity OR Plasticity 
AND cognition AND Habit 
AND Moral 
12 3 
8 22.04.09 Scopus Neuroplasticity OR Plasticity 
AND Cognition AND Habit 
188 19 
9 22.04.09 Scopus Plasticity AND Executive 
Function AND Moral 
3 2 
10 22.04.09 Scopus Plasticity AND Personality 
AND Neuroscience AND 
Habit 
13 4 
11 19.10.12 Pubmed Neuroscience AND Emotion 
regulation (Recent reviews 
only) 
82   7 
12 19.10.12 Pubmed Basal Ganglia AND Emotion 
regulation 
67 3 
13 19.10.12 Pubmed Experience AND Plasticity 75 5 
 
 
  
                                                          
2039
 Prior to settling on searches of 10.2.09 and 22.04.09 I conducted extensive trial searches with 
further key words: procedural learning, automatisation, automaticity, goal directed actions, mirror 
neurons, virtue, emotion, emotion regulation, neuropsychology, attention.  
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Table 2.2 
Systems for sensitive periods of development 
 
Principal sources:  Arden and Linford (2009); Coon (1997); Kessels and Malinow (2009); 
Knudson (2008); Stevens (2008). 
 
Prima facie association with 
development and exercise of 
virtue 
Principal associated brain 
areas 
Discussion proceeds from 
overview, and thence to 
higher brain areas, to 
subcortical structures, the BG 
and limbic structures. 
Principal pathways and 
mechanisms.  
 
 The term “sensitive 
periods” denotes a 
developmental window of 
opportunity, whereby 
there is an enhanced 
capacity for plastic change 
and learning in response 
to experience, emotional 
content, or novelty. 
 Of particular interest in 
the field of virtue 
education are sensitive 
periods found in relation 
to affection, early 
experience, imitation, and 
adoption of new 
behaviours during early 
years. First impressions 
are lasting impressions. 
Experiences during 
upbringing, particularly 
when the stimuli are 
associated with emotional 
significance, can be 
virtually indelible.  
 Windows of opportunity 
in sensitive periods vary:  
for imprinting the window 
is open only for a few 
hours; for language, for 
years. Responsiveness to 
maternal affection is 
largely lost after the 
earliest years. The 
security of affection, in 
turn, facilitates other 
aspects of learning from 
parents.   
 
 Sensitive periods of 
development occur across 
all neural structures and 
pathways.  
 Forms of sensitive period 
learning relevant to virtue 
education are closely 
associated with 
attentional systems. 
Learning in critical periods 
is effortless because the 
nucleus basalis presents 
as active throughout 
during these periods. The 
nucleus basalis, and the 
attention system in which 
it plays a critical part have 
been described as “the 
modulatory control 
system of plasticity”. 
(See Table 2.9 Attentional 
systems.) 
 The relationship between 
sensitive periods and 
cortical development is 
much documented.  
 The amygdala is 
particularly active in 
mediating early 
attachment relationships, 
and reaction to stress and 
non conscious emotional 
memories.  
 
 During the early stages of 
neuronal development, 
guidance mechanisms are 
particularly active: 
astrocyte, and associated 
molecular guidance cues 
of migrating neurons and 
production of growth 
(trophic) factors;  
 Various mechanisms are 
directly involved in 
sensitive period learning. 
Experience tunes both 
excitatory and inhibitory 
connections in a largely 
non reversible manner 
and according to Hebbian 
principles. NMDA 
receptors triggering gene 
transcription associated 
with LTP and LTD
 
are 
integral to the 
mechanisms of the 
sensitive periods and 
developmental learning. 
Also, BDNF, hypothalamic 
oxytocin, DA and 5-HT are 
implicated.   
 Systems associated with 
responsiveness to 
affection are implicated in 
sensitive periods. 
 Attentive mothering leads 
to gene transcripted 
cellular changes in the 
hippocampus reducing 
basal levels of 
glucocorticoids and 
abolishing thereby anxiety 
and fearfulness. The end 
of the sensitive period is 
triggered sensory input 
612 
 
and possibly by 
myelination.  
 Neurotrophins  
 Emotional arousal, for 
example in the positive 
affect produced by sound 
mothering, appears to 
promote synaptic 
plasticity in memory 
promoting learning. 
Mechanisms include 
release of NE.  
 Attentional mechanisms 
operate in conjunction 
with the great range of 
mechanisms of plasticity 
associated with sensitive 
periods of development 
 
  
613 
 
 
Table 2.3 
Overview of the numerous systems and mechanisms of plasticity operating at the cellular 
and molecular level. 
 
Principal sources: Butz (2009); Graybiel (2008). 
Prima facie association with 
development and exercise of 
virtue 
Principal associated brain 
areas 
Discussion proceeds from 
overview, and thence to 
higher brain areas, to 
subcortical structures, the BG 
and limbic structures. 
Principal pathways and 
mechanisms.  
 
 
 The brain’s virtually 
ubiquitous capacity for 
plastic change permits the 
various forms of learning, 
including the learning of 
good habits.  
 Plastic changes are shown 
to be triggered by neural 
activity itself. Hence 
repeated experience lays 
down consolidated 
pathways whereby 
previous behaviours are 
more easily revisited. 
 Plastic changes provide a 
neural explanation for the 
phenomenon of habit. 
Furthermore, freely 
chosen behaviours and 
activities are self-
reinforcing. Prior choices 
are more easily replicated.   
 Forms of structural 
plasticity dependent on 
gene expression bring 
about permanent neural 
changes, and potentially 
new behaviours and a 
modified personality.  
 Plasticity is evident 
throughout the cortical 
and subcortical areas of 
the human brain, 
including areas of the 
brain associated with 
emotional regulation and 
reward systems: most 
notably areas of the PFC, 
the limbic system and the 
BG, areas central to the 
changes evident in the 
acquisition of virtue.   
 See also: 2.4.7; 2.5.4; 
2.7.3. 
 Structural plasticity is 
ubiquitously present in 
the mature human brain.
 
(See Table 2.15 Summary 
of mechanisms for 
neuronal structural 
plasticity as presented 
throughout Chapter 2.) 
 Developmental plasticities 
allow neural development 
driven by for timely inputs. 
In the character 
development of a young 
child,  training in 
moderation of gratification 
and endurance of 
difficulties is more easily 
learned.  
 Activity dependent 
plasticity is present across 
the cortex, in subcortical, 
limbic, and lower brain 
areas, and at the 
neuromuscular synapse.   
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Table 2.4 
Systems for learning 
 
Principal sources: Ito (2001); LeDoux (2001); Manns and Hichenbaum (2008);  Pollak (2005); 
Siegal and Sapru (2006); Waxham (2008); Wickens (2009). 
 
Prima facie association with 
development and exercise of 
virtue 
Principal associated brain 
areas 
Discussion proceeds from 
overview, and thence to 
higher brain areas, to 
subcortical structures, the BG 
and limbic structures. 
Principal pathways and 
mechanisms.  
 
 
 Learning denotes 
knowledge acquired 
through experience, or 
changed behaviour as a 
response to experience. 
Learning may be either 
conscious or unconscious.   
 Learning and memory are 
key processes by which 
environment and 
experience alter 
behaviour.  
 Systems implicated in 
general learning will also 
be implicated in moral 
learning.  
 Virtue is a form of 
experiential learning. 
Moral learning, moral 
“education”, is central to 
the development of 
virtue, and in particular, to 
the development of 
conscience, an aspect of 
the virtue of prudence. 
 Growth of intrinsic 
motivation over external 
reward as automaticity is 
developed accords with 
view that virtue is carried 
out for its own sake.  
 Development of 
automaticity is intrinsice 
to virtue. That DA release 
associated with rewarding 
outcomes facilitates 
learning, and that reward 
paradigms convert over 
time to automaticity in 
the BG suggest a central 
role for reward systems in 
learning of at least some 
 Numerous brain centres 
are implicated in learning, 
including:  hippocampus 
(initially implicated in 
classical conditioning but 
now known to play a 
major role in filing explicit 
memory); cerebellum 
(critical for long term 
retention of the learned 
response); striatum 
(procedural and reward 
learning); amygdala 
(emotional memories); 
cortex (long term 
memories).
 
 
 The roles of the cortex 
and of the BG are most 
significant for this study. 
The ventral striatum is 
associated with emotional 
and reward learning; the 
dorsal striatum lays down 
memory for motor habits 
and instructs the PFC in S-
R situations. The cortex 
(most especially areas of 
PFC, association areas, 
and the medial temporal 
lobe) plays a role in many 
forms of memory. The 
networks of the major 
learning systems include 
cerebral cortex.
 
 
 
 See 2.3 Neural bases for 
learning and memory. 
 Forms of functional and 
structural neuronal 
plasticities underpin 
mechanisms of learning. 
Forms of implicit learning 
such as fear and operant 
conditioning, classical 
conditioning, habituation, 
and sensitization utilise 
various mechanisms 
varying synaptic strength. 
For example, there may 
be decreases or increases 
in synaptic strength 
following changed 
transmitter release or 
presynaptic facilitation, 
associated changes in the 
dendritic tree, etc.  
 Explicit learning, tends to 
utilise forms of LTD 
mediating longer term 
changes.  Learning 
associated with LTP and 
LTD is mediated by NMDA 
receptors, coexisting with 
A receptors, activated by 
L-Glutamate. 
 DA is a key mediator of 
emotion and reward 
associated learning 
throughout the limbic, 
striatal and cortical 
regions. Various other 
neurotransmitters and 
modulators also effect 
learning. 
 ACh mediates learning at 
the neuromuscular 
synapse as well as vivid 
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forms of volitional 
behaviours associated 
with virtue. 
fearful memories in the
 
nucleus basalis.
 
 
 Forms of procedural 
learning, involving 
increased automaticity 
may develop from prior 
goal directed actions. This 
appears to be a pattern 
associated with habit 
learning: A-O paradigms 
transform to S-R 
paradigms with over 
learning.
  
Automaticity 
takes over with 
accompanying changes 
from external to intrinsic 
motivation.  
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Table 2.5  
Memory systems 
 
Principal sources: Alvarez et al. (2007); Arden and Linford (2009); Bailey and Chen (1983); 
Bear (2007); Bechara et al. (2000); Butz et al. (2009); Byrne (2008); Chistiakova and Volgushev 
(2009); Costa-Mattioli (2008); Da Cunha et al. (2009); Desmurget et al. (2007); Engert and 
Bonhoeffer (1999); Deutch and Roth (2008);  Floyer-Lea and  Matthews (2008); Froemke et al. 
(2007); Lynch (2004); Manns and Hichenbaum (2008); Marieb and Hoehn (2010); McGaugh 
(2004); Pastalkova et al. (2006); Pasupathy and Miller (2005); Roesch and Schoenbaum (2006); 
Romero et al. (2008); Squire et al. (2008); Stranahan and Mattson (2008); Tapia and Lichtman, 
(2008); Tomita et al (1999); Tully et al. (2003); Vaynman and Gomez-Pinilla (2005); Waxham 
(2008);  Wickens (2009); Whitlock (2006); Yasumatsu et al. (2008). 
 
Prima facie association with 
development and exercise of 
virtue 
Principal associated brain 
areas 
Discussion proceeds from 
overview, and thence to 
higher brain areas, to 
subcortical structures, the BG 
and limbic structures. 
Principal pathways and 
mechanisms.  
 
 
 Learning and memory are 
key processes by which 
environment and 
experience alter 
behaviour.  
 Memory is the process of 
encoding, storage and 
retrieval of knowledge 
acquired through 
experience.   
 Memory systems are 
functionally implicit to 
learning, to response to 
reward and emotion, to 
habit formation, to goal 
election, and all cognitive 
function.  
 Memory is a functional 
prerequisite for the  
exercise of virtue: 
memory of past 
behaviours, of reward, of 
contextual and emotional 
resonances, and of 
principles of right and 
wrong, all have relevance. 
 Mechanisms of non-
declarative memory 
appear to facilitate the 
ease of practice and the 
inherent motivational 
rewards in virtue, while 
during the more arduous 
process of acquisition of 
virtue, declarative 
 Memory is distributed 
through cortical and lower 
brain areas. Actual 
behaviour is supported by 
multiple memory 
systems. Memory may be 
non-declarative (implicit 
and procedural) or 
declarative or episodic 
(conscious and 
recollective); it may be 
long term, intermediate, 
short term, or working 
memory, an even more 
transient form of short 
term memory. 
 Long term non-
declarative procedural 
memory is located in BG 
in association with 
cerebellum and 
neocortex. Memory in the 
striatum instructs the PFC 
with respect to S-R 
situations. Long term non-
declarative emotional 
memory is dependent on 
amygdala which 
associates rewards and 
punishments with 
particular cues. Long term 
non-declarative motor 
memory is distributed in 
conditioned reflexes 
dependent upon 
cerebellum.  
 See 2.3 Neural bases for 
learning and memory. 
 The numerous 
mechanisms of plasticity 
are at the basis of 
memory. 
  LTP and LTD appear to be 
mechanisms in the cortex 
and hippocampus 
associated with long term 
memory storage. 
Feedback loops, and 
permanent loss of axonal 
input are further 
attractive mechanisms for 
information storage. 
 Further mechanisms for 
consolidation of 
memories include: 
synaptic homeostasis; 
use-induced plasticities 
another;and BDNF is 
implicated in converting 
short term memories to 
long term memories.
 
 
 Neural stem cells 
persisting in regions near 
ventricular layers 
including the 
hippocampus are 
implicated in mechanisms 
for memory and learning. 
 There is remarkably 
complex interplay of 
brain areas in both short 
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memory plays a more 
significant role. 
 Memory is enhanced in 
the presence of emotion 
that is not excessively 
intense. That affection 
enhances memory 
establishes an early 
childhood facilitation. 
 Long term declarative 
memory is based in the 
median temporal lobe and 
the medial diencephalon, 
known as the 
hippocampal memory 
system.  
 Memory in the cortex is 
highly plastic. OFC is richly 
connected to other 
cortical areas and to the 
limbic system mediating 
emotional memory. 
 Hippocampal memory is 
important for both spatial 
and non-spatial learning, 
and is rapidly acquired by 
facilitating novel 
associations. The 
hippocampus initially acts 
as retrieval system for 
information in widespread 
areas of neocortex and 
facilities ongoing cortical 
plasticity.
 
Hippocampal 
plasticity is supplanted by 
cortical plasticity over 
time,
 
mediated by the 
striatum.
 
 
 Cerebellar memory is 
involved in motor reflex 
learning.
 
 
 
and long term learning. 
Short term memory is 
possibly mediated by 
virtually instantaneous 
spine growth, and 
mechanisms of rapid spine 
assembly (typically 20 
mins) where modifications 
can be virtually 
instantaneous.  
 Activation of stored 
memories depends on 
PFC – temporal cortex 
connection.
 
Working 
memory in neocortex 
involves some form of 
synaptic facilitation 
possibly based on 
reverberating circuits. 
Short term memory in PFC 
appears to depend on 
dopaminergic receptors.
 
 
 Emotional memory is laid 
down by NE mediated 
plasticity principally in the 
BLA. Intentional recall is 
managed by 
hippocampus, which is 
subject to cortical 
direction. 
 Interconnections between 
the PFC, the medial 
temporal lobe, and 
hippocampus appear 
implicated in working 
memory, which is linked 
to problem solving and 
planning.  
 The role of the BG in 
action selection and 
storage of non declarative 
memories is mediated by 
convergent projections, 
synchronised by the 
timing of ACh release by 
giant cholinergic aspiny 
neurons, which are 
tonically active. 
 Sleep is shown to create a 
context for Hebbian and 
non-Hebbian 
consolidation of memory.  
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Table 2.6 
Systems for imitation and empathy 
 
Principal sources: Arden and Linford (2009); Byrne (2008); Carr and Jacoboni et al. (2003); 
Jacoboni et al. (1999); Nitschke et al. (2003); Pollak (2005); Schore (2001); Rizzolatti G et al. 
(2009).  
 
Prima facie association with 
development and exercise of 
virtue 
Principal associated brain 
areas 
Discussion proceeds from 
overview, and thence to 
higher brain areas, to 
subcortical structures, the BG 
and limbic structures. 
Principal pathways and 
mechanisms.  
 
 Imitation is one of the 
core processes for 
learning from the 
environment and from 
the example of others. 
The neural basis for this 
is now increasingly well 
described and provides 
an explanation for the 
ease of acquisition of 
virtuous behaviours by 
children.  
 Imitation and empathy 
are related at the level 
of neural systems. 
Plasticity in the systems 
for empathetic response 
appears integral to the 
development of 
sensitivity for the rights 
and needs of others, and 
an understanding of the 
consequences of one’s 
actions, which appear to 
be are at the core of the 
virtue of justice.  
 Effective emotional 
modulation of 
deliberation is essential 
for sound reasoning 
particularly in areas 
requiring empathy with 
others, understanding of 
others viewpoints etc, 
and TOM.
 
 
 The imitation 
mechanisms, mirror 
neurons, are present in 
the left frontal 
operculum area (Broca’s 
area) and the right 
anterior parietal cortex. 
Empathy and imitation 
involve activity in fronto-
parietal, the superior 
temporal cortex, the 
amygdala, and insula. 
 OFC, at the apex of a 
limbic circuit connecting 
the VMPFC, AC gyrus, 
amygdala and temporal 
pole, plays a major role 
processing appreciation 
of moral consequences 
of behaviour, and 
assessing interpersonal 
context.  Activation of 
the OFC produces warm 
and loving feelings, to 
the extent that the OFC 
can overwhelm 
consciousness with these 
feelings.  
 Left and right OFC 
appear to differ in 
function, the right 
decodes mental states of 
others and is associated 
with empathy with 
others; the left reasons 
about mental states. The 
right orbitofrontal and 
right anterior insula 
cortices are components 
of a pathway that 
integrates bodily 
 Increasingly, the 
mechanisms of imitation 
and empathy are being 
linked to the activity of 
mirror neurons. The rapid 
development of speech 
appears to reflect the 
maturation of the 
association cortical areas 
indicating that imitative 
systems enjoy dense 
cortical interconnections. 
 There is now abundant 
evidence that 
developmental realities 
as well as learned 
realities (including moral 
realities such as how one 
exercises one’s freedom), 
govern effective 
consideration of the 
consequences of actions. 
Grey matter reaches a 
maximum at 10-12 years 
of age in parietal lobe, 11-
12 in frontal lobe, and 16-
17 in temporal lobe.  In 
contrast to grey matter, 
white matter maturation 
continues throughout 
childhood and 
adolescence, and into 
early 20s for males.  
Myelination tends to 
progress from lower to 
higher brain areas. Higher 
cortical areas are last to 
develop. All this bears 
significantly on the 
capacity to consideration 
of consequences of one’s 
actions, for example on 
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responses with 
attentional and 
emotional states.   The 
right limbic system is key 
to complex attachment 
dynamics and 
interpersonal coping.  
 BG are acknowledged to 
have a key role in control 
and modulation of social 
behaviours and may be 
integral to a progressive 
evaluation process of 
behaviours. “Current 
findings are consistent 
with a role for incoming 
afferent input in 
selectively stabilizing 
functional synapses and 
in eliminating or 
suppressing inactive 
contacts.” (Byrne, 2008.) 
 
rational consideration of 
risks, and of the impact of 
one’s actions on others.  
This area appears closely 
associated with the 
development of empathy 
towards others.  
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Table 2.7 
Systems for habit formation 
 
Principal sources: Beretta et al. (2008); Byrne (2008); Doyon et al. (2009); Marieb and Hoehn 
(2010); Martin (2003); Wise and Shadmehr (2002); Yin and Knowlton (2006). 
 
Prima facie association with 
development and exercise of 
virtue 
Principal associated brain 
areas 
 
Discussion proceeds from 
overview, and thence to 
higher brain areas, to 
subcortical structures, the BG 
and limbic structures. 
Principal pathways and 
mechanisms.  
 
 
 Virtues may be 
understood as freely 
chosen automatised 
behaviours.  
 Strictly speaking habit 
learning refers to the 
spectrum of automatized 
behaviours supported by 
the BG.  
 Mechanisms of habit 
learning also offer an 
explanation for the 
phenomenon of 
behaviours that appear to 
remain robust in the 
absence of immediate 
rewards. We have seen 
immediately above that 
emotional regulation and 
reward processing are 
interdependent. Reward 
processing and habit 
formation also are 
interlinked systems, with 
reward processing 
essential in the early 
stages of laying down 
habits. This accords with 
the view that extrinsic 
motivation assists initially 
in establishing patterns of 
good behaviour; in time 
this is transformed into 
forms of intrinsic 
motivation with the 
development of a degree 
of automaticity. 
 The brain regions and 
pathways associated with 
the BG seem to offer a 
significant key to 
 Brain regions associated 
with habit formation are 
areas of the BG as well as 
the posterior parts of the 
cerebellum, the non 
primary motor cortex, and 
the PPC. Via the 
oculomotor and 
skeletomotor limbic loop, 
the BG play an integral 
role in management of 
motor responses to 
cortical direction. 
 BG are now seen as a 
centre, not only for 
subconscious facilitation 
of habits, but also 
mediating deliberate 
attention, and limbic 
modulation of cognition 
and action. Hence it is an 
area critical for learning, 
cognition and behavioural 
control. It appears to have 
a key role both in habit 
formation, and in the 
pursuit of complex, 
purposeful, behaviour 
patterns. It may be argued 
that individual goal 
directed behaviours, on 
repetition become 
automated and less 
reward dependent, but 
nevertheless  they remain 
purposeful, thereby 
fulfilling requirements for 
virtuous action. That 
actions are automatic, 
should not be taken to 
mean that they are less 
conscious. The relevance 
 Procedural memory 
consolidation is 
associated with the 
reward systems of the 
brain. DA release from the 
SN is believed to trigger 
memory formation in the 
BG. There is also evidence 
for emotional facilitation 
of memory in the BG. 
 Striatal habit formation is 
subject to cortical 
management via the 
striatal-cortical pathway. 
The dorsal pars (dorsal 
striatum and SN) lays 
down memory for motor 
habits, actions and 
outcomes, playing a key 
role in S-R habit learning. 
It receives afferents from 
associative (more 
implicated in A-O learning) 
and sensorimotor 
domains. The caudate 
nucleus receives 
information from cortical 
sensory, motor and 
integrative areas. The 
caudate is an area of the 
“associative striatum” and 
receives inputs from 
association cortices. The 
putamen is regarded as an 
area of the sensorimotor 
striatum. DA 
neuromodulation inputs 
this region from the SNpc. 
This region is involved in 
learning and movement 
initiation. 
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understanding the neural 
bases of virtue. 
Converging research over 
the past decade links habit 
formation and volition. In 
particular, the BG-
thalamo-cortical loops 
with their widespread 
cognitive-emotional 
interaction offer insights 
into processes of planning, 
goal selection, self 
regulation, attention and 
motivation. Furthermore 
this automatisation lies at 
the heart of the easy 
repeatability of 
behaviours associated 
with virtue… for example 
the habit of greeting 
courteously, of getting up 
when the alarm goes off, 
of reacting to difficulties 
with patient strategies, 
etc. Mechanisms of habit 
learning also offer an 
explanation for the 
phenomenon of 
behaviours that appear to 
remain robust in the 
absence of immediate 
rewards. 
 
of this to virtues as 
conscious, automatic 
(performed with little 
overt effort) behaviours, is 
seen. 
 Hippocampal plasticity 
and memory are present 
in the development phase 
of habits in the striatum. 
 
 The prefrontal cortex-
basal ganglionic pathways 
sustain voluntary 
movement, whereas the 
motor cortex-basal 
ganglionic modules 
underlie more automatic 
movements. 
 
  
622 
 
 
Table 2.8 
Systems for emotional management 
 
Principal sources: Arden and Linford (2009); Balbernie (2001); Barbas and Zikopoulos (2006); 
Beauregard et al (2001); Bennett (2011); Carr and Jacoboni et al. (2003); Davidson 
(2000);.Depue and Collins (1999); Graybiel (2008);  Guyton and Hall (2006); Heatherton and 
Wagner (2011); Keopp et al. (1998); LeDoux (1998); Lee (2007); Markowitsch et al. (2003); 
Pare et al. (2004); Posner and Rothbart (2000); Rapp and Bachevalier (2008); Ray and Zald 
(2012); Salzman and Fusi (2010); Schore (2001); Siegal and Sapru (2006); Squire (2008); Zotev 
et al. (2011). 
 
Prima facie association with 
development and exercise of 
virtue 
Principal associated brain 
areas 
Discussion proceeds from 
overview, and thence to 
higher brain areas, to 
subcortical structures, the BG 
and limbic structures. 
Principal pathways and 
mechanisms.  
 
 
 Emotion management 
systems are at the heart 
of directing our desires 
towards appropriate 
pleasure and towards 
worthy goals despite 
difficulty.   
 The habitual 
management of emotion 
according to what is 
rational is the essence of 
the exercise of virtue.  
 Appropriate 
emotional/aesthetic/ 
social/moral education is 
central to the 
development of virtue. 
 Emotional regulation 
involves cortical 
regulation of goals, 
memories and emotional 
experience. The potential 
for emotion to enhance 
rationality has been much 
noted in recent years.  
 
 Emotion is processed in 
the brain in various 
regions including several 
parts of the PFC, namely 
DLPFC, VMPFC, OFC, as 
well as the amygdala, 
hippocampus, anterior 
cingulate, and insular 
cortex. Subcortical 
sensory inputs to the 
amygdala can drive 
emotional responses that 
precede cortical 
awareness.  
 Conscious regulation of 
emotion utilizes OFC,  
DLPFC and VMPFC, 
although evidence 
suggests that it is 
reciprocal processing 
rather than top-down 
direction that is effective. 
DLPFC appears to 
“arbitrate” conflicting 
emotional situations, and 
in conjunction with VLPFC 
and ACC can formulate 
action plans not tied to 
emotional input.
 
The 
VMPFC which appears to 
play a key role in 
predicting positive and 
negative affective 
consequences. The OFC is 
regarded as the limbic 
gateway to the cortex, 
crucial in emotional 
control.
 
The OFC, within 
 There is no single 
emotional system in the 
brain and therefore no 
single system for 
emotional management. 
Furthermore there is close 
interplay between the 
reward systems, the goal 
directive and executive 
systems of the brain, and 
the systems of emotional 
management.  
 Major emotion associated 
connections enter the PFC 
and especially the OFC 
and ACC from various 
brain locations including 
cortical memory centres, 
amygdala, hippocampus, 
thalamus, hypothalamus, 
VTA, and olfactory system.  
 The PFC utilises rich 
interconnectivity to the 
BG, amygdala, 
hippocampus, anterior 
cingulate, and insular 
cortex. Several parts of 
the PFC, namely DLPFC, 
VMPFC and OFC are 
involved in this processing 
of emotion. The capacity 
of the PFC to elicit 
conscious representations 
of emotion and to assess 
affective consequences of 
actions, via neuroplastic 
remodelling, is at the core 
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the lateral sulcus is 
adjacent to both the 
temporal lobe and the 
parietal, appears to 
integrate various 
sensations, allowing 
rational processing of raw 
emotion: 
viscerosensations, taste, 
pain, and feelings of 
disgust. The OFC is 
activated by tasks where 
processing of rewarding or 
emotional information is 
required.  
 The proximity of these 
areas of the PFC and 
limbic centres facilitates 
emotional regulation. The 
DLPFC and ACC are 
activated in suppression 
of sexual response and in 
conscious management of 
lustful feelings.
 
The ACC 
appears to play a role in 
inhibiting impulsive 
behaviours and in 
generating goal-directed 
behaviours. There is 
evidence that it plays a 
role in analysing 
conflicting options. 
 There are brain circuits 
for specific emotions, eg 
hypothalamus associated 
with the basic drives; 
anterior insula plays a key 
role in disgust;
 
amygdala is 
active in the experience of 
fear and mediates 
emotional influences on 
attention and perception;
 
the BLA in the storage of 
emotional memories; and 
the PFC is active in 
conscious representations 
of emotion, and in 
assessing affective 
consequences of actions.  
 Amygdala is active in 
processing of emotion. Via 
reciprocal pathways 
reaching virtually all parts 
of the cortex the 
amygdala influences not 
only fear response, but 
higher order thought 
of improved affect 
regulation in the PFC, 
allowing the OFC to 
effectively inhibit 
activation of subcortical 
areas such as the 
amygdala. 
 The DMPFC is also closely 
associated, linking with 
inferior parietal cortex, 
the DLPFC, and the 
posterior cingulate. It 
receives limbic inputs and, 
with its linkages to other 
PFC areas, integrates the 
emotional reaction and 
experience with cognitive 
processing.  
 BG-thalamo-cortical loops 
permit complex cognitive-
emotional interaction 
offer insights into 
processes of planning, 
goal selection, self 
regulation, attention and 
motivation. The 
prefrontal-limbic network 
(including ACC, amygdala 
and hippocampus), 
modulated through 
hypothalamus, BG and 
midbrain, is central.  
 The amygdala plays a 
central role in fear 
conditioning, via the 
reciprocal cortico-
amygdalic pathway in 
emotional regulation.
 
The 
amygdala is now known to 
receive neuronal signals 
from all limbic cortical 
areas, and from the 
temporal, parietal and 
occipital cortex (most 
especially the auditory 
and visual association 
areas). Efferent 
connections return to 
these cortical areas as well 
as to the hippocampus, 
the septum, the thalamus 
and the hypothalamus. 
Cortical afferents to the 
amygdala appear to assist 
in modifying fear 
representations in the 
amygdala.
 
The frontal-
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process, working and long 
term memories, ongoing 
perceptions, attention, 
mental imagery etc.  
 The BG are strategically 
positioned for regulation 
of emotional responses as 
it is positioned within the 
thalamo-limbic-cortical 
pathway, the limbic loop 
of emotional 
management; dysfunction 
of basal ganglia-limbic 
circuitry leads to 
schizophrenia and severe 
anxiety. “Increased 
corticostriatal 
transmission leads to 
increased thalamocortical 
activity, and an increased 
likelihood of behavioural 
response 
expression”(Horvitz, 
2009). In the case of tonic, 
not phasic, DA output, LTD 
is likely to result in these 
cells.  
 
amygdala pathway is less 
effective in mediating 
frontal regulation of 
emotion than the frontal-
striatal pathway. 
 The architecture of the 
brain facilitates the close 
cooperation of basal 
structures, OFC, amygdala 
and hippocampus in 
cognitive and emotional 
deliberations. The ventral 
striatum is the target of 
inputs from the limbic 
cortex, the hippocampus 
and the amygdala. 
 Neurotransmitters (most 
particularly the amines, 
DA, 5-HT and NE) play a 
key role in modulating the 
individual’s emotional 
responses. DA, which 
plays a major role in 
mechanisms for emotion 
and reward,
 
is widely 
diffused in cortex with 
80% is concentrated in the 
striatum. 5-HT receptors 
are found in cells in the 
raphe nucleus in the brain 
stem, and also in nerve 
endings throughout brain. 
5-HT is known to inhibit 
aggression. 
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Table 2.9 
Attentional Systems 
 
Principal sources: Breedlove  et al. (2010); Froemke et al. (2007); Kaas and Stepniewska 
(2002); Knudson (2008); Koch (2008); Lundy Ekman (2007); Markowitsch et al. (2003); Pollak 
(2005). 
 
Prima facie association with 
development and exercise of 
virtue 
Principal associated brain 
areas 
Discussion proceeds from 
overview, and thence to 
higher brain areas, to 
subcortical structures, the BG 
and limbic structures. 
Principal pathways and 
mechanisms.  
 
 
 Plasticity both enables 
and is directed by our 
attention system. In turn 
focussed attention 
permits directed plasticity 
in the brain: it is regarded 
as the system controlling 
aspects of plasticity. In 
other words, our capacity 
to direct attention allows 
us some management of 
plasticity mediated 
learning, including the 
development of habit and 
virtue. 
 Attention allows 
suppression of goal 
irrelevant issues and is a 
prerequisite for many 
forms of learning and 
memory, and for goal 
election, cognition and 
executive function, all of 
which are required for the 
acquisition of virtue.  
 The capacity to attend 
and will power appear 
closely linked.  
 Normally we attend to 
stimuli that our senses or 
imagination present to us. 
However, the ability to 
pay attention to a goal 
that is neither pressing 
nor present is central to 
rationality. 
 Various cortical and 
subcortical areas 
cooperate in the 
attentional systems. The 
parietal lobes, extensively 
connected with 
subcortical areas of the 
thalamus and the nucleus 
basalis, appear to account 
for the capacity to direct 
attention, known as 
endogenous attention.   
 The BG play an integral 
role in attention 
regulation,
 
and in 
attentional loops. 
 ACC involvement in 
attentional systems 
appears necessary for 
learning, and a 
prerequisite for goal 
election and executive 
command.
 
 
 Attention is dependent 
upon the fronto-parietal 
control system. Structures 
in the parietal, frontal and 
cingulated cortices at the 
top of the visual system 
hierarchy, 
neuromodulated by the 
cholinergic nucleus 
basalis, generate signals 
guiding selective 
attention.  
 Attentional mechanisms 
are linked to NMDA 
plasticities. Mechanisms 
for enhancing attention 
involve neural signalling 
amplification. 
 Various 
neurotransmitters are 
directly implicated in 
mediating attention: DA 
appears to facilitate 
attention. ACh release 
into thalamus is critical for 
consciousness and for 
selection of objects of 
attention.
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Table 2.10 
Instrumental learning in the basal ganglia.
 
 
 
Principal sources: Da Cunha et al. (2008); Graybiel (2008); Horvitz (2009); Robinson and 
Berridge (2003); Yin and Knowlton (2006). 
 
Learning with 
respect to rewards 
may be 
Goal directed 
 
Habitual 
 
Form of 
instrumental 
learning present in 
BG 
stimulus-outcome  
(S-O)  
Preceding A-O 
learning. 
action-outcome  
(A-O) 
 
stimulus-response  
(S-R) 
 
Form of memory  declarative (explicit 
and conscious) 
procedural 
(unconscious or 
automatic) 
Facilitation DA mediated in the 
presence of 
representations of 
rewards. 
DA mediated in the 
presence of 
representations of 
rewards. 
Appropriate 
schedules of 
reinforcement, or 
overtraining of A-O 
learning leads to 
habitual learning and 
movement of active 
zone of BG towards 
the dorsal striatum.
 
 
Process Presentation of 
reward.  
Through learning the 
behavioural response 
is associated to a 
particular outcome.   
Coincident active 
inputs for stimuli and 
outputs for motor 
responses are 
strengthened.
 
 
Core features Immediate appetitive 
response. 
A cognitive and 
explicit recognition 
of the causal 
relationship between 
act and outcome. 
A habitual 
association between 
specific stimulus and 
response is 
established. 
Conditions  Process of initial 
exposures.  
The subject must 
retain in memory the 
value of the expected 
outcome. The causal 
relationship between 
action and outcome 
must be 
demonstrated.
 
 
Unaffected by 
reward devaluation.
 
 
 
Highest level of 
automaticity. 
Cortical substrate  DLPFC and motor 
cortices 
Motor cortices 
Striatal substrate NAc. Ventral striatum. 
Caudate.
 
 
Dorsal striatum.
 
 
Pathway Limbic to NAc. Association cortex to 
DMS (caudate in 
humans) and is 
modulated by reward 
expectancy (and by 
the limbic loop which 
plays a key role in 
Pavlovian learning)
 
 
Sensorimotor cortex 
to DLS... the 
sensorimotor 
striatum, the 
putamen, in humans.
 
 
627 
 
 
Table 2.11 
Reward and motivational systems 
 
Principal sources: Arden and Linford (2009); Barbas and Zikopoulos (2006); Beretta et al. 
(2008); Buitelaar (2012); Da Cunha et al. (2009); Depue and Collins (1999); Di Filippo et 
al.(2009); Graybiel (2008); Guyton and Hall (2006); Hamann et al. (2002); Heatherton and 
Wagner (2011); Koch (2008); Manns and Hichenbaum (2008); Miller and Cohen (2001); Horvitz 
(2009 ); O'Doherty and Dolan (2006); Petersen (2007); Price (2006); Roesch and Schoenbaum 
(2006); Roberts and Parkinson (2006); Shiflett and Balleine (2011); Somerville and Casey 
(2010); Wagner and Silber (2004);  Schultz and Tremblay (2006); Wickens (2009); Yin and 
Knowlton (2006). 
 
Prima facie association with 
development and exercise of 
virtue 
Principal associated brain 
areas. 
Discussion proceeds from 
overview, and thence to 
higher brain areas, to 
subcortical structures, the BG 
and limbic structures. 
Principal pathways and 
mechanisms.  
 
 
 Reward systems are 
implicated at most levels 
of volitional and sub-
volitional activity. 
Through their interaction 
with the emotional 
systems they provide 
incentive for action, 
including virtuous action. 
 To find pleasure in 
appropriate activities is 
the mark of virtue, and 
hence the link between 
reward expectations, 
emotional responses, 
conscious goal election, 
and virtue.   
 Intrinsically motivated 
activity is pleasurable in 
itself and is an essential 
characteristic of virtuous 
activity.  
 A habit of appropriate 
reward expectation is 
directly linked to the 
development of the virtue 
of temperance. 
 Areas of the amygdala, 
BG, and OFC are 
interconnected major 
reward centres of the 
brain.
 
 The OFC is activated in 
processing rewarding or 
emotional information,
 
of 
both an affective and 
attentional type;
 
it is 
associated with goal-
directed conscious choices 
of action, and in 
integrating information 
about rewards and 
punishments and their 
predictors to select goals 
for action.
 
Medial OFC 
may be implicated in 
reward and lateral OFC in 
punishment.
 
OFC allows 
association information to 
access representational 
memory promoting 
“voluntary, cognitive, and 
goal directed (not stimulus 
driven) behaviour and 
facilitating new learning.”
 
Spindle cells link the OFC 
and the ACC. They are 
now believed to play a key 
role in goal directed 
behaviour and self 
control,
 
and possibly also 
in mechanisms of 
attention.
  
 There are two major 
reward systems: the 
exciting DA driven, and 
the blissful endorphin 
driven. DA release is the 
principal mechanism of 
reward activation.
 
5-HT 
and oxytocin also 
mediate rewards. 
 There are two major DA 
systems in the brain:
 
 
o from the SNpc to 
caudate and putamen 
and in a minor way to 
the NAc-  this appears 
linked to laying down 
of procedural memory, 
and possibly to higher 
order personality 
traits;  
o the mesocorticolimbic 
DA system (mesolimbic 
dopamine system) 
originating in the VTA 
and innervating the 
NAc, the amygdala and 
the various parts of the 
cortex, particularly the 
PFC- central to the 
brain’s reward circuit, 
and critical in 
facilitation of incentive 
motivation.  
 Emotion and reward 
processing are 
interdependent. The 
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 BG are a central 
component in both of the 
principal DA reward 
systems.
 
 The role of the 
BG, and of the cortico-
striatal pathways, in 
conscious goal election is 
increasingly well 
understood.
 
Ventrally 
based limbic reward 
transforms to dorsally 
based pathways 
associated with habit 
formation and also 
addiction.  
 Goal directed behaviours 
modified by the BG are 
based less on reward 
representations in the 
ventral striatum and more 
on cortical based rewards. 
A-O mechanisms give way 
to S-R mechanisms also 
mediated by the striatum. 
These are not opposed to 
actions carried out with 
intention, expectancy and 
internal representation: 
such neural activity should 
not be assumed to be 
solely a function of 
antecedent stimuli.
 
In 
turn, the BG exert a major 
modulatory effect on 
glutamatergic cortical 
outputs via striatal-
cortical reciprocal 
pathways.  
 The BG and OFC are 
closely associated in 
reward processing. BG and 
OFC are activated in 
association with 
movement for an 
expected reward;
 
cells of 
the striatum become 
active in anticipation of 
reward, mirroring reward 
coding in the OFC. BG are 
a central component in 
both of the principal DA 
reward systems.
 
Ventrally 
based limbic reward 
transforms to dorsally 
based pathways 
associated with habit 
formation and also 
ventral pars (NAc and the 
VTA) is a key component 
of mesolimbic pathway 
which is active in reward 
situations playing a major 
role in motivation.
 
DA 
afferents to BG effect 
modulatory output back 
on the cortex via the 
cortical-BG-cortical 
pathways.
 
Appetitive and 
aversive systems share 
aspects of common 
neurobiology. Phasic DA 
and -opioid messaging 
are mutually 
interdependent.  
 The OFC has reciprocal 
connections to the limbic 
system and to the 
striatum (including via the 
cortico-striato-pallido-
thalamic loop) similar to a 
loop associated with the 
medial PFC.
 
The OFC 
(particularly area MOC13), 
with rich connection to 
the amygdala, plays a 
complex processing role. 
 DA release, triggered by 
the novelty of reward 
stimuli,
 
is central to the 
creation and 
reinforcement of 
associations, is the 
condition for synaptic 
plasticity in the BG 
synapses between 
corticostriatal neurons 
and MSNs, possibly 
involving reverberation in 
the cortico-striatal loop. 
this study proposes that 
triggerings by deliberate 
and conscious cortical 
pathways offer the 
satisfaction of greater self 
management and are thus 
attuned to the integrated 
flourishing of the entire 
organism. 
 Cognitive control of goal 
election depends on 
interplay of a PFC areas, 
reward system 
(moderated by NAc), and 
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addiction.  
 NAc, pallidum and 
amygdala, as well as areas 
of the OFC are active in 
reward and also in pain 
processing.  
 Cue-reward learning and 
synaptic plasticity in LA 
appears to be a decisive 
mechanism underpinning 
goal directed behaviour.  
 The hippocampus appears 
also to play an integral 
role in the formulation of 
goal directed motor plans. 
harm avoidant system 
(amygdala).  
 Closed cortical (lateralPFC, 
orbitalPFC, and the 
premotor cortex) - BG 
loops possibly enable PFC 
to link complex 
anticipated behaviours 
with rewards and then 
cache chunked  to achieve 
desired outcomes in the 
rapid plasticities of the 
striatum.  
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Table 2.12 
A summary of the domains of executive function.  
 
Note: Regions of the PFC do not act in isolation in relation to the functions outlined below: 
other brain regions provide provide input and feedback facilitating executive control. 
 
Principal sources: Arden (2009); Balbernie (2001); Beauregard et al. (2001); Davidson (2000); 
Koch (2008); Lazar et al. (2005); Lee (2007); Manns and Hichenbaum (2008); Markowitsch et 
al. (2003); Miller and Wallis (2008); Moghaddam B & Homayoun H (2008); Nelson (2006); 
Nolte (2009); Posner (2005);  Reynolds et al. (2008); Tomita et al. (1999); Zald and Rauch 
(2006). 
 
Region Location and linkages Executive functions in 
which implicated 
Comment 
 
DLPFC  Top and sides of the 
forward lobes. 
  Closely linked to 
parietal multimodal 
cortex,  and 
somatosensory, visual 
and parietal 
association areas 
 Key regulator of 
cognitive processes.  
 Manipulates sources 
of information.  
  Involvement in 
cognitive strategies, 
planning and 
formulation of goals.  
 Appears to be seat of 
working memory; 
(evidence that OFC 
also implicated)  
 
 Damage leads to poor 
contextual 
modification of plans.  
 DLPFC appears to 
juggle the various 
cognitive cortical 
inputs of memories, 
anticipations, self 
evaluation, long and 
short term planning. 
It appears to play a 
role in measuring 
personal conduct 
against norms.  
 DLPFC and ACC have 
been shown to be 
directly related in 
conscious 
management of 
lustful feelings.  
VLPFC  In interacting with 
DLPFC and ACC, the 
VLPFC is active in 
choosing not to 
follow familiar 
behaviour or in 
choosing a novel 
behaviour. 
 VLPFC appears 
contributory to self 
control and emotional 
inhibition.  
 VLPFC activated by 
tasks requiring 
information in 
working memory. 
 VLPFC appears 
implicated in reward 
circuitry in monkey 
studies. 
VMPFC  Includes anterior 
cingulate and 
orbitofrontal areas 
 Key role in inhibition 
of inappropriate 
behaviours.  
 Mediation of 
emotional processing 
and social decision 
making.  
 Prediction of positive 
and negative affective 
consequences. 
 Role in analysis of 
conflicting options. 
 Possible role in 
 Damage leads to 
impulsivity, socially 
inappropriate 
behaviours and 
inappropriate 
emotional responses. 
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working memory. 
OFC  Adjacent to frontal 
areas of the striatum 
and provides gateway 
for thalamo-striatal 
and limbic connection 
with higher cortical 
regulation. 
 Linkages to all PFC 
areas, ACC and insula. 
 Modulatory inputs 
from VTA.  
 
 Central role in 
regulation of 
motivated responses. 
 Implicated in risk 
taking and decision 
making. 
 Implication in 
executive processing 
of reward incentive. 
OFC codes for the 
reward value of 
stimuli, responding to 
anticipation of future 
events and so are 
shown to have access 
to representations of 
the external world.  
 Olfactory processing 
 Co-implication in 
working memory in 
the DLPFC. 
 Inhibition of 
impulsive behaviour 
may be localised to 
the right lateral and 
medial OFC. 
 Right hemisphere 
appears to play a 
greater role in 
response inhibition. 
 NB: effective 
regulation also 
requires election of 
appropriate choices. 
 Possibility that mOFC 
is implicated in 
reward and the 
lateral OFC in 
punishment. 
 Right OFC decodes 
mental states of 
others, and is 
associated with 
empathy with others; 
left OFC reasons 
about mental states. 
 Activation of OFC can 
flood consciousness 
with warm positive 
feelings.  
ACC  Extensive links to 
limbic system via the 
hippocampus, the 
shell region of the 
NAc and the 
amygdala. 
 Extensive links to all 
cortical areas.  
 Involvement in 
direction of attention, 
inhibition of impulsive 
behaviours, and in 
generation of goal-
directed behaviours 
 Facilitation of 
information transfer 
between areas of the 
PFC 
 
 Parietal, frontal and 
cingulated cortices at 
the top of the visual 
system hierarchy, 
appear to generate 
signals guiding 
selective attention. 
 Maintenance of 
attention appears to 
involve the ACC with 
the cooperation of 
the right anterior 
insula. 
DMPFC  Links with inferior 
parietal cortex, the 
DLPFC, and the 
posterior cingulate. It 
receives limbic inputs 
and, with its linkages 
to other PFC areas, 
integrates the 
emotional reaction 
and experience with 
cognitive processing.  
 Adjusts behaviour 
according to 
emotional cues, and 
assists in regulation of 
emotional response.  
 
 Active in perspective 
taking and TOM. 
Parietal 
cortex 
 Fronto-parietal 
network implicated in 
 Involvement in 
response inhibition 
 Parietal, frontal and 
cingulated cortices at 
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visuo-spatial 
processing and 
working memory.  
and attentional 
systems. 
 
the top of the visual 
system hierarchy, 
appear to generate 
signals guiding 
selective attention. 
Temporal 
cortex 
 Closely 
interconnected to all 
parts of the the 
cortex, and especially 
PFC.   
 Implication in 
memory, processing 
sensory input, use of 
language, and aspects 
of emotional 
processing. 
 Hippocampus is 
below the cortex of 
the medial temporal 
lobe. 
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Table 2.13 
Systems for cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election and executive 
direction. 
 
Principal sources: Balbernie (2001); Barbas and Zikopoulos (2006); Beauregard et al (2001); 
Boller and Grafman (1994); Crossman and Neary (2005); Zald and Rauch (2006); Fuster (1989); 
Guyton and Hall (2006); Davidson (2000); Lazar et al (2005); Lee (2007); Markowitsch et al. 
(2003); Miller and Wallis (2008); Moghaddam and Homayoun (2008); Passingham (1993); 
Posner and Rothbart (2000); Reynolds et al. (2008); Siegal and Sapru (2006); Tomita et al 
(1999). 
 
Prima facie association with 
development and exercise of 
virtue 
Principal associated brain 
areas 
Discussion proceeds from 
overview, and thence to 
higher brain areas, to 
subcortical structures, the BG 
and limbic structures. 
Principal pathways and 
mechanisms.  
 
 
 The links between 
cognition, rationality and 
virtue are closely 
associated at the 
psychological level. Brain 
systems associated with 
cognition and goal 
election interconnect with 
neural subdivisions 
implicated in moral 
behaviour. (See Table 
5.1.)  
 Human cognition 
normally implies rational 
capacities: for conscious 
goal setting, reasoning, 
deliberation as to 
consequences and means, 
and final election.  
 The capacity to set specific 
goals, to direct one’s 
actions to those goals, to 
reason about 
consequences and means, 
appears central to 
cognition and to rational 
acts disposed by 
prudence. That one 
chooses goals fitting for 
one’s nature is a mark of 
rationality; virtue is 
essentially the neuronal 
disposition assisting in the 
habituation of this 
capacity.  
 The capacity to pay due 
regard to the impact of 
 The PFC presents as the 
most significant region of 
the brain associated with 
cognition, deliberation 
and executive direction. 
Areas of the PFC are 
central to control of 
behaviour, awareness, 
memory, and the general 
interpretive area and the 
speech centre; they are 
responsible for limbic 
regulation and reward, 
deliberation and 
assessment of 
consequences, empathy, 
motor planning,. The PFC 
is centrally implicated in 
higher order cognition, 
and executive function, 
involving many aspects of 
personality, and planning, 
insight and foresight.
 
This 
area has the capacity to 
synthesise cognitive, 
emotional, contextual and 
somatic information into 
goal directed behaviours. 
 The interconnection 
between lateral, 
orbitofrontal and medial 
sectors, including the ACC 
appears to facilitate 
cognitive and emotional 
processing, and volitional 
activity. (See also above: 
Systems of Emotional 
Management.) 
 The PFC is richly 
interconnected with the 
other functional sectors in 
the frontal lobe (for motor 
and speech), with the 
other lobes, with 
subcortical motor 
systems, with limbic and 
midbrain emotion and 
reward circuits.  This 
interconnectivity 
facilitates cognitive 
activity.  
 It is now apparent that 
pathways for cognition, 
executive function, 
reward evaluation and 
motivation, learning and 
memory, include the BG 
and do not reside solely in 
the outer cortical layers. 
The striatum is a key 
target of excitatory major 
projections from entire 
cortex, and is “constantly 
informed about most 
aspects of cortical 
function” (Nolte, 2002). 
Afferent pathways, input 
pathways to the BG, are 
from all regions of the 
cortex, from the VTA, the 
ILN and the SNpc. 
 Cooperation between 
cortex and the BG is 
necessary for effective 
cognition and goal 
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one’s actions on others, 
modifying them 
accordingly, characterises 
acts disposed by the virtue 
of justice. 
 The exercise of virtue 
requires rightness and 
perfection of reason; the 
operations of reason are 
perfected by the virtues 
of prudence and justice. 
 The development of 
rationality follows a 
developmental trajectory. 
Myelination and 
development of the PFC 
continues into the third 
decade of life. In keeping 
with the Aristotelian 
proposal that infants and 
children, not possessing 
full rationality, are not 
capable of perfect virtue, 
neonates manifest little 
activity in the cerebral 
cortex. However the 
speed of development is 
striking: in first four years 
of life, cerebral neuronal 
activity increases to twice 
adult levels (reflected in 
twice adult levels of 
metabolic rate). There is a 
decline thereafter to age 
15 at which adult levels 
are achieved. This activity 
parallels the rise and 
decline of numbers of 
synapses. 
 The lateral PFC is 
activated by cognitive 
tasks, the VLPFC by tasks 
requiring information in 
working memory, and the 
DLPFC when information 
must be manipulated. 
Anterior areas of PFC may 
have a role in information 
transfer between these 
other areas. Furthermore, 
the PFC appears 
implicated in formulation 
of possible futures. The 
DLPFC appears to be the 
key regulator of cognitive 
processes, richly 
interconnected to the 
parietal multimodal cortex 
as well as to the 
somatosensory, visual and 
parietal association areas. 
 
 The contribution of BG to 
intentional behaviour, 
learning and decision 
making, is also recognised. 
BG play an important role 
in regulation of the 
function of the cerebral 
cortexperhaps in 
overlaying deliberate 
cognitive agendas onto 
habituated actions. Check 
ref.
 
 
 Via the cortical association 
areas-caudate loop, the 
caudate is implicated in 
modulation of cognitive 
cortical function. 
Interaction between BG-
PFC loops adds further 
dimensions of limbic and 
cortical modification of 
outputs.  
 This study argues that in 
the development and 
exercise of virtue the BG 
are closely associated 
with, serves to modulate, 
and ultimately is second in 
importance to, the PFC as 
central protagonist.
 
 
 Learning in the BG is a 
dynamic process, 
directed activity.
2040
 
Cognitive control and 
emotional self regulation 
are closely 
interdependent. 
Cognition of appropriate 
rules assists: the PFC 
(focusing on acquisition of 
new rules) and the BG 
(focusing selection of rules 
appropriate to the 
situation) play 
complementary roles in 
rule learning. Attentional 
mechanisms play a critical 
role in achieving such 
affect regulation and self 
management. 
 Rich neural loops 
involving BG and PFC are 
also deemed significant in 
mediating recursive 
thought. Fast plasticity in 
the striatum favours 
learning the “snapshots” 
of action that capture 
immediate circumstances, 
favoured alternatives, and 
how to get there; slow 
plasticity of the PFC 
favours links to other 
centres and creation of 
entire models, future 
scenarios, of action.  
Neural loops between the 
BG and other areas 
provide a basis for the 
exchange of concrete 
information inherent in 
deliberation.  
 Lower brain areas supply 
the PFC, along with the 
other cortical areas, with 
continuous electrical 
stimulation; a prerequisite 
for conscious activity to 
take place. Excitatory 
signalling (utilising ACh), 
and reverbatory excitatory 
signalling, via the 
thalamus, to almost all 
cortical areas, are critical 
in this process.
 
Mechanisms of control 
                                                          
2040
 Horvitz, “Stimulus-response and response outcome learning mechanisms in the striatum,” 131. 
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facilitated by highly 
redundant parallel 
pathways. The BG 
contains inhibitory 
GABAergic neurons,
 
spiny 
in the striatum and aspiny 
in the pallidum, requiring 
strong and coherent 
excitatory cortical inputs 
from almost all cortical 
areas to become active.  
The BG are a region of 
great biochemical 
diversity, exhibiting 
almost all the neuroactive 
agents. Basal forebrain 
projections innervate the 
hippocampus, amygdala, 
and neocortex.  
(See also above: Systems for 
habit formation, for 
additional contribution of BG 
in cognition.) 
 
utilize the release of NE 
from the LC (usually 
excitatory), DA from the 
SN (inhibitory in the BG, 
and possibly excitatory 
elsewhere in the cortex), 
5-HT from the raphe 
nuclei (inhibitory), and 
ACh from the 
gigantocellular neurons of 
the reticular excitatory 
area.
 
 
 Spindle cells in linkages 
between ACC, OFC and 
insula are associated with 
quick decision making.
 
These pathways are 
complemented by 
neurochemical pathways 
enabling appreciation of 
rewards and difficulties. 
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Table 2.14 
Systems for effective execution of motor commands 
 
Principal sources: Bear (2007); Byrne (2008); Doyon et al. (2009); Floyer-Lea and Matthews 
(2008); Hof et al. (2008); Hoshi et al. (2005); Kaas and Stepniewska (2002); Kalat (2001); 
Marieb and Hoehn (2010); Pollak (2005); Rapp and Bachevalier (2008); Squire (2008); Wise 
and Shadmehr (2002). 
 
Prima facie association with 
development and exercise of 
virtue 
Principal associated brain 
areas 
Discussion proceeds from 
overview, and thence to 
higher brain areas, to 
subcortical structures, the BG 
and limbic structures. 
Principal pathways and 
mechanisms.  
 
 
 Virtues empower action 
in ways tailored to the 
flourishing of our being. 
This includes disposing us 
to execute movement 
towards worthy 
objectives. Therefore the 
neural bases for virtue 
require effective 
connections with motor 
control, even though not 
all virtuous activity 
requires expression in 
motor activity.   
 Efficient and obedient 
motor control is integral 
to the practice of some, if 
not all, of the virtues. 
Some virtues, such as 
generosity, require social 
interaction for the 
complete expression of 
the virtue.
 2041
 And this is 
not only the case with 
social virtues: temperance 
may manifest in the 
capacity to redirect one’s 
attention; courage may 
require expression 
through words; even 
justice may necessitate 
delivering, not just 
considering, an apology.  
 The PFC is well connected 
to motor cortices, primary 
motor cortex, premotor 
and supplementary motor 
areas, allowing effective 
command pathways.   
 Long term storage of 
explicit motor knowledge 
is in the PFC and 
associated parts of the BG, 
while storage of 
intermediate term explicit 
motor knowledge is in the 
MTL.
 
The dorsal striatum 
is implicated in the long-
term storage of well-
learned movement 
sequences.
 
 
 The BG play a role in 
anticipating movement 
and in motor control: 
putamen neurons are 
active in anticipation of 
body movements; caudate 
nucleus neurons are active 
prior to eye movements; 
the putamen receives 
input from motor and 
somatosensory cortical 
areas.  
 The hippocampus plays an 
integral role in the 
formulation of goal 
directed motor plans. 
 The cerebellum assists in 
 The PFC is richly endowed 
with connections for 
conscious motor 
management. Anatomical 
loops between the PFC 
and the BG, closely 
associated with motor 
systems and acting as a 
site of converging inputs 
from other cortical and 
subcortical areas. Also the 
PFC has direct and indirect 
connections to the limbic 
system and endowed with 
abundant intrinsic 
connectivity.  
 Pathways of motor control 
feature areas of the BG: 
GP and the SN play major 
roles in motor control 
selecting patterns of 
cortical activity
 
and 
ultimately selecting and 
reinforcing chosen motor 
programs; processing of 
motor commands takes 
place in the caudate 
nucleus and in the GP, 
with output across to 
thalamus and then back to 
cortical motor areas. 
Outputs of the BG directly 
impact on motor control 
by affecting activity of 
motor areas in the cortex. 
                                                          
2041
 And although a person suffering from advanced Parkinson disease, and therefore without the 
capacity to express emotion on the face, can possess the virtue of cheerfulness in his internal 
dispositions, he lacks the capacity for the normal manifestation of virtue of cheerfulness, a ready 
smile. 
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movement and motor 
habits has a likely role in 
formation of cognitive 
habits. There is now 
evidence that the 
cerebellum and the BG are 
well interconnected and 
interactive via a cerebello-
thalamo-striatal pathway.  
 
The system operates 
mainly “to modify cortical 
motor representations 
rather than control 
behaviour through direct 
motor inputs” (Manns, 
2008).
 
 
 The BG-thalamo-cortical 
loop is associated with 
motor control and also 
with habit formation.
 
It 
provides a direct route for 
subsequent motor 
commands. Motor 
learning involves dynamic 
interplay between cortico-
striatal, cortico-cerebellar, 
and limbic systems. The 
dorsal striatum instructs 
the PFC in S-R situations. 
 The mechanisms of 
efficient motor control at 
the cellular level are 
reasonably well described. 
The premotor cortex 
appears to cache memory 
for motor activities 
triggered by ACh release 
from the basal forebrain. 
ACh is the principal 
mediating agent 
(excitatory) at the 
neuromuscular synapse, 
opening ion channels, 
with Epi also playing a 
role.
 
Glutamate and 
aspartate are the major 
excitatory 
neurotransmitter in the 
CNS and responsible for 
most of the fast synaptic 
transmission in the 
mammalian brain. NE is 
distributed to the 
cerebellum and other 
areas from noradrenergic 
nucleus, the locus 
coeruleus, within the 
pons. 
 Axonal myelination is 
required for speed of 
sensory and motor 
messaging along the long 
pathways from the brain, 
as well as for much 
connectivity within the 
brain itself. Mature 
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myelination of motor 
systems takes place in the 
first two years of life, 
although intracortical 
connections are 
myelinating into third 
decade of life, a fact that 
seems reflected in the 
disconnect that can exist 
between motor activity 
and cognition. For 
example a disproportion 
of serious driving 
accidents take place with 
young drivers at the 
wheel. Cortical 
myelination is not 
complete until the third or 
fourth decade of life.
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Table 2.15 
Summary of mechanisms for neuronal structural plasticity discussed in Chapter 2. 
“Structural plasticity is ubiquitously present in the mature brain.”
 
(Butz et al. 2009) 
 
Sources: Alvarez et al.(2007)
2042
; Blakemore (2008)
2043
; 
 
Blundon and Zakharenko (2008)
2044
;
 
Butz et al. (2009)
 2045
; Chistiakova and Volgushev (2009)
2046
;
 
Conde and Caceres (2009)
2047
; 
Corlew et al (2008)
2048
; Desmurget et al. (2007) 
2049
; Di Filippo et al. (2009)
2050
; Johnston et al. 
(2009)
 2051
; Kessels and Malinow (2009)
2052
; Kim  and Hoffman (2008)
 2053
; Nelson et al. 
(2006)
2054
; Nestler (2001)
2055
; Pyne and Shenker (2008)
2056
; Squire et al. (2008)
2057
; Scott and 
Aperia (2009)
2058
; Stevens (2008)
2059
; Stranahan and Mattson (2008)
2060
; Vaynman and Gomez-
Pinilla (2005)
 2061
; 
 
Category Mechanism Features 
Developmental 
plasticity 
 Genetic mechanisms, 
including neural 
overproduction followed 
by PCD, and 
overproduction of 
synapses and deletion of 
immature synapses. 
 Modification of genetic 
transcription in response 
 Mature development of neural 
structures appropriate to 
environmental inputs.  
 Various stages of development 
manifest periods of elimination of 
synapses, for example during 
adolescence. 
                                                          
2042
 Alvarez, et al. “Distinct Structural and Ionotropic Roles of NMDA Receptors in Controlling Spine 
and Synapse Stability,” 7365-7376. 
2043
 Sarah-Jayne Blakemore (2008) “The social brain in adolescence” Nature reviews neuroscience 
Vol 9 April 2008  267-277 
2044
 Blundon and Zakharenko,  “Dissecting the components of LTP”.   
2045
 Butz, et al., “Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 287-305. 
2046
 Chistiakova and Volgushev, “Heterosynaptic plasticity in the neocortex (Review)”. 
2047
 Conde and Caceres, “Microtubule assembly, organisation and dynamics in axons and dendrites 
(Review),” 319-332. 
2048
Corlew et al., “Presynaptic NMDA Receptors: Newly appreciated roles in cortical synaptic 
function and plasticity,” 609-625. 
2049
 Desmurget et al.,“Contrasting acute and slow growing lesions: a new door to brain plasticity 
(Review),” 898-914. 
2050
 Di Filippo et al., “Short term and long-term plasticity at corticostriatal synapses: implications 
for learning and memory,” 114. 
2051
 Johnston et al., “Plasticity and injury in the developing brain,” 1-10. 
2052
 Kessels and Malinow, “Synaptic AMPA Receptor Plasticity and Behaviour”. 
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to environmental inputs.  
 Activity dependent 
processes that allow for 
ongoing stabilisation and 
modification of 
synapses. 
Neurogenesis  Genetic mechanisms 
including BDNF induced 
transcription.  
 Modification of genetic 
transcription in response 
to environmental inputs, 
including exercise 
induced neurogenesis.  
 Possibility of rapid 
reaction to 
environmental cues. 
 Present at relatively few sites in the 
mature human brain: olfactory bulb, 
dentate gyrus of hippocampus, 
cingulate gyrus and segments of the 
parietal cortex. In addition possible 
presence in amygdala, piriform cortex, 
and inferior temporal cortex.  
 Exercise and caloric restriction induces 
BDNF associated plasticities in 
hippocampus. 
 Hippocampal dentate gyrus neurons 
undergo ongoing replacement.  
Dendritic changes  Genetic mechanisms. 
 Modification of genetic 
transcription in response 
to environmental inputs. 
 Ca2+influx (fast large 
amplitude influx leads to 
LTP; slower, low 
amplitude to LTD). 
 NMDAR presence is 
essential for spine 
density and regulation of 
the number of active 
excitatory synapses. 
Changes may include:  
 Formation of new dendrites, new 
dendritic spines, new branches in the 
dendritic tree, and retraction and 
degeneration of postsynaptic spines. 
 LTD leads to weakening of synapses 
and spines.  
 LTP promotes spine maturation and 
stabilisation.  
Changes at the 
synapse  
 
 Genetic mechanisms 
acting on synaptic 
components and factors. 
 Modification of genetic 
transcription in response 
to environmental inputs. 
 Calcium influx 
associated.  
 Close LTP linkages to 
synaptogenesis.  
 Synaptic reorganisation 
proceeds in stages. 
 Activity dependent 
synaptic pruning. 
Postsynaptic NMDARs 
trigger classical forms of 
LTP and LTD. 
 PreNMDARs mediate 
tLTD at some synapses 
with some evidence also 
of LTP.  
 Various forms of 
synaptic strengthening 
associated with gene 
expression. 
Changes of the synapse may include:  
 Synaptogenesis and synapse 
elimination. 
Changes at the synapse may include:  
 Changes in post synaptic receptor 
density, and alterations to thickness of 
the synapse, increase and decrease in 
the strength and efficacy of synapses, 
and physical changes at the synapse 
leading to pre and post synaptic 
alterations in membrane potential.  
 NMDAR plasticities involved at many 
sites throughout the brain. 
 Stabilisation of synapses brings 
plasticity to an end. 
 Various forms of LTP and LTD can 
produce long lasting synaptic plasticity.  
 Intracellular calcium implicated in the 
various forms of LTP and LTD. 
 Classical conditioning exhibits forms of 
LTP. 
 Synaptogenesis is evident in motorskill 
learning. 
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Changes at the 
axon 
 Genetic mechanisms 
acting on axonal 
structures and guidance 
cues. 
 Modification of genetic 
transcription in response 
to environmental inputs. 
 Myelination of axons 
(perhaps closing off 
sensitive periods of 
development)  
 Processes associated 
with axonal 
overdevelopment.  
Changes may include: 
 Formation of new neural structures 
related to the axon including axonal 
growth zones, localized axonal 
sprouting, changes to axonal fibre 
densities,  myelination of axons, 
changes in the degree of myelination of 
the axon, sprouting of boutons and 
other presynaptic sites, interstitial 
axonal branching, and retraction and 
degeneration of pre synaptic terminals.
 
 
Formation of 
additional 
connections. 
 Modification of neuronal 
connectivity in response 
to genetic and 
environmental inputs. 
 Activation of 
intracortical connections 
that are dormant. 
Changes may include: 
 Additional connections may be 
established between same axon and 
dendrite.  
 Changes in conjunction with further 
outgrowth of axons and dendrites.  
 Synaptic rewiring whereby targets are 
disengaged and new targets 
established using same presynaptic or 
post synaptic element.
 
 
Further structural 
and signalling 
contributions to 
plasticity.  
Growth factors.   Intracellular messengers and growth 
signalling factors are commonly 
associated with structural plasticity.  
 BDNF induced transcription.  
 Implication of astrocytes releasing 
trophic factors and gliotransmitters.  
 GABA may also act as a neurotrophic 
agent. 
Receptors.  Cellular plasticity in the forms of LTP 
and LTD can be a result of AMPA 
receptor trafficking. 
 preNMDARs mediate tLTD at some 
synapses with some evidence also of 
LTP.  
 NMDARs assist in the stabilisation of 
glutamatergic synapses.  
 K+ channels are a postsynaptic 
mechanism for regulation of synaptic 
plasticity. 
 Changes in voltage gated ion channels 
function lead to plasticity changes the 
probability of PSP and duration, and 
mediates metaplasticity, the capacity 
to induce consequent plasticity at the 
synapse.  
Neurotransmitters. 
 
 Plasticity as a result of NMDA 
interaction with DA.  
 The mesolimbic reward system 
supports reward seeking and 
motivational behaviour by regulated 
release of DA. 
 AMPAR trafficking evident in fear 
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conditioning in hippocampus. 
 NMDA-LTP develops rapidly, is 
expressed postsynaptically, and is 
needed for short term memory 
retention. 
 NMDA-independent LTP develops more 
slowly, is expressed presynaptically, 
and allows longer term retention.  
 Release of NE following emotional 
arousal may promote synaptic 
plasticity.  
 Alteration to presynaptic release of 
neurotransmitter  
 Enkephalin dependent mechanisms of 
neuroplasticity.  
Chemical signalling across 
the synapse. 
Ephrin/Eph signalling plays a role in 
regulating the morphology of spines, 
possibly in stabilising immature filipodia 
into mature spines. 
Bioelectrical mechanisms 
for plasticity. 
 STDP can produce calcium-triggered 
activation of certain protein kinases 
resulting in: variation in and 
enhancement of  AMPARs, increasing 
responsiveness to glutamate, synaptic 
strengthening, and activation of silent 
synapses.   
 Patterned tetanic electrical stimulation 
can bring about NMDAR dependent 
spine changes. 
 High frequency firing of the cortical 
neurons may also lead to LTD at the 
striatal synapses according to principles 
of heterosynaptic plasticity (see 
below). 
 PSPs trigger NMDA related plasticity as 
a result of pre and post synaptic 
interaction. Precise timing of 
backpropagating PSPs following EPSP 
leads to a strong depolarisation. This 
leads to glutamate ejection from 
NMDA receptors, thus allowing Ca2+ 
influx, a cascade of intracellular 
messaging, and release of growth 
signalling factors associated with 
structural plasticity and consequent 
LTP.  
 Back propagation. 
Internal signalling Addictive drugs produce the protein 
DeltaFosB which accumulates to the point 
of causing a gene transcription leading to 
plastic change. 
Contribution of 
microtubules to structural 
plasticity. 
Regulation of growth cone motility 
managed by microtubule-associated-
protein 1B (MAP1B).  
Forms of 
experiential 
Hebbian  mechanisms With repeated firing, nerve cells become 
firmly connected. 
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plasticity 
 Anti-Hebbian mechanisms Unwanted noise is filtered out allowing 
only preferred spiking patterns to emerge. 
 Homeostatic plasticity:  
 Synaptic changes of 
transmission as a result 
of the specific induction 
related to learning.
 
 
The capacity for neurons to compensate 
for network activity by regulating their 
own excitability.
  
 
 
 Heterosynaptic, or 
nonassociative, plasticity: 
 Changes at other 
synapses on a given 
neuron that are non-
involved in the original 
induction related to 
learning.
 
 
Occurs when presynaptic and postsynaptic 
neurons are depolarized at the same time. 
Repeated activation of cortical synapses 
induces LTP. 
 
Heterosynaptic plasticity: 
 May result in a neuron as a result of 
back propagation.  
 May assist in synaptic homeostasis, the 
maintenance of the overall synaptic 
weight of a neuron, and in ensuring 
that certain memories are given 
greater permanence.  
 Reverberation in loops may assist in 
maintaining conditions for 
heterosynaptic plasticity in the 
striatum and cortical neurons.
 
 
 Metaplasticity 
 The capacity to induce 
consequent plasticity at 
the synapse. 
Changes in voltage gated ion channels 
function leads to change in the probability 
of PSP and its duration, and mediates 
metaplasticity. 
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Table 5.1 
Neural subdivisions implicated in moral behaviour.  
 
Sources: Beauregard et al. (2001); Burnett et al. (2009); Casebeer (2003); D’Argembeau and 
Salmon (2011); Fuster (1989); Grafman (1994); Green et al.(2001 and 2004); Green and Haidt 
(2002); Harenski et al. (2008) (2012); Jackson et al. (2006); LeDoux (1998); Leknes and Tracey 
(2008); Lee et al. (2007); Martin (2003); Moll et al. (2005); Passingham (1993);  Ruby et al. 
(2009); Wood et al (2004). 
 
Neural 
subdivision 
Specific Area Brodmann’s 
Area
2062
 
Role 
PFC 
Anterior PFC 
(aPFC)  
Ventral sectors of 
PFC 
Frontopolar 
cortex 
 
9,10 
Active in moral evaluations relying on 
predicting the long-term outcomes of 
one’s own actions, such as the 
anticipation of guilt. Active in social–
emotional contextual knowledge and 
learning of learning of moral values. 
Active in moral judgement. 
VMPFC 9,10,12,32 Active in adherence to well-established 
social norms and attitudes. Active in 
reflection on impact on others.  
Active in moral judgement. 
Anterior rostral 
medial prefrontal 
cortex (MPFC) 
11,12,25 Active in social emotional responses, 
especially in adolescents. 
Medial portion of 
the superior 
frontal gyrus, 
orbitofrontal 
gyrus and rostral 
anterior cingulate 
cortex (MPFC)  
9,10,11,32 MPFC active in moral judgement. Active in 
processing various kinds of self‑
referential information, appraising and 
coding the self‑relatedness or self‑
relevance of information. 
Contribution to representations of specific 
future events and autobiographical 
memory retrieval. Active in inference of 
mental states of others, and in empathy 
for others in pain, with linkages to 
anterior ACC and anterior IC. 
Posterior PFC 
areas 
6,9,10,46, Active in overlearned sequences.  
DLPFC 
Mostly right 
hemisphere. 
46 
 
Active in accepting external guidance.  
Active in moral judgement. Pain and 
reward processing. 
Right lateral PFC 44,45,46,47 Active in suppression of sexual arousal.
 
2063
 
                                                          
2062
 Based on Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 3
rd
 ed., 48-49. 
2063
 Beauregard and O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain. A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the 
Soul, 272-3. Beauregard’s work noted in the table above refers to studies of subjects dismissing 
pornography. He has also carried out some fascinating work identifying the neural bases of 
spiritual and mystical experience. Debunking the fad idea of a “god spot” in the temporal lobe, 
Beauregard reviewed brain activations during religious, mystical and spiritual experiences: “Our 
objective and subjective data suggest that RSMEs (religious, spiritual, and or mystical experiences) 
are complex and multidimensional and mediated by a number of brain regions normally implicated 
in perception, cognition, emotion, body representation, and self consciousness.” He noted 
significant loci of activation, relative to baseline condition, in the following (underlined indicates 
significant activation with respect to control condition): right and left inferior parietal lobe, visual 
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LPFC 44,45,46,47 Active in suppression of sadness. 
OFC 
Orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC) 
11,25 Active in appreciation of moral 
consequences of behaviour and 
consideration of impact on others.  
Lateral OFC 
(LOFC) 
47 Active in adapting to social–emotional 
cues. 
Right OFC 47 Active in suppression of sadness. 
Cingulate 
cortex 
Anterior cingulate 
cortex  
(ACC) 
24 
 
Involvement in moral conflict resolution. 
Active in consideration of impact on 
others. Pain and pleasure processing. 
Rostral ACC  
 
(peri-genual 
BA24/BA33; 
subcallosal 
BA32/BA25) 
Active in empathy with the pain of others.  
 
Right ACC 23,24 Active in suppression of sexual arousal. 
Posterior 
cingulate/retrospl
enial cortex 
23,26 Contributing region to imagination of 
specific future events and 
autobiographical memory retrieval. Active 
especially in females in responses 
requiring moral sensitivity to others. 
Active in adult moral judgement, less so in 
adolescence. 
Temporal 
lobes 
Temporal lobes 20,21,22,35,
36, 38,41,42 
Storage of social perceptual 
representations. Contributing region to 
imagination of specific future events and 
autobiographical memory retrieval. 
Superior 
temporal cortex 
22 Active in adult moral judgement. 
Posterior superior 
temporal sulcus 
(STS) 
22 Active in recognition of socially relevant 
perceptual features of faces, body posture 
and movements. Active in moral 
judgement. 
Posterior 
temporal lobes 
20,36,37 Assists in storage of representations of 
objects, actions and spatial maps; storage 
of social semantic knowledge. 
Anterior temporal 
lobes ( aTL) 
 
20,21,38 
 
Storage of knowledge of social concepts 
and values that are more context 
independent (eg honour and greed). 
Occipital 
lobe 
 18,19,37,39,
40 
Active in creating representations of 
objects, actions and spatial maps; storage 
of social semantic knowledge. 
Parietal 
lobe 
Inferior parietal 
lobe 
40 Contributing region to imagination of 
specific future events and 
autobiographical memory retrieval. Active 
especially in males in responses requiring 
moral sensitivity to others. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
cortex, caudate nucleus, right medial orbitofrontal cortex, right medial prefrontal cortex, right 
middle temporal cortex, right and left superior parietal lobule, left brain stem, left insula, left and 
right anterior cingulate cortex, among others. 
Beauregard’s insights accord with the view presented in this study that consciousness and decision 
making involve complex and highly coordinated neural activation (note that three of the four 
cortical lobes as well as other subcortical areas show heightened activity). To argue that there is a 
single location for moral thought and responses is opposed both to neuroscientific data, and to the 
philosophical expectation that higher activity must involve greater biological integration.     
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Temporo-parietal 
junction 
(proximate to 
insula and rich in 
spindle cells) 
39,40 
 
Active in adult moral judgement, less so in 
adolescence. 
Limbic and 
paralimbic 
areas 
Amygdala  Activation in basic emotional and 
motivational states thereby affecting 
moral behaviour. Active in exercise of self 
control, patience, and empathy.  Active in 
moral judgement. 
Hypothalamus 
especially 
ventromedial 
sector  
 Activation in basic emotional and 
motivational states thereby affecting 
moral behaviour. Active in exercise of self 
control, patience, and empathy. 
Insula   Activation in basic emotional and 
motivational states thereby affecting 
moral behaviour. Active in exercise of self 
control, patience, and empathy. Active in 
judgements of fairness. 
Anterior insula  Active in empathy with the pain of others. 
Pleasure and pain processing. 
Posterior insula  Processing of hypothetical reward 
outcomes.  
Hippocampus  Role in storage of memories according to 
context. 
Thalamus  Contribution to pain and pleasure in initial 
processing of sense input.  
Basal 
ganglia (BG) 
Ventral striatum   Active in judgements of fairness.  
Activation in basic emotional and 
motivational states thereby affecting 
moral behaviour. 
NAc (in 
association with 
Ventral striatum) 
 Hedonic and aversive processing. 
Caudate nucleus  Active in responding to moral values, 
attitudes and moral emotions.  
Pallidum  Active in judgements of fairness. 
Vental pallidum  Aspects of pain and pleasure processing. 
Septal 
nuclei 
  Participation in assessing the reward 
potential of events. 
Cerebellum 
  Contribution to processing of unexpected 
reward and pain. 
Brainstem 
Rostral brainstem 
tegmentum 
 Active in thalamic activity and therefore in 
filtering cortical inputs. 
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Table 5.2 
A summary of the principal brain systems contributing to the development and exercise of 
virtue.   
 
System Ref Contribution to the development and exercise of virtue 
The 
numerous 
systems and 
mechanisms 
of plasticity 
operating at 
the cellular 
and molecular 
level.
2064
 
 
2.2 
 
Tables 
2.3, 2.15. 
 
 The brain’s virtually ubiquitous capacity for plastic change 
permits the various forms of learning, including the 
learning of good habits.  
 Plastic changes are shown to be triggered by neural 
activity itself. Hence repeated experience lays down 
consolidated pathways whereby previous behaviours are 
more easily revisited. 
 Plastic changes provide a neural explanation for the 
phenomenon of habit. Furthermore, freely chosen 
behaviours and activities are self-reinforcing. Prior choices 
are more easily replicated.   
 Forms of structural plasticity dependent on gene 
expression bring about permanent neural changes, and 
potentially new behaviours and a modified personality.  
Systems for 
learning. 
2.3 
 
Table  
2.4 
 Learning denotes knowledge acquired through experience, 
or changed behaviour as a response to experience. 
Learning may be either conscious or unconscious.   
 Moral learning is central to the development of virtue, and 
in particular, to the development of conscience, an aspect 
of the virtue of prudence. Moral learning will take 
advantage of systems implicated in general learning.  
 Virtue is a form of experiential learning.  
 Development of automaticity is intrinsice to virtue. That 
DA release associated with rewarding outcomes facilitates 
learning, and that reward paradigms convert over time to 
automaticity in the BG suggest a central role for reward 
systems in learning of at least some forms of volitional 
behaviours associated with virtue. 
Attentional 
systems. 
2.5.5 
 
Table 2.9 
 Plasticity both enables and is directed by our attention 
system. In turn focussed attention permits directed 
plasticity in the brain: it is “the modulatory control system 
of plasticity”.
2065
 In other words, our capacity to direct 
attention allows us some management of plasticity 
mediated learning, including the development of habit 
and virtue. 
 Attention allows suppression of goal irrelevant issues and 
is a prerequisite for many forms of learning and memory, 
and for goal election, cognition and executive function, all 
of which are required for the acquisition of virtue. 
 The capacity to attend appears closely linked to will 
power.   
 Normally we attend to stimuli that our senses or 
imagination present to us. However, the ability to pay 
attention to a goal that is neither pressing nor present is 
central to rationality and virtue development. 
                                                          
2064
 Arguably plasticity involves both systems and mechanisms. Systems involve coordination of 
various brain areas (eg VTA release of DA to striatum effecting cortical regulation) and cellular 
mechanisms (eg second messenger plasticities). 
2065
 Michael Merzenich. cf 2.2.6; 2.3.4.1; 2.5.5; 2.7.3.1.  
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Memory 
systems 
2.3 
 
Table  
2.5 
 Learning and memory are key processes by which 
environment and experience alter behaviour. Structural 
neuronal plasticities are a core mechanism underpinning 
learning.   
 Memory is the process of encoding, storage and retrieval 
of knowledge acquired through experience. There is a self 
evident link to habits reinforced by experience.   
 Memory systems are functionally implicit to learning, to 
response to reward and emotion, to habit formation, to 
goal election, and all cognitive function.  
 Memory is a functional prerequisite for the  exercise of 
virtue: memory of past behaviours, of reward, of 
contextual and emotional resonances, and of principles of 
right and wrong, all have relevance. 
 Mechanisms of non-declarative memory appear to 
facilitate the ease of practice and the inherent 
motivational rewards in virtue, while during the more 
arduous process of acquisition of virtue, declarative 
memory plays a more significant role.  
 Memory is enhanced in the presence of emotion that is 
not excessively intense. That affection enhances memory 
establishes an early childhood facilitation. 
Systems of 
emotional 
management 
2.5 
 
Table 
2.8 
 Emotion management systems are at the heart of 
directing our desires towards appropriate pleasure and 
towards towards the endurance of pain, fear and 
difficulties for the sake of worthy goals.  Hence they are 
the essence of the virtues of fortitude and temperance. 
 The habitual management of emotion according to what is 
rational is the essence of the exercise of virtue.  
 Emotional regulation involves cortical regulation of goals, 
memories and emotional experience. The potential for 
emotion to enhance rationality has been much noted in 
recent years.  
 Appropriate emotional/aesthetic/social/ moral education 
is central to the development of virtue. 
Reward and 
motivational 
systems 
2.6 
 
Table 
2.11 
 Reward systems are implicated at most levels of volitional 
and sub-volitional activity. In concert with the emotional 
systems they provide incentive for action, including 
virtuous action. 
 To find pleasure in appropriate activities is the mark of 
virtue, and hence the link between reward expectations, 
emotional responses, conscious goal election, and virtue.   
 Intrinsically motivated action, activity is pleasurable in 
itself, is an essential characteristic of virtuous activity. 
Growth of intrinsic motivation over external reward as 
automaticity is developed accords with view that virtue is 
carried out for its own sake.  
 A habit of appropriate reward expectation is directly 
linked to the development of the virtue of temperance. 
Systems for 
habit 
formation 
2.4 
Table 2.7 
 
 Virtues may be understood as freely chosen automatised 
behaviours.  
 Mechanisms of habit learning also offer an explanation for 
the phenomenon of behaviours that appear to remain 
robust in the absence of immediate rewards. Just as 
emotional regulation and reward processing are 
interdependent systems, reward processing and habit 
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formation also are interlinked systems, with reward 
processing essential in the early stages of laying down 
habits. This accords with the view that extrinsic motivation 
assists initially in establishing patterns of good behaviour; 
in time this is transformed into forms of intrinsic 
motivation with the development of a degree of 
automaticity. 
 Strictly speaking habit learning refers to the spectrum of 
automatized behaviours supported most particularly by 
the BG via the BG-thalamo-cortical pathways.  
 The brain regions and pathways associated with the BG 
seem to offer a significant key to understanding the neural 
bases of virtue. Converging research over the past decade 
links habit formation and volition. In particular, the BG-
thalamo-cortical loops with their widespread cognitive-
emotional interaction offer insights into processes of 
planning, goal selection, self regulation, attention and 
motivation. Furthermore this automatisation lies at the 
heart of the easy repeatability of behaviours associated 
with virtue… for example the habit of greeting 
courteously, of getting up when the alarm goes off, of 
reacting to difficulties with patient strategies, etc. 
Mechanisms of habit learning also offer an explanation for 
the phenomenon of behaviours that appear to remain 
robust in the absence of immediate rewards. 
Cognition, 
consideration 
of consequen-
ces, planning, 
goal election, 
and executive 
direction. 
2.7 
 
Tables  
2.13, 5.1. 
 
 
 The links between cognition, rationality and virtue are  
closely associated at the psychological level. Brain systems 
associated with cognition and goal election interconnect 
with neural subdivisions implicated in moral behaviour. 
(See Table 5.1.)  
 Human cognition normally implies rational capacities: for 
conscious goal setting, reasoning, deliberation as to 
consequences and means, and final election.  
 The capacity to set specific goals, to direct one’s actions to 
those goals, to reason about consequences and means, 
appears central to cognition and to rational acts disposed 
by prudence. That one chooses goals fitting for one’s 
nature is a mark of rationality; virtue is essentially the 
neuronal disposition assisting in the habituation of this 
capacity.  
 The capacity to pay due regard to the impact of one’s 
actions on others, modifying them accordingly, 
characterises acts disposed by the virtue of justice. 
 The exercise of virtue requires rightness and perfection of 
reason, the operations of which are perfected by the 
virtues of prudence and justice. 
Systems for 
effective 
execution of 
motor 
commands 
2.7.3.1 
 
Table  
2.14 
 Virtues empower action in ways tailored to the flourishing 
of our being. This includes disposing us to execute 
movement towards worthy objectives. Therefore the 
neural bases for virtue require effective connections with 
motor control, even though not all virtuous activity 
requires expression in motor activity.   
 Some virtues, such as generosity, require social interaction 
for the complete expression of the virtue. And this is not 
only the case with social virtues: temperance may 
manifest in the capacity to redirect one’s attention; 
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courage may require expression through words; even 
justice may necessitate delivering, not just considering, an 
apology. Hence efficient and obedient motor control is 
integral to the practice of some, if not all, of the virtues.  
Systems for 
imitation and 
empathy 
2.3.6 
 
Table  
2.6 
 Imitation is one of the core processes for learning from 
the environment and from the example of others. The 
neural basis for this is now increasingly well described 
and provides an explanation for the ease of acquisition of 
virtuous behaviours by children.  
 Imitation and empathy are related at the level of neural 
systems. Plasticity in the systems for empathetic 
response appears integral to the development of 
sensitivity for the rights and needs of others, and an 
understanding of the consequences of one’s actions, 
which appear to be are at the core of the virtue of 
justice.  
 Effective emotional modulation of deliberation is 
essential for sound reasoning particularly in areas 
requiring empathy with others, understanding of others 
viewpoints etc, and TOM. 
Sensitive 
periods of 
development  
2.2.4.1 
 
Table 
2.2 
 The term “sensitive periods” denotes a developmental 
window of opportunity, whereby there is an enhanced 
capacity for plastic change and learning in response to 
experience, emotional content, or novelty. 
 Of particular interest in the field of virtue education are 
sensitive periods evident in responsiveness to affection, 
early experience, ease of imitation, and in development of 
new behaviours during early years. First impressions are 
lasting impressions. Experiences during upbringing, 
particularly when the stimuli are associated with 
emotional significance, can be virtually indelible.  
 Windows of opportunity in sensitive periods vary:  for 
imprinting the window is open only for a few hours; for 
language, for years. Responsiveness to maternal affection 
is also established in the earliest years, and if an infant is 
reared in an environment deprived of maternal affection 
there will be lasting deficits.  
 The security of affection, in turn, facilitates, at the 
neurophysiological level, other aspects of learning from 
parents.   
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‘Quando il corpo sta bene, l’anima balla’ 
When the body is well the soul dances. 
Italian proverb. 
 
